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The Ukraine and Georgia conflicts have attracted a great deal of attention from scholars and practitioners 
who seek to explore why these conflicts have emerged and endure. In the literature, the conflicts tend to be 
treated as outcomes of the Soviet past or as consequences of negative relations between Russia and the 
EU/NATO. Such research does give valuable insight into why the conflicts emerged. But it does not 
sufficiently explain why the states and non-state actors involved in the conflicts continue to fail in 
implementing the conflict resolution efforts that they have all agreed to. This dissertation explores this 
research puzzle. By linking social constructivism and social psychology, it explores the role the conflict 
parties’ understandings of the situation, self, and other play in shaping conflict protraction. More 
specifically it engages with how the conflict parties reach such understandings through social cognitive 
processing, and the role their interacting processing tendencies play in shaping negative intergroup 
dynamics between them.  
The dissertation finds that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are protracted because the 
conflict parties struggle over who gets to be a group. The conflicts are thus not between groups per se but 
between agents who fight over who is present in the conflicts, which groups these agents belong to, and 
how these groups relate to each other. This struggle occurs as the result of four interacting cognitive 
tendencies, which the conflict parties resort to when they process conflict stimuli (social information such 
as behaviour, events, statements made by self or others in the conflict). The first of such tendencies is to 
process conflict stimulus by adapting self or other identities/interests, or to adapt stimulus so it fits with self 
or other identities/interests. The second tendency to process the out-group’s identity/interests as the 
outcome of leadership manipulation, and to process in-group identity/interests as the outcome of group 
think. The third tendency is to process the out-group’s intent to be the management of the in-group’s 
identity/interests, and the in-group tendency to manage the out-group’s identity/interests. The fourth 
tendency is to support parts of another conflict party’s social cognitive framework, and to point to cognitive 
support as the cause for conflict protraction.  
These processing tendencies contribute to conflict protraction as they lead to flexible and 
opposed group identities, which the conflict parties continuously seek to present as real and distinct. It also 
leads to continued in-group mobilisation as the conflict parties need to uphold their opposed group 
identities, to ensure that their constructed in-group identity persists. This interaction leads to a cognitive 
struggle over how to, and who gets to, establish the social boundaries that define the conflicts. The Ukraine 
and Georgia conflicts are therefore not only protracted because there is a conflict between EU/NATO and 
Russia, nor because conflict narratives or self/other understandings are cemented. They are also protracted 
because the conflict parties continue to engage in processing tendencies, which shape a struggle over who 
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The conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine have attracted a great deal of attention over the years as scholars and 
practitioners have sought to make sense of why these conflicts occurred and why they continue to endure. 
Although the conflicts take place in different territories and between different conflict parties, the literature 
tends to point at the conflicts’ seemingly similar nature. There is particularly a common argument that both 
conflicts are outcomes of struggles between governments and secessionists and/or the expansion of NATO 
and EU into what Russia perceives to be its neighbourhood and sphere of influence1. The tendency is to 
treat the conflicts as outcomes of clashing interests and to argue that to end the conflicts, certain interests 
need to be aligned or curbed. What is puzzling about the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, however, is that 
the conflict parties have all signed up to agreements (such as the Minsk and Sochi agreements and various 
ceasefires) that aim to align their clashing interests, and all conflict parties continuously express the 
importance of upholding these agreements. They nevertheless continue to fail in implementing these 
agreements and the conflicts continue to fester. This raises the question of whether the cause for conflict 
protraction should not merely be found in clashing interests, but also in clashing understandings. Because, 
given that the conflict parties continue to clash, it may imply that they continue to shape their actions around 
certain understandings, which drive them towards confrontation rather than reconciliation. The research 
puzzle that shapes this dissertation is thus why the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties continue to be in 
conflict despite having reached several agreements, and what role ideational factors may play in this regard. 
To address this puzzle, I focus my attention on cognition, or the process of knowing, with the aim of 
exploring how sense-making may assist in shaping protracted conflicts. The objective is more specifically 
to analyse how each conflict party process the social information (stimuli) they encounter in the conflict 
context, and how they compartmentalise such stimuli into understandings that come to guide their thoughts 
and actions. It is then by exploring the conflict parties’ interacting processing tendencies, or inter-group 
dynamics, that I can discuss how come the conflict parties in Ukraine and Georgia continue to fail in ending 
the conflicts between them. This then leads to the specific research question of this dissertation which is: 
 
How do social cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics contribute to the protraction of the 
Ukraine and Georgia conflicts? 
 
 
1 John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” 
Foreign Affairs 93 (2014): 1-12; Charles King, “The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis.” 
Foreign Affairs 87, (2008): 11; Stephen Blank, “Russian and the Black Sea’s Frozen Conflicts in Strategic 
Perspective.” Mediterranean Quarterly 19, no. 3 (2008): 23-54 
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To explore this topic, I apply a multidisciplinary approach which links social constructivism 
and social psychology. This allows me to explore and explain how and why the conflict parties seek to 
make sense of the situation, self, and other, and how their sense-making assists in shaping protracted 
conflicts. To this end, the theoretical framework focuses on what social cognitive processing is and how it 
results in intergroup dynamics. It also presents the theories of social categorisation, social identity, and 
attribution processing, which explain how and why agents reach understandings of situations, such as 
conflicts, by categorising self and other into groups and attaching identities and interests to these groups. 
The theoretical framework will also address the theories of conflict supporting narratives and radical 
disagreement, which point to how conflict protraction occurs from cemented self/other understandings. In 
combination, these theories allow me to explain the role social cognitive processes play in times of conflict. 
I engage with two case studies namely the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts and I draw my attention to the 
conflict parties: Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, South Ossetia, and the Donetsk Peoples Republic. These conflict 
parties are not treated as units or persons, but as group identities that state and non-state leaders use to make 
sense of self and other. Attention is thus on group identity management including how identity managers 
(Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers, and Ministries) process conflict stimuli, cognitively systematise 
stimuli, and how this results in cognitive frameworks from which thoughts and actions arise in the conflict 
contexts. The intention is to explore the conflict parties’ official conflict narratives and the cognitive steps 
that make up these narratives. To do so, I apply a thematic and frame analysis, which allow me to explore 
what nodes are activated in the conflict narratives, how these nodes are compartmentalised into self-, other-
, and situation-schemas, and how these schemas form social cognitive frameworks, which the conflict 
parties apply as cognitive roadmaps in their interactions. It is then by exploring the conflict parties’ social 
cognitive frameworks, and the processes they use to reach these, that I will be able to discuss how conflict 
protraction may arise from social cognitive processing.  
I argue that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are protracted because the conflict parties 
engage in processing tendencies, which form a cognitive struggle between them over who gets to be a 
group. When digging into the cognitive processes at play, it becomes noticeable that the conflicts are not 
between specific groups per se, but between agents who clash over who gets to cognitively systematise (or 
group) those involved in the conflicts, and who gets to define these groups. In their social cognitive 
processing, all conflict parties seek to dismiss and uphold certain group identities, and they all argue that 
they possess the true account of which groups are present and the characteristics and relations that define 
these groups. These group identities are, however, incompatible, which leads to interactions where each 
conflict party treats the opponent’s group identities as fake, whilst they treat their own group identities as 
real. This cognitive struggle arises from four processing tendencies, which all conflict parties apply when 
they process and compartmentalise stimuli. The first tendency is to process stimulus by adapting self or 
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other identities/interests, and to adapt stimulus so it fits with self or other identities/interests. The second 
tendency is to process the out-group’s identity/interests as the outcome of leadership manipulation, and to 
process in-group identity/interests as the outcome of group think. The third tendency is to process the out-
group’s intent to be the management of the in-group’s identity/interests, and the in-group tendency to 
manage the out-group’s identity/interests. The fourth tendency is to support parts of another conflict party’s 
social cognitive framework, and to point to cognitive support as the cause for conflict protraction. These 
processing tendencies lead to a struggle between the conflict parties over how to, and who gets to, establish 
the social boundaries that define the agents present in the conflicts. The processing tendencies equally result 
in flexible understandings, which the conflict parties continue to adapt at their will. Rather than being the 
outcome of cemented understandings, the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protraction are thus outcomes of 
flexible cognition, and rather than being conflicts between groups, they are conflicts over who gets to be a 
group. This finding fills a gap in the literature as it expands our understanding of the factors that contribute 
to conflict protraction in Ukraine and Georgia. Apart from this, it is a finding that may function as a 
complementary study to the material studies of the conflicts, as it points to the importance of cognition in 
times of conflict and how clashing cognitions may hinder the “rational” pursuit of interests. It is also a 
finding which is of relevance for conflict resolution attempts, as it points to how we should equally explore 




















2.0 Studying Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space  
This chapter will explore the literature written on the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, and the conflicts in 
Ukraine and Georgia in particular. The first section will delve into the academic developments that have 
occurred in the study of conflicts from being primarily a state-focused endeavour, to encompass a wide 
range of theories and actors. This section will particularly draw attention to the inclusion of social 
psychology in the study of conflicts and how this relates to my research. Following this is a focus on the 
literature that deals with the conflicts in the post-Soviet space. To provide a more structured insight into 
this literature, I divide it into three perspectives: the historical/systemic perspective; the 
Russian/Eurocentric perspective; and the group/individual perspective. Each perspective relates to the 
overall arguments that scholars express when exploring why the conflicts in the post-Soviet space occurred 
and sustain. The chapter will end with a section where I situate my research in the existing literature and 
present the gap that this research will fill.  
 
2.1 The Study of Conflicts  
A predominant occupation in the field of International Relations (IR) has been to explore and explain why 
conflicts occur2. To this end, scholars have traditionally focused on why states go to war with an emphasis 
on the structural and material factors that lead to conflicting state relations3. In the structuralist theories, 
such as neorealism and realism, scholars take the approach that it is the international structure and the 
inherent state of anarchy that causes conflicts, as the distribution of power and material factors fluctuate 
between states4. From this viewpoint arises the argument that conflicts are a naturally occurring phenomena 
as states inevitably clash over limited resources and power. Other theories, such as social constructivism 
and post-structuralism, have focused on ideational factors and how e.g. identities and norms construct 
interests and relations, which function as the subsequent foundation for conflicts5. In this approach, conflicts 
are largely caused by the ideas that state actors bring to their interactions with others6. The primary causes 
for conflicts have thus for long been regarded as outcomes of state behaviour and state relations. In the 
1980s a new conflict-approach developed as scholars started exploring internal factors within states that 
 
2 John Stoessinger. Why nations go to war. (Cengage Learning, 2007); and Richard Ned Lebow. Why nations fight: 
Past and future motives for war. (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
3 Oliver Ramsbotham, “Introduction to Conflict Resolution: Concepts and Definitions” in Contemporary Conflict 
Resolution, ed. Oliver Ramsbotham, Hugh Miall and Tom Woodhouse (Polity, 2011), 9 
4 Walter Carlsnaes, “Actors, Structures, and Foreign Policy Analysis.” In Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, 
ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne (Oxford University Press, 2016), 119. 
5 Carlsnaes, "Actors, structures, and foreign policy analysis.", 121 and Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in 
International Relations Theory.” International Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 171-200. 
6 John Baylis, Patricia Owens, and Steve Smith. The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 146. 
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were conducive for conflict7. This shift was particularly enhanced with the end of the Cold War where a 
rise in intrastate conflicts propelled the need to shift academic attention from interstate to intrastate 
conflicts8. The end of the Cold War and its peaceful transfer of power also challenged the realist approach 
towards conflicts9.  
What resulted was the creation of a multifaceted approach, which combined fields such as 
IR, conflict studies, political science, comparative politics, and social psychology10. Rather than focusing 
on how conflicts emerged as purely outcomes of state relations, scholars explored how conflicts occurred 
as an outcome of e.g. insufficient state structures, nation-building attempts, lack of social and economic 
development11, criminal networks12, ethnic rivalry13, and religion14. Another focus area was the 
psychological factors that contribute to conflicts, such as clashing beliefs15, misperceptions16, collective 
needs and fears17, greed and grievances18, and collective memories19. Scholars also included a wider range 
of actors to the study of conflicts. “Actors” such as civilians, non-state actors, NGOs20, and international 
organisations21 were included to acquire a better understanding of conflicts’ multidimensional 
characteristics, and how they develop with the presence, intervention, assistance, and influx of others22. The 
 
7 Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen, and Juliette Verhoeven. Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An 
Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 71 
8 Tongeren, de Veen, and Verhoeven, Searching for peace in Europe and Eurasia: An overview of conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding activities, 71-72 
9 Stefano Guzzini. "‘The Cold War is what we make of it’: when peace research meets constructivism in 
International Relations." In Contemporary security analysis and Copenhagen peace research, Ed. Stefano Guzzini 
and Dietrich Jung (Routledge, 2003), 46; and Janice Bially Mattern. Ordering international politics: identity, crisis 
and representational force. (Routledge, 2005) 
10 Herbert Kelman, “Social-psychological dimensions of international conflict”. In Peacemaking in international 
conflict: Methods & techniques, Ed. I.W. Zartman (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007), 61 
11 Ramsbotham, “Introduction to Conflict Resolution: Concepts and Definitions.”, 5.  
12 Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications.” Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 30, no.3 (2007): 207-227. 
13 Dietrich Jung, Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars A Political Economy of Intra-State War. 
(Routledge, 2002) 
14 Jonathan Fox, “The Rise of Religion and the Fall of the Civilization Paradigm as Explanations for Intra-State 
Conflict.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20, no. 3 (2007): 361-382 
15 Daniel Bar-tal, “From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological 
Analysis.” Political Psychology 21(2000): 351-365 
16 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics: New Edition (Princeton University Press, 
2017). 
17 Kelman, “Social-psychological dimensions of international conflict”, 64 
18 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 
563-595. 
19 Dario R. Paez and James Hou Fu Liu, “Collective Memory of Conflicts.” In Intergroup Conflicts and Their 
Resolution: A Social Psychological Perspective, Ed. Daniel Bar-tal (Psychology Press, 2011) 
20 Tongeren, de Veen, and Verhoeven, Searching for peace in Europe and Eurasia: An overview of conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding activities, 71 
21 Simon Duke, “The United Nations and Intra‐state Conflict.” International Peacekeeping 1, no. 4 (1994): 375–93. 
22 Kelman, “Social-psychological dimensions of international conflict”, 64 
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end of the Cold War hence shifted attention to the complexity of conflicts and resulted in a multifaceted 
outlook on the study of this phenomenon.  
This research is rooted in such an outlook as it takes a multidisciplinary approach with the 
aim of exploring how social cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics contribute to conflict protraction 
between states and non-state actors. It more specifically draws on IR’s social constructivist theory, which 
it combines with social psychology to acquire a better understanding of the ideational factors at play in the 
Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. Although I apply a multidisciplinary approach, this does not mean that I 
seek to construct a new IR theory nor that I am trying to substitute IR theories with those of social 
psychology. Rather, I root my research in amongst other the work of Herbert Kelman who has also 
combined IR and social psychology in the study of conflicts. As Kelman explains, there is a need to integrate 
social psychological dimensions into a more general theory of IR23. The reason for this is that psychological 
processes, at both the individual and collective level, constitute and mediate much of the behaviour that 
defines conflicts24. He also argues that since IR explores notions such as decision making, risk taking, 
identities, and threat perception, IR already operates with psychological concepts25. Adding social 
psychology to the study of IR phenomena thus merely offers complementary tools for exploring these 
issues, rather than functioning as a substitution for any existing theoretical framework. The inclusion of 
social psychology to the study of conflicts also assists researchers in exploring the less-explored dimensions 
of conflicts. This includes e.g. how states and non-state actors operate within structures which is an aspect 
yet to be fully developed in IR, but which may be elaborated with the use of social psychology as it focuses 
on relations between agents and social systems26. Social psychology with its focus on how behaviour arises 
from continued situational interactions also offers a more contextual approach to conflicts27. Rather than 
merely treating conflict protraction as the outcome of relations developed over time, social psychology 
allows one to explore how negative relations also sustain because of conflict parties’ continued interactions. 
The inclusion of social psychology in IR therefore allows one to dig deeper into the connection between 
agents and structures.  
The field of psychology is often perceived to only focus on the internal processes of the mind 
and how thoughts and feelings arise and shape certain types of behaviour. To include a social psychological 
approach to conflicts, however, does not mean that conflicts should be treated as unreal or as merely 
products of misunderstandings and misperceptions28. Social psychological processes, such as emotional 
 




27 Susan T. Fiske. Social Beings: Core Motives in Social Psychology. (John Wiley & Sons, 2018), 128 
28 Kelman, “Social-psychological dimensions of international conflict”, 63 
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and cognitive processes, should be treated as underlying forces that generate differences in how conflict 
parties construct reality, which results in differing approaches towards conflicts and imposes constraints on 
the rational pursuit of interests29. By adding social psychology, one emphasises the role ideational factors 
play and it allows one to explore how conflicts arise as a result of “actions and interactions of large numbers 
of individuals who, in turn, function through a variety of groups and organizations and who are propelled 
by collective moods and states of consciousness”30. As Dunne et.al also state, scholars “need to keep asking 
whether there are processes, objects, ‘things’ that are not caught by the lens we are currently using”31. This 
is the point of departure for this research, as the literature review reveals a gap in the exploration of the 
ideational factors that may contribute to the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protraction. Ultimately, as 
Dunne et.al further state, academic disciplines are artificial constructs and so there is no basis for keeping 
disciplines separate32. On the contrary, the inclusion of social psychology to the study of conflicts may 
strengthen the field of IR, as social psychological concepts and approaches can support IR’s theoretical 
claims33.  
Including social psychology to the study of conflicts is a matter of identifying what part of 
a conflict is neglected and such an analysis is a complementary matter, as the findings become part of a 
more comprehensive exploration and understanding of the conflict. The exploration of e.g. cognitive 
processes should thus be combined with e.g. the exploration of material constraints to acquire a holistic 
understanding of what drives and shapes a given conflict. In this research, I link social constructivism and 
social psychology to explore a yet to be explored aspect of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts - namely why 
the conflicts are protracted and how the continued interaction between conflict parties’ cognitive processing 
may contribute to this protraction. This research will therefore address one aspect of the Ukraine and 
Georgia conflicts with the aim of providing a missing piece of the puzzle. Whereas the relation between 
social constructivism and social psychology will be further elaborated in the theory chapter, this chapter 
will explore the literature that has been written about the conflicts in the post-Soviet space. This is done to 
highlight what types of explanations already exist, and to present the gap this research will fill. Although 
the literature on the conflicts in the post-Soviet space is diverse, it is possible to divide it into three 




31 Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight. "The end of International Relations theory?" European Journal of 
International Relations 19, no.3 (2013), 419 
32 Ibid, 420 
33 Ibid 
34 The division of literature into these three perspectives is merely one possible classification. Another example of 
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changes the Soviet Union imposed upon citizens/states, and the vacuum that occurred following the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. 2) The Russian and Eurocentric perspective, where emphasis is on Russia’s behaviour 
and interests in the post-Soviet space, and how this derives from Russia’s relations with the West. Finally, 
there is the 3) group or individual perspective, which focuses on the role clashing ethnic group relations or 
elite interests play in causing and sustaining the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. Although it is possible to 
divide the literature into these three perspectives, this does not mean that there is no overlap between them, 
as much of the literature engages with two or more of these perspectives when exploring the conflicts in 
the post-Soviet space. These three perspectives are, however, provided to give clarity to the content of the 
existing literature, and to offer an overview for situating my research within the gap found in this literature.  
   
2.1.1 The Historical and Systemic Perspective  
Reading through the literature on the conflicts in the post-Soviet space one finds a stark difference in how 
these conflicts are defined as scholars have approached them as frozen conflicts35, separatist conflicts36, 
ethnic conflicts37, geopolitical conflicts38, and as conflicts between Russia and a given state39. There is thus 
from the outset a discrepancy in how to make sense of these conflicts, their primary characteristics, and the 
parties involved. Despite this, a dominant perspective found in the literature is that the post-Soviet conflicts 
are an outcome of the ideational and material structures the Soviet Union imposed on its citizens. In this 
perspective is a recurring argument that the conflicts are predominantly outcomes of the Soviet Union’s 
reliance on ethno-federalism, which increased the chances of conflicts between groups as agents were 
socially separated based on identity affiliation40. As Zurcher and Martin state, the Soviet Union created a 
context for separatist movements as Soviet leaders were “systematically promoting the national 
 
35 Mykola Kapitonenko, “Resolving Post-Soviet ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Is Regional Integration Helpful?” Caucasian 
Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (2009): 37-44. 
36 Dov Lynch, “Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts.” International Affairs 78, no. 4 (2002): 831-848 and 
Ivan Katchanovski, “The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?” European Politics and 
Society 17, no. 4 (2016): 473-489. 
37 John M. Cotter, “Cultural Security Dilemmas and Ethnic Conflict in Georgia.” Journal of Conflict Studies 19, no. 
1 (1999): 1-27 
38 Gerard Toal, “Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War over South Ossetia.” Eurasian 
Geography and Economics 49, no. 6 (2008): 670-705; Rein Müllerson, “Ukraine: Victim of Geopolitics.” Chinese 
Journal of International Law 13, no. 1 (2014): 133–45; and Hiski Haukkala, “From Cooperative to Contested 
Europe? The Conflict in Ukraine as a Culmination of a Long-Term Crisis in EU–Russia Relations.” Journal of 
Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 1 (2015): 25-40. 
39 Nona Mikhelidze, “After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus.” The International 
Spectator 44, no. 3 (2009): 27-42; and Elina Lange-Ionatamishvili and Sanda Svetoka. “Strategic Communications 
and Social Media in the Russia Ukraine Conflict.” In Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against 
Ukraine, Ed. A. Niglia (IOS Press, 2015) 
40 Christoph Zurcher, The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus (New 
York University Press, 2007) and Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the 
Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Cornell University Press, 2001), 1 
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consciousness of its ethnic minorities and establishing for them many of the characteristic institutional 
forms of the nation-state”41. Once the Soviet Union collapsed, a power vacuum occurred and the space for 
separatism and conflicts flourished. This argument is contrasted by Gellner who argues that the Soviet 
Union did not create the foundation for the post-Soviet conflicts, as the Soviet Union contained conflicts 
that had historically existed between groups in the area42. The post-Soviet conflicts that occurred in the 
early 1990s were therefore unleashed ethnic conflicts, which had existed prior to the Soviet Union’s 
establishment.  
Another dominant argument is that the post-Soviet conflicts were not outcomes of, or held 
in place by, the Soviet Union per se. They instead arose in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse as the 
post-Soviet states started to engage in (often) failed state- and nation-building attempts43, as well as 
struggled with deep socioeconomic crises that spun grievances and divided nations along ethnic lines44. 
Wanner and Kolstø e.g. point to how tensions emerged between non-Russians and ethnic Russians, as the 
collapse of the Soviet Union changed the status of ethnic Russians from being “members of the dominant 
nationality of a multinational state” into a diaspora45. This social change played a role in the increased 
instability in the post-Soviet space, as the presence and demands of the Russian diaspora complicated the 
construction of unified national identities46. This argument is also found in the analyses of the Ukraine 
conflict where the non-state actors in Eastern Ukraine tend to be defined as “ethnic Russians” or “Pro-
Russians” who are struggling to reunite with Russia and/or re-establish the times under the Soviet Union47. 
From this viewpoint it is argued that the Soviet Union imposed a form of “colonial legacy” on the post-
Soviet states through various Soviet nationality policies48. This legacy explains the occurrence of conflicts 
in the area as states have since struggled to reclaim a national historiography devoid of Soviet myths and 
legends49.  
 
41 Martin. The affirmative action empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939, 1 
42 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1997) 
43 James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, “Comparing Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet Transition 
States.” Regional & Federal Studies 11, no. 3 (2001), 28; and Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and 
Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Penn State Press, 2010), 11; and Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder. Post-Soviet 
Political Order. (Routledge, 2002). 
44 Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose Gottemoeller, Catherine McArdle Kelleher, and Lee Walker. Ethnic Conflict in the 
Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis: Case Studies and Analysis. (Routledge, 2015). 
45 Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Penn State Press, 2010), 13  
46 Pål Kolstø, “The New Russian Diaspora - An Identity of Its Own? Possible Identity Trajectories for Russians in 
the Former Soviet Republic.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 19, no 3 (1996): 609 
47 Al-Khateeb, Samer, and Nitin Agarwal. “Understanding Strategic Information Manoeuvres in Network Media to 
Advance Cyber Operations: A Case Study Analysing Pro-Russian Separatists’ Cyber Information Operations in 
Crimean Water Crisis.” Journal on Baltic Security 2, no 1 (2017): 6-27; Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian 
Military; How Moscow Reloaded.” Foreign Affairs 95 (2016), 23 
48 Taras Kuzio. "History, memory and nation building in the post-Soviet colonial space." Nationalities Papers 30, 




As seen, there are diverging arguments regarding the role the Soviet Union played in shaping 
the post-Soviet conflicts, and the extent to which these conflicts existed prior to the Soviet Union or were 
outcomes of developments that ensued following its collapse. What unites this literature is that the Soviet 
Union played a role in shaping the conflicts, as the Soviet Union either imposed or disrupted material and 
ideational divisions, which states have since struggled to change and unify. The Soviet Union functioned 
as a catalyst for containing or defining e.g. identities and it led to relations that now make up the post-Soviet 
space and the conflicts within it. In the historic/systemic literature it is thus inferred that the conflicts are 
products of the past and structures generated over time. This is of interest as it indicates that the Ukraine 
and Georgia conflict parties are responding to factors largely beyond their control. From this perspective, 
the conflict parties are not responding to outcomes produced in the conflicts but to the ideational and 
material structures that they find themselves in. The historic/systemic perspective hence confines the 
conflicts to the systems and structures that were imposed upon citizens, and it approaches the conflicts, and 
the continuous interactions that unfold in such contexts, as mainly outcomes of history. It may, however, 
be argued that the post-Soviet conflicts are not only outcomes of historical developments as the conflict 
parties’ relations are also shaped by the stimuli that they continue to produce in the conflict situation. There 
is hence a contextual aspect to these conflicts which the historical/systemic perspective neglects, but which 
this research addresses as it explores how relations between conflict parties equally form and sustain as part 
of the interactions that take place in the conflicts. This does not mean that this research treats the Georgia 
and Ukraine conflicts as ahistorical phenomena, but that it draws in contextuality to explore how conflict 
protraction may also emerge from continued interactions.  
 
2.1.2 The Russian and Eurocentric Perspective      
The other perspective that dominates the literature on the conflicts in the post-Soviet space is the Russian 
and Eurocentric perspective, which perceives the conflicts as outcomes of Russia’s behaviour and Russia’s 
relations with “the West”. In this literature, there is an argument that the conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia 
are outcomes of a rivalry that occurred between Russia and the West following the end of the Cold War50. 
In his work on the Ukraine conflict, Mearsheimer argues that the annexation of Crimea, and the conflict 
that followed, is the result of the West’s failure to acknowledge Ukraine’s strategic importance51. Here the 
conflict is put into the context of NATO and EU’s expansion, as it is argued that this expansion resulted in 
 
50 Ronald Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West. (St. Martin’s 
Press, 2010) 
51 John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin.” 
Foreign Affairs 93 (2014): 1-12. 
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conflicting structural conditions52. Adding to this argument is also the point, that the conflicts in the post-
Soviet space can be regarded as a Russian reaction towards an increasingly liberal world order53. On the 
other hand we find scholars such as Götz who points to the geopolitical nature of the conflicts, as he argues 
that Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine was a response to Ukraine’s geographic location; the EU’s activism in 
Eastern Ukraine; and the new Kiev government’s pro-Western orientation54. In connection to this argument 
we find Tuathail who argues that the 2008 events in Georgia occurred because of, amongst other, Georgian 
leaderships’ dismissal of Georgia’s geopolitical position55. When Georgian leadership started moving 
towards NATO and EU, they neglected the geopolitical context they found themselves in which, combined 
with Russia’s great power ambitions, assisted in fuelling the conflict56. In contrast to this is, however, Raik 
who argues that the Ukraine conflict should not be understood as a battle over “who controls the region” 
but a conflict over the norms and values of the European order that defines “Ukraine’s place in Europe”57. 
Others have moved beyond a focus on Europe and instead point to the issue of uni- and multipolarity and 
how Russia is seeking to improve its international standing by creating a sphere of influence in its 
neighbourhood through amongst other the use of conflicts58. Here scholars such as Abushov argue that 
Russia is interested in keeping the post-Soviet conflicts intact as “controlled instability” allows Russia to 
establish a balance of power59. To re-establish Russia’s power, as it enjoyed during the Cold War, Russia 
deploys a strategy of “occupation without occupation” where it seeks to create a “cultural construction of 
fear and intimidation”60. This is equally stressed by Kapitonenko, Toal and Dunn et.al who argue that the 
creation of conflicts is a central part of Russia’s foreign policy tools61, as this prevents post-Soviet states 
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from joining the NATO/EU and ensures a situation where Russia may re-establish the Russian empire62. 
The Georgia and Ukraine conflicts are thus calculated outcomes that Russia has set in motion to counter 
the shifts in power that followed the end of the Cold War.  
In conjunction to this viewpoint is the argument that, although driven by power, Russia’s 
behaviour is primarily shaped by a wish to gain “respect and recognition rather than territorial enlargement 
or the need to dominate per se”63. Russia’s behaviour in the post-Soviet space should not be regarded as an 
attempt to resurrect an empire, as Russia’s actions in e.g. Georgia was an attempt to counter US’ influence 
and reshape the post-Soviet space in Russia’s favour64. Allison also argues that the geopolitical account of 
the Ukraine conflict is insufficient in explaining the cause of the conflict65. The Ukraine conflict rather 
derives from increased tensions in Ukraine-Russia relations and from Russia’s domestic considerations, as 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine could be used to silence internal opposition to Vladimir Putin’s centralised rule 
and prevent the occurrence of colour revolutions inside Russia66. Alongside this argument is the claim that 
Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine came as a response to the “Ukrainian nationalist politics that alienated the 
country’s ethnic Russian community” as such policies opened a window for Crimea’s annexation67. 
Freedman and Treisman, on the other hand, argue that Crimea’s annexation, and the following Ukraine 
conflict, did not occur as the result of a long-held strategy, but as the result of an impulsive Russian decision 
with no clear end point68. Also, rather than imperial ambitions per se, Russia was driven by a material 
interest of maintaining control over the Black Sea Fleet and gaining access to new maritime territorial 
claims69. Finally, one finds the argument that Russia’s behaviour in the post-Soviet space should be treated 
from a comparative perspective, as Russia’s behaviour in Georgia came as a response to Kosovo’s 
independence and the West’s failure to dismiss Russia’s assertive behaviour in Moldova70. Another 
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dominant argument in the literature is thus that the conflicts in the post-Soviet space should be explained 
by looking at Russia’s national interests and Russia’s standing vis-á-vis the West.  
In connection to these arguments is literature that explores the role identities play in shaping 
Russia’s behaviour in the post-Soviet space. Here Europe plays a central role as it is argued that Russia’s 
self-understanding derives from the other-understanding of Europe, and that this self/other understanding 
is central in explaining why Russia behaves the way it does in the post-Soviet space71. Amongst other Hopf 
argues that Russia’s national identity discourse made the annexation of Crimea and the intervention in 
Eastern Ukraine thinkable and natural, and this discourse evolved as a response to the West’s actions and 
to the internal developments within Russia72. Bassin has had a similar focus but he argues that Russia’s 
identity discourse emerges from the geopolitical position Russia has as neither a European nor an Asian 
state73. On the other hand, are scholars such as Prizel who points to how different intellectual groups within 
Russia have had an influence on Russia’s national identity formation74. Although these Russian schools 
differ in their approach, they believe that Russia is a distinct civilization whose “survival depends on 
preserving a way of life that is different from, if not contrary to, the civilizations of the West” 75. There is 
also work that focuses on how Russia’s identity has developed alongside changes in “self-identification and 
prioritizations of Russia as a security actor”76. On the other side of the spectrum, one finds Morozov et.al 
who have focused on how Russia as “the other” has shaped Europe’s identity discourse77. Relations, and 
particularly worsening relations, between Russia and the West have thus been drawn in when explaining 
the formation of a distinct Russian identity. Scholars such as Heller e.g. point to how Russia’s behaviour to 
a great extent is driven by a moral expectation about Russia’s social status in world politics, which derives 
from “negative experiences of status deprivation and misrecognition by the West throughout the post–Cold 
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War era”78. To understand Russia, and the role identity plays in shaping Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine, one 
thus needs to draw in the aspect of emotions. Casier, on the other hand, points to cognition as he argues that 
the worsening relations between EU and Russia resulted from attribution biases where both parties 
gradually processed behaviour from the perception of the other’s negative geopolitical ambitions79. This is 
echoed by Nitoiu who points to how the Ukraine conflict is the physical manifestation of a 
conflict/cooperation dichotomy that for long has characterised EU-Russia relations80. To this argument one 
also finds the work of Korosteleva, who points to how the “speech war” in Ukraine was not about Ukraine 
per se, but about the EU and Russia and their exclusive identities81. In this literature there is hence overall 
a focus on how Russia’s self/other understanding has formed vis-á-vis the West, and how this has shaped 
the interests Russia pursues and the behaviour it engages with in the post-Soviet space.  
Although this Russia/West-centred literature addresses the material and ideational structures 
that shape developments in the post-Soviet space, it neglects the role of other actors in shaping the post-
Soviet conflicts. In this literature, the Georgian state and the de-facto South Ossetian government e.g. are 
often rendered voiceless and to a great extent without agency, as they are treated as victims or followers 
that either had to succumb to, or chose to, support Russia’s interests. This tendency to omit or reduce small 
states and particularly non-state actors in the study of conflicts has consistently characterised the field of 
IR. As Barkawi and Laffey state, conflicts are in IR traditionally treated as struggles between great powers, 
which is an outcome of a Eurocentric perspective that has led to a misrepresentation of the South and non-
state actors in shaping conflicts and security threats82. To understand conflicts, scholars need to approach 
the North and South, state and non-states, as mutually constitutive in “making history”83. There is a need 
to reformulate “the categories we deploy to make sense of both past and present security relations”84. 
Although other fields, such as social psychology, place “the weak and the strong” in a “common analytical 
framework”, IR continues to focus on the strong85. There is therefore a gap in exploring relations between 
weak/strong states and states/non-states in IR, which also extends to the study of the Georgia and Ukraine 
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conflict. An objective of this research is thus to explore this state/non-state relation by focusing on relations 
between Georgia, Ukraine, Russia, South Ossetia, and the Donetsk People’s Republic, and how these 
relations contribute to the conflicts’ protractions. I do so from the argument that to fully understand the 
ideational factors at play in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, there is a need to include the processes that 
form, sustain, and change relations between states and non-states. There is thus a need to move beyond the 
dominant argument that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts can merely be explained by referring to 
Russia/West relations.  
 
2.1.3 The Group and Individual Perspective  
The literature on the conflicts in the post-Soviet space also includes a group and individual perspective. 
Here it is argued that the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, and in Georgia and Ukraine in particular, are 
outcomes of ethnic group relations or individual interests. In the literature on group relations, the Georgia 
conflict is sustained by a patron-client relationship between Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia86. The 
conflict’s protraction is an outcome of group relations where Russia’s hegemony prevents the non-state 
actors from establishing external relations with others such as the EU87. There is generally a dominant 
argument in scholarly literature and policy circles that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are outcomes of 
Russia’s patronage88. Scholars such as O’Loughlin et.al, however, argue that Russia’s policies are not 
necessarily imposed upon the non-state actors, but are a welcome feature as relations with Russia assists 
the non-state actors in ensuring their interests89. The local elite in South Ossetia are not “compliant 
instruments of Russian influence”90. The Georgia conflict instead draws on historically conflictual relations 
where the fight between ethnic and cultural groups over territory, perceived as the cradle of each group’s 
identity, is the root cause of the conflict’s occurrence and continuation91. Here, the South Ossetians view 
Russia as a military mean for protecting their ancestral territory and so South Ossetia-Russia relations is a 
mutual benefitting partnership92. An aligning argument is that the Georgia conflict is an outcome of a 
security dilemma between the Georgian and Ossetian ethnic groups, as each group’s aspiration for 
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independence (to ensure their cultural heritage) led to a conflict between them93. Garb also points to how 
the Georgia conflict occurred and sustains from the South Ossetian’s lack of trust in the West and Georgia 
following the 2008 events94. In this literature it is thus argued that the conflict in Georgia occurred and 
sustains as a result of group relations and interests, but equally so as a result of “group think” where ethnic 
groups have come to perceive each-other as a threat.  
Whereas the Georgia conflict has mainly been approached from a group perspective, the 
Ukraine conflict has to a greater extent been approached from a leadership perspective. In this literature, 
there is a tendency to approach the Ukraine conflict as an outcome of Vladimir Putin’s personality and 
interests, as it is argued that Putin’s competitive logic has shaped Russia’s military strategy95. Similar is 
said for Russia’s foreign policy, which has been treated as the outcome of Putin’s personality or as stated 
by Lo: “Russian foreign policy[…]is intimately associated with Putin the individual”96. Forsberg et.al argue 
that Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine can partially be explained by including a psychological analysis of Putin 
as a decision maker97. Others have argued that the conflict in Ukraine, and Russia’s behaviour in this regard, 
cannot be explained by merely pointing at Putin. O’Loughlin et.al argue that the project of Novorossiya 
was largely launched and sustained by intellectuals and aspiring local politicians inside Ukraine98. The 
conflict is instead an outcome of identity politics where Ukrainian political elites manipulated identities 
that Russia later used to justify its actions with99. The Ukraine conflict is also treated as an outcome of 
domestic bargaining failures and commitment problems between Ukrainian political actors100. Rather than 
identity politics, the conflict is rooted in failed power-sharing arrangements, which prompted separatists to 
take up arms101. Katchanovski similarly points to how elites amongst the separatists, the Yanukovych 
regime, the Maidan opposition and government, far-right organizations, the EU, and the US all 
misrepresented the demands that occurred amongst the Donbass population102. The Ukraine conflict thus 
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emerged because of grievances inside Ukraine, which were either manipulated or miscalculated by elites 
and state actors. In addition to explaining the Ukraine conflict as an outcome of Russia/West relations, is 
hence also the argument that the conflict was forged from individual interests and missteps.  
Whereas there is a tendency in the Georgia conflict to focus on group relations, there is in 
the Ukraine conflict a tendency to focus on leadership. Both perspectives omit certain aspects of the 
conflicts particularly those pertaining to agency and relations between leaders and citizens. In the Georgia 
conflict, the focus on groups omits the role of individuals in shaping the situation and it approaches the 
conflict as an outcome of “group think”. Here there is no further exploration of who is speaking and how 
group members come to behave from an understanding of collective belonging. In Ukraine, focus is on 
leaders with little attention as to how leaders’ personality come to shape the behaviour of their citizens. 
Citizens are rather treated as puppets who automatically adopt the identity of their leaders and act on behalf 
of these leaders’ personal interests. Further exploration of what links leaders and citizens, and how leaders 
and groups can create and sustain a conflict, is lacking. According to Wendt, this group/individual 
perspective derives from the tendency in IR to attribute human properties to states, whilst at the same time 
treating states as non-human103. This blurs the human processes that allow groups to “think and act” 
collectively. It may, however, be argued that to understand why conflicts become protracted and how 
individuals and groups shape such protraction, there is a need to move beyond the individual/group divide 
and address how collective behaviour is rooted in processes of group belonging managed by individuals104. 
It is by exploring the role group identities play in transforming individual agency into group behaviour that 
one may bridge this divide. When doing so, conflicts do not merely become outcomes of groups per se or 
individuals. Conflicts can instead be treated as outcomes of ideational processes that mobilise collectives 
and offer citizens and leaders a lens through which the situation is viewed and from which actions arise105. 
When we approach conflict protraction as an outcome of group identity formation and maintenance, this 
deconstructs our understanding of who is acting and how relations form between perceived protagonist and 
antagonist. This approach also allows one to apply a common analytical framework to the study of 
state/non-state relations as it treats all actors as group identities that are used for sense-making in times of 
conflict106.  
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The focus on group identity management equally addresses the tendency in IR to approach 
identities as the outcome of a leadership-citizen hierarchy107. In e.g. foreign policy analysis, state leaders 
are granted the agency to act and think on behalf of the state they represent108. This diminishes collective 
behaviour to a matter of puppetry and excludes citizens’ agency. Focus on identity management, on the 
other hand, allows one to explore how group identities form from a mutual reciprocal relation between 
leaders and citizens. When doing so, the leader is still granted agency, but the group identity that unites 
leaders and citizens is not merely an outcome of unilateralism but rooted in a dialogue because as Wendt 
states:  
 
States and their members (citizens) are dynamically interdependent. The behaviour of citizens causally 
produces and reproduces states over time, and that behaviour is in turn shaped by states. And they are also 
mutually constitutive. A state only exists in virtue of citizens and their practices (bottom-up constitution), 
and the identities of those citizens and practices only exist in virtue of the state (top-down)109 
 
When addressing states and non-states as group identities, one can explore conflicts as joint efforts that are 
equally upheld by leaders and citizens. This is the approach taken in this research as I explore conflict 
protraction from the issue of how group identities occur and are maintained from a dialogue between leaders 
and citizens. This allows me to explore the ideational aspect of protracted conflicts and it also addresses the 
agent-structure dilemma of IR, as it explains and explores how agents can produce/reproduce/transform 
structures and how these structures enable/constrain agents’ actions110.  
 
2.2 The Gap in the Literature    
The three perspectives outlined in the previous sections each have limitations in terms of explaining why 
the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts sustain. These limitations are e.g. a lack of literature which explains how 
conflict protraction occurs from agency and interactions, and not merely long-held and imposed structures. 
There is also a lack of literature which explains the role relations between states and non-state actors play 
in times of conflict, how and why individuals engage in collective behaviour, and how groups come to 
“think”. To account for these gaps, this research will approach the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts with 
attention to contextuality; state/non-state relations; and group identity management as this allows me to dig 
into the processes that may assist in sustaining the conflicts. Another contribution this research will make 
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is to address the conflicts’ protraction specifically. As seen in the previous sections, there is a tendency in 
the literature to primarily focus on the cause of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. Limited focus is on the 
conflicts’ protraction and if so, the causes of protraction are regarded as the same that caused the conflicts. 
As stated by Crocker et.al, however, the source of conflict protraction is rarely the same as the source of 
conflict outbreak. As they further state: “no matter what issues formed the foundation for the initial conflict, 
a number of other elements will come into the mix to augment or even supplant the original disputes”111. 
This development is amongst other linked to the continued interactions between the conflict parties but also 
to the increased involvement of other actors, as well as social, cultural, political, and economic 
developments that may occur around the conflicts112. There is thus a need to establish the specific aspects 
that may contribute to conflict protraction and these, I argue, may be explained by drawing on a contextual 
approach and particularly by exploring how group identities form in relation to the continued interactions 
that occur between the conflict parties in the conflict context.  
This research hence draws attention to the continued creation and reinforcement of social 
boundaries113. As Neumann states “Students of international relations have studied physical and economic 
borders for a long time. The concern with these types of boundaries needs to be complemented by a focus 
on how social boundaries between human collectives are maintained”114. To focus on how group identities 
are formed and sustained in interactions between the conflict parties, is to explore how these parties 
continuously seek to construct an order of shared knowledge from their interactions, which they can use for 
the pursuit of interests115. The focus on processes of social boundary formation allows one to explore the 
factors that put constraints on the rational pursuit of interests, or constraints on the rational implementation 
of conflict resolution efforts. This is of relevance to the study of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts where 
the conflict parties continue to dismiss conflict resolution efforts, whose primary objective is to ensure that 
clashing interests and concerns are addressed. An example is the Minsk Agreements in Ukraine, which all 
parties have agreed are conducive for ending the conflict, but which they continuously fail to implement. 
Another is the Sochi agreement in Georgia or the creation of a non-use of force agreement, which equally 
have failed to be implemented and instrumental in ending the conflict. This may imply that there are 
continued processes of boundary formations within the conflict parties’ interactions, which need to be 
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unravelled to understand why the conflicts continue to exist. This research hence focuses on the processes 
that shape these boundaries and the resulting intergroup dynamics that arise from their interactions. It is by 
exploring this aspect that this research contributes to the IR literature on the conflicts in post-Soviet space 
and the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts in particular.  
 
2.3 Conclusion   
This chapter presented the gap in the literature that this research will fill. The gap is a lack of literature 
which deals with why the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are protracted, and the role continued interactions 
between states’ and non-states’ group identity management play in this regard. In the existing literature 
there is a tendency to treat conflict protraction and conflict outbreak as the same. There is also a tendency 
to approach the conflicts in the post-Soviet space from either a historic/systemic perspective; 
Russia/Eurocentric perspective; or individual/group perspective. In the literature it is argued that the 
conflicts in the post-Soviet space are either: consequences of the Soviet Union’s collapse and/or a result of 
the social and political changes this system imposed on the post-Soviet states; outcomes of Russia’s 
interests and relations with the West; or outcomes of ethnic group relations or leadership interests. I, 
however, argue that there is a need to approach conflict protraction as something separate from conflict 
outbreak, and a need to explore how social boundaries continue to form and sustain as a result of the 
continued interactions that states and non-states engage in. This research hence emphasises the cognitive 
processes that shape self/other understandings and how these processes interact to form intergroup 
dynamics.  
This does not imply that this research dismisses the issue of e.g. history, power, and material 
interests in shaping conflict protraction. Each of these aspects offer insight into the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflicts’ characteristics. But it does imply that this research addresses a yet to be explored aspect of the 
conflicts, which is essential for understanding why the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties continue to 
engage in violence and deny the implementation of conflict resolution efforts proposed to them. To this 
end, this research will draw in social psychology as it allows me to explore the cognitive processes that lead 
to self/other understandings. This will, however, not stand alone as social psychology’s combination with 
social constructivism allows me to explore how such processes manifest into discursive practices. The 
inclusion of social psychology to the study of conflicts is thus not meant to replace any existing IR 
framework, but is a complementary approach as it allows one to dig deeper into the human subtleties that 






3.0. Theories of Protracted Conflicts and Intergroup Dynamics  
In this chapter I lay out the theoretical framework used to explore the role that ideational factors play in 
shaping conflict protraction. The chapter will start by presenting the multidisciplinary approach applied, 
which combines social constructivism and social psychology. In this section, I present how and why social 
constructivism and social psychology can be linked, and why their combination is beneficial for the study 
of conflict protraction. It will then proceed to present the theories and concepts applied, including social 
cognitive processing, social identity theory, attribution theory, and opposed conflict narratives. In 
combination, these theories and concepts allow me to explain how negative interactions between conflict 
parties may occur as a result of cognitive processes that partition situations and agents around a group-
prism, and how conflicts may become protracted as a result of these interacting understandings.  
 
3.1 Linking Social Psychology with Social Constructivism    
This research is based on a multidisciplinary approach as I link social psychology with social constructivism 
to address how ideational factors shape protracted conflicts. Social constructivism is an IR theory that 
explores the construction of social reality within the realm of international politics116. Unlike the more 
traditional structuralist IR theories, such as structural realism that regards the role of agents as determined 
by their relative position in an international system structured along material capabilities, social 
constructivism approaches agents and structures as co-constitutive117. Thus, rather than treating the world 
“as it is, constructivism sees the world as a project under construction as becoming rather than being”118. 
According to social constructivist scholars, the social world is comprised of intersubjective understandings, 
subjective knowledge and material objects, and so social facts, such as identities and interests, are rooted 
in collective understandings and discourses119. Social facts such as who we/they are and what we/they want, 
depend on social knowledge being attached to the physical reality120. Social constructivism questions the 
realist argument that the world is a physical reality that can be grasped and challenges the explanation that 
state behaviour occurs as merely a response to clashing material interests or shifting distributions of 
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power121. Rather, in social constructivist literature, behaviour derives from interpretations122. The agent is 
thus drawn into the equation of international politics as it is argued that to explore and understand state 
behaviour, we must explore the human properties that have assisted in constructing the intersubjective 
understandings state actors rely on123.  
From the outset, social psychology and social constructivism share the same approach that 
to explain behaviour, one must explore the interpretations that agents rely on when engaging with one 
another. Despite this, the inclusion of social psychology in IR is still a relatively new engagement and this 
even though social psychology deals with how cognitive and emotional processes lead to intersubjective 
understandings124. As Ringmar states: “Constructivists have conclusively established that meaning matters 
to the study of international relations - and cognitive theory can tell us how meaning is made”125. The cause 
for the division between social psychology and social constructivism may be found in the constructivist 
tendency to primarily focus on the products of ideational processes than on the processes themselves126. In 
social constructivist research, focus is often on how social knowledge, or a system of ideas, regulate and 
determine behaviour127. Social psychology, on the other hand, tends to focus on the processes that shape 
and change social knowledge. To explore these processes, social psychologists focus on the agent, which 
is common for all fields of psychology. However, whereas the more traditional strands of psychology 
address the ideational processes that arise within an agent, and how these shape the agent’s behaviour, 
social psychologists explore how ideational processes occur because of interactions between agents128. 
Focus is more specifically on how agents reach social knowledge by processing the “actual, imagined, or 
implied presence of other human beings”129. Social psychologists direct their attention to how social 
knowledge occurs from the emotional and cognitive processing of the physical or remembered presence of 
human beings and/or the social facts human beings attach to the psychical reality. The field of social 
psychology is thus rooted in the same argument as seen in social constructivism that to reach an 
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understanding of how and why behaviour occurs, one must explore how self/other understandings emerge 
from emotional and cognitive processes130.  
In IR, scholars have also focused on cognitive and emotional processes and particularly how 
e.g. cognitive biases and emotions hinder rational decision making131. A significant contribution in this 
direction is the work of Jervis and his misperception theory132, but others such as Crawford133, Hutchison134, 
Clément and Sanger135, Koschut et.al136, Mercer137, Reus-Smit138, Casier139 and Young and Schafer have 
focused on how cognition and emotions play a role in shaping IR phenomenon140. As in the field of social 
psychology, so too is there a tendency in IR to draw a sharp distinction between cognitive and emotional 
processes. It varies why scholars in psychology and IR treat emotions and cognition as two separate 
processes, although there has been a tendency in IR to exclude emotions, as emotions are perceived as 
processes that do not feature in the rational decision making that political actors engage with141. However, 
as Mercer states, the assumption that emotions do not play a role in rational thinking is misguided, and it is 
often driven by the observation amongst political actors and scholars that “thinking does not feel like an 
emotion”142. The separation between the two processes is nevertheless not clear-cut, as emotions are needed 
for agents to process the social information that they receive, whilst cognition fuels or activates certain 
emotions143. Emotions and cognition work in tandem in the construction of understandings and behaviour, 
which is an observation that has started to dominate in social psychology144, and which is an understanding 
that also drives this research. In this research I will, however, continue to focus on cognition exclusively 
and how these processes contribute to conflict protraction. This does not mean that I dismiss the validity of 
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emotions or that I advocate for a renewed dichotomy between emotions and cognition. Rather, the focus on 
cognition is an analytical choice that I have had to make to not expand this research beyond its scope. For 
future research it would however be interesting to pair this research with an analysis of the emotional 
processes that occur in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, as this will ensure a more holistic understanding 
of the intergroup dynamics at play.  
As focus in this research is on cognitive processes, it will to a great extent be rooted in the 
social psychology sub-field of social cognition, which focuses on how agents reach an understanding of the 
social world and their place within it145. Whereas social psychology more broadly seeks to understand the 
“social nature of being human”146, social cognition draws attention to how agents store and process social 
information for the use in certain situations147. Emphasis is on cognitive processing in social contexts and 
how social knowledge forms, operates, and changes148. As a field of study, social cognition builds on the 
concept of naive psychology developed by Heider149, which explores how agents think about others through 
causal reasoning150. Social cognition is interested in examining how agents reach knowledge about 
themselves, others, and situations through a deductive process151. As Fiske and Taylor state, behaviour “is 
more usefully understood as a function of people’s perceptions of their world rather than as a function of 
objective descriptions of their stimulus environment”152. Social cognition also draws on social 
constructivism’s outlook that behaviour is not merely an automated response to an environment, but hinges 
on how agents process information that they receive through various types of stimuli being produced in the 
interaction they have with others153. Emphasis is thus on “cognitive elements that intervene between 
observable stimulus and observable responses”154. Whereas social constructivism and social psychology 
tend to draw attention to how self/other understandings have formed over time, social cognition focuses on 
specific situations (such as conflicts) and how self/other understandings are formed, changed, and sustained 
within these situations as a result of the continued interactions that occur between the agents present. This 
contextual focus does not mean that social cognition refutes the role that e.g. history and memory play in 
shaping self/other understandings. But it does imply that to understand the forces that shape a conflict it is 
not enough to focus on how a conflict has occurred because of a “stored” or general understanding of self 
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and other. One also needs to explore how self/other understandings are further shaped, sustained, and 
changed by the interactions that occur in the conflict context. This approach is of interest to this research 
as emphasis here is on the ideational factors that contribute to conflict protraction in Ukraine and Georgia. 
In the literature on the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, there is generally an argument that certain historical 
developments and collective memories have shaped self/other understandings, which caused the outbreak 
of the conflicts. It may, however, be argued that conflict protraction is not only found in these stored 
self/other understandings. The factors that contribute to conflict protraction may to a greater extent be in 
the processes that the conflict parties continue to rely on in their interactions. This research thus explores 
how self/other understandings are upheld in the conflict context through continuous cognitive processing 
of stimuli, and how the interpretation of interactions continues to feed into the conflicts’ continuation. Focus 
is hence on the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts parties’ interacting social cognitive processes, and how these 
may shape intergroup dynamics that contribute to the conflicts’ protraction.  
In connection to this one should address the role of power and how it relates to cognition. In 
this research I focus on cognition exclusively and how it emerges and sustains in certain contexts. This 
does, however, not mean that I treat cognition as neutral processes devoid of any power considerations. In 
IR, scholars have drawn attention to the cognition-power nexus with amongst other Young and Schafer 
pointing to how power derives from cognitive processes that political actors engage with155. This is a 
development in IR as there has long been a tendency, amongst particularly realist scholars, to dismiss the 
relevance of cognition. When analysing cognition in IR, scholars have often found themselves bound or 
challenged by the rationalist approach, which emphasises that all political actors think and act rationally156. 
According to this approach, an elaboration of the cognitive processes that underly thoughts and actions is 
futile157. Instead one should “consider all decision-makers to be alike” and so focus should be on systems 
and state power as sources of action in IR158. According to Rosati, however, one cannot treat events such 
as e.g. the Cold War as “foreordained and determined” by the presence of certain systems, and one should 
not trivialise the role of policymakers by treating them as unitary actors159. Instead there is a need to explore 
the social construction of politics and how cognition shapes individual understandings of interests and 
power. When doing so one arrives at an understanding that political actors do not think from the same 
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perspective160. Political actors often think in different ways, which leads to different understandings of 
interests and power (not to mention understandings of how power should be obtained)161. To understand 
power and the role it plays in IR, there is a need to explore how political actors themselves define and 
understand power. This is equally argued by Wendt who points to how agents act towards other agents 
based on the meanings these others have for them162. In this sense the distribution of power may shape state 
behaviour, but the existence of power depends on intersubjective understandings and “the “distribution of 
knowledge”, that constitute their conceptions of self and other”163. Power is thus dependent on shared 
knowledge as social constructs may lose their significance if agents decide that these constructs no longer 
are of validity or exist164.  
Similar argument can be found in post-structuralism where Foucault points to how 
knowledge and power imply one another as “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution 
of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations”165. Here he emphasises the power of discourse with specific attention to how discourse is not 
neutral but an active engagement that allows for the establishment or maintenance of power relations166. 
From this perspective, language is power as it is through language that actors and their identities are 
constructed167. In IR, and in social psychology, there is thus an understanding that knowledge, cognition, 
and power are inextricably interlinked. The difference in focus is whether scholars explore how the 
understanding of power shapes the processes (cognition) that may lead to understandings, or how power 
derives from the discursive practices (knowledge) that agents rely on. In my research I do acknowledge the 
nexus between power, cognition, and knowledge. I will, however, not engage with a further exploration of 
power and how it is pursued or upheld in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, as focus is on the role cognitive 
processes play in contributing to conflict protraction. I thus do not engage further with the realist or post-
structuralist conceptualisation of power, but I do acknowledge that cognition and power are interlinked and 
acknowledge that the production of cognition is not neutral, but often rooted in attempts of establishing 
certain power relations. The focus on power relations is of course of relevance to this research, particularly 
given Russia’s role in the conflicts and the position of power that Russia seeks to establish or maintain 
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towards the other conflict parties. As there is, however, a limit to the scope of this research, I only focus on 
the “cognitive moment” of conflict protraction as I wish to unravel how cognitive processes form from 
contexts and how these processes shape conflict protraction. These are processes that tend to be neglected 
in the existing literature, but they are processes that we need to explore to establish the intergroup dynamics 
present in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. Once these intergroup dynamics have been located, one may 
then apply these dynamics in e.g. a post-structuralist study or critical geopolitical study of how these 
dynamics assist in shaping or maintaining certain power relations between the conflict parties in Ukraine 
and Georgia. Given that I focus on the cognitive element of conflict protraction, I also exclude any further 
evaluation of material power and power as influence. Such a realist analysis equally has merits in the study 
of these conflicts, but it is also a topic that has been explored at length in the existing literature. As this 
research is of a complementary nature to the existing literature, the findings may, however, also be 
combined with a realist study for a more comprehensive understanding of the factors (ideational and 
material) that shape the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protraction.  
Eventually the reason why the interlinkage of social constructivism, social psychology, and 
its’ sub-field of social cognition is of use in this research, is because these fields approach behaviour from 
the understanding that agents and structures are co-constitutive, and that the link between agents and 
structures is to be found in interpretations. Where the fields differ is in the approach they take to the study 
of ideation as social constructivists tend, in practice, to focus on the macrostructural boundaries on 
perceptions based on prevailing identities and norms168. Social psychology and social cognition tend to 
focus on the micro-foundations that assist in shaping and changing behaviour and identities169. In this sense, 
social constructivism explains how established self/other understandings shape behaviour, whilst social 
psychology and social cognition explain how self/other understandings are formed and why they change. 
To combine social constructivism and social psychology is thus an opportunity to engage with how social 
knowledge is formed and the role social knowledge plays in shaping behaviour170. When adding the element 
of contextuality emphasised in social cognition, one may construct a theoretical framework that explores 
how social knowledge is formed, sustained, and changed as a contextual phenomenon. In the end, as 
Jackson states, social constructivism is an approach to social research and is therefore not a substantive 
theory in and of itself171. As he puts it: “Constructivism does not have anything specific to say about war, 
conflict or conflict resolution; anything that can be said about conflict resolution can only be inferred from 
broader theory and research findings of particular constructivist studies”172. Social constructivism’s 
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contribution to the study of conflicts is therefore not specific theories for analysing why conflicts occur and 
sustain. Instead, social constructivism offers the lens and concepts needed to engage with the ideational 
factors that shape and sustain conflicts. To apply theories that can explain why conflict protraction occurs, 
one may include social psychological theories such as social identity, attribution theory, and opposed 
conflict narratives. Such theories apply the same concepts as social constructivism, but they dig deeper into 
the “technicality” of how e.g. clashing identities occur and why opposed narratives may shape conflict 
protraction. Social constructivism thus sets the stage for exploring the role self/other understandings play 
in conflicts, and social psychology offers the theories for further exploring how these understandings occur, 
sustain, and change in conflict contexts.  
Apart from providing a theoretical outlook for exploring the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ 
protraction, the multidisciplinary approach allows me to address the gaps located in the literature. As stated, 
such gaps pertain to: the tendency to dismiss the forces that shape protraction (as these are regarded as the 
same that caused the conflict); the tendency to dismiss relations between states and non-states; and the 
tendency to dismiss further establishing the link between individuals and groups. The multidisciplinary 
approach addresses the first gap as its’ focus on self/other understandings and contextuality allows me to 
dig into the processes that contribute to the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protraction. The approach allows 
me to explore whether there are certain trends in the conflict parties processing that continue to feed into 
their opposed self/other understandings. Social psychology and social constructivism’s focus on group 
identities also allows me to apply a common analytical framework for the study of relations between state 
and non-state actors. In social constructivism, scholars primarily grant attention to how collective identities 
occur in the form of states. In social psychology focus is on how collective identities occur in the form of 
groups. This state/group divide is not incompatible as both concepts are approached from an ideational 
perspective. In social constructivism, collective identities are treated as states’ discursive practices, whilst 
social psychology treats collective identities as group processes. Whereas the state-focus, however, limits 
the inclusion of non-state actors in the analysis of conflict protraction, the focus on collective identities as 
group processes removes this divide. The group level of analysis also allows one to dig into the link between 
leaders and citizens. As will be explained further on, social constructivism does not approach collective 
identities as outcomes of “group think”, but as discourses that leaders produce and sustain. Similar approach 
is taken in social psychology where collective identities are an outcome of a reciprocal relation between 
group leaders and group members. Leaders are thus managers of the group forming process, but they are 
not puppet masters who automatically steer the thoughts and behaviour of their group members. Rather, 
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leaders’ discursive practices, amongst other, derive from a processing of stimuli their members generate173. 
Social psychology’s group level thus allows one to approach collective behaviour as an ideational process 
between leaders and members. It is from this understanding that I have chosen to apply a multidisciplinary 
approach as it allows me to explore the forces that contribute to conflict protraction. It also allows me to 
bridge the theoretical divides and fill the gap located in the literature review.  
 
3.1.1 The Importance of Context        
To study why conflicts are protracted is to study why conflict parties continue to engage in negative 
interactions, such as the continued engagement in violence and the dismissal of conflict resolution efforts. 
To understand why conflicts become protracted there is a need to explore the forces that shape and sustain 
such behaviour. To this end, one needs to situate behaviour within the context it occurs. In the realist 
theories of IR, there is a tendency to explain behaviour by referring to human nature and/or the environment 
in which international politics takes place174. Here conflicts and the behaviour that unfolds are explained 
by referring to the human nature of self-interest, and how the combination of such tendencies coupled with 
an environment of anarchy (lack of central authority) results in power competitions175. In psychology, 
scholars also refer to the role the environment and human tendencies play in generating behaviour. In e.g. 
behavioural psychology, behaviour is thought to occur as purely a response to the environment, whereas 
personality psychology focuses on how personalities shape repetitive behaviour176. In social constructivism 
and social psychology scholars point to the co-constitution between agents and structures, as behaviour is 
treated as an outcome of structures of meaning and the interpretations that agents bring to their 
engagements. Both theories thus try to tread the middle ground in the agent-structure debate as they 
emphasise the importance of interactions in shaping behaviour. This argument is also found in post-
structuralism where interactions are an essential aspect of the co-constitution between structures and 
agents177. As Doty states: structures are only “instantiated by the practices of agents” and agents emerge 
“with the effecting of structures”178.  
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In the field of social cognition, scholars have expanded the concept of interactions as 
behaviour is not merely treated as an outcome of general self/other understandings but also as an outcome 
of contexts. As social psychologists such as Lewin and Fiske have stated, “social behaviour is, to a larger 
extent than people commonly realize, a response to people’s social context, not a function of individual 
personality”179. From this perspective, behaviour cannot be purely explained by referring to ideational 
structures that endure, or agent-specific tendencies that cause repetitive behaviour. Rather, to understand 
why agents engage in certain behaviour, one should also explore how agents respond to other agents present 
within a given situation, and the stimuli that arise as a result of the presence of such agents180. Termed 
situationism, it pertains to the “scientific belief in the significance of context” and the premise that “the 
social situation, not just unique personality, dramatically controls people’s behaviour”181. To understand 
why conflict parties engage in negative interactions, there is a need to zoom into the situation and explore 
how self/other understandings sustain as a result of the parties’ contextual interactions182. From this outlook, 
behaviour is a “social and intersubjective phenomenon” and so it cannot be reduced to a universal 
phenomenon that continues to replicate183. Behaviour changes in connection to context as behaviour that 
occurs in e.g. an office meeting is fundamentally different from behaviour that occurs in a conflict. This 
means that to explain the continuation of a conflict, it is not enough to identify material interests or general 
human traits and how this may lead to competition184. Conflict protraction and interactions that generate 
such protraction cannot be explained by “general rules derived from past events; nor can their outcomes be 
used to predict future ones”185. Understanding the past may serve as a starting point for analysing structural 
conditions, but it will never suffice in unravelling the processes at play within the situation186. There is a 
need to focus on the interactions that form within a situation, but this should be done from an understanding 
that several processes feed into interactions and that most outcomes are “instances of singular causation”, 
which are non-repetitive187. It is therefore not possible to define a standard set of causes for the continuation 
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of conflicts, but rather one needs to look for causes of causes from an understanding that there are multiple 
causal chains188.  
Where this research deviates from the existing literature on the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflicts, is that it approaches the conflict parties’ behaviour from a contextual perspective. This research 
does therefore not draw on a meta-analysis of behaviour, such as that of post-structuralism where emphasis 
is on the role of history and power in shaping systems of knowledge189. Focus is instead on the interactions 
that occur in the conflict situation and how this is processed and structured into contextual meanings that 
sustain negative relations. This research thus emphasises the role the situation and the constellation of 
conflict parties in the situation play in shaping behaviour190. This does not imply that I disregard the role of 
history and memories in shaping behaviour, but that I seek to engage with how behaviour is also responsive 
as it equally forms from contextual interactions191. The aim of this research is thus not to draw out general 
cognitive processes that shape conflict protraction, but to draw out the dynamics that shape the Georgia and 
Ukraine conflicts’ protraction specifically as a result of the responses the conflict parties make towards 
each other in the conflict. This also means that the findings reached in the analysis should not be treated as 
a definitive answer to why the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are protracted. It is an additional insight that 
fills a gap in the existing literature and complements existing analyses of the conflicts.  
 
3.1.2 States as Group Identities   
As established in the literature review, there is a foundation for approaching the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflicts from a group identity perspective, as this offers a better insight into the link between states/non-
states and the cognitive processes that may compel the conflict parties to dismiss conflict resolution efforts. 
In this research, I approach the conflict parties (states and non-state actors) as group identities. More 
specifically, I focus on how the leadership of each conflict party constructs and communicates certain group 
identities, which they themselves and their citizens come to think and act on behalf of (or are expected to 
think and act on behalf of) in the conflict context. When I refer to states and non-state actors as group 
identities, I do not mean that states are persons or physical units, but that they are collective identities agents 
activate in certain contexts and choose to unite around. These identities are generally administered by state 
or non-state leaders who have the role of managing a group identity, and constructing a narrative around 
the group identity, which they and their citizens can apply as the ideational foundation for their thoughts 
and actions in a given context. This does not mean that citizens of states necessarily agree with how their 
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state leaders construct the group identity that they are said to belong to192. But it means that states are group 
identities that leaders manage for the purpose of e.g. sense-making and interest-seeking, and which some 
citizens choose to belong to and use as the lens through which a context is viewed.  
Treating states and non-state actors as group identities is an interesting endeavour as it opens 
the IR debate about actors/agents and the extent to which states are persons, institutions, or something 
entirely different193. In the work of Wendt, a state is a “superorganism”, which is a “collection of single 
creatures that together possess the functional organization implicit in the formal definition of organism”194. 
Wendt treats a state as a “person”, but what is interesting is that to reach this interpretation, he draws on a 
distinction between a state as a corporate entity, and a state as an identity. As he puts it, states constitute of 
a corporate and a social component, which generates an interaction between the “we” and the “I”195. This 
means that states (at times) have an influence on agents’ identity or the “I”. States also have an aspect of 
“we” as the constituent agents and institutions create the feeling of states as an entity196. Wendt hence points 
to how a state is both a physical manifestation, but also an ideational manifestation. In the work of Hudson, 
and particularly in the field of foreign policy analysis197, a state is not treated as a person per se, but as an 
outcome of state leaders’ personal characteristics198. Stated differently, leaders and their personalities make 
up the states and come to define the states’ behaviour. In his work, Sasley, however argues that a state 
should not be treated as a person nor as an outcome of state leaders’ personality per se199. States should 
instead be treated as a group where state leaders’ “cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise, 
and reflect that of the group (state) and so determine how the state will act”200. What Sasley points to is that 
states are outcomes of group reification processes, as states can be treated as group identities, which grant 
citizens and state leaders a structured self/other understanding and an understanding of shared expectations 
in the situation201. It is then from this group identity that behaviour and the pursuit of interests, in the name 
of the state may arise202. A state is hence not a physical being, nor is it merely an outcome of leadership 
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personality, but is instead represented by a collection of agents who have united around a group identity, 
and whose self-understandings and motivations to a great extent are formed around this identity. This 
understanding of states also links to the identity/difference problem expressed by Connolly and Campbell 
who dismiss the notion of the state as an existing and unitary actor but treat states “at the heart of the 
relationship between personal and collective identity”203. In this research, I adopt the approach that states 
can be treated as group identities. Doing so does not imply that I dismiss the institutional role of states, nor 
do I dismiss that states can be treated as e.g. organisations. But it implies that I, in this research, seek to 
emphasise the ideational role of states and particularly how states also function as group identities, as this 
allows me to unravel the psychological processes that too define the behaviour of states in times of 
conflict204. 
States may thus be treated as group identities that agents perceive themselves or others to 
belong to. In this sense, states are outcomes of group processes where leaders and citizens come to engage 
in discursive and social practices that conform with a certain understanding of collective belonging and 
expressed collective interests205. If one adopts this understandings of states, it may be argued that for states 
to have a presence and serve as a mobilising factor in times of e.g. conflicts, agents need to first engage in 
group reification processes where they come to define themselves around this group identity. It is then from 
this processing that states as group identities have the capacity to shape collective behaviour. Despite this 
link between states and group processes, there is a tendency in IR to treat states and groups as different 
concepts, as the group concept is used to define e.g. ethnic groups that reside within a state206. If one adopts 
the social psychological understanding of groups, one may nevertheless bridge this state/group dichotomy. 
In social psychology, groups are not units but collective identities that arise from cognitive and emotional 
processing where agents come to define themselves and others as group members that either share, or do 
not share, collective commonalities207. This perceived commonality is based on external and/or internal 
criteria with the external criteria being visible similarities (e.g. similar facial features or a shared language), 
and internal criteria being an awareness amongst agents that they share a membership and that there is a 
certain value attached to this membership208. Hence, rather than being physical beings per se, groups are 
discursive and social practices that agents engage with in times where there is a need for a collective 
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identification209. While agents may communicate a seemingly fixed and physical existence of a group, this 
is as stated by McSweeney “never more than a provisional and fluid image of ourselves as we want to 
be”210. When I approach states/non-states as group identities it is therefore not an attempt to group agents 
into units. It is an expression of the ideational nature of states and an accentuation of the group forming 
processes that lead to an understanding that states exist. The emphasis on states as group identities is also 
an attempt to bridge the individual/collective divide in IR, where scholars tend to dismiss any further 
exploration of how collectives are formed by individuals, and how individuals can mobilise collectives. 
This link is enhanced with the focus on how states are shaped from group forming processes and maintained 
through group identity practices. The group identity approach is also rooted in the work of Neumann who 
points to how the study of the self/other nexus from a group identity management perspective, offers an 
opportunity to better understand “who ‘the actors’ are, how they are constituted, how they maintain 
themselves, and under which preconditions they may thrive”211.  
In this research, I explore how the state actors in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts 
cognitively process the situation and those involved, and how this understanding shapes their relations. 
Since I adopt an understanding that states are group identities, this does not imply that I treat states as 
conscious subjects that engage in group think. As stipulated by Mercer, whereas studying the cognition and 
emotions of a state per se is useless and similar to studying the cognition and emotions of another non-
biological entity, scholars need to study how agents “feel like a state”212. To study how agents come to “feel 
like a state” one may explore the role of social cognitive processing and how it results in group identities. 
Such processing does, however, not occur in a vacuum. As will be discussed in the next sections and in the 
method chapter, the construction of group identities is an agent-led process as state leaders manage the 
group identities their citizens abide to, or should abide to, in a given context. This does not mean that the 
leaders’ personalities come to form the state/group’s identity and interests per se, but that leaders manage 
the process of group formation as they provide “the state’s” self/other understanding. This is an important 
factor as the construction of intergroup relations thus can be traced to the official narratives that leaders 
communicate. It is therefore that I focus on the leaders’ identity management in this research. To this one 
should also add the role of non-state actors. In my research, I will approach the state and non-state conflict 
parties as of similar origin – i.e. non-states are also group identities that agents in certain situations perceive 
themselves or others to belong to, and subsequently behave and think on behalf of. To analyse relations 
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between the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties, there is a need to move beyond the state/non-state divide 
that tends to define research conducted on these conflicts. This is not to legalize the actions of the non-state 
actors nor to advocate for their recognition as states. It is an analytical choice taken to avoid the often 
legalistic-approach towards these conflicts, which constructs parties as of differing origin based on whether 
they have been internationally recognised as states or not. This, I believe, may significantly hamper our 
ability to understand the dynamics that shape the conflicts’ protraction. It also blurs the agency which 
arguably exists within states and non-states. The focus on non-states and states as group identities is equally 
rooted in the protracted social conflict theory outlined by Azar who emphasised the need to move beyond 
the state-to-state analysis, and engage in a level of analysis that could emphasise how the perceived presence 
of different parties shapes conflict dynamics213. It is thus by approaching states and non-states as group 
identities that one may reach a common analytical framework, which is currently neglected in the literature 
on the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. The focus on states/non-states as group identities is also of value to 
the study of conflict protraction where conflict parties find themselves in a conflict shaped by continuously 
opposed self/other understandings. To understand why such a deadlock has come about it is beneficial to 
retreat a few steps back and explore the social cognitive processes that shape these group identities, as this 
allows one to explore where contestation and protraction may derive from.  
 
3.2 Intergroup Relations in Times of Protracted Conflict 
Conflicts are an inevitable part of human life. They occur in day-to-day interactions between spouses, 
colleagues, parents and children and they are, in most cases, handled in a quick and non-violent manner214. 
Conflicts can, however, also take on a collective nature as they can occur between communities, institutions, 
states etc. In these instances, conflicts may take the form of violent interactions and whereas some of them 
are resolved, others sustain215. There is a plethora of research in the field of conflict studies, IR, and social 
psychology that focuses on how and why collective conflicts occur, and the steps that must be taken to 
solve them. This is a herculean task as scholars agree that conflicts are not one-dimensional but multifaceted 
and ever-evolving, hereby making it difficult to pin-point their characteristics and the areas in need of 
conflict resolution efforts216. Multiple factors such as material interests, systemic developments, and 
ideational factors intertwine to create complex situations. Since it is often impossible for a single research 
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to address all aspects of conflicts, there is a need to pin-point the gap that the existing literature has yet to 
explore. It is then by adding the missing element that one may gain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the forces that shape conflicts. In this research, focus is on a particular aspect of the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflicts, namely their protraction and how social cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics may 
contribute to this protraction. Although there is no general definition of protracted conflicts217, it is agreed 
that protracted conflicts are conflicts that have yet to be resolved and situations where conflict parties 
continue to dismiss efforts aimed at resolving their dispute218. A central element of studying protracted 
conflicts is to explore how come conflict parties continue to engage in negative interactions. In social 
psychology and social constructivism, protracted conflicts, and the negative interactions that shape them, 
are approached as an outcome of the understandings that conflict parties construct and resort to. This does 
not mean that other factors are rendered mute. It means that this is the target area that these fields emphasise. 
The aspect that social constructivists and social psychologists explain is how conflicts arise and sustain 
from the understandings that conflict parties attach to the situation, self and other. As Bar-Tal states:  
 
A conflict [is] a situation in which two or more parties perceive their goals, intentions, and actions as 
being mutually incompatible and act in accordance to this perception[…]Conflict, as a situation with 
observable consequences, should be considered only when the perception of the situation is followed by 
behaviors that reflect this perception219 
 
From a social psychological and social constructivist perspective, conflicts emerge from opposed self/other 
understandings. This does not imply that opposed self/other understandings automatically generate 
conflicts. Rather, for a conflict to exist, all conflict parties need to agree that there is a conflict and act from 
this understanding220. It is then from this intersubjective understanding that a conflict gains its existence. 
This implies that to understand the ideational aspect of conflicts, one must explore how conflict parties 
reach opposed self/other understandings followed by an exploration of how these understandings interact 
to form the conflict221. 
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 To explore how opposed self/other understandings occur, one may engage with the cognitive 
processes that shape intergroup relations. Intergroup relations refer to: “any aspect of human interaction 
that involves individuals perceiving themselves as members of a social category, or being perceived by 
others as belonging to a social category”222. Intergroup relations are relations where agents act and think 
from the basis of group identities, and it is thus relations shaped around the process of group reification223. 
Group reification refers to the tendency to take bounded groups as basic constituents of social life224. 
According to Brubaker, there is a tendency in social situations to take groups as something that is ‘real’ and 
to treat groups as actors to which one may attribute agency and interests225. There is hence a taken-for-
granted assumption that situations such as conflicts, where parties claim to act from a frame of ethnicity or 
statehood, should be approached as struggles between ethnic groups or states226. What this results in is the 
tendency amongst conflict parties to cognitively systematize the conflict through a group-prism and treat 
these groups as the protagonist and antagonist227. Conflicts constructed around an ethnic or state frame are, 
however, not conflicts between ethnic groups or states per se. They are conflicts between agents who have 
come to associate themselves and others with a group identity, and who have come to understand the 
conflict through these social categories. Despite this, there is also a tendency in research (including the 
literature on the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts) to uncritically adopt the reification of groups as scholars 
analyse how states or ethnic groups have come into conflict. Groups, regardless of their construct being in 
a state or ethnic frame, are unquestionably treated as units of analysis. However, as Brubaker states, groups 
are not units that scholars should use to explain a phenomenon with, as this merely reinforces these groups 
and neglects the factors that have led to the conflict228. The tendency to partition the social world and 
situations into homogenous groups is a process that scholars should try to explain229. Instead of 
conceptualising groups as something tangible, bounded, and in possession of agency there is a need to think 
of groups in relational and processual terms230.  
A group is thus not an actor but a “contextually fluctuating conceptual variable” that derives 
from and manifests into cognitive schemas, discursive practices, organisational routines, political projects 
etc.231. It is in the form of e.g. discursive practices that group identities come to inform the decisions and 
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behaviour conflict parties engage in232. Collective behaviour as seen in times of conflict amongst other 
occurs as agents mobilise around, as well as validate their actions from, a discourse that calls for the 
protection of their group identity and interests233. Rather than being mobilised from “group think”, groups 
are mobilised as speech acts that members adopt and feed into. This function of discursive practices has 
e.g. been addressed in the work of Giddens and Steele, where focus has been on “biographical narratives” 
and how states talk of their actions in identity terms to acquire meaning and present actions/reactions as 
relevant234. In such situations, a group identity functions as meaning attached to actions, and actions are 
decided in relation to their influence on self-identity235. When certain group identities have emerged and 
inform discursive practices, conflicts may occur as “the groups” come to compare themselves. According 
to Gries, conflicts occur when groups socially compare themselves with other groups and perceive their 
existence and/or objectives as incompatible236. As he argues “it is only when comparisons are made with 
salient others, are consequential and are framed in zero-sum terms that intergroup competition may 
ensue”237. Intergroup relations therefore derive from group reification processes and group practices, and 
intergroup conflicts occur from a social comparison between groups and the understanding that these groups 
and their interests are incompatible.  
Since the processes that shape intergroup relations may explain the occurrence of conflicts, 
these may also explain why conflicts become protracted. However, as stated in the literature review, the 
causes of conflict outbreak and conflict protraction are seldomly the same. In conflict protraction theories, 
it is generally acknowledged that conflict protraction occurs when group practices become cemented. As 
stated by Ramsbotham, conflict protraction occurs because of continuously clashing discourses. Also called 
a radical disagreement, he argues that protracted conflicts are situations where conflict parties continue to 
have opposed understandings of the conflict situation and those involved238. This is also argued by Bar-Tal 
who points to how conflicts become protracted when clashing self/other understandings are cemented and 
institutionalized239. This leads to a stagnated situation where the conflict parties’ negative self/other 
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understandings do not merely shape the conflict situation. These institutionalised understandings also feed 
into continuously negative relations, as societies e.g. pass these understandings on to the next generations 
and continue to validate these understandings by shaping various policies around them240. The manifestation 
of these negative self/other understandings eventually generate conflict supporting narratives, which refer 
to an overall narrative of the conflict and those involved241. This narrative comes to play a key role in 
sustaining conflicts as it satisfies a social psychological need of justifying and explaining a situation that 
involves chronic stress and distress242. In protracted conflicts, conflict parties will develop opposing 
narratives and they seek to maintain “the dominance of their own narratives among the in-group members 
and also make efforts to persuade other groups of their narratives’ truthfulness”243. The construction of 
conflict supporting narratives contribute to conflict protraction as they serve as an ideational foundation 
from which the conflict parties will continue to process information and hereof think and act244. In the work 
of both Ramsbotham and Bar-Tal, protracted conflicts are thus times of cemented self/other understandings, 
where conflict parties struggle over who gets to “provide the lens through which the conflict is viewed”245. 
To change protracted conflicts in a direction more favourable for resolution, there is a need to change the 
conflicting narratives involved and encourage the creation of new and/or more peace-supporting self/other 
understandings246.  
In the protracted conflict theories, focus is on how groups act/react towards each other based 
on their understanding of each other247. This may also be defined as intergroup dynamics, which refers to 
trends or developments that form group behaviour and group relations248. In the above-mentioned theories, 
the intergroup dynamics that shape conflict protraction are defined as stagnated discursive practices, which 
prevent conflict parties from changing their relations. Conflicts are hence protracted because groups’ 
self/other understandings and narratives about the conflicts do not change. In this research, I will, however, 
not focus on how self/other understandings manifest in societies. I will focus on the social cognitive 
processes that the conflict parties apply to reach their self/other understandings. I thus take a step back to 
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explore the processes that may have led to the protracted intergroup relations. The reason for this is because 
I wish to explore whether there are differences and similarities in how the conflict parties reach their 
opposed self/other understandings. Instead of focusing on institutionalised self/other understandings, I 
explore how these understandings arise and sustain from the stimuli that occur in the conflict situations. 
Focus is therefore on how self/other understandings occur but also how they are sustained through the 
processes used when social information arises in the conflict parties’ interactions. This will give me an 
insight into the link between group reification and intergroup relations. It will also allow me to explore 
whether conflict protraction may be found in the conflict parties’ social cognitive processing, rather than 
merely in their established self/other understandings. To this end, I thus direct my attention to how social 
cognitive processing arises, and how it results in group identity and interest formation.  
 
3.3 Social Cognitive Processing     
Social cognitive processing refers to information processing about “people, including the self, and about 
the norms and procedures of the social world” 249. It is a mental process that agents engage with to make 
sense of something/someone, and a process that leads to structured understandings of a situation, self, and 
other250. A central concept that assists in driving social cognitive processing is agency, which refers to the 
human ability to explore, interpret, store, and respond towards stimuli received when engaging in a 
situation251. Stimuli refers to any social information agents experience252. It may e.g. be words someone has 
uttered or behaviour which has occurred. Stimuli is social information that requires processing for the agent 
to understand what is going on, and to get a sense of how it should think, act, or react in a situation. The 
reason why agency is of importance in terms of social cognitive processing, is because it grants agents the 
ability to influence their own functioning and life circumstances through active and conscious engagement 
with the world around them253. Agency entails the ability to be consciously aware about the environment 
and the ability to evaluate, and based on this evaluation, react towards the stimuli the environment may 
produce254. Agency is a unique feature of humanity that has developed over time through evolution, and it 
is a feature that has allowed human beings to become sentient - hereby replacing the “aimless environmental 
selection” with purposeful agency255. Unlike animals who react instinctively to stimuli they encounter in 
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the environment, agents have the “ability to reason and to process information about the causes of 
events”256. Agency is thus the ability to consciously determine why something is happening, or has 
happened, who one is, and who others are257.  
A central feature of social cognitive processing is to make sense of what is happening in a 
situation. Social cognitive processing does, however, not merely allow agents to make sense of situations, 
but also make sense of who is present and the extent to which self and other have an influence on the 
situation. The reason why agents seek to make sense of others is because thinking about others is the 
foundation for interacting with them258. Social cognitive processing revolves around “collecting data” about 
others, but this data also reflects the active role of the observer259. When interacting or confronted with 
others, agents will reflect and infer about who the other is, what the other does, what it feels, what it wants, 
and what it is about to do260. Social cognitive processing is hence as much about making sense of another 
as it is about acquiring (often a false feeling) that one is two steps ahead of the other because it has got the 
other one ‘figured out’. This sense making of others includes the sense making of one-self as the 
understanding of others creates the assumption that one has a cognitive framework to operate within. The 
construction of an other-understanding thus offers a cognitive systematization from which one may position 
one’s self-understanding261. As Neumann points out: “the formation of self is inextricably intertwined with 
that of its others”262. Social cognitive processing leads to an understanding about a situation but also an 
understanding of who self and other is in this situation, and how one should think and react based on this 
social knowledge263. The reason why agents seek to cognitively position themselves and others within a 
situation is because they want to ensure a goal. According to Padilla et.al “thinking is doing” and with social 
cognitive processing comes the motivation of wanting to ensure a certain outcome264. The exploration of 
social cognitive processing should thus be rooted in the understanding that sense making is goal driven265. 
Such goals may be material, ideational, or normative and so a goal may be to simply understand what or 
who caused a situation, or it may be to influence the situation and change the behaviour that occurs to 
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ensure a favourable end-point for one-self266. Goals are desired outcomes that may be physical (e.g. 
acquiring territory or wealth) or psychological (e.g. changing interactions or gaining power)267. These 
desired outcomes play a role in social cognitive processing as they assist in forming the outlook from which 
understandings of self and other originate268. As Wendt states, behaviour is not merely driven by identities 
nor interests alone, as interests presuppose identities because “an actor cannot know what it wants until it 
knows who it is” 269. Identities do therefore not in and off themselves explain situations such as a conflict, 
as “being is not the same thing as wanting, and we cannot read off the latter from the former”270. Identities 
provide the direction for interests, and interests provide the motivational force for identities, and so there is 
a need to explore how interests and identities work as interlinked processes that form self/other 
understandings271.  
Although social cognitive processing may result in an understanding about a situation, self 
and other, this is rarely static. In social cognition, scholars such as Bandura point to agents’ ability to self-
regulate and self-reflect, as agents will monitor and regulate their understandings to reflect on their 
adequacy272. Agents possess “self-reflective and self-reactive capabilities”, which allow them to, to some 
extent, control their “thoughts, feelings, motivation, and actions” 273. Instead of merely adopting a fixed 
understanding about a situation, self, and other, agents will reflect on their understanding vis-á-vis new 
incoming stimuli, which may cause them to regulate this understanding274. Social cognitive processing is 
thus also shaped around a process of feedback control or monitoring275. Despite such abilities, agents will 
seek to reach a somewhat consistent cognitive systematization of a situation, self, and other, as this offers 
them a structured and simplified understanding of who they and others are, and how they are to respond to 
certain situations276. As stated by Bandura:  
 
When people observe their thought patterns, emotional reactions, and behaviour and the conditions under 
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between situations and their thought and actions, people can identify the psychologically significant 
features of their social environment that lead them to behave in certain ways277. 
 
 
The result of social cognitive processing is the establishment of a social cognitive framework, which refers 
to a cognitive structure that agents refer to and rely on when making sense of self and others and the situation 
they find themselves in278. Social cognitive frameworks are context-specific cognitive roadmaps that come 
to function as the underlying component of the conflict narratives presented in the previous section279.  
In this respect, agents seek through social cognitive processing to reach, as stated by Heider: 
“in some measure what a science is supposed to achieve: an adequate description of the subject matter 
which makes prediction possible”280. Since social cognitive frameworks are socially constructed, however, 
they are often tainted by beliefs, world views, goals and other biases that make up the human conscious. 
They are subjective evaluations of reality rather than adequate descriptions of self, situations, and others. 
But regardless of this, social cognitive frameworks function as ways to make sense of what a situation is 
about, who is present within it, and the type of responses that should be made and outcomes that should be 
reached, based on the understanding of what characterises the situation and those present. By emphasising 
these human capabilities, scholars such as Bandura stress that agents do not unconsciously react to an 
environment, nor are they unconsciously steered by the past or by set future goals281. Rather, agents 
construct their social cognitive processing around various abilities, which will result in understandings that 
are constantly monitored282. To understand a situation there is hence a need to explore agents’ social 
cognitive processing, how this occurs, what the resulting social cognitive frameworks constitute of, and 
how such frameworks interact to form the situation. This is also the aim of this research as focus will be on 
how the conflict parties in Ukraine and Georgia cognitively process the conflict and the conflict parties 
involved, and how they cognitively systematise and compartmentalise stimuli into social cognitive 
frameworks that come to form their interactions. The exploration of how the conflict parties reach social 
cognitive frameworks will eventually give an insight into the intergroup dynamics that shape the conflict 
parties’ relations. To explore the conflict parties’ social cognitive framework there is, however, a need to 
further unravel the cognitive processes that shape group identities and interests, and how these processes 
result in structured understandings of situations, self, and other.  
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3.3.1 Constructing Group Identities   
In social constructivism, identities are treated as social constructs. However, as Guillaume states, despite 
this many IR scholars do not focus on identity construction but on the impact that socially constructed 
identities have on issues in international politics283. To understand the function of identities there is, 
however, also need to explore the processes that lead to their construction. According to Guillaume, 
identities emerge from dialogue284. Identities are thus not finite as they are relative to their position in the 
world, and they occur as a result of interactions285. This is also emphasised by Connolly who points to how 
identities are relational as there is no identity without difference, and so “everything” can be traced to how 
this identity/difference is negotiated286. This relational view of identity is equally found in social psychology 
where Tajfel argues that identities are “at the same time separate and unavoidably shackled together (in a 
sense that the fate of each of them depends, to a large extent, upon the nature of its relations with the 
others)”287. Identities are thus interdependent social constructs as their construction is reliant on the presence 
of other identities. In social psychology, the construction of identities is linked to the cognitive process of 
social categorization288. Social categorization is a cognitive process that involves classifying agents into 
groups based on perceived similar characteristics and trademarks these agents are thought to share289. These 
trademarks can be many including appearance, culture, religion, sex, age etc. From this process, the agent 
can cognitively systematise situations, as social categorisation allows the agent to establish who it is, who 
the others are, and how these groups of agents relate to each other. Social categorization is thus, according 
to Lilli and Rehm, an important part of forming self/other understandings290 as it allows them to reason, as 
further stated by Liberman: “about the likely thoughts, beliefs, actions, and interactions of others, as guided 
by group membership”291. Social categorization identifies classes of stimuli that share important properties, 
which allows the observer to bring order and coherence to agents, objects, and events it encounters292. Social 
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categorization thus assists in forming agents’ social cognitive frameworks as it provides a cognitive 
structure from which social information becomes more relatable and manageable293. Social categorization 
also allows the observer to differentiate between agents as the observer can speak of categorical 
representations, rather than having to separately name and treat each individual within this representation 
“as a wholly unprecedented and hence unpredictable entity”294. Through social categorisation the agent can 
approach e.g. a conflict as a situation involving “Ukrainians and Russians”, instead of a situation that 
unfolds between individuals who interact in accordance with inter-personal identities and interests295. A 
consequence of this categorization is that situations become more cognitively structured. It may, however, 
also lead to a perception that agents associated with the same category are more similar than is usually the 
case, whilst agents associated with outside categorise are perceived as more dissimilar296. Social 
categorisation therefore also involves the construction of in- and out-groups, where the in-group is the group 
the observer belongs to and out-groups are categories the observer does not belong to297.  
To socially categorise is to make sense of self and other and to predict what is likely to guide 
behaviour and how relations should or will unfold in a social situation. Social categorization does, however, 
not merely structure situations in accordance with categorical representations, as it also functions as the 
foundation for constructing group identities. According to Tajfel, a group or social identity is a cognitive 
construct of who one is in a social situation and it is linked to social categories as the understanding of who 
is who is based on group membership298. Group identities are identities, which manifest as discursive 
practices. Group identities are therefore not “things” that agents possess299. A group identity is the 
understanding that one belongs to a group300. Such identities are not universal but rooted in situationism as 
an agent’s group identity varies in accordance with the situation it finds itself in301. One may hence think 
and act from e.g. an identity of being a woman in one situation and think and act from the identity of being 
a Ukrainian in another. Group identities differ from interpersonal identities as interpersonal identities refer 
to personalized bonds of attachment (formed through close dyadic relations such as family or other face-
to-face groups), and group identities are bonds deriving from common identifications with a social 
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category302. Group identities do not require personal relations but are depersonalized senses of self where 
the understanding of self is an interchangeable example of a social category, rather than a “perception of 
self as a unique person” 303. Group identities are thus defined as a “connection with a broader community, 
category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which may be imagined 
rather than experienced directly”304. Linking this back to the theory of group reification it may hence be 
argued that group identities are outcomes of group reification processes, which occur because of social 
categorisation305.  
Since group identities are cognitive constructs, they are not visible in the environment but 
are invoked through social interactions and specific artefacts assigned to them (such as clothing, territory, 
etc)306. Group identities are also invoked through shared understandings of belonging, a perceived historical 
connection between group members, and by the identities being “embedded in coherent and integrative 
social practices” 307. Group identities are formed around cognitions and emotions that members come to 
share, which play a part in making these identities seem “real” 308. Group identities are thus social constructs 
or “sets of meanings” agents attribute to self and others309. Despite the cognitive nature of identities, agents 
often treat group identities as real or as “social objects”310. This may also be referred to what Tajfel called 
“differentiation between social groups”, which refers to a tendency amongst agents to highlight their 
differences to obtain a clearer distinctiveness between them311. This distinctiveness may be expressed by 
pointing at physical differences, such as appearance or territory associated with a group, but also 
psychological differences, such as the dispositions associated with a certain group. When making sense of 
a situation, agents will hence resort to social categorization where they first determine who is present in the 
situation. This will be linked to a group identity where agents will further elaborate and construct the in-
group and out-group’s social distinctiveness, which then functions as a cognitive framework for 
interactions. The process of constructing group identities is of interest as it allows me to explore how the 
Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties cognitively systematise the conflict situations. The theory on social 
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identity and social categorization will thus allow me to explain how the conflict parties systematize the 
conflict and parties involved around identity boundaries.  
 
3.3.2 Constructing Group Interests   
A social cognitive framework is not merely rooted in group identities as such frameworks also arise from 
an understanding of what agents want in a situation. Another central element of social cognitive processing 
is therefore attribution processing where agents will try to establish the group interests that drive those 
present in a situation by inferring the causes of their behaviour312. To “attribute” is to interpret the cause 
behind one’s own and the behaviour of others313. According to Bertram et.al, social interactions require 
agents to infer and avow their own intentions and to interpret and establish the intentions of others, as this 
provides the understanding of motivations that guide behaviour314. Whereas identification establishes who 
is present, attribution establishes what these actors want. When an agent is confronted with stimulus, it will 
experience this as a disruption in its environment which requires an explanation315. Agents will thus engage 
in a process of determining the causes behind a stimulus, which involves establishing who or what caused 
it and why316. As stated by Gordon Moskowitz, one of the most important changes to our environment, 
which will cause us to search for explanations, are stimuli caused by interactions with others317. Attribution 
theory therefore focuses on how agents process the causes of behaviour to make sense of the stimuli they 
encounter as well as judge these and act on them318. Attribution processing is linked to an epistemic need 
as attributing behaviour fulfils the need to identify, understand, and make predictions about self and 
others319. This allows agents to discern a situation and the stimuli that occurs, and it enables agents to decide 
upon their actions and responses320. The conclusions reached following the attribution processing provides 
a feeling of being in control and a sense of well-being, as it creates the perception that agents can “predict” 
outcomes and position themselves in a strategic manner within the situation321. Establishing the interests of 
self and others allows agents to bring order to the often-chaotic occurrence of behaviour by constructing a 
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relatively stable knowledge around it322. In this sense, attribution is a fundamental aspect of intergroup 
relations as it explains how observation and interpretation of behaviour functions as a means for 
engagement323.  
Although a highly subjective process, attribution processing is often experienced as the 
pursuit of facts and based on an assumption that agents can accurately assess the behaviour under 
observation324. In attribution processing, the observer nevertheless produces its own truth about the 
observed, which may lead to biases325. When processing information, agents will arrive at what they believe 
is the cause or intent of a given behaviour. These causes may be many, but they tend to be divided into 
personal and situational causality326. Personal causality is an attribution linked to an agent’s disposition, its 
motives, goals, and sentiments327. Behaviour explained around personal causality is regarded as intentional 
as an agent is thought to behave in a certain manner due to its character328. To arrive at personal causality, 
agents will observe how consistent a behaviour is (stability) and the extent to which an agent is in control 
of its behaviour (controllability)329. This implies that the behaviour of an agent is attributed to its character 
if the behaviour is regarded as “typical” for this agent, and if the agent is perceived as being in control of 
what it is doing. The situational causality, on the other hand, refers to the external circumstances that have 
forced an agent to act in a certain manner330. Here behaviour is perceived as unintentional as it is caused by 
forces beyond the agent’s control331. Often when agents seek to prescribe the causes of other’s behaviour 
there is more focus on personal than situational factors332. This is also termed the fundamental attribution 
error, which is the tendency to underestimate situational factors and overestimate personal factors when 
attributing the causes of other’s behaviour333. As argued by Smith, there is a difference in attribution 
processing depending on whether these are directed at oneself or others334. In attributing one’s own 
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behaviour there tends to be focus on situational causality, as this often supports a more positive self-
understanding335.  
The study of attribution processing has mainly been conducted on interpersonal relations 
where an individual’s behaviour is attributed to either its personality or the situation it finds itself in. 
According to Yzerbyt et.al, attribution is, however, not only linked to interpersonal relations as agents may 
also refer to social categories as an invariant factor that shapes behaviour336. This means that social 
categories are, in certain interactions, regarded as stable causal factors, which can be used to explain 
behaviour that occurs337. Linked to the theory of social identity, it is argued that group membership is not 
merely a “background factor” but an important dispositional aspect338. This is particularly the case in 
conflicts perceived as group mediated. In these contexts, individual attributions are substituted with social 
attributions, as behaviour is explained from the social category self and others are perceived to belong to339. 
In this context, personal and situational attributions still apply, however, as stated by Yzerbyt et.al, if 
“members of a group take a particular line of action and that group is perceived to be a coherent social 
entity, perceivers may well underestimate the causal role of the environment and credit instead some 
underlying disposition of the group”340. In times of conflicts, groups are thus often perceived as “a person”, 
which can be identified by certain shared characteristics or “a personality”341. When seeking to make sense 
of who is present in a conflict and what they want, agents may thus also engage in social attribution where 
the perceived group and its members are understood as behaving and thinking in a consistent manner 
because they make up a species of their own342. This tendency may result in an attribution bias called “group 
attribution error”, where the characteristics and attitude of a group member is perceived to reflect the 
characteristics and attitude of the whole group this agent belongs to343. The theory on attribution processing 
is of interest as it allows me to explain how the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties make sense of the 
agents present in the conflicts by granting them associated group traits and interests through the attribution 
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of behaviour. Attribution theory will therefore allow me to explain how the conflict parties make sense of 
the factors that motivate themselves and the others in the conflict. Attribution theory will also allow me to 
explain the biases that may occur in social cognitive processing and how intergroup dynamics arise from 
such biases. Finally, the concepts and theories dealing with group identity and interest construction will 
assist me in exploring and explaining how the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties reach social cognitive 
frameworks, which come to define their interactions. It is then by comparing these frameworks and the 
processes that constitute them that I will be able to locate the intergroup dynamics that contribute to the 
Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protraction.  
 
3.4 Theoretical Constraints  
In this research, it is argued that social cognitive processes, and the interaction between them, are vital 
aspects to include if we are to better understand why conflict parties continue to engage in violence and 
deny conflict resolution efforts. This research thus seeks to complement the literature on the conflicts in the 
post-Soviet space, as it focuses on the role intergroup dynamics play in times of conflict protraction. It more 
specifically seeks to explore how the conflict parties process stimuli in the conflict contexts, and how such 
processing leads to and sustains the self/other understandings that they rely on in their interactions. This 
does not imply that there are no constraints when using the theoretical framework established in the previous 
sections. A constraint of this approach is that it re-directs attention from the material motivations for 
behaviour and how these may generate conflict protraction. In the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts there are 
inevitably a plethora of interests that need to be addressed for the conflicts to be resolved. Adding to this is 
also that interests may play a role in shaping behaviour. The understanding among conflict parties that 
interests are not addressed in current agreements may e.g. be a cause for the continued dismissal of conflict 
resolution efforts. Similarly, negative behaviour may be undertaken as conflict parties believe that interests 
are better fulfilled through violence. Here the aid of Russia for the non-state actors, as well as the support 
the non-state actors grant Russia’s actions, may function as a motivation for the conflict parties to continue 
their pursuit of certain interests. As stated in the literature review, the material aspect of the conflicts is of 
essence in understanding why they occurred and to some extent why they continue. If one however takes 
Wendt’s account that interests and identities are mutually constitutive, the pure emphasis on material 
interests does not provide the full picture of the factors that shape the conflicts’ protraction344. This is hence 
were the focus on cognition and how this shapes self/other understandings has merits, although I do 
acknowledge the constraints this approach has in determining motivations for behaviour.  
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This also leads to the question of interpretation and the various forces that may shape these. 
In this research, emphasis is on how the processing of stimuli in specific contexts leads to group identity 
and group interest management. To understand why conflicts occur and become protracted, one should, 
however, also address the role of power. According to Guzzini and Guillaume, there is a tendency in social 
constructivism to exclude power from the equation of interpretations and interactions345. As Guzzini states, 
power functions as the “reflexive link between observation and action”346. This is not something that this 
research denies as power is inevitably linked to cognition and it relates to how the conflict parties seek to 
position themselves within the conflicts and how they interact. The focus of this research is, however, not 
on the role power plays in generating interpretations, but the role that intergroup dynamics play in shaping 
continued negative interactions. A power analysis is of great value for understanding the factors that may 
have caused the conflicts to occur, the power relations that may keep the Ukraine and Georgia conflict 
parties in a deadlock, and why conflict parties e.g. benefit from the continuation of a certain social system347. 
This, however, is not the chosen emphasis of this research, as I seek to explore and explain how intergroup 
dynamics form relations conducive for conflict protraction. This is something which has yet to be addressed 
and it is the gap in the literature that I seek to fill.  
This research also excludes a historical focus and how collective memories have assisted in 
shaping, maintaining, and changing understandings of self and other348. This does not imply that this 
research refutes the influence of history and collective memories, as these too greatly shape the self/other 
understandings that the conflict parties rely on349. As there has already been written a great amount of 
literature on the role history and collective memory plays in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, this is not 
the focus of this research. Furthermore, as this research focuses on the factors that contribute to conflict 
protraction, I have found it of more value to focus on contextuality and how self/other understandings are 
sustained through the processing of occurring stimuli. Stated differently, this research addresses identities 
and interests as a continued dialogue that too needs to be unravelled to explore the forces at play in Ukraine 
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and Georgia350. Although this research excludes history and memory, this does not imply that the approach 
taken is a-historical. In social psychology, self/other understandings are equally treated as “conventions of 
knowing that we have acquired over time”351, as self/other understandings are both outcomes of contextual 
factors as well as pre-set assumptions of self and other. But it does imply that I have decided to focus on 
the interactional aspect of knowledge production to unravel the dynamics that shape conflict protraction 
specifically. What this research cannot account for is thus how self/other understandings arise from power 
struggles or how they sustain because of larger knowledge structures generated over time. It can, however, 
account for is how these understandings sustain from contextual interactions. It is then by combining the 
findings of this research with that of the existing literature that we may gain a more holistic understanding 
of the social knowledge that shapes the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts.  
The focus on intergroup relations is another aspect that needs to be addressed as it leaves out 
the internal dynamics within states/non-states, which may also have a role to play in shaping interpretations. 
Since this research explores how the conflict parties construct group identities and interests, and how these 
processes interact, it portrays the understanding that citizens and leaders unite around a given group identity 
and interest construct. Reality is, however, more diverse as there are social identities within states/non-
states that collide and equally feed into the conflicts352. This should be acknowledged but it should also be 
stated that it has been a conscious decision to exclude the study of intragroup dynamics, as this would 
expand the scope of this research. In future research it would nevertheless be of value to address how 
intragroup dynamics generate or complicate the construction and maintenance of certain group identities 
and interests, and how this shapes intergroup relations. As will be seen in the analysis, this research does 
seek to move beyond the notion that group identities and interests are unified. Hence, although it draws out 
social cognitive frameworks to reach an insight into the intergroup dynamics that shape the conflicts’ 
protraction, these frameworks are approached as dynamic. The findings are thus not final conclusions on 
the group identities and interests present in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, but are used as a means for 
discovering the intergroup processes that shape the dynamics at play. This theoretical framework is thus 
not exhaustive but seeks to offer a specific lens that explores not merely the often-neglected intergroup 
dynamics in times of conflict, but also how interpretations arise from interactions. It is then by exploring 
this that one may explore how social cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics contribute to the 
protraction of the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts.  
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3.5 Conclusion    
This chapter has presented the theories and concepts which will be applied in the analysis of how social 
cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics contribute to the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protraction. 
To this end, this research applies a multidisciplinary approach, which combines social constructivism with 
social psychology. Whereas social constructivism is used as the lens to inform how agents and structures 
are co-constitutive, and the role identities and narratives play in shaping relations, social psychological 
theories are used to inform how self/other understandings arise and change as a result of cognitive 
processes. In this research, I also apply the social psychological sub-field of social cognition, which draws 
in the aspect of contextuality and addresses how self/other understandings arise from the continued 
interpretation of stimuli that arises in given situations. It is with this as the point of departure that this 
research seeks to explore how the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties’ cognitive processing forms, 
sustains, and changes their self/other understandings, and how such processes may lead to conflict 
protraction.  
 To explore this, there is a need to develop a common analytical framework for the study of 
states and non-states. To do so, this research uses a group approach, which focuses on how states/non-states 
as group identities form from group reification processes. To approach states/non-states as group identities 
does not imply that they are units that engage in group think. Instead it emphasises the nature of states and 
non-states as ideational processes where agents come to form group identities and interests, which shape 
their collective behaviour in times of conflict. It is from this understanding that the theoretical chapter 
proceeded to present how self/other understandings arise from social categorisation, social identity 
formation, and attribution. This section presented how conflicts derive from group reification processes that 
result in group identities and interests, and how intergroup relations arise from social comparison between 
groups. It also addressed the theory on protracted conflicts, which argues that conflict protraction occurs as 
the result of cemented self/other understandings. However, rather than merely focusing on how conflict 
protraction occurs as the result of cemented understandings, this research takes a step back to focus on how 
the conflict parties reach their self/other understandings and whether their processing may equally 
contribute to conflict protraction.  
This research therefore takes the point of departure that to understand why the conflicts in 
Ukraine and Georgia continue to persist there is a need to explore the intergroup dynamics that arise 
between the conflict parties as a result of their interacting social cognitive processes. To establish these 
dynamics, one may explore how the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties partition the conflicts into specific 
groups, with specific identities and interests, and the social cognitive frameworks that arise from this. It is 
then from these frameworks that one may analyse the processes that the conflict parties utilize when seeking 
to make sense of and act/react to the stimuli they encounter when interacting with others from a foundation 
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of group reification. By establishing these dynamics, one may gain a better understanding of why the 
conflict parties continue to pursue detrimental behaviour and continue to insist on upholding specific 































4.0. Methods for Analysing Intergroup Dynamics   
In this chapter I present the methods and data used to analyse the Georgia and Ukraine conflict parties’ 
social cognitive processing and the intergroup dynamics that may derive from this. To this end, this chapter 
will address how social cognitive processing relates to groups, and the role group leaders play in 
constructing understandings about the situation, self, and other through their capacity as identity managers. 
It will also explain why the two case studies have been chosen, how the methods of frame and thematic 
analysis can be used to analyse social cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics, and how data has been 
collected.  
 
4.1 Group Identities, Identity Managers, and Conflict Narratives 
The objective of the analysis is to explore how the conflict parties in Ukraine and Georgia reach 
understandings about the conflict situation, self, and other through social cognitive processing, and the 
intergroup dynamics that occur from these interacting processes. Focus is thus on conscious processes353. 
Unlike psychoanalytical research, which explores unconscious processes such as emotions and how these 
steer behaviour354, this research explores how agents consciously make sense of something and someone355. 
To explore such processing, I direct my attention to the conflict parties’ conflict narratives. More 
specifically, the objective is to analyse what the conflict parties are saying and how they structure what they 
are saying, as this gives insight into the processes they apply when seeking to reach structured 
understandings of the situation, self, and other. As stated in the theory chapter, social cognitive processing 
is a human experience that individuals engage in. From the perspective of this research, however, conflicts 
are not only individual experiences, but a collective engagement rooted in intergroup relations where agents 
think and act from a group-prism. Before going into details regarding the methods and data used in this 
research, there is therefore a need to dig into how social cognitive processing relates to group identities and 
particularly group leaders.  
In social psychology there is a general agreement that to experience and produce cognition 
there must be a physical body356. Since cognition occurs as a process within an individual it is argued that 
it is not possible for groups to experience this. Mercer, however, states that psychological processes, such 
as cognition and emotions, do take place in collective settings, but rather than taking place as a bodily 
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experience they occur as social relations357. Drawing on social categorization theory, he argues that 
cognition is not only connected to the biological body but also to the social categories that agents use to 
define themselves and others with358. Therefore, even though cognitive processing depends on a biological 
body to exist, it is not reducible to the body359. Rather, social categorization and social identity is strongly 
linked to cognition as identification is based on a perception of belonging. A shared understanding is what 
make social constructs such as group identities seem “real” and of importance360. A group is therefore not 
a biological body nor a collectively assembled organ capable of producing a thought or feeling, which 
instinctively transcends to all agents within this constellation361. Rather, in a group context, cognitions are 
socially contagious processes that occur when agents discover that events and issues impinge on their group 
identity and its attached values and norms362. To reach collective cognitions, group members rely on group 
structures (such as group roles and norms), which give them the ability to think, feel, and behave 
collectively363. One of such structures is the reliance on group leaders to produce a dominant narrative about 
a situation, including an understanding of who the group is within the situation, who it is confronted with, 
and thus how in-group members should think and act. In this sense, cognition becomes a structural 
engagement as group leaders reach a collective interpretation on behalf of a group, based on the expressed 
group identity and interests thought to unite them and their group members. In situations of collective 
action, cognition hence still arises within the individual. However, here leaders will communicate and 
compare cognitions to reach a collective understanding of a given situation and of how it should be 
approached.  
Such an approach is also found in IR where scholars point to how leaders utilize identity 
discourses in times of e.g. conflict364. This approach is often rooted in the understanding that there is a 
hierarchy between leaders and citizens, as leaders construct the self-understanding that citizens of a state 
abide to365. In social psychology, however, identity construction is not an outcome that derives from a 
hierarchical relationship between leaders and members but from a reciprocal relationship. What this implies 
is that group identities are not constructed in isolation but in connection to the actual, imagined, and implied 
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producer[…]tries to consolidate both an external and internal self through the creation of an identity 
discourse aimed equally at individuals within the state and other state-identities surrounding it”366. The 
construction of a group identity is not the sole outcome of leaders’ cognitive processing. It is an interactive 
process where leaders construct sense making through the processing of stimuli that their group members 
and others generate, whilst group members adopt or reinforce this sense making by processing the stimuli 
that their leaders and others generate. As Lührmann and Eberl state, this also means that group identities 
and interests are rarely the sole outcome of leaders’ actions or personal identities367. Leaders instead seek 
to match or enhance a social identity that they perceive exists within a society368. Sense making about a 
situation, self, and other forms from a leadership-member relationship, where both leaders and members 
seek to reinforce the prototypes associated with the group identity that has been mobilized in the situation369. 
The construction of groups is therefore a somewhat mutual endeavour which is managed (and not dictated) 
by leaders370.  
This understanding links to the work of Anstee who focuses on the role political elites as 
representatives of their states play in shaping and managing identities371. In her work, Anstee points to how 
a state does not abide to one identity but inhabits and represents transnational identities and a compilation 
of domestic identity constructs372. There are multiple social identities that can shape understandings of self 
and other, and so it becomes the role of leaders to manage the cognitive systematization that they and their 
members should abide to when making sense of a situation373. This implies that identity management 
involves the reification of groups as leaders will point to which group identities are of “contextual 
relevance”, resulting in specific social identities becoming more salient in certain situations374. Identity 
management is about internal power as leaders do not necessarily seek to manage the behaviour of members 
per se but manage the members’ understanding of self and other375. It thus becomes the role of leaders to 
manage in-group members through the establishment of the official discourse surrounding a situation376. 
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From a conflict perspective, this links to the understanding that conflicts are collective endeavours which 
involve, as well as rely on, an interaction between leaders and members. As Bar-Tal states:  
 
Although leaders often make the decisions, society members are an inherent part of these conflicts as they 
have been mobilized for participation[…]Leaders and their followers thus form a socio-psychological 
repertoire[…]that lead to conflicts and their escalation, and both must change in order to deescalate and 
terminate the conflicts377 
 
To explore how and why conflicts become protracted there is a need to approach these situations as 
collective situations and acknowledge that leaders are not agents who automatically steer the thoughts and 
behaviour of their citizens. Leaders are group identity managers who manage the official discourse 
connected to the conflict, and through this sets the ideational foundation for citizens’ understanding of the 
conflict, self, and other. This ideational foundation then plays a significant role in guiding leaders’ and 
citizens’ thoughts and behaviour. Group identity management is hence an essential aspect of conflicts 
because as further stated by Bar-Tal: “The fundamental point thus in understanding the dynamics of 
conflicts is not their eruption but the way they are handled”378. The focus on identity managers is also of 
relevance in this research, as this concept presents “who” is speaking and where cognition arises from. 
Hence, rather than treating social cognitive processing as the outcome of group think, this research draws 
emphasis on leaders and how they come to think on behalf of, and to some extent construct, the groups that 
they claim to represent. The concept of identity managers allows me to explore who is processing stimuli 
and who to a great extent is upholding certain structured understandings of a situation, self, and other. It 
also allows me to approach the construction of understandings as a mutual endeavour between leaders and 
citizens, as citizens adopt (or are meant to adopt) the understandings their leaders produce and/or feed into 
these understandings through the stimuli that the citizens themselves produce. This research hence 
approaches social cognitive processing, and the social cognitive frameworks that arise and sustain, as 
managed processes.  
Leaders play a pivotal part in conflicts as it becomes their role to cognitively systematise the 
conflict and provide a narrative that justifies and explains the occurrence and continuation of the conflict. 
A narrative refers to “a story about an event or events that has a plot with a clear starting point and end-
point, providing sequential and causal coherence about the world and/or a group’s experience”379. When 
studying narratives, scholars have done so from amongst other the individual level where focus is on the 
life stories that provide a sense of meaning and offers a chronological overview and purpose to an 
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individual’s life380. On the group level, narratives are treated as social constructs consisting of interrelated 
events, which account for a group’s collective experience and represents the shared identity381. Such 
narratives assist in creating and negotiating reality and they construct agents as socially specific persons 
from which they understand themselves382. This is also a reason for the complexity of changing narratives 
as these pertain to both a group identity’s existence but also an individual’s self-understanding383. This 
research takes the group approach to narratives as focus is on how leaders form and sustain conflict 
narratives that their citizens come to think and act in accordance with. As stated, this does not mean that I 
approach citizens as agents who automatically abide to these narratives. As Bar-Tal states, there is often an 
element of narrative engagement as citizens navigate several narratives and as a result may challenge the 
narrative their leaders communicate384. However, rather than exploring how narratives are contested within 
a group identity, I draw attention to how leaders of the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties’ construct 
social cognitive frameworks, and how these form conflict narratives that shape continued negative 
interactions between the conflict parties. This also means that I explore the official conflict narratives. 
Emphasis is not on a leader’s personal beliefs nor is the aim to explore if a conflict narrative is true or false, 
or if it derives from personal interests. Focus is on the role leaders play in shaping official narratives and 
how such narratives may contribute to conflict protraction. To this end, I explore what the leaders are saying 
as this gives an insight into the processes they use to reach an understanding about the situation, self, and 
other, and the processes that come to shape the conflict parties’ intergroup dynamics. 
  
4.2 Analysing the Steps of Social Cognitive Processing 
To analyse the social cognitive processes that lead to conflict narratives, one must explore the cognitive 
steps that allow identity managers to process and compartmentalise stimuli they encounter. As established, 
when engaging in a situation, agents will be confronted by various stimuli (social information such as words 
uttered, behaviour performed etc), which they need to decipher to position themselves and others in a 
cognitive framework from which they can act/react. In social cognitive research, the processing of stimuli 
is approached as a series of steps. When confronted with stimulus, an observer will first seek to deconstruct 
this stimulus by breaking it into nodes. These nodes will then be compartmentalised into schemas, which 
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function as the components that shape the social cognitive frameworks385. According to Huesmann, the 
human memory is a network of nodes and links, which represent certain encoded propositions that become 
activated when an agent is confronted with stimulus386. These nodes and links refer to concepts that agents 
activate and use to make sense of what they are confronted with387. A node may e.g. be a social category 
such as “Russians”, it may be a topic such as “genocide”, and it may be a feature such as “hostile”. Links 
are determinants that link these concepts together such as “are” or “is not”. The nodes that an agent activates 
may derive from previous experiences, or knowledge, and so some may be pre-used concepts that the agent 
once again applies for sense making388. The social category “a Russian” may e.g. be a node that has gained 
its characteristics over the years and one that is constantly reused for sense making. The topic of “genocide” 
may only have arisen into consciousness in recent years, as the agent has been exposed to or experienced 
certain types of behaviour, which it now can characterise as genocide. An agent can, however, also construct 
new nodes in a situation if what it is confronted with does not correlate with anything it has 
seen/experienced before389. In such a case an agent may rely on social categorisation in order to group 
stimuli into specific concepts. Nodes can hence be pre-set concepts that are reactivated, or they may be new 
concepts that agents form by processing the stimuli they encounter. Once a node has been activated this 
may spread to other nodes through various links390. The initial step of social cognitive processing thus 
involves the identification of stimuli traits, which allows the observer to interpret what is going on and who 
or what it is confronted with391. Although node activation occurs from linked concepts, there is no hierarchy 
between them as they make up a web392.  
From the activation of nodes, the observer will compartmentalise these nodes into schemas, 
which are mental frameworks agents rely on to interpret and organise information. According to Huesmann, 
a schema refers to any “macro knowledge structure[…]that represents substantial knowledge about a 
concept, its attributes, and its relations to other concepts”393. Schemas constitute of interlinked nodes and 
they are used to infer about situation, self, and others where they are referred to as a self-schema, situation-
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schema394 and other-schema395. Schemas are organized knowledge rooted in generalisations or propositions 
about the concept being observed and inferred about (e.g. a self-schema may be rooted in a proposition that 
“I am friendly”)396. They are thus not merely an understanding of a given concept but are also used in times 
of attribution processing as attributions are influenced by existing schemas397. Schemas form a packaged 
knowledge about someone or something and they are used to inform agents about what to expect from a 
certain individual/group and/or situation398. When a string of schemas (such as a situation-schema, self-
schema, and other-schema) are activated in relation to each other, this results in a social cognitive 
framework, which refers to both declarative and procedural knowledge399. A social cognitive framework is 
a constellation of schemas that combined serve as a script for how agents should think and act in a 






Figure 1: The steps of social cognitive processing and the construction of a social cognitive framework 
To understand how conflict parties process stimuli, one may explore what kind of nodes and links the 
identity managers activate in their conflict narratives, and the schemas and frameworks they construct from 
these nodes and their compartmentalisation. This reveals the processes used for reaching structured 
meanings of a conflict, self, and other. These processes and how they interact can then be explored to 
unravel the dynamics that shape the conflict parties’ relations. This is also the objective of my analysis as I 
apply a thematic and frame analysis to explore the cognitive steps that form the conflict narratives 
communicated in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts.  
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4.2.1 Thematic Analysis 
A central feature when analysing social cognitive processes is to infer what kind of nodes are activated in 
the processing of stimuli. Since nodes relate to concepts, one may approach these as “themes”. When 
exploring which nodes are activated as part of a conflict party’s social cognitive processing, one may focus 
on which themes run as patterned meaning through the conflict party’s conflict narrative. To do so, one 
may apply a thematic analysis. Thematic analysis is a qualitative method that has been widely applied in 
psychology as a tool for exploring how agents cognitively process the social world401. According to Braun 
and Clarke, a thematic analysis “is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) 
within data”402. Such an analysis is used for exploring patterns in verbal communication for the purpose of 
unfolding sense making. The use of a thematic analysis may be either inductive or theoretical403. If used 
inductively the themes located will function as part of theory development404. A theoretical thematic 
analysis is, on the other hand, rooted in a theoretical framework, where discovered themes are explained 
through the chosen theoretical prism405. This research is based on the latter as it explains the conflict parties’ 
social cognitive processing by situating the themes explored, within the theories and concepts discussed in 
the theory chapter.  
The aim of a thematic analysis is to “locate” themes within a given text. According to 
Boyatzis: “A theme is a pattern found in the information that at minimum describes and organizes the 
possible observations and at a maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon”406. When exploring themes, 
the researcher goes through three phases, which are: 1) recognising an “important moment” in the text 2) 
encoding this moment and 3) interpreting its meaning and function407. A theme is not necessarily located 
through the occurrence of a word. It may also be recognised by reading a sentence or a paragraph, and 
interpreting what the overall theme or topic of this paragraph is. An example of this is from the dataset of 
this research and a quote from the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Information and Press Department regarding 
the election day for the Russian Duma in September 2016. In this paragraph the department stated that: 
“Kiev’s attempts to present ultimatums to Russia and to tie up the opening of polling stations in Ukraine to 
elections in Crimea are ridiculous. Crimea is an inalienable part of Russia, and any decision to hold elections 
there is the exclusive right of the Russian Federation”408. In this paragraph one may interpret the overall 
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theme as “belonging” since the Russian identity managers refer to how Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia 
and how, from this understanding of belonging, Russia may engage in certain behaviour within this 
territory. Another theme is the “disruption of truth” as the Russian identity managers process the Ukrainian 
identity managers as wrongfully trying to present the opening of polling stations in Crimea as similar to 
opening them in Ukraine. The Russian identity managers hence process the Ukrainian identity managers as 
agents who are trying to distort the truth about who Crimea belongs to, and how one should interpret the 
behaviour that occurs in the context of the election based on this understanding. Themes may thus be located 
in words, sentences, and paragraphs and regardless of their ‘origin’ the overall function is that they present 
a, in the case of this research, given understanding about the conflict and conflict parties involved. 
 When exploring themes, I only look for themes related to the conflict situation (how did the 
conflict occur, who is involved, and how to solve it), the conflict parties understanding of self (who are we 
and what motivates us in the conflict ) and their understanding of the other (who are they and what motivates 
them in the conflict). The thematic analysis will focus on how the conflict parties use language to shape 
and maintain a narrative about the conflict, self, and other in this context, and it proceeds as follows: 
1. First, I read a text to familiarise myself with it and get an overview of themes immediately visible409. 
This is done to familiarise myself with how a text proceeds and to prevent “reading in” themes, 
which do not correspond with the sentences and paragraphs that emerge further down the page. It 
is also done to see whether a text addresses issues concerning the conflict and sense making of the 
situation, self, and other. If there are not any locatable references to this, the text is discarded.  
2. If a text deals with the conflict and/or the conflict parties, I proceed to exploring what themes can 
be interpreted from the different words, sentences, and paragraphs within the text. Such themes 
may e.g. be: “intergroup conflict”, “genocide”, “belonging”, “history”. The themes are coded using 
the Nvivo 11 pro software, which is the software used to store texts, analyse directly into these 
texts, and generate an overview of the themes analysed. 
3. Once I have analysed all texts within the dataset, I streamline the themes. This is done to delete 
themes which have only occurred once within the dataset, and to amalgamate themes that are 
similar. Each theme is given a short description.  
From this analysis, I gain an overview of the various themes that run through the conflict parties’ conflict 
narratives and an understanding of the nodes that the identity managers activate when processing stimuli. 
The exploration of nodes eventually offers a foundation for exploring the schemas that constitute the 
conflict parties’ social cognitive frameworks. The result of the thematic analyses can be found in appendix 
7 (Thematic Analysis Georgia – Themes) and appendix 8 (Thematic Analysis Ukraine – Themes).  
 
409 Please refer to the section on “primary data” for a more elaborate description of how texts were selected for the 
thematic and frame analysis. 
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4.2.2 Frame Analysis 
To explore the final steps of the conflict parties’ social cognitive processing, I analyse how they 
compartmentalise nodes into situation-, self-, and other-schemas. To explore the conflict parties’ schemas, 
I focus on how they construct frames using their most salient themes410. In the field of social cognition, 
frames are treated as a system of classifications “that allow us to ‘locate, perceive, identify and label’ the 
diverse phenomena we encounter through the course of our lives”411. Framing thus refers to the 
schematisation of stimulus and it is a daily activity as agents “frame reality in order to negotiate it, manage 
it, comprehend it, and choose appropriate repertoires of cognition and action”412. The use of frames allows 
an agent to structure social information, so this information becomes more tangible. To explore frames is 
therefore to explore how the conflict parties structure conflict stimulus into schemas, which come to 












Despite the academic agreement that frames shape cognition, there is a disagreement in both IR and social 
psychological literature whether frames are interactive or structural. Within the literature on cognition, 
frames are often treated as cognitive structures stored in memory413. From this, frames are pre-given 
understandings that agents apply or activate when making sense of various situations414. In sociology and 
 
410 The most salient themes are themes that have emerged most often in the conflict parties’ conflict narratives. I 
decided to draw my attention to the most salient themes as their continued occurrence implies that they hold a 
central place within the conflict parties’ sense making. The selection of salient themes may, however, be susceptible 
to personal biases, which is elaborated in the methodological constraint section. 
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Figure 2: The link between themes, frames, and schemas 
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anthropology, frames are interactional as they are negotiated and formed in interactions with others415. 
Unlike structured frames, interactive frames arise within given situations and so instead of being pre-given 
understandings, such frames function as contextual understandings416. In this research, frames will be 
approached as a combination of both interactive and structural systems of classifications, as it may be 
argued that frames are formed from both ideational structures and contextual encounters. If one applies this 
to the conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia, this implies that when processing stimuli, identity managers will 
not merely rely on pre-set understandings generated from stored memory and shared understandings (such 
as norms and past experiences), but also form understandings based on the interactions they have with 
others in the conflicts. This also correlates with the focus on the social cognitive processing steps, where 
agents activate (construct or re-use) certain nodes that either derive from memory or from the 
compartmentalisation of stimuli in the context they find themselves. In this research, frames are hence both 
interactive and structural as behaviour is an outcome of the co-constitution between structures and agents.  
 To unravel how the conflict parties construct schemas, I could have applied several methods 
including discourse analysis. Frame analysis and discourse analysis draw on many similarities and frame 
analysis may be viewed as a type of discourse analysis417. Both methods pertain to the analysis of discourse 
and both are used to explore “how ideas, culture, and ideology are used, interpreted, and spliced together 
with certain situations or phenomena in order to construct particular ideative patterns through which the 
world is understood by audiences”418. From the outset, both methods are of use when analysing sense 
making and how sense making results in constructed social realities419. Where they differ is that discourse 
analysis is primarily used to study how texts reproduce or challenge dominant understandings of reality420. 
Frame analysis is used to analyse how agents “locate, perceive, identify and label” the stimuli that they 
encounter421. Whereas discourse analysis generally is used to explore the components of pre-set 
understandings, frame analysis allows me to explore the processes that lead to understandings, as frame 
analysis can pin-point how stimuli is sorted into cognitive schemas422. It hence allows me to interpret how 
 
415 Art Dewulf, Barbara Gray, Linda Putnam, Roy Lewicki, Noelle Aarts, Rene Bouwen and Cees van Woerkum. 
"Disentangling approaches to framing in conflict and negotiation research: A meta-paradigmatic perspective." 
Human relations 62, no 2 (2009): 156 
416 Deborah Tannen and Cynthia Wallat. "Interactive frames and knowledge schemas in interaction: Examples from 
a medical examination/interview." Social psychology quarterly 50, no. 2 (1987): 206 
417 Lasse Lindekilde “Discourse and Frame Analysis” in Methodological Practices in Social Movement Research, 
Ed. Donatella della Port (Oxford University Press, 2014), 195 
418 Lindekilde “Discourse and Frame Analysis”, 196 
419 Lindekilde “Discourse and Frame Analysis”, 200; and Amy Lynn Fletcher, “Clearing the Air: The Contribution 
of Frame Analysis to Understanding Climate Policy in the United States.” Environmental Politics 18, no 5 (2009): 
802 
420 Lindekilde “Discourse and Frame Analysis”, 198 
421 Jenny Kitzinger. "Framing and frame analysis." in Media studies: Key issues and debates. Ed. Eoin Devereux. 
(Sage, 2007), 135 
422 Johnston, “A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive Schemata”, Ibid, 219 
71 
 
the conflict parties compartmentalise salient themes/nodes into frames/schemas. Framing also allows me to 
gain an insight into how discourses are used with the aim of mobilising others. According to Entman, to 
frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text” 423. Such salience may be pursued from various objectives, albeit the primary one is to reach a cognitive 
systematisation of something/someone to have a social cognitive framework from which one may think and 
act. Adding to this is also, as Lindekilde states, that frames tend to be used to convince audiences of adopting 
a certain interpretation424. Framing is therefore not an unconscious endeavour but a conscious activity that 
is context and goal directed425. This correlates with this research’s emphasis on identity managers and how 
state/non-state leaders construct conflict narratives, which are meant to mobilise their members and justify 
and explain behaviour in the conflict contexts.  
 To analyse how the conflict parties compartmentalise their most salient themes into frames, 
I focus on what they are saying when they use certain themes. Focus is on how e.g. the conflict parties 
combine themes such as “annexation” and “intergroup conflict” to interpret what is going on and who they 
are confronted with. The aim of the frame analysis is therefore not to explore how the conflict parties make 
sense of a theme per se, but how they combine themes to form a schematic understanding of the situation, 
self, and other. An example of this is from the Ukraine data set where Petro Poroshenko on May 2018 stated 
that: “We hate the stereotype, as if we are part of the Soviet or Russian empire. Our past is related to Europe. 
We are trying to get back to the European family right now”426. Here themes such as “history”, “belonging”, 
and “Russification” are combined to form an understanding of who Ukrainians are and what they want. In 
this quote, Poroshenko is speaking on behalf of the agents who identify as Ukrainian in the conflict, but he 
is also managing the Ukrainian identity as he presents the social origin of this identity, and the general 
ambitions that drive agents who identify as Ukrainian. In this sentence, the Ukraine identity is framed as 
one which for years has been mis-identified as part of the Russian identity, and it is through these combined 
themes that Poroshenko points to how Ukrainians now have an ambition of ridding themselves of this false 
Russian identification. A frame analysis may therefore be used to gain an insight into how nodes are 
combined into schemas. It is then by combining these schemas that I get an understanding of the social 
cognitive frameworks that are used for interpretation and narrative production in the conflicts427. By 
focusing on how the conflict parties reach their social cognitive frameworks through node activation and 
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Exploring the use of themes and frames gives an indication of the processes used for sense making in the 
conflicts. It is by exploring these processes that I get an indication of the intergroup dynamics that contribute to 
the conflicts' protraction
Frame Analysis 
Explores how salient themes are used to frame the 
situation, self, and other. 
Frames give an indication of the schemas that make up 
the social cognitive frameworks
Thematic Analysis 
Explores the themes that run as patterned meanings 
through the texts
Most salient themes give an indication of the nodes 
activated in the conflict narratives
Figure 3: The Analysis Steps of this Research 
schema production, I will eventually be able to locate the processes that they rely on. It is then by exploring 
the processes from each conflict party, and how these interact, that I may define the intergroup dynamics 













Since the frame analysis refers to the analysis chapters of this dissertation, they can be found on page 87-
155 (Ukraine conflict case) and page 156-218 (Georgia conflict case). For a codebook of the frame analysis 
please consult appendix 9 (codebook for Georgia analysis) and appendix 10 (codebook for Ukraine 
analysis)  
 
4.3 Conflict Cases and Conflict Parties 
This research focuses on two case studies: the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. Here, a case study is treated 
as “not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied”, which is defined by the “boundaries 
around places and time”428. A case study is hence a choice of topic. Focus is more specifically on cases of 
protracted conflicts that are bound by the timeframe from when these conflicts occurred, and up until the 
end-point of data collection for this research (for Ukraine it is 2014-2018 and for Georgia it is 1990-2018). 
They are also bound by the geographical places where they take place (Ukraine and Georgian/South 
Ossetian territory). The use of case studies is not meant to be theory building but explanatory, as focus is 
on how come the conflicts are protracted. The cases are also rooted in deductive reasoning as they are 
approached from the understanding that the forces that shape conflict protraction, may amongst other be 
found by unravelling the conflict parties’ social cognitive processing. The aim of the analysis is then to 
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explore how such processing occurs and interacts and how this may contribute to the conflicts’ protraction. 
Although I have decided to focus on two cases, this research could have been based on a single case study, 
which would have allowed for a more in-depth analysis of the processes at play in the specific case. I, 
however, chose to engage with two case studies who share certain similarities to draw out commonalities 
of conflict protraction429. This does not imply that I seek to draw out general dynamics of protracted 
conflicts but that each conflict case offers insights into how processes shape conflicting and opposed 
self/other understandings. The reason for choosing these two cases is that they represent cases of protracted 
conflicts that have occurred within the post-Soviet space. They hence speak to a personal interest in this 
area and in protracted conflicts, but they also form an opportunity to add to the growing literature on 
conflicts in this area by exploring their less-explored dynamics. There are several conflicts in the post-
Soviet space that could be subject to this analysis, such as the one between Moldova and Transnistria430. 
The reason for choosing Ukraine and Georgia is that these conflicts have experienced the most recent 
outbursts of violence and direct Russian interference (Georgia in 2008431 and Ukraine in 2014432). They 
thus offer new data on conflicts in the post-Soviet space and new data on how relations have developed 
between Russia and the other conflict parties. Additionally, the recent outbursts of violence have occurred 
during a time when the conflict parties have been connected via online media. Compared to conflicts which 
saw significant developments primarily in the early 1990s, there is in the Ukraine and Georgia cases a range 
of accessible online data, which may give a “fresh” insight into the conflict parties’ social cognitive 
processing. The choice of case studies was thus based on access to data and from an observation that the 
two cases offer an opportunity to dig deeper into protracted conflicts, which continue to shape developments 
in the post-Soviet space.  
The conflict parties chosen are the Ukraine government, Russian government, Georgian 
government, de-facto South Ossetian government, and the Donetsk People’s Republic. These have been 
selected because they are the ones who lay claim to certain physical spaces, needs and rights, and they are 
the ones with the most consistent presence in the conflicts. This does not imply that there are not any other 
parties with a role to play in shaping the conflicts. But it does imply that these parties are the ones that have 
the most leverage in shaping the conflict situation, as it is amongst other their actions and cooperation which 
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is required for the conflicts to end. Choosing which conflict parties to analyse thus meant the decision to 
exclude others. In the Ukraine case, I decided to exclude the Luhansk Peoples Republic. This was driven 
by the difficulty to locate English content from the Luhansk representatives, which would enable me to 
produce a substantial argument about their social cognitive processing. I also decided to exclude the 
Crimean representatives as this areas’ inclusion/annexation under the Russian Federation questions the 
extent to which the Crimean representatives speak on behalf of Crimea433. The decision to exclude Crimea 
was also made as I wanted to focus on violent behaviour as seen between Russia, Ukraine, and the non-
state actors in Donbass. In the Georgia case, I decided to exclude Abkhazia as Georgia often treats the 
conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as the same, making Georgia’s social cognitive processing 
around the two non-states intertwined434. This Georgian tendency questions the possibility of acquiring 
insights which would not be locatable in an exclusive analysis of South Ossetia. This does not imply that I 
regard Abkhazia and South Ossetia as conflict parties that act from a similar social cognitive framework. 
Rather, it is an analytical choice made to make the analysis more concise and avoid expanding my research 
with a case, which would not provide any substantial new insight into intergroup dynamics in Georgia.  
Another party excluded, and which arguably assists in shaping the conflicts, is the EU435. 
When exploring how Georgia and Ukraine make sense of the EU, it becomes noticeable that the EU is 
treated in a similar way as the non-state actors in Donbass and South Ossetia treat Russia, namely as an 
external party whose assistance is vital for identity construction. Where the EU and Russia, however, differ 
is that Russia is treated as a conflict party by Georgia and Ukraine. The EU, on the other hand, is not treated 
as a conflict party by any of the Georgia and Ukraine conflict parties but largely as an external negotiation 
partner. As I wish to focus on conflict parties, and not third parties, the EU has thus been excluded. Others 
excluded include non-state actors in Ukraine such as the Right Sector436, Azov Battalion437, and the Berkut 
units438 (this pertains to both the Berkut units which were active during Maidan, but later dissolved by the 
interim government, and the Berkut units which defected to Crimea439). Although these play a significant 
role in the conflict’s development, it may be argued that they are not conflict parties per se but non-state 
actors that support specific conflict parties. They hence represent additional tracks in the conflict, and they 
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are of relevance if we are to understand how the official conflict narrative in Ukraine has formed. Since 
focus here, however, is not on how identity managers construct narratives in regards to the expressed 
grievances or beliefs that occur within their society, but how the official understanding of the situation, self, 
and other interacts with the other conflict parties sense making, these groups are also excluded from my 
research. An exploration of their social cognitive processing would however be of interest in future studies 
pertaining to how intragroup dynamics shape developments within Ukraine. The choice of conflict parties 
was thus made in relation to those deemed most relevant in terms of shaping and changing conflict 
dynamics. It was also based on a wish to present a substantial research design which could provide an 
account of intergroup dynamics in Ukraine and Georgia, whilst staying within the dissertation’s word count 
requirement.  
Another consideration made for this research design is “who” the different identity managers 
are. In this research, I identify identity managers as individuals who officially represent the states and non-
state actors that I have, in the previous section, recognised as conflict parties in the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflicts. Given that focus is on official representatives, the individuals under scrutiny include e.g. 
Presidents, Prime Ministers, representatives at organisations such as the UN and OSCE, but also institutions 
such as Foreign Ministries. The identity managers are hence agents and institutions which are connected to 
a government or de-facto government, and which seek to present the conflict party’s official conflict 
narrative. When talking about Russia’s identity managers, e.g. this does not refer to Russian citizens, the 
Russian opposition, the Russian parliament, nor the Russian civil society. Rather, when analysing Russia, 
I analyse the narratives e.g. Vladimir Putin and the Russian Foreign Ministry communicate, and I treat their 
narratives as part of the official narrative “Russia” relies on in the conflict. I do therefore not focus solely 
on Presidents but on a collection of agents who collectively work together to present a unified and consistent 
approach towards the conflict. This approach also applies to the non-state actors where identity managers 
refer to the leaders, ministries, and spokesmen of the South Ossetian de-facto government and the Donetsk 
People’s Republic440. In the case of Russia, it could be argued that media such as RT reflect Russia’s official 
narrative and hence there is ground for including such media as identity managers. Since, however, it is 
difficult to locate “who” is speaking on RT, and the extent to which this media is an extension of the Russian 
government, or a media that seeks to follow the narrative produced by Russia’s government, I have decided 
not to include this, or any other media, as “identity managers”. Focus is therefore only on sources explicitly 
linked to a government or a republic.  
 
 
440 This opens a debate about the extent to which e.g. the DPR leaders have been democratically elected by the 
members they claim to represent. For the sake of not expanding the research design with an analysis of how the 
different representatives came to power, I will have to rely on the conflict parties’ own proclamation of 
representatives as being their actual leadership. 
76 
 
4.4 Data  
Data used for this research have been collected from online sources. One part of the dataset has been 
collected from the homepage of the conflict party representatives, i.e. Presidents, Foreign Ministries and 
Republic441. Another part includes data from media and organisations and conflict timelines produced by 
the research institutes of CSIS and IISS442. All data collected have been produced in English as I do not 
possess the skills to translate Ukrainian, Georgian, Russian, or Ossetian sources. This has restrained my 
research, as I have had to exclude the Luhansk People’s Republic from my research and had to rely on 
official translations. These translations have been provided by the conflict parties as they were published 
on their respective homepages. I thus base my analysis on data written in English by the conflict parties 
themselves. The reliance on English content has meant that the retrieval of data has been smaller than would 
be the case if I spoke the conflict parties’ languages. I have sought to compensate for this by collecting a 
substantial amount of data from the conflict parties’ own homepages. Also, although the reliance on English 
versions meant using data that may omit cultural distinctiveness, the fact that the conflict parties have 
produced these English texts, means that they are equally a part of the official narrative that the parties 
communicate to the outside world. This does not mean that there cannot be instances of mistranslation or 
the use of incorrect words. Since English is not the native language of either of the conflict parties, there is 
a risk that they have mistranslated aspects of their narratives. This has implications for this research as I 
run the risk of interpreting the conflict parties’ narratives, and hereof their social cognitive processing, 
incorrectly. However, given that I have sought to rely on large amounts of data stretching over a couple of 
years, this does grant the conflict parties the time to correct any misuse of words/expressions that may have 
occurred. Also, since I am not seeking to establish what the identity managers, or their represented groups 
as a collective, “actually think” but how the identity managers communicate their reached understandings, 
this implies that I am exploring how they present themselves and others to the outside world. I am thus to 
a great extent relying on the same form of communication that the other conflict parties rely on when they 
seek to infer the identity and intensions of the other. The official narratives are therefore an essential part 
from the perspective of understanding the dynamics that occur between the conflict parties in the official 
conflict setting. Stated differently, whereas Russian or Georgian texts may be regarded as texts targeting 
group members, the English texts (including mistranslated English texts) target a wider audience including 
most importantly the other conflict parties.  
The timeframe used for my data collection is in the case of Ukraine 2013-2018 and Georgia 
1990-2018. The reason for establishing these timeframes is because 2013 and 1990 are generally 
approached in academia, and by the conflict parties themselves, as the onset of the conflicts. The date for 
 
441 Elaborated in the section on primary sources   
442 Elaborated in the section on conflict timelines 
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the onset of the conflicts are, however, also disputed by some of the conflict parties, which is further 
discussed in the analysis. Nevertheless, 1990 and 2013 are times when conflict related events began to be 
reported in the media and on the conflict parties’ own homepages. In the Georgia case, 1990 is also the 
furthest one can go back in terms of online sources, as some of the news articles from these early years 
have been transferred to online media. Due to the limited access to online sources in the Georgia case from 
1990 to approximately 2002, I also rely on reports from media and organisations to get a sense of how the 
conflict has progressed and the main events reported. It is also due to this that the Georgia analysis primarily 
focuses on the timeframe from 2008-2018. The year of 2018 is the end year for both datasets, as this is 
when I ended my data collection. Although several developments and events have occurred following 2018, 
which are of equal relevance to this study, I have had to limit my collection to this end-date, as 2019 was 
spent on the analysis and the final writing of the dissertation.  
 
4.4.1 Conflict Timelines 
The initial phase of my data collection centred around the construction of an overview of how the conflicts 
have progressed, as I wanted to get an overview that could provide the necessary context for conducting 
the thematic and frame analysis. To get an overview of how the conflicts progressed, I directed my attention 
to the conflict timelines been created by the CSIS443 (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and the 
Armed Conflict Database444 of IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). These are timelines 
which, more or less, give a day-to-day account of the events that have unfolded during the conflicts and 
insight into other conflict-related information such as number of casualties. Both databases are based on 
media reporting. Whereas the IISS database offers an overview of the main events that have unfolded within 
a week or month (based on the analysis of media reporting), the CSIS timeline is a chronological 
compilation of news articles. Although these timelines give a good overview of how the conflicts have 
progressed, and the key stimuli to be aware off, they were not always elaborate. I hence supplemented the 
timelines with my own media monitoring. The timelines established for this research are therefore a 
compilation of the news reporting that the CSIS and IISS have referred to, as well as news reporting I have 
located from my own media monitoring. In the initial phase of data collection, I thus relied and expanded 
on the CSIS and IISS timelines, which resulted in the creation of my own timelines.  
Constructing timelines is a sensitive matter as a central issue in the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflicts is a disagreement over when the conflicts started and what their characteristics are. The reason for 
 
443 “The Ukraine Crisis Timeline.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Accessed October 15, 2019. 
http://ukraine.csis.org/. 




constructing conflict timelines was not to establish the ‘true’ progression of the conflicts. It was to gain a 
better overview of e.g. the signing of ceasefires which one needs to know about to understand what 
agreements the conflict parties have signed but continue to fail in implementing. It was also to gain an 
understanding of key stimuli such as the events in 2008 in Georgia or the creation of the anti-terror operation 
in Ukraine, which the conflict parties refer to in their conflict narratives. In this sense, the timelines 
functioned as a foundation for exploring the stimuli that the conflict parties rely on in their social cognitive 
processing. The timelines were also used to gain insight into the overall changes that may have occurred 
within the conflict parties’ conflict narratives, and they offered an opportunity to collect additional “texts” 
for the analyses. When reading through media sources it was possible to locate quotes that the conflict 
parties have not replicated in texts published on their own homepages. This offered an opportunity to 
expand the dataset by e.g. including short statements given to the media following negotiations, or other 
short reactions made in connection to certain events. Using quotes from media sources runs the risk of 
including quotes that have been reconstructed or misquoted, hereby making these a false replication of the 
conflict parties’ conflict narratives. To reduce this risk, I have only included quotes that were directly 
referenced as quotes (with quotation marks) and have refrained from including quotes paraphrased by the 
media445. Apart from media, I also relied on reporting from different organisations such as the Jamestown 
Foundation and the OSCE. The reason for relying on organisational reporting was to acquire a better 
understanding of particularly developments in the Georgia conflict which has, in comparison to the Ukraine 
conflict, had limited media coverage prior to 2008 and following 2009/2010 where the conflict diminished 
in terms of news appeal. These reports have not been taken at face value. Such reports have been treated in 
a similar manner as news reports i.e. they have been used to get an insight into key events and additional 
quotes made by the conflict representatives.  
One also needs to address the issue that the media sources used in my own and the CSIS and 
IISS timelines are media sources from both the “West” and Russia. When using such media to infer about 
events that have unfolded, one runs the risk of using media that report from a certain objective. This 
particularly pertains to media such as TASS, Sputnik news, and Russia Today, which are known to be 
biased446. To avoid expanding the timelines with false reporting, I have sought to use a wide range of media 
sources and whenever possible verified reporting in one media with another. I have also checked media 
reporting against academic sources. I could have relied on purely “Western” media but as the objective of 
 
445 By using quotes that have been referenced using quotation marks one still runs the risk of including misquotes. 
To not expand the analysis with a search for whether statements are properly quoted in the media, I have had to 
place my trust in the correct quotation of the media. As stated, media quotes are not the primary source of this 
research and their usage in the analysis have therefore been minimum.  
446 Ilya Yablokov, "Conspiracy theories as a Russian public diplomacy tool: The case of Russia Today (RT)." 
Politics 35, no 3-4 (2015): 301-315 
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my data collection was to locate the conflict parties’ conflict narratives, and not merely the media reporting 
of their narratives, the reliance on various media allowed me to locate statements from e.g. Russian 
representatives, which were not quoted in “Western” media such as the BBC but nevertheless in media such 
as RT. The timelines are thus a compilation of media and organisation reports with the total number of 






                         Figure 4: Number of media and organisation sources used for the conflict timelines  
The timelines are attached as appendix 1 (Ukraine Conflict Timeline) and appendix 2 (Georgia Conflict 
Timeline) and the timeline’s bibliographies are attached as appendix 3 (Bibliography: Ukraine Conflict 
Timeline) and appendix 4 (Bibliography: Georgia Conflict Timeline). When referring to the conflict 
timelines or media/organisation sources in the analyses, I have chosen the referencing system: name-
number (appendix). When referencing an article from e.g. a media source, the referencing system may be 
“Aljazeera-1 (3)”, with “Aljazeera” indicating the name of the source, “1” indicating the number of the 
Aljazeera article, and “3” indicating the appendix where this reference can be located.  
 
4.4.2 Primary Sources  
From the timelines I proceeded to collecting data from the conflict parties’ own sources. These sources 
refer to the homepages of the Presidents448, Foreign Ministries449 and, in the case of DPR, the Republic450. 
The purpose of collecting data from these sources was to collect data that could be used for the thematic 
and frame analysis. This meant collecting various kinds of “texts” i.e. written communication the conflict 
parties have produced about the conflict, self, and other. These texts include speeches, press releases, policy 
papers, reports, interviews, factsheets, and statements. By relying on these texts for the thematic and frame 
analysis, I used data that the identity managers have used when communicating their understandings about 
the conflicts to their members, the other conflict parties, and spectators, and so it is texts that make up their 
 
447 For an in-depth insight into which organisation and media sources have been used, and how many articles have 
been used from each source, please refer to appendix 3 and 4 where this is listed in more detail. 
448 President of Russia: http://en.kremlin.ru/ President of Georgia: https://www.president.gov.ge/mtavari.aspx and 
http://www.saakashviliarchive.info/en/ President of Ukraine: https://www.president.gov.ua/en  
449 Russian Foreign Ministry: http://www.mid.ru/en/main_en Georgia’s Foreign Ministry: 
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/Home.aspx?lang=en-US Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry: https://mfa.gov.ua/en South Ossetia’s 
Foreign Ministry: http://www.mfa-rso.su/en/  









official conflict narratives. To seek out the texts most relevant, I only included texts that addressed topics 
related to the conflicts. This means that the collected texts spoke about the conflict in general (why did it 
occur, who is involved, what is happening, and how should the conflict be solved), the conflict parties 
involved (who are we/they and what motivates our/their behaviour) or the texts functioned as responses to 
specific conflict stimuli (e.g. responses to a military attack, walk out of negotiations, increase in troop 
presence, statements made by the out-group). To collect these texts, I first went through the “news” pages 
of the conflict parties’ homepages and collected the different statements, press releases etc. published within 
the timeframe of my dataset. When collecting these texts, I did a cursory reading of each to see whether 
they were related to the conflicts and the conflict parties involved. If a text e.g. spoke about Ukraine-Russia 
relations, it was included in the dataset. If it spoke about Ukraine-Spain relations, it was excluded. When a 
text had been selected it was exported to Nvivo, where it was later scrutinized to see whether it fit the text-
selection criteria mentioned. If deemed so, it was analysed in accordance with the methods mentioned. 
Apart from exploring the “news sites” of the homepages, I looked if the homepages had any pages 
specifically pertaining to the conflicts, which was the case for Georgia’s Foreign Ministry that has a page 
on the “occupied territories”451, and the Russian Foreign Ministry that has a page on the “situation around 
Ukraine”452. These texts were equally included to the dataset. Finally, I conducted an overall search of the 
homepages using the search field and words such as “Conflict”, “Donbass”, “Maidan”, “Crimea”, “Russia”, 
“South Ossetia”, “Georgia”, “Tskhinvali”, “Tbilisi”, “2008”, “2014” etc to locate texts I had missed. The 











         
Figure 5: Number of primary sources used for the analysis  
 
451 GFM-58 (5) 
452 RFM-206 (6) 
•President of Georgia: 68
•Georgia's Foreign Ministry: 55
Georgia
•South Ossetia's Foreign Ministry: 97South Ossetia
•President of Russia: 19
•Russia's Foreign Ministry: 126
Russia (Georgia)
•President of Ukraine: 92
•Ukraine's Foreign Ministry: 95
Ukraine
•People's Council of the Donetsk People's Republic: 
205
DPR
•President of Russia: 13




 It should be noted that there is a tendency amongst the Georgian and Ukrainian governments 
to delete the homepages of their previous administrations. Whereas Georgia has provided an archive of the 
press releases, statements etc. made during the Saakashvili administration453, this has, in time of writing, 
not been the case for Ukraine as the homepage of Poroshenko has been removed and replaced with that of 
Zelensky. The primary sources used for the Ukraine and Georgia analysis have, however, been saved in 
Nvivo (including their original URL and date of publication). In case online access is denied to any of the 
primary sources referenced in the Georgia primary data bibliography (appendix 5) and the Ukraine primary 
data bibliography (appendix 6), please consult the Nvivo files provided as links in appendix 11. When 
referencing primary sources in the analysis, I refer to these as “name-number (appendix)”. This means that 
in e.g. the Georgia analysis, when using sources from Georgia’s Foreign Ministry, referencing will be GFM-
1 (5), with GFM indicating “Georgia’s Foreign Ministry”, 1 indicating the number of the article in the 
bibliography, and 5 indicating the appendix where this reference can be located. When referring to sources 
from Presidents the abbreviation is e.g. GP-number indicating “Georgia’s President”. Similar is done for 
Ukraine and Russia. In terms of the non-state actors, the abbreviations used are DPR, indicating “Donetsk 
People’s Republic” and SO, indicating “South Ossetia”454. 
 
4.5 Methodological Constraints   
The purpose of this research is to explore how social cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics 
contribute to the protraction of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. Rather than being theory building, it 
seeks to explain what is happening in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, how, and why455. To reach this 
explanation, I rely on qualitative methods as it allows me to explore how the conflict parties reach 
interpretations about the situation, self, and other through social cognitive processing, and how these 
interacting understandings form intergroup dynamics between them. This does not mean that I dismiss the 
utility and benefits of multi-methods when analysing conflicts. But it does mean that I emphasise the 
ideational aspect of conflicts, which are factors best explored through qualitative methods as these allow 
me to unravel how behaviour is formed through relations of differing perceptions and interpretations456. As 
with all methods, there are strength and weaknesses that need to be addressed. Despite the utility of 
qualitative methods, their weakness is that the analysis findings are to a great extent rooted in the 
researcher’s interpretations, hereby making topics and data susceptible to over-, under-, or 
 
453 http://www.saakashviliarchive.info/en/  
454 Please consult the appendices page for an overview of the various appendices and their content 
455 David E. McNabb, Research Methods for Political Science, (Routledge, 2015), 3 
456 Looi Theam Choy “The strengths and weaknesses of research methodology: comparison and complimentary 
between qualitative and quantitative approaches” Journal Of Humanities And Social Science 19, no. 4 (2014), 102 
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misinterpretation457. Such an analysis is also susceptible to personal biases, which may come to the inform 
the research findings and which in the end are not objectively reifiable458. Quantitative methods are, on the 
other hand, objectively reifiable and the research findings may allow more general evaluations of certain 
topics459. This, however, is also a weakness as it may eradicate contextual specifics and limit human 
behaviour to statistics, which does not further explain the motives, perceptions, or other human tendencies 
that have come to drive such statistics460. To even out the strengths and weaknesses of the two, it would be 
useful to apply a mixed-methods approach461. Since, however, this research emphasises how meanings 
occur and sustain in the conflict context, rather than how they replicate over broad sets of data, it has been 
a choice to only engage with qualitative methods to explore the intricacies that shape the conflict parties’ 
social cognitive processing in the conflict contexts.  
The methods used have been chosen as they allow me to explore the different steps related 
to social cognitive processing. This offers the insight needed for establishing the intergroup dynamics that 
contribute to the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts protraction. The thematic and frame analysis complement 
each other as they each address an aspect that in combination grants an overview of the ideational factors 
at play in the conflicts. Despite these methods’ complementary nature, there are constraints attached to each 
of them. The thematic analysis is meant to highlight the themes, or nodes, that run as patterned meanings 
through the texts. It is hence used to explore which nodes are activated when processing stimuli. The 
exploration of nodes could equally have been undertaken using quantitative methods such as observational 
statistical studies462. The issue with quantitative methods is, however, that they do not allow the “unpacking 
of issues of causal direction, measuring concepts in context, and making explanatory or interpretive claims 
about individual cases”463. In my analysis, I do not merely seek to explore how many times a theme has 
emerged in a text. I explore which themes can be interpreted from the texts. The themes located are hence 
both ‘implicit and explicit’, as they can sometimes be ascribed to a recurring word, and at other times are 
interpreted as an overarching theme inferred to run through a section of text. The thematic analysis allows 
me to explore the meanings attached to interactions. Where this method falls short is that such findings 
cannot be applied to broader contexts as would be the case if using a statistical method464. As focus of this 




459 Ibid, 103 
460 Ibid, 102 
461 Andrew Bennett, "Found in translation: Combining discourse analysis with computer assisted content analysis." 
Millennium 43, no.3 (2015), 985 
462 Andrew Bennett, "Found in translation: Combining discourse analysis with computer assisted content analysis." 





how specific patterns of nodes replicate in the Georgia or Ukraine conflict, but to explore what kind of 
patterns pertain to the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts specifically.  
Whereas the thematic analysis allows me to explore the activation of nodes, frame analysis 
allows me to explore the schemas that constitute the social cognitive frameworks. As frame analysis is 
rooted in discourse analysis, it too points to how social reality is constructed rather than fixed and 
objective465. Due to this, the frame analysis allows one to explore the conflict parties’ structured 
understandings of the situation, self, and other. This method, however, also pulls in the role of the researcher 
whose ideas may shape the analysis. A constraint of the frame analysis is thus that it is susceptible to the 
researchers own biases. This is a constraint that defines many interpretivist research methods, as the 
interpretation of how others interpret social phenomenon may shape the analysis process and findings. The 
validity of a frame analysis thus to a great extent depends on the researcher’s integrity and honesty. To this 
is also the constraint that the frame analysis will not produce a fixed insight into the problem at hand, as 
structured understandings change. Meanings are, as stated by Hopf, not fixed. They are not constantly 
evolving either, as it is possible “to theorize about replicable patterns of social conduct over time”466. The 
frames retrieved from the analysis should therefore not be treated as fixed, as some of these may exist over 
the course of the conflict, whilst others may be adapted or changed following the incoming of new stimuli. 
This brings an element of change which the frame analysis in and off itself cannot account for, but which 
needs to be complemented with an overview of how certain frames have changed over time. This constraint 
has sought to be accounted for by using the conflict timelines to get an overview of how, and whether, 
conflict narratives have changed over time. It is then by combining such findings with the frame analysis 
that I can acquire an understanding of the frames that are “fixed” and those that have had a shorter lifespan 
in the conflict narratives. Such insight is also of relevance for studying the social cognitive processes at 
play. Finally, the frame and thematic analysis are deemed of relevance as they each address an aspect of 
the social cognitive processes that shape understandings in Ukraine and Georgia. Whereas the thematic 
analysis explores what is being said, the frame analysis explores how something is being said. This allows 
me to explore the complexity associated with interpretations as it focuses on both processes of meaning and 
structures of meaning.  
When conducting research on conflicts and social cognitive processes there are additional 
pitfalls that need to be considered. First, when conducting the thematic and frame analysis with the aim of 
exploring how conflict parties process the conflict and those involved, this may fall subject to my own 
biases. This includes locating themes and frames that may not represent the conflict parties’ understandings 
 
465 Ibid, 989 




or overinterpreting the salience of a theme. To avoid making false assumptions about this, I have taken 
different steps as part of my analysis process. I have e.g. always read the texts before analysing them to 
first get an account of the overall narrative before digging into the specifics. This was done to get a sense 
of what the conflict parties are saying, rather than interpreting the texts based on isolated segments. In terms 
of the thematic analysis, I have chosen to analyse the most salient themes in order to engage with themes 
that I continue to encounter in the text. This is done to avoid placing too much emphasis on themes that 
only feature sparsely and thus may not function as an integrated part of the conflict parties’ social cognitive 
processing. Eventually, locating themes is a subjective endeavour as one researcher may locate themes that 
it finds of importance, whilst another may point at a different interpretation467. The researcher hence has an 
active role in analysing data. To address this, I have ensured to accompany my analysis with descriptions 
of how I have reached an interpretation and finding. I have also attached the thematic analysis to the 
appendix. By taking these steps I have sought to provide a transparent account of my research.  
 Another aspect to be addressed is the choice of conflict parties. In the process of selecting 
my cases I had to choose which conflict parties to analyse. Here others may have chosen to focus on parties 
such as e.g. NATO or the EU. This is a matter of analytical choice and, as mentioned, my choice of conflict 
parties was based on a consideration of who has the most significant presence in the conflict and leverage 
in shaping the relations that exist. My choice of conflict parties has, however, also been based on a wish to 
engage with parties that tend to be neglected in the literature. As stated in the literature review, when 
exploring the conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia there is a tendency to focus on EU/NATO/Russia relations 
making the approach highly state-focused. By drawing my attention to both state and non-state actors, it 
has been my aim to not merely approach these conflicts as an outcome of power politics between Russia 
and ‘Western’ states and institutions, but also as contexts shaped between, and by, parties that fight on the 
ground. Hence, the social cognitive processes that I explore are processes I have chosen to focus on. There 
are without a doubt more to be included, which could be of interest for future research. Since the research 
subject is a conflict, there is also a need to consider whether my own understanding of the conflicts and 
their preferred outcomes may shape the way data is interpreted. As these conflicts have existed for some 
time, and both have been covered in the media, one will enter the research with a presumption of who 
caused the conflict, the relations that exist, and how the conflicts should be solved. To avoid this being 
reflected in the analysis, I have to the best of my ability allowed the data guide me. This implies that I 
approach data with an open mindset and when discovering something that contradicts my assumption, I 
have not forced this into my pre-set understanding of the conflicts but explored this as new insight.  
 
467 Boyatzis, “Thematic Analysis and Code Development”, 1 
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Another way to avoid including my own understanding has been to avoid providing my own 
narrative of the conflicts prior to the analyses. Usually in the field of conflict analysis, the researcher will, 
prior to the analysis, provide ‘basic facts’ about the conflict such as when it arose, between who, and why. 
Since the aim of this research is to explore the conflict parties’ social cognitive processing, such a 
preliminary background chapter would constitute as a counter-narrative, or as ‘the correct account of the 
conflicts’, to which the conflict parties’ narratives are compared. This is contradictory for this research as 
focus is on how the conflict parties make sense of the conflict and how their social cognitive processing 
interact to form intergroup dynamics. To this one should then also address the conflict timelines mentioned 
in the previous section. As stated, the aim of my conflict timelines is to give an overview of key events, and 
hence conflict stimuli, that the conflict parties refer to. My timelines do therefore not provide an analysis 
of e.g. why an event happened or why a conflict party said something. They give an overview of events 
reported in the media/organisational reports. The timelines are thus meant to be objective and they are used 
as an overview of the progression of events, rather than an evaluation of them. Biases may nevertheless 
occur when constructing such timelines, as the choice of when to report something may influence how the 
conflict is overall viewed. To avoid such a bias, I have relied on various media sources to verify that an 
event did occur on the date provided in a report. I will hence refrain from contributing with my own conflict 
analysis prior to the analysis of the conflict parties’ narratives. I will, however, in the discussion chapter 
compare analysis findings to present my account of the dynamics I perceive exist between the conflict 
parties as a result of their social cognitive processing. This raises the question whether I have understood 
the conflict parties’ narratives correctly and whether I can represent their version of the truth. As stated, I 
will to the best of my ability let the data guide me and I will also in the analysis flag any doubts I may have 
about certain texts or interpretations.  
Since all data applied is publicly available and retrieved via a desk-analysis, there are as such 
no ethical conundrums as to interference with the research subjects. That said, I will treat all data with equal 
respect and refrain from any subjective evaluation of the characters or goals of the parties involved. The 
aim is to observe and analyse, not to judge and make recommendations. It should also be added that my 
research is not a definitive answer to the question about social cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics 
in times of protracted conflicts. It is instead an attempt to open a discussion about the role these processes 
play in such conflicts.  
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the methods and data used to explore the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties’ social 
cognitively processing and the intergroup dynamics that arise from their interacting processes. It started by 
presenting how social cognitive processing is equally a group phenomenon but rather than being a process 
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that occurs within an individual, it is a shared experience as group members will collectively form 
understandings when confronted with group-related events. In such times, groups will rely on group 
structures, which allow them to reach collective understandings. One of these is the reliance on groups 
leaders, or identity managers, who become responsible for presenting a unified understanding of the 
situation, self, and other. To explore how intergroup dynamics occur one may thus draw attention to leaders 
and how these systematize stimuli in accordance with a specific conflict narrative, which they seek to 
convince their members and others to adopt. In this research, focus is thus on identity managers and how 
these engage in a series of cognitive steps, which include the activation of nodes and the compartmentalising 
of such nodes into schemas, which make up a social cognitive framework. To explore these steps, I apply 
a thematic analysis, which allows me to explore the themes that run as patterned meanings through the 
conflict parties’ narratives. Such an analysis allows me to explore which nodes the identity managers 
activate when interpreting conflict stimuli. These patterns will be further unravelled through a frame 
analysis, which will be used to establish the schemas that the identity managers form around the situation, 
self, and other. The frame analysis will hence allow me to explore how the identity managers 
compartmentalise nodes into schemas, which come to form an overarching social cognitive framework. To 
explore the intergroup dynamics, I will eventually focus on how the conflict parties’ processes interact. It 
is then by exploring these interactions that I will get an insight into the dynamics that shape their intergroup 
relations.  
 This chapter also explored how and why the conflict cases and conflict parties were chosen 
and how data was collected. The two case studies have been chosen as they represent cases of protracted 
conflicts within the post-Soviet space, which have experienced recent developments and thus new stimuli. 
In comparison to conflicts that saw main developments in the 1990s, the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts also 
offer access to online data. The conflict parties have been chosen as these are deemed those that have a 
significant impact on the conflicts’ and their continuation. The non-state actors have also been chosen as I 
wish to include conflict parties that are not usually included in the literature. The chapter also presented the 
dataset and how data was collected. For the analysis I have divided data into two categories namely 
media/organisation data and data from the conflict parties’ own sources. Media/organisation data was 
collected from my own media monitoring and from the CSIS and IISS timelines. This resulted in my own 
conflict timelines, which are meant to provide context and allow for the detection of relevant speech 
acts/texts required for the core empirical analysis. I also collected primary data, which were used for the 
frame and thematic analysis. Such data refers to various texts including statements, press releases, 
interviews, speeches etc. that the conflict parties have published on their homepages. This chapter therefore 
presented the steps that will be taken to answer the research question of how social cognitive processes and 
intergroup dynamics contribute to the protraction of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts.  
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5.0 Social Cognitive Processing in the Ukraine Conflict  
This chapter will analyse the Ukraine conflict and the conflict narratives of the conflict parties: The Russian 
government, Ukraine government, and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR). The aim of the analysis is to 
explore the social cognitive processes the conflict parties rely on when constructing understandings about 
the situation, self, and other. To do so, I first explored the nodes that the conflict parties activate in their 
conflict narratives. These findings are attached in the thematic analysis under appendix 8. This chapter will 
explore how they compartmentalise these nodes into schemas. To this end, it will focus on how the identity 
managers frame the situation, self, and other, and how these frames constitute schemas that form the conflict 
parties’ social cognitive frameworks. Before digging into the conflict parties’ schemas, I will explore how 
their conflict narratives have developed over the course of the conflict. This is done to see whether 
narratives are passed on to succeeding identity managers, and whether schemas have changed over time. 
The findings from each conflict party will eventually be compared in section 5.5 in order to discuss how 
their social cognitive processes interact.  
 
5.1 Schematic Changes   
When exploring the Ukraine conflict parties’ conflict narratives, it becomes apparent that they have changed 
their situation-, self-, and other-schemas over the course of the conflict. Whereas the Ukrainian identity 
managers have changed their situation- and other-schemas following information about Russian 
involvement in the conflict, Russian identity managers have sought to adapt information about Russian 
troop presence in Eastern Ukraine into their existing self-schema. The DPR identity managers have had 
difficulties establishing their self-schema as it has changed in accordance with the state projects they have 
proposed over the course of the conflict.  
 
5.1.1 Ukraine 
Ukraine’s conflict narrative has to a great extent stayed consistent since 2013, which may be explained by 
the fact that the identity managers have largely stayed the same. There were, however, cognitive changes 
in the beginning of the conflict as the identity managers briefly struggled to cognitively systematise the 
events that unfolded and socially categorise the agents involved. In Ukraine’s narrative, the conflict is 
constructed as a Ukraine-Russia conflict468. Although this is now a consistent feature of Ukraine’s conflict 
narrative, this understanding was only reached once the identity managers settled on a social category for 
the non-state actors in Donbass. In the beginning, there was slight confusion about who the non-state actors 
 
468 Elaborated further in the section on Ukraine’s situation-schema 
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were. Initially, they were categorised as terrorists who sought to take control over Eastern Ukraine. This 
was e.g. the understanding in early 2014, when government buildings were seized in the city of Slovyansk 
and where Ukraine deployed special forces to the area. This led Ukraine’s Interior Minister, Arsen Avakov, 
to state on Facebook in April 2014: “Our response will be very severe[…]There is zero tolerance for armed 
terrorists”469. The initial understanding was hence that the non-state actors represented criminal elements 
who had seized a part of Ukraine’s territory, and thus agents who needed to be removed. The situation was 
by extension of this defined by lawlessness. As Ukraine’s President, Petro Poroshenko, stated in July 2014 
in connection to the recapturing of Slovyansk: “This is not a complete victory. But the cleansing of 
Slovyansk from armed-to-the-teeth gangs of animals has great symbolic importance”470. This understanding 
changed in late 2014 as Ukrainian identity managers changed their social cognitive processing of the 
situation from an issue of terrorism, to an issue of Russian invasion. This resulted in a social categorical 
shift as the non-state actors were to a greater extent categorised as Russian proxies. This change largely 
originated around the time Russia annexed Crimea and information started occurring about Russian troop 
presence in Eastern Ukraine. With these events, it may be argued, emerged new stimulus that was monitored 
and which activated nodes such as “war”, “annexation”, and “Russia”. This led the Ukrainian identity 
managers to change their understanding of the situation and agents involved.  
Whereas the non-state actors initially were categorised as lawless elements - but nevertheless 
as independent agents - they came to be identified as Russians and agents that the Russian identity managers 
had mobilised. As Poroshenko stated in September 2014 following reports on the presence of a Russian 
tank battalion near Luhansk: “Direct and undisguised aggression has been launched against Ukraine from 
a neighboring state. This has changed the situation in the zone of conflict in a radical way”471. Following 
late 2014, Ukrainian identity managers therefore shifted their social cognitive processing towards the role 
of Russia, and they came to argue that Russian leaders had mobilised agents, and deployed Russian troops, 
in a war against Ukrainians. The situation thus became cognitively systematised around a Russia social 
category. This led to a new other- and situation-schema as Ukrainian identity managers adopted an 
understanding that the conflict was an intergroup conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Since Russia 
became regarded as the antagonist, this also meant that the non-state actors lost their agency472. As 
Poroshenko stated in February 2015 at a ceremony marking the one-year anniversary of Maidan: “Now, it 
is finally clear that we struggled on Maidan not against Yanukovych. He was just a cruel and obedient 
marionette[…]Moscow was preparing to the liquidation and tearing Ukraine apart long before the victory 
 
469 Aljazeera-4 (3) 
470 Washington Post-12 (3) 
471 Reuters-41 (3) 




of Maidan. They were expecting the fall of Yanukovych and accelerated the course of events”473. In the 
beginning, Ukrainian identity managers hence struggled to process the conflict and socially categorise the 
others present. They eventually reached cognitive systematization by using the Russian social category as 
the primary category for making sense of the situation and agents involved.  
 
5.1.2 Russia 
Russia’s conflict narrative has also stayed consistent since 2013 as Russian identity managers have 
consistently referred to the ousting of Yanukovych as a coup, which caused a conflict between Ukraine’s 
central government and agents in Donbass. In Russia’s conflict narrative, the conflict is processed as a 
result of internal disagreements between Ukrainians474. Despite this consistency, the Russian identity 
managers have changed their self-schema slightly, and particularly their sense making of the role Russians 
play in the conflict. This is most visible in their explanation for the presence of Russian troops in Eastern 
Ukraine. In the beginning, Russian identity managers persistently denied any presence of Russian troops in 
Ukraine and rather socially categorised all agents involved in the conflict as Ukrainians. As Vladimir Putin 
stated in April 2014 in response to allegations that the protests in Eastern Ukraine were staged by Russia 
and that Russian armed units had entered the country: “Nonsense. There are no Russian units in eastern 
Ukraine – no special services, no tactical advisors. All this is being done by the local residents, 
and the proof of that is the fact that those people have literally removed their masks. So I told my Western 
partners, “They have nowhere to go, and they won’t leave. This is their land and you need to negotiate with 
them”475. The Russian identity managers hence initially denied that Russians had any physical presence in 
the conflict, nor that there was any ground for processing the situation through the activation of the Russia 
social category.  
This changed in late 2014 when Vladimir Putin acknowledged the presence of Russian 
citizens who fought as volunteers in the conflict476. A year later Putin regulated this assessment and stated 
that: “We never said that there weren’t people there dealing with certain tasks, including in the military 
sphere[…]But that doesn’t mean there are regular Russian forces there. Feel the difference”477. Following 
the incoming information about Russian troop presence in Ukraine, the Russian identity managers were 
forced to change their self-schema in accordance with this stimulus, and they were also put under pressure 
to change their situation-schema. Although Russian identity managers have now acknowledged the 
presence of Russian citizens, they continue to deny any official Russian involvement. Russia’s situation-
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schema has thus stayed the same and Russian identity managers have only altered their self-schema slightly. 
Because although they acknowledge the presence of Russians on Ukraine territory, these agents are largely 
categorised as volunteers. By categorising them as such, the identity managers can construct these agents’ 
behaviour as beyond the identity managers’ control. Hence, these agents do not act in accordance with the 
interests the Russian identity managers construct for the Russian group identity. This does not imply that 
these agents cannot be identified as Russians. But categorising them as volunteers implies that they are 
Russian group members who act from their own personal interest. Their categorisation as volunteers thus 
functions as a Russian sub-category, which continues to comply with the self-schema that Russia as a group 
is a neutral party, and the situation-schema that the conflict is between Ukrainians. As Kremlin’s spokesman 
Dmitry Peskov stated in February 2015 in response to Russia’s role in guaranteeing peace in Ukraine: 
“[Russia] is not a party that has to take action in this matter. We simply cannot do that physically, because 
Russia is not a participant in this conflict”478. 
 
5.1.3 DPR  
DPR’s conflict narrative has also stayed somewhat consistent since 2013, as the identity managers continue 
to construct the conflict as one between DPR and the central government in Ukraine479. The DPR identity 
managers consistently construct a situation- and other-schema around the Ukraine social category. Where 
their processing has wavered, however, is in the construction of their self-schema. When constructing this, 
the identity managers have had difficulties establishing how DPR as a social category differs from the 
Russian and Ukrainian social category. This confusion is particularly visible in the different state projects 
the DPR identity managers have advocated for over the course of the conflict. The establishment of the 
DPR state was officially declared in April 2014 and with the independence referendum came the expressed 
plan of a referendum on joining DPR with Russia480. As the leader of the DPR, Denis Pushilin, stated 
following the independence referendum in May 2014: “The people of Donetsk have always been part of 
the Russian world. For us, the history of Russia is our history[…]Based on the will of the people and on the 
restoration of historic justice, we ask the Russian Federation to consider the absorption of the Donetsk 
People’s Republic into the Russian Federation”481. From the expressed interest of uniting DPR with Russia 
it may be inferred that the DPR identity managers constructed the DPR self-schema around an 
understanding that the agents in Donetsk belonged to the Russian group identity. In the beginning, the 
identity managers hence socially categorised the people of DPR as Russians. Russian identity managers 
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did, however, not act on the unification referendum although they did acknowledge DPR’s independence482. 
With the limited reaction to the DPR ambition of uniting the Russian group members therefore emerged, 
what may be assumed, a social cognitive conundrum and particularly an identity vacuum where DPR’s self-
schema had to be changed.  
In May 2014, the identity managers of DPR and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) 
declared the restoration of the region “Novorossiya” as a confederation between the two republics483. This 
confederation was to serve as an independent territory, where agents who belonged to the Russian group 
identity could co-exist. From this project the DPR and LPR identity managers sought to socially categorise 
the agents of these areas as “new Russians” i.e. as a group of agents with a Russian heritage. The 
understanding that certain territories in Eastern Ukraine could be defined as the Novorossiya region was 
shared with Russian identity managers, as Putin stated in his Direct Line in April 2014: “the region is called 
Novorossiya. Russia lost these territories for various reasons, but the people remained”484. Novorossiya 
was, however, put on hold in May 2015 when the DPR and LPR identity managers abandoned the project 
with Alexander Kofman, Foreign Minister of DPR, stating that the: “The Novorossia project is frozen until 
a new political elite emerges in all these regions that will be able to head the movement. We don't have the 
right to impose our opinion on [the Ukrainian cities of] Kharkiv, Zaporizhia and Odess”485. The project was 
abandoned as there were not any identity managers in these cities who could, or maybe would want to, 
represent and unite agents around this group identity. Whereas the failed Russian unification referendum 
challenged the DPR identity managers’ understanding that the agents of DPR could be socially categorised 
as “Russians”, the Novorossiya project challenged their understanding that these agents could be socially 
categorised as “new Russians”. This conundrum was pointed to by the DPR identity managers who 
expressed disappointment with the Russian identity managers and their lack of ability, or willingness, to 
support and join the agents of DPR and LPR under a united categorical representation. As Pushilin stated 
on twitter in July 2014 where he pointed to a perception of being led down by Russia: “What to say. They 
encouraged us. Encouraged us and abandoned us[…]Putin’s words about protecting the Russian people, 
protecting Novorossiya, they were beautiful. But they were only words”486. The project of Novorossiya 
hence equally failed as an attempt to define the people of DPRs’ social identification.  
In July 2017 the DPR identity managers proclaimed another state project called 
“Malorossiya”, which was to be, according to the constitution written: “We, the representatives of former 
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Ukraine, declare the establishment of a new state, Malorossiya, which is a successor state to Ukraine. We 
agree that the new state’s name will be Malorossiya because the very name of Ukraine has discredited 
itself”487. Malorossiya was equally an attempt to socially categorise the agents of DPR. However, rather 
than categorising them as “new Russians”, they were categorised as “little Russians”. In DPR’s narrative, 
this group identity was amongst other granted historical roots to prove its existence. It was, however, to a 
greater extent meant to function as the cognitive systematization of the conflict situation and the agents 
involved, because with its creation came the understanding that the conflict was between “Little Russians” 
and “Ukrainians”. The project was short-lived as Russian identity managers declared it a personal project 
of the DPR identity managers488 and the LPR identity managers dismissed the idea489. The failed attempts 
of establishing a Malorossiya identity thus once again left the DPR identity managers in an identity vacuum, 
as they struggled to socially define and distinguish between the agents of DPR, Russia, and Ukraine. What 
has now surfaced in DPR’s conflict narrative is a consistent referral to the need of creating a DPR state 
where DPR as an independent group identity may exist. The DPR identity managers have thus constructed 
a self-schema around a distinct DPR group identity, which they argue is socially distinct from Ukrainians 
and Russians490.  
 
5.1.4 Schematic Changes   
What surfaces when exploring the conflict parties’ conflict narratives, is that the identity managers have 
had difficulties establishing their situation-, self-, and other-schemas. Whereas the Ukrainian identity 
managers initially struggled to define the situation and the non-state actors, the Russian identity managers 
have had difficulties adapting information about Russian troops into the existing self-schema of being a 
neutral party. The DPR identity managers have been through a development of their self-schema, as they 
have gone from socially categorising the people of DPR as Russians to agents who belong to a DPR group 
identity. This indicates that the conflict parties have struggled to process behaviour that occurs, and 
cognitively systematize the agents who are present in the conflict. All of them have eventually arrived at 
somewhat consistent schemas, which they construct around the perceived presence of definable groups. 
These schemas will be further unravelled in the following analysis of the Ukraine conflict. From this section 
it may nevertheless be argued that the conflict parties’ group identities are overall adaptive and capable of 
changing depending on new stimulus. What this finding does it that it challenges the social comparison 
theory, which argues that intergroup conflicts arise between salient groups. Although the conflict parties 
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do perceive themselves as opposed and salient groups, their self/other identities are nevertheless mouldable 
and reactive to stimulus. This implies that although the conflict parties perceive themselves as opposed 
groups, they do not rely on a stable self/other understanding but may adapt these if certain stimulus arises. 
This is then a positive finding for conflict resolution, as it implies that the conflict parties may eventually 
decide to refute their negative inter-group relations, if certain stimulus occurs and if they decide to adapt 
their identities in accordance with this. As seen in the previous section, this is, however, currently not the 
case as the conflict parties continue to construct their identities along contrasted and opposed group 
constructs. This finding will, alongside the findings in the next sections, be further discussed in chapter 7. 
 
5.2 Ukraine’s Social Cognitive Framework  
The following section will explore how Ukrainian identity managers construct schematic understandings 
about the situation, self, and other in the Ukraine conflict, and the social cognitive framework that forms 
from this.  
 
5.2.1 Situation-Schema  
5.2.1.1 Conflict Cause  
The schema that the Ukrainian identity managers construct when processing the situation is that the conflict 
is between Russia and Ukraine, and it is a situation that Russia has unilaterally and unprovoked imposed 
upon Ukraine. When constructing this situation-schema, the identity managers do not categorise Russia and 
Ukraine as two states per se, nor do they construct the conflict as one between leaders of two countries. 
When they process who is fighting who and why these agents have come into conflict, they draw on an 
intergroup prism. The situation and agents within it are thus cognitively systematized in accordance with a 
Ukrainian and a Russian group identity, hereby making the conflict between two groups - or between an 
in- and an out-group. As the Foreign Ministry stated in April 2014: “Escalation of the situation in some 
cities in the East and South of Ukraine is instigated externally and is caused by subversive activities of the 
Russian Federation”491. When processing the situation, the Ukrainian identity managers do not point to any 
behaviour on their, or their group members, behalf which could have caused the conflict. Rather, the conflict 
is one Russia for long has planned and decided to launch following Maidan. As the Foreign Ministry stated 
in a fact-sheet published on the Ministry’s homepage titled “10 facts you should know about Russian 
military aggression against Ukraine” (caps lock from original text): “FACT 1: RUSSIA PLANNED 
MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE IN ADVANCE. VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION 
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OF DIGNITY WAS ONLY A CONVENIENT PRETEXT”492. The conflict is thus a calculated Russian 
outcome and so when Ukrainian identity managers make sense of the situation, they draw on a fundamental 
attribution error as the conflict derives solely from Russian behaviour. The identity managers therefore 
deny that the conflict is an outcome of situational causality. Instead, they argue that the conflict occurred 
solely because of Russian intent. 
An interesting feature in Ukraine’s situation-schema is that the conflict is not caused by all 
members of the Russia group. It is a situation that Russian identity managers have instigated and now 
control, as they are orchestrating the behaviour of their Russian group members who have a presence on 
Ukraine’s territory. As Ukraine’s OSCE representative stated during the Annual Security Review 
Conference in June 2017: “Everyday fighting, and military aggression carried out by the Russian hybrid 
forces take their toll among my fellow Ukrainians”493. There is thus a distinction between Russian identity 
managers and group members, with the identity managers being those who dictate behaviour, and group 
members being those who execute the orders they receive. To this understanding is the viewpoint that the 
conflict has not mobilised all Russian group members, but merely some of the Russian group members. 
The conflict is hence not one where Ukrainians face hostilities from all Russians. Nor is it one where 
Ukrainian identity managers are facing hostilities from their in-group members because of these identity 
managers’ inefficiency to govern. As Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Danylo Lubkivsky, stated in July 
2014:  
 
The turmoil in Ukraine comes to a logical conclusion. It was not a civil war – as it was brought, instigated 
and financed from Russia. It was not a liberation movement – as personal liberties were the last thing on 
the minds of terrorists. It was not an “insurgency” – either by the roots, nature or the scale of destruction. 
It has been an act of aggression by Russia against Ukraine that begun in Crimea and continued in the 
East494. 
 
The conflict is an intergroup conflict that identity managers of an out-group have initiated, and it is a conflict 
being physically fought by some members of this out-group. Apart from the use of a fundamental attribution 
error is thus also the use of a group attribution error, as the Russian identity managers’ behaviour and the 
behaviour of those Russian group members who fight in the conflict is processed as something that 
generally reflects the attitude of the Russia out-group.  
From the processing of conflict stimuli arises the understanding that the conflict is one where 
Russian identity managers and group members have annexed and now occupy parts of Ukraine’s territory. 
What is interesting about this understanding is that whereas Ukrainian identity managers for obvious 
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reasons use the annexation/occupation node when processing the situation in Crimea, they also process the 
situation in Donetsk as a matter of occupation. As the Foreign Ministry stated in June 2017 in connection 
to an attack on the OSCE SMM: “Ukraine strongly condemns pro-Russian militants’ constant provocations, 
pressure and threats against OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)’s observers in the temporarily 
occupied territories of certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine”495. The cognitive 
foundation for processing the situation in Eastern Ukraine as a matter of occupation, may be found in the 
social categorisation of the non-state actors. Because, by identifying these agents as Russians, Ukrainian 
identity managers can construct the situation in Eastern Ukraine as an outcome of Russian occupation. If 
the non-state actors were categorised as disgruntled Ukrainians, this would question the activation of the 
occupation node, as occupation is linked to the alien take-over of someone’s territory. By socially 
categorising the non-state actors as Russians, the identity managers can process the situation as one where 
an out-group has taken control over Ukrainian territory. What is not elaborated is, however, who these “pro-
Russians” are and the extent to which they are Russian citizens sent from Russia or Ukrainian citizens with 
a Russian heritage/mind-set. It is generally difficult to establish how the Ukrainian identity managers make 
sense of the agents present in the conflict, and a reason for this is that they do not categorise agents in 
accordance with citizenship but rely on social categorization.  
In Ukraine’s conflict narrative, a “Russian” is not a legal category but a social category. 
Hence, although it is easy to separate agents into Russian and Ukrainian citizens, Ukrainian identity 
managers use social categories such as Russian proxies, pro-Russians, hybrid Russian forces, Russian 
militants etc. The establishment of a Russian presence in Eastern Ukraine is thus a matter of group 
reification, and the subsequent definition of who is a Russian and who is Ukrainian is something Ukrainian 
identity managers are responsible for establishing. This leads to blurry social boundaries where the non-
state actors are not distinctly Russian citizens, but they are de-facto Russians as their behaviour is 
orchestrated from Moscow. The groups fighting in the conflict are not citizens of a nation, but agents who 
identify with a group identity and agents who abide to orders their group identity managers dictate. This 
has implications as to how Ukrainian identity managers process the situation because eventually it is not 
only a matter of removing alien citizens from Ukraine’s territory. It is also a matter of regaining control 
over in-group members. As Poroshenko stated in May 2018 during a military ceremony:  
 
Almost four years ago, when I was elected President, the whole Donbas was under the control of Russian-
terrorist troops and their mercenaries, the fifth column inside the country. But I emphasize that in the 
summer of that year there was a successful military operation, as a result of which the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine[…]liberated almost two thirds of Donetsk and Luhansk region from the militants496. 
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The situation is thus also defined by clashing identity management, as Ukrainian identity managers point 
to how Russian occupation means that Russian identity managers have imposed their management on 
agents in Eastern Ukraine. Russian identity managers are more specifically trying to gain control over 
territory and agents by sending and mobilising Russian group members in the area. This is a tactic meant 
to force non-Russians to surrender to Russian identity management, and force Ukrainian identity managers 
to give up these in-group agents and territory. In the end, although the Ukrainian identity managers try to 
construct the conflict as a clear-cut intergroup conflict, their conflict narrative is somewhat inconsistent as 
their use of social categories leads to a confused understanding of who is fighting who and why. Despite 
this confusion, the identity managers nevertheless seek to present their conflict narrative as consistent, and 
the conflict as one between clear-cut groups to which certain identities and interests can be assigned.  
 
5.2.1.2 The Agents Involved  
The main social cognitive conundrum in Ukraine’s conflict narrative is to establish “who” the non-state 
actors are. As seen in the section on Ukraine’s schematic changes, this has to some extent been solved by 
identifying the non-state actors as Russians. Despite this, Ukrainian identity managers continue to apply 
various social categories when identifying the non-state actors (such as separatists, pro-Russian, Russian 
militants, armed gangs etc.). The reason for the confusion regarding the non-state actors’ identity, may be 
because Ukrainian identity managers are struggling to identify the extent to which the non-state actors act 
from their own interests; whether they are acting on behalf of Russian interests; or whether they are acting 
together with Russian identity managers to ensure collective interests. Ukrainian identity managers are thus 
struggling to position the non-state actors’ motivation for behaviour, which has implications for how these 
agents are socially categorised. What this results in is diffuse categorisation where the non-state actors at 
times are driven by their own interests (but with Russian backing) and at other times they are members of 
the Russian Armed Forces. As Poroshenko stated in July 2015 on the anniversary of the downing of the 
Malaysian Airline: “Unfortunately, this civilian aircraft and 298 people on board became a target of a 
ruthless terrorist attack, launched from a territory occupied by the Russian-backed militants in the East of 
Ukraine”497 and as Ukraine’s delegation at the OSCE stated in June 2017: “These forces have been 
integrated into Russia’s military control and command chains and are equipped and trained by Russian 
officers[…]It is important to note that contrary to Russian claims the situation in Donbas is something 
which the Kremlin can and does turn on and off like a tap”498. Despite confusion, the dominant 
understanding is that the non-state actors are acting on behalf of Russian interests. They are thus socially 
categorised as Russian puppets whom Russian identity managers can mobilise and de-mobilise at their will.  
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It is from the processing of the non-state actors’ interests that Ukrainian identity managers 
establish that these agents are not Ukrainians but rather should be identified as Russian group members. As 
Lubkivsky stated at the Ukraine Crisis Media Centre in April 2014:  
 
They [Russia] stick to the same routine as in Crimea. First, they recruit and arm professional military. 
Second, they deploy them on Ukrainian territory. Third, they hire local radicals to pose as the “pro-
Russian forces”. Fourth, they try to make it look like a turmoil coming from beneath. But it’s not[…]It’s a 
full-blown foreign aggression on Ukraine[…]One thing is abundantly clear: these are NOT Ukrainians. 
These are professional Russian militants499.  
 
Ukrainian identity managers hence point to the presence of two distinct groups, which define the situation. 
These two groups are presented as the victim and the aggressor, and they function as encompassing groups 
to which agents are classified depending on their behaviour in the conflict. As Poroshenko stated in an 
interview to the Financial Times in March 2018: “We are not the aggressors here. It is Putin who has his 
troops on our land. And we need nothing more, just please, would you be so kind as to take your troops 
away? We don’t need anything else”500. What is noteworthy is, however, that it is not only the non-state 
actors who are identified as Russians, as Ukrainian identity managers also point to how the aggressor 
includes agents who covertly support Russia. As Poroshenko stated in March 2018 at a ceremony 
celebrating the 4th anniversary of the National Guard of Ukraine:  
 
It is very easy to recognize the enemy on the front with the colorado ribbon of Russian tricolor. It is more 
difficult to recognize them in the rear, because here, inside Ukraine, the enemy dresses up, camouflages, 
blends in, acts disguised, insidiously, through the fifth column. He involves in his shameful scenarios 
politicians who make an entirely pro-Ukrainian impression on the first glance - the words from their 
mouth sound like patriotic and it is not written on the forehead that sometimes they are not ashamed to 
take money even from Moscow501. 
 
Here we again see inconsistent categorisation as it is argued that although someone may look or talk like a 
Ukrainian, they may be Russian or at least controlled by Russian identity managers. There is hence overall 
a difficulty in making sense of who the different agents are in the conflict. Ukrainian identity managers 
have nevertheless sought to cognitively simplify the situation by categorising agents in accordance with 
two distinct groups defined as Russians and Ukrainians.  
 
5.2.1.3 The Solution  
Apart from defining what is going on, who is fighting who, and why, Ukraine’s situation-schema includes 
an understanding of how the conflict should be solved. Since Russian identity managers caused and now 
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sustain the conflict through the mobilisation of their group members on Ukraine territory, the conflict can 
only be resolved if Russian identity managers decide to physically remove their group members from 
Ukraine. As Poroshenko stated during a visit to Spain in June 2018: “When can peace come? Only when 
Russian invaders leave the Ukrainian land and when the Ukrainian flag and the Ukrainian national emblem 
return to the Ukrainian Donbass”502. Russian group members also need to stop attacking Ukrainians, which 
is behaviour only Russian identity managers can change as they are the ones who control these agents. As 
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Pavlo Klimkin, stated at an UNSC meeting on Ukraine in May 2018: “In a 
nutshell, as everyday developments show, Russia and its ongoing military activity in the occupied territories 
of Donbas remain the obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. As soon as Moscow takes the decision 
to stop violence, the conflict will end”503. Conflict resolution is hence two-fold as it requires Russian 
identity managers to retrieve their armed forces from Ukraine, and these identity managers must end their 
management of the non-state actors. Resolution is therefore not merely dependent on the physical removal 
of Russians but also the removal of Russian social influence. This understanding is linked to the diffuse 
categorisation of the non-state actors as it is recognised that the pro-Russians fighting in Eastern Ukraine 
may not only be Russian citizens, but also Ukrainian citizens who have fallen for Russian identity 
management. As the Advisor to the Head of the Presidential Administration on Information Policy, Natalia 
Popovych, stated in February 2015: “Each day we are losing the best sons of Ukraine because someone 
believes in myths, lies and informational manipulations of Russian propagators”504. Conflict resolution is 
also an internal matter as there is a need for all Ukrainians to understand the danger Russian identity 
managers pose. As Klimkin stated at an OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in December 2017: “We must 
do more to help our citizens resist Russian propaganda and disinformation – our citizens must now realise 
that Russia is a State that lies on an industrial scale”505. There is hence a need to make Ukrainians socially 
distance themselves from Russians and to inform them about the hostile intentions these agents, and 
particularly their identity managers, have towards Ukrainians.  
Russian aggression does not merely come in the form of military threats but equally in the 
form of ideational threats, as the Russian use of propaganda spreads false narratives about the situation and 
the Russia and Ukraine groups. As Poroshenko stated in the interview to Financial Times in March 2018: 
“They use a huge army of provocateurs and agents in social media[...]That is why Ukraine stopped Russian 
TV broadcasting and Russian social media[…]Because they (Russia - ed.) use it for propaganda war”506. 
Because of this Russian intent, one should not regard Ukrainian identity managers’ attempt to oppose the 
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Russian conflict narrative as something that occurs from negative social dispositions or interests. The 
Ukrainian identity managers are instead trying to prevent the aggressor from manipulating Ukrainian group 
members, and the outside world, into believing the falsities Russian identity managers construct around the 
groups present. The conflict is thus not only fought on the ground but in the minds of agents, and so it is 
equally an ideational battel between the conflict parties’ understanding of themselves, the other, and the 
situation. As Poroshenko stated at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2018: “It is very 
important to deliver the truth about the events in Ukraine to protect the world from the fake news that are 
actively distributed around the world”507. Conflict resolution therefore also hinges on the adoption of the 
Ukrainian identity managers’ social cognitive framework and the need to spread their understanding about 
Russia to prevent others from identifying themselves as Russians, and/or acting in accordance with Russian 
interests. In the end, adopting the Ukrainian identity managers’ truth constitutes a way to remove Russian 
social influence as it offers a stronger social identification for those who are Ukrainians. In Ukraine’s 
situation-schema there is overall a great emphasis on the group relations that shape the conflict. There is 
also a sharp division of the group identities and interests that should be included and those that should be 
excluded to solve the conflict. Ukraine’s situation-schema is therefore not merely rooted in an attempt to 
define “who” Russia is and what this group has done and wants, but also in an attempt to establish what 
defines Ukrainians and how they are different from Russians. This is of interest as it points to how leaders 
manage certain group identities and how they construct narratives around these group identities. What this 
finding, however, also indicates is that the leaders of the conflict parties do not merely seek to manage their 
own in-group identity but also the identity of the out-group. This points to an element of alien identity 
management, which will be discussed further in the section on Ukraine’s other-schema, as well as in chapter 
7.  
 
5.2.2 Self-Schema  
5.2.2.1 The Ukraine Group 
In Ukraine’s self-schema, Ukrainians are reified as a group of agents that have been collectively mobilised 
in the conflict context. More specifically is the argument that the Russian attack mobilised Ukrainians in a 
collective pursuit of repelling this aggressor and strengthening their standing vis-á-vis this aggressor in the 
future. The situation is overall presented as one where Ukrainians are fighting for the retrieval of their 
territory and the regaining of control over their existence. To reach this understanding, Ukrainian identity 
managers amongst other point to the events that took place in 2004 and 2013. According to the identity 
managers, these events served as stimuli where Ukrainians contested the old ways of managing the Ukraine 
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group, and the times when the group started moving towards a more equal and correct form of identity 
management. As Poroshenko stated in a decree in November 2016 where he established the Day of Dignity 
and Freedom:  
 
Ukraine is a territory of dignity and freedom[…]We became so owning to not one but two revolutions – 
the Maidan of 2004, which was a Festival of Freedom, and the Revolution of 2013, the Revolution of 
Dignity. It was an extremely tough challenge for Ukraine when the Ukrainians demonstrated their 
Europeanness, dignity, their desire for freedom508. 
 
From the processing of these events arises the understanding that 2004 and 2013 represents the time when 
Ukrainians collectively mobilised themselves in order to re-establish their social distinctiveness. Russian 
identity managers, however, hindered the positive developments that characterised Maidan, as they saw 
2013 as an opportunity to launch their long-held plan of destroying Ukraine. In Ukraine’s self-schema, 
Maidan is thus processed as both a time of liberation and as a time where Ukrainians united against a 
commonly defined out-group. As Poroshenko stated in a press release in January 2018: “Having the bitter 
experience of anarchy in the period of the Ukrainian national revolution, we repel any attempts to instigate 
chaos and anarchy in the country. We understand, at least most of us, that the consolidation of all Ukrainians 
against the backdrop of the most dangerous foreign threat from Russia is the key precondition of our 
victory”509. It is then by comparing the 2004 and 2014 events to the ongoing conflict that Ukrainian identity 
managers reify Ukrainians as a group of agents who are seeking to uphold their collective existence in the 
wake of the Russian threat.  
When exploring Ukraine’s in-group reification, it becomes noticeable that the identity 
managers use personal and situational causality to distinguish between Ukrainians and Russians. In their 
conflict narrative, the identity managers e.g. reify Ukraine as a peaceful group, which is merely responding 
to Russian behaviour. Whereas Ukrainians are responding to the situation, Russians are behaving with 
intent. To this understanding is also the viewpoint that the behaviour Ukrainians (including their leaders) 
undertake in the conflict context, is something which has collective Ukrainian validation as it derives from 
the mobilisation of the Ukraine group in 2004 and 2013. Hence, instead of being behaviour dictated by the 
Ukrainian identity managers, the behaviour that occurs in the Ukraine conflict is the outcome of Ukrainians’ 
collective cognition, collective engagement, and collective interests. The Ukraine group is thus reified as 
an entity that behaves in a consistent and collective manner. One of Ukraine’s consistent tendencies is to 
behave in accordance with the agreements made in the conflict. As the Foreign Ministry stated in a press 
release addressing the situation in Donbas in November 2015: “Ukraine remains committed to the Minsk 
agreements of 2014 and 2015 as the only efficient instrument of peaceful settlement of the situation in 
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Donbas and will take all necessary measures for their proper implementation”510. Ukrainian identity 
managers reify the Ukraine group as a united group whose identity managers and group members are 
committed to solving the conflict peacefully and adapting their behaviour in accordance with the various 
agreements made. This implies that the reason a solution has not yet been reached is due to the stance and 
behaviour of the other. It is also from this understanding of the situation and the Ukraine group that the 
Ukrainian identity managers make sense of their military response. According to the identity managers, 
Ukraine’s military manoeuvring does not derive from any negative Ukrainian dispositions or interests. 
Rather, this behaviour is caused by the need to defend Ukrainians against the external enemy. As Ukraine’s 
Prime Minister, Arseny Yatseniuk, stated in February 2015 in an interview to Reuters: “Peace in Europe 
depends on peace in Ukraine and for us to achieve that peace Ukraine must have the means to defend itself. 
Not in offensive operations, but in defense operations”511. It is thus also through the use of situational 
causality that Ukrainian identity managers can construct Ukraine as a peaceful group, as it is argued that 
Ukrainians’ behaviour in the conflict would not have occurred had it not been for the situation Russian 
identity managers imposed on them.  
Although Ukrainians are forced to take up arms within their own country, this is based on 
the needs of the Ukrainians held hostage in Eastern Ukraine who seek assistance from their fellow in-group 
members. As Poroshenko stated in a press release regarding the delayed opening of checkpoints in Zolote 
in March 2018: “The Head of State emphasizes that Ukrainian border guards and military stay on the 
checkpoint risking their lives to ensure normal life of citizens[…]He visited this village and local residents 
met him saying: “Thank God, Ukraine has come here”512. The wish of the Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine is 
to be liberated by those who belong to the Ukraine group and not the Russian group due to the dispositions 
associated with these two. As Poroshenko further stated about Russia in April 2017 during a TV program 
titled “Freedom of Speech”: “We are a very responsible nation and we do not let the situation inside the 
country to be destabilized when they would like to shed blood”513. Although this self/other understanding 
is something the Ukrainian identity managers reach through the cognitive systematisation of the agents 
involved in the conflict, they argue that they speak the truth about the Ukraine group and the situation it 
finds itself in. As Poroshenko stated during a meeting with regional media in April 2018: “The war will end 
with our victory[…]Not only because we have the best Armed Forces[…]But also because the truth is with 
us and the Lord is with us, so we will surely win”514. There is therefore only one truth about the conflict in 
Ukraine, and this is the truth Ukrainian identity managers express in their conflict narrative.  
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5.2.2.2 Ukraine’s Motivation for Behaviour     
When reifying the Ukraine group, Ukrainian identity managers construct it as a counter-identity to the 
Russian identity. They do so by amongst other referring to the hostilities Russian identity managers have 
imposed upon Ukrainians in the conflict context, but also by referring to the past relations that have existed 
between the two groups. When processing stimuli that Ukraine and Russia produce in the conflict context, 
Ukrainian identity managers amongst other emphasise the hierarchical relations that existed between these 
two groups during the Soviet Union. During this time, Russians enforced their control and interests upon 
Ukrainians, which led to great suffering. This is a common memory all Ukrainians share and a memory that 
drives Ukrainians’ behaviour in the conflict today. Despite this shared memory, there are remnants from 
the past, both narratives and historical artefacts, within the Ukraine society which contradict this 
understanding. The current presentation of history does not correspond with what transpired and the 
intergroup relations that existed. There is therefore a need to re-establish the correct account of this memory 
and to re-unite Ukrainians around a shared understanding of right and wrong. As Poroshenko stated during 
a speech at the ceremony commemorating the victims of political repression in May 2018: “The state is 
now consistently pursuing a state policy aimed at restoring and preserving the historical memory of the 
Ukrainian people”515. The restoration of Ukrainians’ collective memory is not merely a matter of uniting 
those belonging to the Ukraine group and re-establishing the truth about Russia-Ukraine relations. It is also 
a matter of separating the Ukraine and Russian identities from each other. This was amongst other expressed 
by Poroshenko in May 2018 during a speech held at a photo exhibition called “Heroes”, where he stated 
that:  
 
The policy of historical memory is becoming Ukrainian again[…]At the end of last month, at my 
command, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Viktor Muzhenko 
approved[…]measures for the restoration and implementation of national traditions in the Armed Forces 
of Ukraine. The army will be finally cleared of all the dangerous rudiments of the Soviet-Russian 
ideology, which negatively affect the morale of the Ukrainian army. They mislead us with false 
propaganda stamps called to keep us in mental orbit of Russia516. 
 
Hence, although the Ukraine group is reified as unique and unified, Ukrainian identity managers point to 
how it continues to be cognitively entangled with the Russian identity. There is consequently a need to 
cognitively separate the two group identities, which includes restoring historical memories about the true 
intergroup relations and removing “dangerous ideological rudiments”, which may confuse the social 
differentiation between the two groups.  
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The past is something that has shaped the Ukraine group identity, but it is also something 
which needs to be re-shaped to fit the current contours of what it is to be, and have been, a Ukrainian. A 
motivation that drives Ukrainian behaviour in the conflict is thus the re-establishment of a Ukrainian 
collective memory network and the cognitive separation of the Ukraine identity from the Russian identity, 
as this symbolises a move from the past towards the future. As the Foreign Ministry stated following the 
Foreign Minister’s attendance at the 7th Kyiv Security Forum in April 2014: “The Foreign Minister stressed 
that Ukraine does not choose between Europe and Russia. "The only choice is between the past and the 
future", he said, adding that the Ukrainian people will make that choice on their own, without any guidance 
from outside”517. In Ukraine’s conflict narrative, is hence also a referral to how the conflict is defined by 
an interaction between two types of group identities, which are not static but mouldable as Ukrainians are 
moving away from their past misperceived Soviet/Russian identification. What manifests in Ukraine’s self-
schema, is a distinct social differentiation between the Ukraine and the Russia/Soviet identities, which are 
treated as separate groups that have never co-existed peacefully, nor have these identities ever overlapped. 
Rather, the Ukraine group has temporarily been forced under an identification with Russia, which is a social 
cognitive wrong that the Ukrainian identity managers are now trying to right.  
A central interest that drives Ukrainians in the conflict is the need to strengthen the Ukraine 
group identity and hereby unify the Ukraine group members, which may be done by spreading the social 
practices that invoke the Ukraine identity. As Poroshenko put it in a statement published on his homepage 
in March 2018:  
 
The unity of the country is an absolute priority for everyone and the authorities must take into account 
this imperative in their language and humanitarian policy. “I don’t want the language issue to be on the 
agenda of the election campaign again[…]Language must unite, not split the state. We shouldn’t let the 
fifth column get a single benefit on the future presidential, parliamentary and local elections[…]Fighting 
for our Ukrainian language means not only shouting the slogans and putting forward demands to the 
authorities. It means to buy Ukrainian books. It means to buy tickets and watch Ukrainian movies[…]And 
the main thing is to speak it. Even if you have been speaking Russian for a lifetime, switch to the 
Ukrainian language. I think this is the right path518. 
 
To reach a unified Ukraine group, Ukrainians must adopt social practices, which the Ukrainian identity 
managers associate with the Ukraine identity. This implies that those who belong to the Ukraine group are 
not only identified based on the behaviour they engage with or the position they take in the conflict, but 
also by e.g. the language they speak. A strong Ukraine identity is, however, not merely rooted in social 
practices but also in social and political systems, as there is a need for constitutional and administrative 
changes, which reflect the Ukraine group’s unity. Here the identity managers advocate for decentralisation, 
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which they compare to the alien federal solution Russian identity managers recommend. As Poroshenko 
stated during a speech at the Ukrainian Municipal Forum in June 2018:  
 
Decentralization is my child, and I will work hard on this project just as long as the Ukrainian people 
leave me in power[…]As long as I am President, I will not allow the revision of this course. Because 
decentralization is in the interests of communities, their residents, and all citizens of Ukraine. And 
Ukraine becomes stronger when communities become stronger, when nobody raises the voice to offer us 
separatism and federalization519. 
 
To restore the Ukraine identity, Ukrainians must engage in social practices that conform with this identity 
and they must support systems that unite their group members. This entails speaking Ukrainian, advocating 
decentralization, and disposing the Russian language and the idea of federalism. Those who continue to 
advocate for the practice of speaking Russian, and the need to establish a federalised state, may be 
categorised as Russian, or as “others”, as they do not comply with the social practices, world view, and 
interests associated with the Ukraine group. In Ukraine’s self-schema is hence also a referral to how there 
is a true and a false constellation of group identities, and how there is a need to retreat to Ukraine’s correct 
ideational foundation to ensure prosperity amongst group members. 
Another interest that motivates Ukrainians in the conflict is the improvement of manager-
member relations. In the past, the Ukraine group was defined by a distorted manager-member relationship, 
which resulted in a distorted Ukraine identity and interests. To reach internal cohesion, and a stronger stance 
towards Russia in the conflict, there is a need to engage in a dialogue with in-group members and ensure 
their demands. As Lubkivsky stated at the Ukraine Crisis Media Centre in May 2014:  
 
Dialogue is a pivotal concept in modern Ukraine. Maidan started from a protest of citizens who wanted to 
be heard by the Government[…]In more than 20 years of Ukraine’s independence, fundamental issues of 
our nation’s development, ranging from Constitutional basics to language policy, have been largely 
neglected or cast aside due to political games. Maidan changed that520. 
 
Ukraine’s group members have the wish to be heard by their leaders, and they wish to become a part of 
defining Ukraine’s identity and interests. In this is a referral to how the former Ukraine government, i.e. 
the former Ukraine identity managers, failed in including the collective interests of their group members, 
and instead engaged in identity management that did not correlate with the group’s social distinctiveness 
and ambitions. Due to the revolutions in 2004 and 2013 (and the inauguration of new identity managers), 
there has, however, occurred a shift as Ukrainian identity managers are now acting on behalf of the 
distinctiveness and interests that unite Ukrainians. This also implies that Russian interests, which once 
steered Ukrainian identity managers, no longer steer the decision-making of the new identity managers. 
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The Russian group identity and interests will hence no longer direct the course of Ukrainians. As 
Poroshenko stated in April 2018 during a working trip to Vinnytsia:  
 
I want to remind you that in April, May, June of 2014, the policy of federalization was imposed on us 
from outside[…]All this was from abroad and they tried to sell it to the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian 
society as a way to the development of our state[…]We did not have the right to fool people and our 
principled position was - Ukraine is a unitary state, Ukrainian people stand together, we will not allow to 
split the state521. 
 
The re-establishment of a unified and unique Ukraine group identity thus also hinges on improved manager-
members relations and the establishment of intragroup dialogue. Dialogue does, however, not pertain to 
those who advocate federalism, separatism, and other Russian demands. As Lubkivsky further stated at the 
Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre in May 2014: “Dialogue with all regions of Ukraine is underway and must 
be reinforced. Official Kyiv confirmed several times that it is ready to discuss the future model of local 
government. However, we will not engage in conversations with terrorists”522. In Ukraine’s self-schema is 
therefore also a referral to how specific identity invocations need to be complied with for agents to be 
identified as Ukrainian group members - and hereof for their demands to be heard and acted upon by 
Ukrainian identity managers. What emerges from the Ukrainian identity managers’ self-schema is hence 
the tendency to process Ukraine as an entity that behaves and thinks in a consistent manner. To reach this 
understanding the Ukrainian identity managers apply a group attribution error where they construct Ukraine 
as a unit that behaves in accordance with the same self/other understanding and interests. This use of a 
group bias is of interest, because, as will be seen in the next section, the Ukrainian identity managers do 
not apply the same bias in the processing of Russia. Rather, when they process who Russia is and what this 
group wants, they apply a leadership bias as they argue that Russia is a manipulated group, whose 
worldview and interests are fully shaped from the Russian leaderships’ personal characteristics and 
interests.  
 
5.2.3 Other-Schema  
5.2.3.1 The Russia Group 
Whereas the Ukrainian identity managers construct their self-schema around the Ukraine group identity, 
they construct their other-schema around the Russian group identity, which is understood as the party that 
caused and sustains the conflict. As with Ukrainians, Russians are reified as a group of agents who inhabit 
a certain territory and agents who pursue specific interests in the conflict. What is interesting in Ukraine’s 
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other-schema is that unlike the argument that Ukrainians share the same memory network and act in unison 
in the conflict, Russia’s group identity and interests are shaped by the Russian identity managers’ personal 
interests and personal dispositions. In Ukraine’s other-schema, “the other” is to a great extent the Russian 
leadership who are managing the Russian group in a negative way, as they are forcing, encouraging, and/or 
misleading Russian in-group members into pursuing hostile interests in Ukraine. Russian group 
mobilisation in the conflict does not derive from a collective Russian experience or memory. Rather, it is a 
group that the Russian identity managers have mobilised in the conflict in order to pursue particularly 
Vladimir Putin’s personal interests. Russian behaviour is thus not an outcome of collective cognition nor 
collective interests but behaviour Putin controls from Moscow. It is from this understanding that the 
Ukrainian identity managers process the conflict as a situation Putin has instigated, as Putin has a desire to 
sow destruction. As Poroshenko stated in an interview with the German media Bild in February 2018: 
“Putin is always happy to see any signs of political instability anywhere. Instability is what he is trying to 
create anywhere where democracy prevails”523. Putin epitomises the Russia group and the long-held 
Russian policy of invading Ukraine derives from Putin’s interest. This interest is not merely shaped by 
Putin’s wish for instability but linked to Putin’s idea that the Russia group, and Putin himself, is of more 
social value than others. As Klimkin stated at the Human Rights Council in February 2017:  
 
It is quite easy to indicate one common source of this insecurity in Europe — one state that considers 
himself “more equal than others”. A strategy to instigate, participate, support and then derail instead 
of mediating has been used by this state to create a number of volatile hotspots across our continent524. 
 
To reify the out-group, Ukrainian identity managers use a group attribution error as Putin’s behaviour is 
thought to reflect the general attitude of the Russia group. An interesting feature is, however, that they do 
not merely present Putin as a prime example of a “Russian”. Rather, Putin’s personality and personal 
ambitions are thought to shape Russia’s group identity and interests. To the group attribution error is 
therefore attached, what may be called, a “leadership attribution error”, where the out-group’s identity and 
interest is processed as the outcome of the leadership’s personality and personal ambition. This Ukrainian 
use of a group bias when processing its self-understanding and a leadership bias when processing its other-
understanding, is of interest as it indicates a cognitive tendency, which leads to clashing group identities. 
Alongside the adaptability of these group identities, as seen in the section on schematic changes, this 
indicates an area which potentially may have significant implications for the conflict parties inter-group 
relations and the nature of the conflict.  
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Although Ukrainian identity managers process Russian behaviour as something Putin has 
mobilised and now directs, they also point to how Putin’s negative interests are being pursued by Russian 
in-group members, who either share Putin’s negative interest of sowing destruction, or who are oblivious 
to the consequences their actions have. As Poroshenko stated at the 54th Munich Security Conference in 
February 2018: “This war has already recruited many different actors, who might not be even aware of their 
destructive roles. However, the evil behind this war is the same, and he resides in Kremlin”525. Whereas 
Ukrainian identity managers and group members act and think in unison, Russian identity managers impose 
their personal identity and interests upon their group members. There is thus not a cooperative relationship 
between Russian group managers and members when it comes to constructing the Russian group identity. 
Russian identity managers are rather constructing the Russia group out of their own image. This tendency 
does not only derive from the current Russian identity managers but is a tendency that the Russian identity 
managers have taken over from the Soviet identity managers. As it was put in a statement by the Foreign 
Ministry regarding the “Abduction and illegal detention of Ukrainian citizens by the Russian Federation” 
in March 2016: “So far the Russian Federation has[…]demonstrated the intention to pursue its illegal 
practices consistent with the political persecutions of the Soviet times”526. Russia and the Soviet Union are 
in Ukraine’s conflict narrative categorised as similar, as Russian and Soviet identity managers are thought 
to follow the same behavioural pattern of sustaining a manger-member hierarchy. The Ukrainian identity 
managers, however, also reify the Russia group by comparing the current Russian behaviour in the conflict 
to the behaviour of Nazi Germany. As Poroshenko stated in a speech delivered at the National Museum in 
connection to WW2 commemoration ceremony in May 2018:  
 
Eighty years ago, in the spring of 1938, Führer organized the Austrian Anschluss[...]Wasn’t the Ukrainian 
Crimea annexed under such a scenario? [...]a little bit later, Hitler, under the pretext of alleged protection 
of the rights of the German-speaking population, occupied the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia[…]Doesn’t 
it looks like the Russian occupation of the Ukrainian Donbas?527. 
 
In Ukraine’s other-schema, Russian identity managers engage in the same behaviour as e.g. the leaders of 
Nazi Germany, and so previous events conducted by other groups categorised by a manager-member 
hierarchy is used to make sense of Russian intent in the Ukraine conflict. By referring to how similarly 
hostile and hierarchical groups have behaved in the past, Ukrainian identity managers establish “who” 
Russia is and what this group “wants”. They also reach an understanding of what will happen in the conflict, 
as the past behaviour of e.g. Nazi Germany can be used as a “script” for predicting Russia’s future steps. 
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Current Russian behaviour is thus processed as a replication of past behaviour, which is typical for negative 
groups.  
In the Ukraine conflict narrative, Russia is generally reified as a negative out-group as it 
symbolises repression and conflict. The Russian identity managers are not merely replicating former 
hierarchical and repressive groups, they are abiding to a behavioural tendency of sowing conflicts and 
failing in solving them. This Russian tendency is something Ukrainian identity managers for long have 
been aware of. These tendencies were, however, not acted upon by the international community who 
already in 2008 failed to acknowledge the true content of the Russian identity and interests. As Klimkin 
stated at the UNSC Ministerial debate in February 2017:  
 
Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008 became a litmus test for European security. It was a warning 
sign that was not heeded. The aggressor, being just slapped on the hand by the international community, 
took this as a green light. Had the lessons from the 1938 Munich agreement not been learned? Today 
it is obvious[...]Appeasement of aggressors and lack of consequences merely encourage more aggression. 
Since 2014 this state has vigorously activated this strategy in Ukraine.528. 
 
Russia is hence a group that inhabits negative social dispositions, which do not comply with the positive 
dispositions the Ukraine group represents. Whereas Ukrainians are peaceful agents who value freedom, 
Russian identity managers and group members are agents who continuously engage in warfare and 
aggression against others. As the Foreign Ministry stated in the conflict factsheet published on their 
homepage (caps lock from original text): “FACT 9: MILITARY AGGRESSION AND HYBRID 
WARFARE IS RUSSIA’S STANDARD PRACTICE. Russia’s aggressive policy targets not only Ukraine. 
Russia violated territorial integrity of Moldova and Georgia, announced its territorial claims and the 
willingness to “protect” Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States. Russia supports Eurosceptic and 
radical movements in Europe”529. Warfare is a feature that characterises Russian behaviour and it is a 
tendency that Russian identity managers justify by arguing for the need to protect their in-group members. 
However, apart from protecting Russian in-group members present in alien territories, Russian identity 
managers otherwise inhabit a complete disregard for the life of others. As the OSCE Delegation of 
Ukraine stated at the Permanent Council in January 2017: “Russia and its proxies in Donbas continue to 
undermine the peaceful process[…]by pursuing their political objectives through the usual blackmail of the 
indiscriminate use of force”530. Those who belong to, or are categorised as belonging to, the Russia group 
are thus hostile and selfish agents who will not aid or spare the lives of others if these do not identify as 
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Russians. Rather, Russian identity managers and group members have no qualm attacking out-groups in 
their attempt to reach their negative interests.  
Alongside this Russian trait, is the Russian tendency to lie as Russian identity managers 
misinterpret and misrepresent facts to justify their leadership decisions and their group members’ behaviour 
in the conflict. As Klimkin stated about Russia at a UN Open Debate on international peace and security in 
February 2015: “To justify its[…]brutal actions, it hides behind barefaced misinterpretation of the relevant 
documents and its related commitments”531. Russian identity managers have a tendency of hiding the truth 
about the role their in-group members play in the conflict, and they continuously seek to fool others into 
believing that they do not have any leverage in the conflict. As Ukraine’s OSCE representative, Ihor 
Prokopchuk, stated at the OSCE Permanent Council in January 2018: “It proves Russia’s unchanged 
intention to hide from the international community the mounting evidence of Russia’s direct role as a party 
to the conflict in Ukraine’s east, including by supplying heavy weapons, military equipment, regular troops 
and mercenaries”532. In comparison to Ukrainian identity managers who value the truth, is the counter 
construction of Russian identity managers who seek to impose false narratives about the situation and agents 
involved. This accusation of lying is also attributed to the non-state actors who are processed as agents that 
clothe their true intentions in talks about referendum and rights. As Ukrainian President, Oleksandr 
Turchynov, stated in May 2014: “That farce the terrorists call a referendum is nothing else but a 
propagandist cover for killings, kidnapping, violence and other grave crimes”533. Russian identity managers 
and group members are hence generally characterised as untrustworthy and hostile agents who do not 
compare to Ukrainians.  
 
5.2.3.2 Russia’s Motivation for Behaviour   
Apart from identifying Russians and their social traits, Ukrainian identity managers reify the Russia group 
by granting it interests based on the interpretations made of Russian behaviour in the conflict. Since Russian 
identity managers are thought to steer the behaviour of their in-group members, the interests thought to 
motivate the Russia group in the conflict are interests attributed to the Russian identity managers. From this 
understanding is the viewpoint that the Russian group members who engage in the conflict, are agents that 
automatically or uncritically follow the orders their identity managers give them. These orders include the 
destruction of other groups and forcing them under Russian identity management. As Poroshenko stated 
during the Munich Security Conference in February 2018: “The “Russian world” turns everything it touches 
into ruin and decline. Have a look at Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria or occupied Donbas and Crimea. 
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It seems that according to the “Russian world” doctrine, all the Europe should look like Kaliningrad or 
Donetsk under occupation, but not vice versa”534. In Ukraine’s other-schema, Russian identity managers 
are driven by social domination, which includes the removal or conversion of other groups into becoming 
Russian. An extension of this interest is the wish of annexing territory as it fulfils the objective of gaining 
power and control over populations. As Poroshenko stated during the meeting of the Military Cabinet in 
February 2018: “We shouldn’t think that Russia’s goal was Crimea of the east of our state. I am sure that 
the goal is still the whole Ukraine. Of course, the aggressor didn’t expect the resistance organized from the 
first days of the aggression by the Ukrainian people”535. Russian behaviour is driven by the ambition of 
removing other forms of social identification as part of a larger power struggle. Since Ukrainians opposed 
the Russian attempt to destroy the Ukraine group identity, however, Russian identity managers have been 
forced to pursue their objectives with other means. As stated in a press release published on the President’s 
homepage in March 2018: “The Russian aggressor has not changed its plans on the split of Ukraine and 
continues to support the fifth column and other performers to achieve this goal”536. Russian identity 
managers’ interests of eradicating the Ukraine group identity is now sought using proxies who seek to 
undermine the Ukraine social identification by advocating a Russian social belonging, waging a war against 
Ukrainians, and annexing territory that belongs to those who identify themselves as Ukrainian. This finding 
is of interest as it also points to how the Ukrainian identity managers see cognitive support as another cause 
for the conflict. As they argue, the conflict has largely occurred because Russia has convinced the non-state 
actors that Russia’s narrative is the truth. The conflict, and the inter-group relations that define it, are hence 
equally made sense off through the processing of whose cognition gets to prevail. 
The eradication of the Ukraine group identity is not merely related to the physical destruction 
of Ukrainians and associated territory. It also involves the removal of social practices and cultural artefacts 
that invoke the Ukraine group identity within and beyond Ukrainian territory. As Ukraine’s delegation to 
the OSCE stated at the Permanent Council in October 2015:  
 
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has taken many forms and manifestations. Yesterday the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expressed a resolute protest in connection with yesterday’s search by Russian 
authorities of the premises of the library of Ukrainian literature in Moscow – the single specialised 
institution designated to meet the cultural, language and information needs of the Ukrainian community. 
The search was carried out under the pretext of looking for “russophobic” and “extremist” 
literature[…]We call on the Russian authorities to stop pressure on this library and put an end to the 
deliberate policy of eliminating everything Ukrainian537. 
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The same interest is extended to the non-state actors who by virtue of being socially categorised as Russians 
are motivated by the objective of destroying the Ukraine group identity. As Lubkivsky stated at the 
Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre in July 2014: “The Russian terrorists showed that negotiating more rights 
for Russian language, getting a better representation of the region in central government was not what their 
fight was about. Their fight was about one and only thing: Ukraine’s dismemberment. Once the Russian 
involvement is out of the picture – we, Ukrainians, will agree among us”538. Russian identity managers are 
hence driven by an interest in sowing destruction and splitting Ukrainians in accordance with group 
belonging, which is part of a long-term ambition of eradicating the Ukraine group identity and replacing it 
with the Russian group identity.  
The Russian identity managers also want to reinstate the Soviet Union, as this will ensure 
the Russian group identity’s social dominance. As Poroshenko stated at the Munich Security Conference 
in February 2018: “Yet, it is not Ukraine that is Moscow’s target. Russia has a different goal in mind. Its 
goal is to satisfy the Kremlin’s ambitions and to avenge the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th 
century[…]I am the one to warn you that there are no limits in the Kremlin as regards its hidden agenda”539. 
The re-establishment of the Soviet Union is rooted in an ambition of creating a system where agents are 
forced to identify with an alien identity and be managed by alien identity managers. If Russian identity 
managers reach this interest, it will have fatal consequences as it will lead to collective suffering. As 
Poroshenko also stated at the Munich Security Conference in February 2018:  
 
Countering Russian aggression is an existential challenge in terms of what our future will be. Will it be a 
“Russian world of alternative values” or “the Free World of universal values”?[...]First, you need to 
understand what the “Russian world” is. Examples are many. Just compare the standard of living in 
former Koenigsberg with the lifestyle in Munich. Or Karelian territories, annexed by Russia 80 years ago, 
with Finnish Karelia[…]There is a shocking difference between the “Russian world” and the Free 
World[…]The “Russian world” turns everything it touches into ruin and decline540. 
 
The primary Russian interest is to destroy and conquer lands as with the spreading of instability and 
suppression comes the expansion of the Russian group identity. In Ukraine’s conflict narrative is hence also 
a referral to how groups should only be managed by members of their in-group. The establishment of who 
is Ukrainian and Russian is, however, as seen, not given but something Ukrainian identity managers 
construct through the categorization of agents and subsequent reification of groups. In their conflict 
narrative, Ukrainian identity managers are hence not merely seeking to manage their in-group’s identity 
and interests. They also seek to manage the Russian identity and interests as they try to present their account 
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of Russia as the correct account of the group, which others should adopt and hereof think and act in 
accordance with.  
 
5.2.4 Ukraine’s Social Cognitive Framework  
In the previous sections I have analysed how the Ukraine identity managers process stimuli and how they 
combine nodes into schemas, which come to make up their social cognitive frameworks. This has been 
done to get an insight into the processing tendencies the Ukrainian identity managers resort to. These 
findings will in section 5.5. be compared to the tendencies of the other conflict parties. The reason for 
comparing these tendencies is to explore the intergroup dynamics that exist between the conflict parties and 
to explore the role their social cognitive processes may play in shaping conflict protraction. In Ukraine’s 
conflict narrative, the identity managers construct a situation-, self-, and other-schema, which combined 
shapes the social cognitive framework they rely on as the ideational foundation for making sense of and 
interacting with others in the conflict541. In this framework, the conflict is processed as an intergroup 
conflict between Ukraine and Russia. To reach this understanding, the identity managers process stimuli 
such as the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s troop presence in Eastern Ukraine, and the Maidan uprising. It 
is, however, also an understanding reached by cognitively systematizing the agents present in the conflict 
in accordance with group identities. When the Ukrainian identity managers make sense of Russia, they do 
not process Russia as a state or territory per se. Russia is instead reified as a group consisting of managers 
and members and a group that Russian leadership, particularly Vladimir Putin, is capable of mobilizing and 
controlling for the reaching of their own objectives. The conflict is thus understood as one where Russian 
identity managers have mobilized agents in a fight against Ukrainians. What is interesting in Ukraine’s 
social cognitive framework, is that the Russian identity managers are not merely capable of mobilizing 
Russian citizens. They are also capable of mobilizing agents residing outside of Russian territory, as it is 
them who have mobilized the non-state actors in Eastern Ukraine. In Ukraine’s framework, the non-state 
actors are categorized as e.g. pro-Russians/hybrid Russian forces, which are blurry social constructs that do 
not depend on legal categorization, such as citizenship. These agents’ identification instead rests on social 
categorization. According to Ukrainian identity managers, these agents are Russian because they are 
controlled by the Russian identity managers and because they are driven by the same interests and share 
the same negative dispositions as Russians. When Ukrainian identity managers speak of ‘Russia’ they hence 
refer to Russian identity managers and group members, which includes Russian citizens; Russian leaders; 
agents who socially identify as Russians; and agents who the Ukrainian identity managers have identified 
as Russians. Russia is thus a fluid group identity with no clear distinction mark. Rather, since Russia is 
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defined through social categorization, it becomes the role of the Ukrainian identity managers to construct 
what a Russian is and who is a Russian. This is then a construct the identity managers define through social 
features such as the way one thinks, talks, and acts in the conflict.  
To make sense of the conflict and the agents involved, the Ukrainian identity managers 
engage in a group reification process, where they construct Russians and Ukrainians as fundamentally 
different agents that do not share the same interests and dispositions. When referring to interests and 
dispositions, this does not imply that the Russian identity per se has interests and traits. It is the agents who 
belong to this group identity who share interests and social dispositions, which come to define their identity. 
The conflict is hence between two groups whose identities, interests, and social dispositions are so different 
that they have come into conflict. If we link this to the finding that a Russian and a Ukrainian in the conflict 
is a social category, this poses the question of how come these groups – which it may be argued all consist 
of human beings - are different. Eventually, this differentiation falls back to the identity managers who do 
not merely manage their in-group’s interests, but also seek to manage how their group members should 
understand themselves, others, and the situation they find themselves in. This managerial role of the leaders 
is to some extent one the Ukrainian identity managers acknowledge in their narrative. However, what is 
interesting is that whereas this manager-member relationship is highlighted in the case of Russia – as it is 
argued that it is the Russian identity managers who mobilize Russian group members – it is erased from 
Ukraine’s self-schema. In Ukraine’s self-schema, the Ukraine group is processed as an entity that behaves 
in a uniform and consistent manner, due to amongst other a perfect symbiosis between group managers and 
members, and a collective memory of past Russian oppression. In the conflict, the Ukrainian identity 
managers are not mobilizing Ukrainians but instead represent Ukrainians’ shared experiences, 
understandings, and interests. Whereas Russian behaviour is controlled and shaped by the leadership, 
Ukrainian behaviour is the outcome of collective cognition and engagement. In Ukraine’s framework is 
therefore also a referral to how some groups, when managed correctly, will behave from a uniform 
ideational foundation where members and managers to some extent become one person.  
Despite the identity managers’ attempt to construct a clear-cut conflict narrative, they have 
had difficulties socially categorizing the non-state actors. Initially these agents were categorized as 
terrorists, but they eventually came to be categorized as Russians or Russian proxies. What this shows is 
that social partitioning is not given, and that a central aspect of the conflict becomes the need to socially 
distinguish between those who are present to simplify the situation, and direct thoughts and behaviour. This 
partitioning is a complex endeavour as it is difficult to make sense of a conflict between agents who are 
seemingly similar. There is nevertheless a need to arrive at a cognitive simplification to make sense of what 
is going on, and so it becomes the role of the identity managers to present this systematization. To do so, 
the identity managers seek to compartmentalize agents in accordance with group identities, which are 
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treated as fixed and ‘natural’. What the findings indicate is nevertheless that these group identities are fluid 
and they are constructs the identity managers at times struggle to maintain a clear understanding off. Despite 
this, the identity managers do try to present clear-cut indications of how to distinguish between a Ukrainian 
and a Russian, and what this implies is that they are not only seeking to manage the Ukraine group identity 
but also the Russian group identity. The Ukrainian identity managers are thus in their conflict narrative 
presenting a constructed social reality which they define is the truth, and which they argue should be the 
understanding that guides conflict resolution efforts. The problem with this is, however, that their social 
cognitive framework conflicts with the ones that the Russian and DPR identity managers construct. 
 
5.3 Russia’s Social Cognitive Framework  
The following section will explore how the Russian identity managers construct understandings about the 
situation, self, and other in the Ukraine conflict, and the social cognitive framework that forms from this. 
 
5.3.1 Situation-Schema  
5.3.1.1 Conflict Cause  
In Russia’s conflict narrative, the conflict is processed as one that was triggered by a coup and the 
subsequent decision of the new Ukrainian identity managers to disregard the rights and fears of their in-
group members in Eastern Ukraine. The Russian identity managers process the situation through an 
intragroup prism as they categorise agents in accordance with a Ukraine group identity and construct the 
conflict as one where relations between Ukrainian group managers and members have deteriorated. The 
conflict is more specifically understood as one where agents who identify as Ukrainians have come into 
conflict with one another and this is a situation which was triggered by several stimuli. One of such stimuli 
was Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement, which led to public unrest and the 
illegitimate ousting of him and his government. As Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, stated in his Direct 
Line in April 2014: “As you know, President Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement with 
the EU[…]This provoked public unrest that eventually culminated in an unconstitutional coup, an armed 
seizure of power”542. The removal of the Yanukovych government is processed as a coup where legitimate 
Ukrainian leaders were removed and illegally replaced with new leaders. The onset of the conflict is hence 
linked to this event. The conflict’s continuation is, on the other hand, attributed to the new Ukrainian 
identity managers’ intent and the behaviour they engaged with since Maidan. Because once these identity 
managers illegally seized the right to manage the Ukraine group, they started excluding Ukrainian in-group 
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members who did not fit into their understanding of what it is to be Ukrainian. As Putin further stated in 
his Direct Line in April 2014:  
 
People in eastern and southeastern regions of Ukraine were worried about their future[…]because they 
saw a rapid growth of nationalist sentiments, heard threats and saw that [the new authorities] wanted 
to invalidate some of the ethnic minorities’ rights, including the rights of the Russian minority. 
On the other hand, this description is relative, because Russians are native persons in Ukraine. But 
an attempt was made to invalidate all decisions regarding the use of the native language. This alarmed 
people, of course 543. 
 
A central aspect of the conflict is thus that, following Maidan, the new Ukrainian identity managers started 
changing the Ukraine group identity as they made it an exclusive identity, which did not allow for any dual-
identification such as being Ukrainian with a Russian heritage.  
This change was not enforced on all Ukrainians as it was supported by Ukrainian group 
members who the Russian identity managers categorise as “nationalists”. This seems to imply that, in the 
Russian view, Ukraine was polarised among two groups of which the nationalists claimed unrightfully to 
represent all Ukrainians. These nationalists started to behave in accordance with the sharp social 
identification the new Ukrainian identity managers were communicating. This resulted in a situation where 
agents in Eastern Ukraine increasingly worried for their existence due to the occurrence of hostile attitudes 
towards them and their identity demands. The rise in nationalist sentiments led to fear amongst these 
disgruntled Ukrainian group members as nationalists started to threaten them. As Putin concluded in the 
Direct Line in April 2014:  
 
Meanwhile, nationalist groups did not surrender their weapons, but threatened to use force in the eastern 
regions. In response, people in the east started arming themselves. Refusing to see that something was 
badly wrong in the Ukrainian state and to start a dialogue, the government threatened to use military force 
and even sent tanks and aircraft against civilians544. 
 
The new Ukrainian identity managers’ negative construct of those who identified as Russian/Ukrainian, or 
primarily as Russian, lead to the mobilisation of nationalist Ukraine group members who were led to believe 
that it was justifiable to eradicate Ukrainian in-group members who had a Russian affiliation. The Ukrainian 
group members who had such an affiliation finally armed themselves, making the conflict a matter of self-
defence against nationalists who wished to see them physically eradicated, and self-defence against identity 
managers who no longer wanted these members to be identified as part of the Ukraine group. The conflict 
is therefore not between all members of the Ukraine group. It is a situation that the Ukrainian identity 






To understand the conflict, the Russian identity managers point to events around and 
following Maidan as stimulus that should be processed. Unlike the Ukrainian identity managers who 
process Maidan as a time where Ukrainians regained control over their existence, the Russian identity 
managers process Maidan as a time where the Ukraine group was torn apart, as there emerged an internal 
social differentiation between Ukrainian group members. Whereas Ukraine was once an overarching group 
identity used to categorise agents of all backgrounds living within the Ukraine territory, the Ukraine group 
identity was increasingly managed as something exclusive. In Russia’s situation-schema there is therefore 
a referral to how agents previously had the possibility of belonging to a multitude of social identities, as 
those who identified with the Russian group identity also for long had been able to identify with the 
Ukrainian group identity. With the onset of the conflict, however, occurred a social cognitive shift as this 
dual-identification was no longer made possible by the new Ukrainian identity managers. This led to a 
situation where agents had to decide which group to belong to. The Russian identity managers hence also 
apply a fundamental attribution error when constructing their situation-schema, as they attribute the onset 
and continuation of the conflict to the Ukrainian identity managers’ intent of changing and dictating their 
in-group members social identification.  
Although the conflict is attributed to the new Ukrainian identity managers’ behaviour, the 
Russian identity managers acknowledge that there did exist a collective wish for change within Ukraine. 
This particularly pertained to relations between Ukrainian group managers and members as Ukrainian group 
members, during Maidan, demanded a more inclusive and democratic system where their interests could 
be heard and acted upon. As Putin stated in a meeting with Russian media representatives in March 2014: 
“I understand the people on Maidan who are calling for radical change rather than some cosmetic 
remodelling of power. Why are they demanding this? Because they have grown used to seeing one set 
of thieves being replaced by another”545. The collective interests of change that occurred during Maidan 
were valid demands, but these reflected a discontent towards the Ukrainian identity managers rather than 
towards agents who identified with the Russian group identity. Following Maidan, the Ukrainian identity 
managers nevertheless decided to focus on these agents, rather than on the need to change the distorted 
relations between them and their members. The Ukrainian identity managers thus made the conflict a matter 
of group belonging instead of focusing their attention on in-group grievances. The conflict could thus have 
been avoided had the Ukrainian identity managers reacted to the Ukrainians’ collective demands and had 
the identity managers included their Eastern in-group members’ concerns and wishes in the redesigning of 
the Ukraine group. A dialogue with these agents was, however, disregarded. As Putin stated in his direct 
line in April 2014: “Instead of starting a dialogue with these people, Kiev appointed new governors – 
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oligarchs and billionaires – to these regions. People are suspicious of oligarchs as it is[…]This only added 
to the public discontent. People chose their own leaders, but what did the new government do to them? 
They were thrown into prison”546. Apart from removing these in-group members right to invoke their 
Russian identification through amongst other the language they speak, the Ukrainian identity managers also 
removed these in-group members’ right to decide who should represent and manage their dual-identity.  
In Russia’s situation-schema, the identity managers hence dismiss the understanding that the 
conflict is between a European or a Russian choice, as this is a lie Ukrainian identity managers have created 
to redirect attention away from their unwillingness to change relations with their in-group members. This 
redirection has caused a conflict between Ukrainians who seek for either a homogenous or a heterogenic 
composition of the Ukraine group identity. As Putin stated in 2014 at a ceremony where he received the 
credentials of foreign diplomats: “The anti-constitutional coup in Kiev and attempts to artificially impose 
a choice between Europe and Russia on the Ukrainian people have pushed society toward a split and painful 
confrontation.”547 and as Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, stated in August 2014 in an interview 
with Russian media: “I expect Ukrainian authorities to understand that it is absolutely unacceptable, when 
Ukrainians[...]are forced to fight with their own people”548. The conflict is hence not one that an out-group 
has imposed upon Ukraine, nor is it a question of external ideational belonging. It is a situation that the 
Ukrainian identity managers have imposed upon themselves and their group members, with the result that 
the Ukrainian identity managers are now socially and physically splitting the group, and country, into two. 
As Putin stated in April 2015 in his Direct Line: “To sum up, there are grounds to say that the current Kiev 
authorities are cutting Donbass from Ukraine themselves”549. The conflict is thus a self-imposed internal 
conflict between group members who are fighting over how to construct the Ukraine group identity.  
 
5.3.1.2 The Agents Involved  
Although the Russian identity managers process the conflict as a self-imposed intragroup conflict, they 
have, like the Ukrainian identity managers, had difficulties establishing who the agents in Eastern Ukraine 
are and how they are similar to Ukrainians and distinct from Russians. Whereas Ukrainian identity 
managers have resolved this conundrum by categorising the non-state actors as Russian group members, 
the Russian identity managers have made sense of the non-state actors by separating the Crimea situation 
from the Donetsk situation. This allows the identity managers to socially categorise those who live in 
Donetsk as Ukrainians, and those who live in Crimea as Russians. Despite this distinction, Russian identity 
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managers continue to have difficulties social differentiating the agents in Donetsk from the agents in 
Crimea. When constructing Crimea, the identity managers point to how Crimea as an area inhabits a diverse 
demographic. As Putin stated following the signing of the treaty that united Crimea and the Russian 
Federation in March 2014: “Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and traditions. This 
makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost over the centuries. 
Russians and Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and people of other ethnic groups have lived side by side in 
Crimea, retaining their own identity, traditions, languages and faith”550. Despite this diverse demographic, 
the Crimean Peninsula is primarily inhabited by Russians and the remaining inhabitants are agents who, as 
Putin stated in an address to Russian MPs in March 2014, “as the referendum has shown, also lean towards 
Russia”551. Donetsk, on the other hand, is an area that in terms of ethnic composition and historical 
affiliation differs from Crimea. As Putin stated in his Direct Line in April 2014:  
 
First, we must admit that the ethnic composition of Crimea differs from that of southeastern Ukraine. 
These territories, as I just said, were transferred to Ukraine in the mid-1920s, and in 1954, Crimea was 
annexed to Ukraine for some reason as well[...]As for what is happening in southeastern Ukraine, we 
don’t know for sure. But we believe that we ought to do everything we can to help these people defend 
their rights and determine their fate on their own552 . 
 
Hence, although Russian identity managers acknowledge that agents in Donetsk and Crimea share many 
social similarities, they categorise the agents in Crimea as predominantly belonging to the Russian group 
identity, based on the amount of time this territory has been a part of Ukraine. What socially differentiates 
the agents in Donetsk and Crimea is thus the amount of time these territories, and agents inhabiting them, 
have been managed by Ukrainian identity managers.  
In Russia’s conflict narrative, the non-state actors are socially categorised as Ukrainians who 
are defending themselves against their in-group members and managers. As the Foreign Ministry stated in 
May 2014 regarding the OSCE’s roadmap for settlement of the conflict: “We also request an end to the 
practice of threatening civilians by the use and threat of the use of force. We expect that if Kiev takes such 
steps, the leaders of the self-defence force of Donbass and Lugansk will react accordingly”553. To make 
sense of the who the non-state actors are the Russian identity managers rely on situational causality, as 
these agents are Ukrainians who are merely reacting to situational forces that seek to take away their group-
mediated rights. The agents involved are therefore not categorizable as Ukrainians and Russians, but purely 
as Ukrainians. Despite this, Ukrainian identity managers seek to construct the situation differently, as they 
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socially categorise the non-state actors as alien and as out-group members they may legitimately attack. As 
the Foreign Ministry stated regarding the situation in Ukraine in April 2014:  
 
We are puzzled by the praise of self-proclaimed Kiev authorities for their allegedly well-considered 
actions on the implementation of the "operations to restore law and order" in the South-East of Ukraine, 
which have already led to bloodshed. They say nothing of the anti-constitutional use of armed forces to 
"appease" their own people, who dare to defend their legal interests and rights, or of the other decisions 
taken by Kiev clearly aimed at provoking the South-Eastern regions.554 
 
The conflict is thus processed as one where Ukrainians are fighting Ukrainians, and one where Ukrainian 
identity managers are trying to justify their hostile actions against their own in-group members, by 
constructing the conflict as one between a Russian and Ukrainian group. Like the Ukrainian identity 
managers, the Russian identity managers are hence also seeking to cognitively systematize the agents 
present in the conflict by drawing distinct and clear-cut social boundaries between them.  
 
5.3.1.3 The Solution  
Since the conflict is an intragroup conflict between Ukrainians, the Russian identity managers argue that 
there is a need for dialogue and for a federal system, which may represent the diversity associated with the 
Ukraine group. As Lavrov stated in an article published in The Guardian in April 2014: “Russia is doing 
all it can to promote early stabilisation in Ukraine. We are firmly convinced that this can be achieved 
through, among other steps: real constitutional reform, which would ensure the legitimate rights of all 
Ukrainian regions and respond to demands from its south-eastern region to make Russian the state's second 
official language”555. According to Russian identity managers, the solution hinges on the need to 
acknowledge the diversity associated with the Ukraine group identity, and particularly the need to elevate 
the value of being Russian inside Ukraine. To ensure this, Ukrainian identity managers must introduce 
federalism, which will grant the opportunity for unity in diversity and allow for the restoration of peaceful 
relations between Ukrainians and the Russian/Ukrainians. The Ukrainian identity managers also need to 
elevate and respect the social practices identified as Russian and include these as equal practices alongside 
those associated with Ukraine.  
To ensure a peaceful outcome to the conflict, Ukrainian identity managers also need to 
engage in a dialogue with their citizens who fully or partly identify as Russian. As Putin stated in his Direct 
Line in April 2014:  
 
People in the eastern regions are talking about federalisation, and Kiev has at long last started talking 
about de-centralisation. But what do they mean? To be able to understand what they mean, they should sit 
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down at the negotiating table and search for an acceptable solution. Order in the country can only be 
restored through dialogue and democratic procedures, rather than with the use of armed force, tanks 
and aircraft556. 
 
The conflicting parties need to engage in a dialogue about what it means to be Ukrainian and how relations 
between group managers and members should be systematised. To do this, Ukrainian identity managers 
should acknowledge the presence of the non-state actors and grant them equal influence in the conflict 
resolution process. As the Foreign Ministry stated at a Geneva meeting on the Ukraine conflict in April 
2014: “The Geneva meeting was to send a clear signal to Kiev that the situation can be stabilised only 
through the launch of a comprehensive dialogue with regions, especially with those, where Russian-
speaking population is prevailing and whose opinions should be heard by the central authorities”557. There 
is thus also an argument that the cause for the conflict’s continuation is the Ukrainian identity managers’ 
tendency of dismissing the social existence of the non-state actors, and hereby the existence of contradicting 
understandings of the Ukraine group identity.  
To solve the conflict, the first step is to acknowledge that the Ukraine group identity is not 
homogenous but diverse and that this identity needs to encompass agents with different affiliations and 
social practices. As Putin stated in his 2015 Direct Line: “It is also very important that they observe the 
legitimate rights and interests of Russians living in Ukraine and those who consider themselves Russian 
regardless of what their passports say. People who consider Russian their mother tongue and Russian 
culture their native culture. People who feel an inextricable bond with Russia”558. The Russian solution to 
the conflict is thus for the Ukrainian identity managers to end their attempt to create a homogenous Ukraine 
group identity, and to retract to the former understanding of this identity as encompassing a wide range of 
agents, particularly those who have strong affiliations and relations with Russia. In this is then also the 
argument that the solution to the conflict hinges on Ukrainian identity managers’ adoption of Russia’s social 
cognitive framework.  
 
5.3.2 Self-Schema  
5.3.2.1 The Russia Group  
In Russia’s self-schema, the identity managers point to the presence of a distinct Russian group identity, 
which is the identification they use to describe themselves with. What is interesting is that the identity 
managers do not reify the Russia group as one only they and their citizens belong to. Instead, they argue 
that the Ukrainian identity draws roots to the Russian identity as both stem from the Soviet Union. Both 
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identities originate from an overarching Soviet identification, and so the agents of these two groups have 
previously co-existed as in-group members. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian and 
Russian identities, however, manifested as their own groups. As Putin stated in his 2015 Direct Line:  
 
Ukraine is an independent state and we must respect this. We alienated all this ourselves at one time when 
we made a decision on the sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the early 1990s. We made this 
decision, didn’t we? We freed them from us but we took this step. It was our decision. And since we did 
this, we should treat their independence with respect. It is up to the Ukrainian people to decide how to 
develop relations559. 
 
Although the Russian identity managers point to the similarity between Ukrainians and Russians, what is 
noteworthy is that the Ukraine and Russia groups are not treated as equals. There is a social hierarchy 
between them as Russians “decided” to free the Ukrainians and allowed them to define themselves as their 
own group. The Russian identity managers hence reify Ukraine as a sub-category of the Russian group 
identity that the Russians decided to release in the early 1990s, and which since then has been a group with 
the task of socially differentiating itself from Russia. Despite the existence of these two groups, the identity 
managers reify Russians and Ukrainians as agents who continue to be the same, as they share the same 
social origin. As Putin stated in his 2015 Direct Line: “I see no difference between Ukrainians and Russians, 
I believe we are one people”560. There are hence overlaps between Ukrainians and Russians, which is 
noticeable by the fact that the conflict revolves around agents in Ukraine who continue to identify 
themselves as Russians. Despite the social similarity, the identity managers also refer to how they now 
primarily have an interest in those who predominantly identify themselves as Russian. As Putin stated in 
his Direct Line in April 2014:  
 
I would like to remind you that what was called Novorossiya (New Russia) back in the tsarist 
days[…]were not part of Ukraine back then. These territories were given to Ukraine in the 1920s 
by the Soviet government. Why? Who knows[…]Russia lost these territories for various reasons, but 
the people remained. Today, they live in Ukraine, and they should be full citizens of their country. That’s 
what this is all about[…]The key issue is providing guarantees to these people. Our role is to facilitate 
a solution in Ukraine, to ensure that there are guarantees561. 
 
Thus, although the Ukraine and Russia groups have control over their own existence, the Russian identity 
managers continue to provide for those who find themselves in the social categorical crosshair between 
being Ukrainian and Russian. In Russia’s self-schema is hence a referral to the fluidity of identities, as 
agents may identify as distinctly Russian or Ukrainian, but they may also identify as Ukrainian/Russian, 
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Despite this shared past, the Russian identity managers do accept that there is a certain 
negativity in Ukrainian and Russian group relations due to the Soviet Union’s previous attempt of imposing 
its interests upon Ukrainians. As Putin responded in his 2015 Direct Line to a question regarding the 
Ukraine tendency of comparing Russia to Nazi Germany: “But in truth, we, or rather our predecessors, gave 
cause for this. Why? Because after World War II, we tried to impose our own development model on many 
Eastern European countries, and we did so by force. This has to be admitted. There is nothing good about 
this and we are feeling the consequences now”562. The Russian identity managers construct the Russian 
group identity as not an identity which originated in its own right, but as the identity successor of the Soviet 
Union. Whereas the Soviet Union amongst other split into the Russian and Ukraine group, from which the 
Ukraine group needed to establish its social identification, the Russia group continued to evolve from the 
Soviet identity. This entails that the Russian group identity at times is compared to the Soviet Union. 
However, despite Russian affiliation with the Soviet Union, the Russian identity managers distance 
themselves from some of the interests associated with the former Soviet identity managers. As Putin further 
stated in 2015: “For all the ugly nature of the Stalin regime, for all the reprisals and even the banishment of 
entire peoples, the Stalin regime never set the goal of destroying [those] peoples, so the attempt to put an 
equal sign between the two [Nazism and Stalinism] is absolutely groundless”563. Hence, although Russia 
may be socially compared to the Soviet Union, Russian identity managers should not be compared to Soviet 
identity managers who previously distorted some of the interests associated with the Russian/Soviet group. 
The Russian identity managers are thus selective in how much of the Soviet Union’s previous tendencies 
they associate with the Russia group and the Russian behaviour that occurs in the conflict. A feature which, 
however, continues to define the Russians is that they are, like the leaders and members of the Soviet Union, 
an inclusive group which welcomed and welcomes diversity amongst their people. The Russian identity 
managers hence reify the Russia group as an ‘improved’ version of the Soviet Union - largely due to the 
decisions the Russian identity managers have made on behalf of their group members. Like the Ukrainian 
identity managers, Russian identity managers present an account of how to make sense of the groups present 
in the conflict, and how these group identities have emerged and continue to relate to each other.  
Apart from referring to “who” Russia is and how this group is similar to Ukraine, the identity 
managers reify the Russia group by constructing social dispositions for it. The primary disposition is that 
the Russia group is a peaceful and neutral party in the Ukraine conflict. The Russian identity managers did 
not instigate the conflict, nor do they or their group members play a role in sustaining it. As the Foreign 
Ministry stated in July 2014 regarding the presence of OSCE observers at the Donetsk and Gukovo 
checkpoints on the Russian-Ukrainian border: “Our invitation to international observers is another 
 




confirmation of Russia' good will, because Russia uses all its efforts to assist the de-escalation of the internal 
Ukrainian crisis”564. The Russia group is amongst other reified through situational causality, as Russian 
behaviour is not an outcome of intent, but a response to the conflict situation Ukrainian identity managers 
have caused. It is from this attribution processing that the Russian identity managers reify themselves and 
their group members as agent who merely want to solve the conflict peacefully. As Putin stated to media 
questions in March 2014: “We need to be heard by all of Ukraine’s people. We have no enemies in Ukraine. 
Let me say again that Ukraine is a friendly country. Do you know how many people came from Ukraine 
to Russia last year? 3.3 million came, and of that number almost 3 million people came to Russia 
for work[…]This is no joking matter. We welcome all of them[…]They are all equal in our eyes, all 
brothers to us”565. This understanding is further coupled with the argument that the Russian identity 
managers speak the truth about their group and the conflict. Hence, when Ukrainian identity managers 
blame the conflict on Russian identity managers, this is processed as an attempt to redirect attention. As the 
Foreign Ministry expressed in August 2014 to statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on Ukraine, who accused Russia of sending weapons to the non-state actors in Eastern Ukraine:  
 
We view this as another confirmation that the accusations of our country in escalation of the conflict in 
Ukraine are unjustified and precarious. Those who are engaged in the search and spinning of such 
insinuations instead of this would better show their political will and the influence they have to stop the 
bloody punitive operation, which is conducted by Kiev in the East of the country566. 
 
The Russian identity managers therefore provide counter-schemas to the ones offered by the Ukrainian 
identity managers, and from the exploration of the two conflict narratives it becomes apparent that they rely 
on many of the same processing tendencies albeit from a mirror imaging vis-á-vis each other.  
Eventually, the Russia group is reified by referring to the manager-member relations that 
constitute this group. Here, the identity managers argue that they act in confinement with their Russian 
group members’ social identification and interests. To reach this understanding the identity managers apply 
a group attribution error, as they argue that their behaviour and cognition is said to reflect the general 
attitude of all Russians. From this is the argument that, unlike the Ukrainian identity managers, the Russian 
identity managers are in close connection with their group members and so the Russia group does not 
experience the same internal divisions and conflicts as Ukraine. As Putin stated in a meeting with media 
representatives in March 2014: “The real problem is that none of the previous Ukrainian governments gave 
proper attention to people’s needs. Here in Russia we have many problems, and many of them are similar 
to those in Ukraine, but they are not as serious as in Ukraine[…]People [in Ukraine] see what is going on, 
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and this creates lack of confidence in the authorities”567. There is a perfect symbiosis between Russian 
identity managers and members, as the group members are fully content with how their identity managers 
manage their group identity and interests. It is then by coupling situational causality with the group 
attribution error that the Russian identity managers can reify Russia as a neutral party, which behaves in a 
peaceful and unified manner in the conflict.  
 
5.3.2.2 Russia’s Motivation for Behaviour  
The Russia group is also reified through the construction of interests, which are said to motivate Russian 
behaviour in the conflict. One of these is to ensure the social inclusion and existence of agents who identify 
as Russian within Ukrainian territory. As Putin stated in his direct line in April 2014: “The essential issue 
is how to ensure the legitimate rights and interests of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the southeast 
of Ukraine”568. The expressed interest is to ensure a socially united Ukraine, where agents may co-exist 
despite their social identification, and where those who affiliate themselves with the Russian group identity 
can express their social belonging. Whereas Ukrainian identity managers are said to dismiss the presence 
of the non-state actors and dual-identities inside Ukrainian territory, Russian identity managers process 
themselves as agents who support the non-state actors’ social existence. This support of existence is not 
rooted in an understanding that DPR represents a different group identity, but that the people of DPR are 
Ukrainians who have the right to be heard and included. The other interest said to motivate Russian 
behaviour is thus to assist Ukrainians in ensuring their unity. To ensure this, Russian identity managers will 
temporarily take over responsibilities that otherwise befall Ukrainian identity managers. As the Foreign 
Ministry stated in February 2017 following a Presidential Executive Order on allowing agents residing in 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions to enter the Russian Federation:  
 
This measure is designed to alleviate life in the region that has been affected by the inhumane policies of 
the Kiev authorities and the thoughtless actions of Ukrainian nationalists. Kiev’s actions[…]have 
seriously worsened the conditions for the Donbass people who refused to accept the anti-constitutional 
coup in Ukraine in February 2014[…]Measures stipulated in the Executive Order are temporary and will 
be effective until the political settlement of the crisis in certain districts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and 
Lugansk regions pursuant to the Minsk Agreements569. 
 
In Russia’s self-schema, the identity managers construct themselves as temporary Ukrainian identity 
managers who will continue to ensure unity and security in Eastern Ukraine, until the unrightful Ukrainian 
identity managers live up to their responsibilities. This behaviour does not derive from the identity 
managers’ intent but is a response to the situation, as Russian identity managers are responding to demands 
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that have arisen in Eastern Ukraine. As the Foreign Ministry stated regarding the provision of humanitarian 
aid to Eastern Ukraine in May 2014: “Russia receives requests from nationals and organisations in the 
conflict zone in the Eastern regions of Ukraine, where there are casualties and many injured as a result of 
forceful action”570. Once again situational causality is used to process why the Russian identity managers 
assist the non-state actors in the conflict, and why the identity managers have taken an active role in the 
conflict despite the proclaimed Russian neutrality.  
Eventually, the identity managers process Ukrainians and Russians as agents who share the 
same collective interests. As Putin stated in his Direct Line 2014: “Russia has always been close to Ukraine 
and will always remain closely related to it[…]The point is that we have extensive common interests. If we 
want to succeed, we must cooperate and join efforts. I’m confident that we will understand this despite all 
the emotional complications we’re seeing today”571. This understanding is rooted in the social 
categorisation of the agents present and the reification of the Ukraine and Russia groups as sharing a similar 
social origin. From this construction of the Russian and Ukrainian group identity comes the understanding 
that their interests are the same. Russians and Ukrainians may thus act differently in the conflict, but this is 
an outcome of the new Ukrainian identity managers’ hostile behaviour, rather than a result of incompatible 
Russian and Ukrainian goals. In Russia’s self-schema the identity managers process themselves as agents 
who possess the correct understanding of who Ukraine is and what this group wants. This understanding is 
said to guide the Russian identity managers’ behaviour, as they are working towards re-establishing the true 
Ukraine group identity through amongst other the advocacy for federalism and support for the non-state 
actors in Eastern Ukraine. In the end, this Russian behaviour is a necessity because as Lavrov stated in an 
article published in The Guardian in April 2014: “We are not imposing anything on anyone, we just see 
that if it is not done, Ukraine will continue to spiral into crisis with unpredictable consequences”572. The 
Russian identity managers are hence also indirectly arguing that they do not foresee any end to the conflict 
until the Ukrainian identity managers reverse to the Ukraine group construct that the Russian identity 
managers perceive to be the correct one.  
 
5.3.3 Other-Schema  
5.3.3.1 The Ukraine Group  
In Russia’s other-schema, the antagonists are the new Ukrainian identity managers who have launched a 
conflict against their in-group members in an attempt to create an exclusive Ukraine group identity devoid 
of any dual-identities. When constructing the other-schema, focus is on the Ukrainian identity managers 
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and how these agents are constructing the Ukraine group around their negative personal identities and 
interests. To make sense of the other, the Russian identity managers thus also apply a leadership attribution 
error, as they argue that the leaders in Ukraine have started to shape the Ukraine group from their own 
image. This change has not occurred spontaneously. Rather, the change in the Ukraine group identity from 
being a diverse social identification into being defined by the Ukrainian identity managers’ personality and 
interests, has occurred with the Ukrainian identity managers’ deliberate attempt to change Ukraine’s 
history. To reach this understanding, the Russian identity managers particularly emphasise the Ukrainian 
identity managers decision to remove historical references and artefacts that previously united Russians and 
Ukrainians. As the Representative of Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Alexander Lukashevich, stated in 2014 in 
response to a comment by a Ukraine Foreign Ministry Representative who said that self-determination was 
only the right of indigenous groups, and that the Russian minority was not an indigenous people:  
 
If this statement means that by calling Russians a "diaspora", pointing out their subordinate position with 
regard to the "indigenous" Ukrainian population of the country, then the investigations of "ethnographers" 
from Mikhailovsky Square highly resemble the searches of the last century by theorists of Nazism in the 
1930's. It seems at least inadequate to propose arbitrarily distorted interpretations of the origin of people, 
who by some quirk of fate, became related to different geographic parts of Ukraine. The Ukrainian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes a serious mistake, when in this critical situation they hit at the 
historical memories of millions and millions of Russians and Ukrainians, who have been living together 
for ages and have made a big joint contribution to the establishment and welfare of historical and modern 
Ukraine573. 
 
The Ukrainian identity managers are thus in the process of constructing a distorted Ukraine group identity 
by constructing a false narrative about how the Ukraine identity came to be, who may identify as Ukrainian, 
and what this group wants.  
Although the creation of this distorted Ukraine identity originated with Maidan, the Ukraine 
group identity has been under construction for a long time. In Russia’s other-schema, the confused contours 
of the Ukraine group identity derive from the past where agents residing in the Ukraine territory were 
defined through various categorical representations. This confused categorisation has for long led to internal 
disagreements in Ukraine, and so the current conflict is to some extent merely a continuation of this internal 
struggle. The current situation is now shaped by Ukrainian identity managers who are trying to impose a 
specific social differentiation upon those who live in Ukraine. The way they do this is by constructing a 
false Ukraine group identity around an expressed European belonging, which they advocate is a social 
identification that has always, and once again should, define the Ukraine group. As Putin stated in his Direct 
Line in 2014:  
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Some of these territories were part of Czechoslovakia, some of Hungary, some of Austro-Hungary 
and some of Poland, where they were never full-fledged citizens. You know, something has always been 
growing in their heart of hearts. Some people seem to believe that it is this circumstance – because these 
territories were former possessions of several present-day EU countries – that imbues them with some 
special European substance. That they were second-rate citizens in those states seems to have been 
forgotten, but this still lurks in their historical memory, under the crust, deep down in their hearts, see? 
It’s where their nationalism comes from, I think574. 
 
The understanding that the Ukraine group identity embodies European traits is misinterpreted as Ukraine’s 
European belonging was defined by a hierarchical social relation. The Ukraine identity also never originated 
from a European identity. Rather, Ukrainians were forced to socially identify with several different social 
categories depending on which group had the power over them and their territory. A group that did exist, 
and which did include Ukrainians on an equal social footing, was the Soviet Union where Ukrainians co-
existed peacefully with others. The Ukraine group identity draws roots to a Soviet/Russian social belonging 
and the longer the Ukrainian identity managers deny this origin, the longer the conflict will continue. As 
the Foreign Ministry stated in October 2014 in connection to the attempts of introducing constitutional 
reforms in Ukraine: “All of Kiev’s attempts to distort their country’s history and to renounce the 
achievements of the Russian and Soviet past will only deepen the rift in modern Ukrainian society”575. The 
Ukrainian identity managers are thus trying to change history and the social origin of the Ukraine group, 
which implies that they are trying to change how Ukrainians should socially differentiate themselves, and 
how they should understand the history and ideational foundation from which they and their identity derive. 
The Ukrainian identity managers’ attempt to construct a European social belonging thus goes against the 
common memory network that Ukrainians share.  
The current Ukraine identity is confused because of both the events following the Soviet 
Union but also as a result of Ukrainian identity managers’ attempt to change the trademarks that define this 
identity. Nowhere is this confusion more profound than in Eastern Ukraine where the fluid identity between 
Russian and Ukrainian has created a social identification challenge. As Putin stated in his 2014 Direct Line:  
 
Central, eastern and southeastern Ukraine is another matter. I’ve just mentioned this area, New Russia, 
which has intertwined its roots with those of the Russian state. The local people have a somewhat 
different mentality. They found themselves part of present-day Ukraine, which had been pieced together 
in the Soviet period. Of course, it is difficult for them to establish proper relations and to understand each 
other. But we should help them to do so as much as we can576. 
 
The confused identification inside Ukraine’s territory is not merely propelled by Ukrainian identity 
managers’ behaviour but also by the West, which has failed in countering the nationalist sentiments that 
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called for an exclusive Ukraine group identity. As Lavrov, stated during a press conference in February 
2014: “I cannot leave aside the responsibility of the West (at least many Western countries), who attempted 
to interfere with these events in all possible ways[…]they insistently and consistently shied away from any 
principled assessments of the extremists' actions, including Neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic manifestations”577. 
The Russian identity managers point to how the Ukraine group identity continues to be shaped and adapted 
in accordance with stimuli produced by external actors. The Ukraine identity is hence an identity under 
construction, and it is an identity that several parties seek to shape based on their own interests.  
In Russia’s other-schema, the identity managers therefore refer to two versions of the 
Ukraine group identity. Whereas the ‘original’ Ukraine group inhabits positive interests and traits that this 
group shares with Russia, the ‘new’ Ukraine group is characterised by negative tendencies where Ukrainian 
identity managers are imposing their personal traits and ambitions on their in-group members. As the 
Foreign Ministry stated in May 2014 as a reaction to Ukraine’s propositions for settling the conflict: “It is 
evident that Arseniy Yatsenyuk and his team should talk to the Ukrainian people as a priority and they 
should not have "top-down" discussions, but discuss it as equals, without ultimatums, of which everyone is 
becoming tired, and without the criminal use of force”578. The current characteristics associated with the 
Ukraine group is thus that there is a social hierarchy between Ukrainian in-group managers and members. 
The outcome of this hierarchy is that the Ukrainian identity managers try to suppress the voice of those who 
seek to counter the managers’ narrative about the Ukraine group identity and the conflict situation. As 
Lukashevich responded in February 2018 to an attack on the “Federal Agency for the CIS Affairs, 
Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation” office in Kiev:  
 
Amidst acute intra-Ukrainian disagreements, political turbulence and social dissatisfaction, Kiev officials 
are imposing an image of Russia as an external enemy. Crimes against Russian property and Russian 
nationals in Ukraine are encouraged. The government is supporting persecution of the canonical Orthodox 
church, Russian language and culture. Freedom of speech is being restricted. Attacks on the media, 
journalists and bloggers have unfortunately become commonplace.579. 
 
The Ukrainian identity managers’ conflict narrative is false, but regardless of this, they continue to advocate 
this constructed truth. They do, however, not merely lie about the history and social origin of the Ukraine 
identity. They also lie about Russia and the role managers and members of this group play in the conflict. 
The Ukrainian identity managers therefore lack the political will to resolve the conflict as they continue to 
deny the truth about who they are fighting and why. As the Foreign Ministry commented in April 2015 in 
response to Ukraine’s announcement that it would not engage in a dialogue with the representatives of 
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Donetsk and Luhansk: “This is yet further evidence of Ukraine’s unconstructive stance, which contradicts 
the provisions of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements[…]which says 
that “questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of certain 
areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk region”580. Whereas Russian identity managers abide to agreements made 
and commit to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, Ukrainian identity managers continue to sabotage the 
peace process. The Russian identity managers thus also point to how the continuation of the conflict hinges 
on the other and this antagonist’s interests and dispositions.  
 
5.3.3.2 Ukraine’s Motivation for Behaviour   
The Russian identity managers also reify the Ukraine group by processing the motivations that drive 
Ukrainian identity managers’ behaviour in the conflict. One of these interests is to re-shape the Ukraine 
group identity, which has become a predominant policy amongst Ukrainian identity managers. To re-shape 
the Ukraine group identity, there is a need to change previously shared understandings of where the Ukraine 
group derives from and the role Russia and the Soviet Union played and continues to play in this respect. 
As the Foreign Ministry responded in April 2015 to Ukraine’s adoption of a law package, which included 
a law “Condemning the Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and 
Banning the Promotion of Their Symbols”:  
 
Moscow is seriously alarmed by the growing struggle against Ukraine’s heroic past waged by the forces 
that have seized power in the Ukraine. Recently, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a new package of laws 
aimed at rewriting the history of Ukraine and suppressing political dissent[…]By presenting the years 
1917-1991 as a period of struggle for Ukraine’s independence and denouncing the “communist 
totalitarian government” of that period as “criminal” and “pursuing a policy of state terrorism,” the 
current Ukrainian authorities are trying to erase from the memory of millions of Ukrainians the real 
history of their country in the 20th century and its progressive advance as part of the Soviet Union581. 
 
Ukrainian identity managers’ are driven by the wish to exclude everything Russian including agents who 
represent, identify, or sympathy with Russia; Russian social practices (such as the Russian language); 
Russian representations (such as media and cultural centres); and the historical artefacts that have Russian 
connotations (such as the Soviet Union and memories of the Great War). As the Foreign Ministry stated in 
October 2017: “It is sad to know that a once friendly nation has adopted a “good” tradition, ignoring the 
interests of its own people – to wage a frenzied war against everything that is Russian, including the 
language, printed products, television, radio, press, as well as websites. Now, performing artists are added 
to this list. What's next? Will they go as far as making the very word “Russia” illegal?”582. According to the 
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Russian identity managers, Ukrainian identity managers are thus motivated from an ambition of 
‘Ukrainisation’, which includes the creation of a false understanding that having affiliations with Russia is 
non-Ukrainian.  
Although this is a management goal, it has trickled into the Ukraine group as the removal of 
anything Russian has become an objective for Ukrainian nationalists. As the Foreign Ministry stated in a 
response to an incident towards the CIS office in Kiev in April 2017: “Inspired by the Kiev government’s 
policy of total Ukrainisation, radical Ukrainian nationalists staged yet another anti-Russia provocation on 
April 8”583. As the Ministry also stated in March 2014: “The proliferation of Neo-Nazi slogans, the 
glorification of Nazi punishers, the calls for reprisals against the Russian population of Ukraine and 
Russians in general (i.e. actions having all the signs of ethnic cleansing) must be clearly and unambiguously 
condemned”584. What the Ukrainian identity managers’ conflict narrative and behaviour generates is a split 
country, as the identity managers are creating an imaginary social distance between those who fully identify 
themselves as Ukrainians, and those who partly identify themselves as Russians. The Ukrainian identity 
managers are, however, not merely creating divisions inside Ukraine territory, but also between agents 
living in Ukraine and Russia. As the Foreign Ministry stated in July 2017 in connection to Ukraine’s plans 
of changing the rules of entry to Ukraine for Russian citizens:  
 
Thus, Kiev is stubbornly following its vicious line towards severing contacts between millions of people 
in both countries. This policy is not surprising. For the current Kiev regime the very fact that Ukrainians 
have numerous relatives, friends and acquaintances in Russia is, evidently, a real threat. Considerable 
funds are being spent on fighting it - from the construction of Yatsenyuk's 'Great Wall' to banning 
Russian social networks. By all appearances, Ukraine is ready to build a new 'iron curtain' for the sole 
purpose of preventing normal human and family communications between citizens of Russia and 
Ukraine585. 
 
The Ukrainian identity managers’ goal is hence the removal of the Russian identity from Ukrainian territory 
and the removal of the social links that exist between the Ukraine and Russian groups.  
In the end, the Ukrainian identity managers’ behaviour are defined by an attempt to 
misinform Ukrainians and the international community about Ukraine’s ‘Europeaness’. To establish this 
European social distinctiveness, Ukrainian identity managers need to present Ukraine as a group of agents 
who are socially divorcing themselves from Russia and their Russian legacy. However, since large 
segments of the Ukraine group are still united around this past and define themselves through associations 
with the Russian identity, Ukrainian identity managers need to blindfold their in-group members while 
leading them in the identity managers’ preferred direction. As the Foreign Ministry put it in May 2017, in 
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connection to newly imposed sanctions on Russia: “Obviously eager to finalise its mythical 'divorce from 
the Russian Empire,' as President Poroshenko said the other day, and hence from centuries of its own 
history, Kiev will put blinkers on people’s eyes and plugs in their ears to prevent them from getting a picture 
of the situation in Ukraine and other countries that differs from the one provided by Ukrainian 
propagandists”586. This tendency to mislead Ukrainians and move them towards EU has resulted in a 
totalitarian Ukrainian leadership. As the Foreign Ministry stated in August 2017 regarding the alleged 
harassment of a Ukraine journalist accused of disseminating pro-Russia materials: “Regrettably, we have 
to state that the “European way” in Ukraine’s style amounts to a return to the worst totalitarian practices of 
suppressing dissent”587. EU integration thus has negative consequences for Ukrainians who find themselves 
in a self-inflicted conflict where they are being told to exclude friends and relatives based on their Russian 
affiliation. The Russian identity managers therefore point to the same tendencies as the Ukrainian identity 
managers when constructing the interests of the other in the conflict. Namely that “the other” (out-group 
leadership) is seeking to dictate the group identity and interests of the in- and out-groups present in order 
to reach personal gains. 
 
5.3.4 Russia’s Social Cognitive Framework  
From the analysis of Russia’s schemas emerges a social cognitive framework. The main aspect of Russia’s 
framework is that the conflict is an intragroup conflict that the new Ukrainian identity managers 
(inaugurated following Maidan) have imposed upon themselves and their in-group members, as the identity 
managers have engaged in a contested process of redefining the Ukraine group identity. This is an 
understanding that the Russian identity managers reach by amongst other processing the events following 
Maidan and the policy changes that the Ukrainian identity managers introduced in the wake of this. Like 
the Ukrainian identity managers, the Russian identity managers do not process ‘Ukraine’ as a state but as a 
group identity that agents residing in the Ukraine territory belong to. What separates Ukraine and Russia’s 
framework is that whereas Ukrainian identity managers reify the Ukraine group as one where members 
share the same understanding of their identity and interests, Russian identity managers reify the Ukraine 
group as one that consists of competing self-understandings. Russian identity managers hence dismiss the 
united Ukraine group construct the Ukrainian identity managers present, and instead point to how the 
Ukraine identity is in the process of changing. In Russia’s framework, the conflict should be understood 
through this change and particularly as a situation where certain Ukraine in-group members have contested 
the idea of removing everything Russian-associated from the Ukraine identity. Russian identity managers 
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thus point to how there are “true” and “false” identity constellations, and that the cause for the conflict lies 
in the fact that the new Ukrainian identity managers are retrieving from the correct Ukraine group construct. 
Russian identity managers also point to the fluidity of identities as they construct the Ukraine and Russian 
group identities as overlapping and indistinguishable. One is capable of being Russian and Ukrainian at the 
same time, as these two groups derive from the same social origin (Soviet Union) and share the same 
interests and social dispositions. The sharp social differentiation that Ukrainian identity managers advocate 
is hence a falsity, and a construct that goes against the natural phenomenon that Ukrainians and Russians 
are the same agents who have always co-existed peacefully.  
Like the Ukrainian identity managers, the Russian identity managers seek to present a 
specific cognitive systematisation of the agents involved in the conflict and when doing so they disregard 
the legal categorization of agents. Rather, they also systematise the agents involved through social 
categorisation with the conclusions being presented as factual accounts. Despite this, they have nevertheless 
had difficulties socially categorising the non-state actors. Eventually, these agents are categorised as 
Ukrainians with a Russian affiliation, which is a construct that correlates with the identity managers’ 
understanding that Ukrainians and Russians are the same. The identity managers equally try to reify the 
groups present. Unlike the Ukrainian identity managers, the Russian identity managers do acknowledge 
that the construction and management of groups rests on relations between group managers and members. 
Hence, rather than pointing to how Russian behaviour in the conflict is shaped by shared Russian 
experiences and collective cognition, the identity managers point to how it is their responsibility to manage 
the Russian group, and that they do so with the blessing of the Russian group members. To this 
understanding it is then argued that whereas the Ukraine conflict is caused by the mismanagement of the 
Ukraine identity, the Russian in-group is stable as the current identity management of this group is in 
confinement with the needs and interests of Russian group members. Whereas Ukrainian identity managers 
are imposing their will on their group members and distorting the Ukraine group identity in the process, 
Russian identity managers are experiencing a perfect symbiosis between their management and the wishes 
of their Russian members. This is then used as another reason why there is a conflict in Ukraine and not in 
Russia. It is also used as the underlying argument why Russian identity managers should assist Ukrainian 
identity managers in solving the conflict. What emerges from both Russia and Ukraine’s processing is hence 
that both conflict parties seek to impose their social partitioning on the conflict, and both seek to manage 
the categorisation of the agents that lay ground to the primary cognitive confusion - namely the non-state 




5.4 DPR’s Social Cognitive Framework  
The following section will explore how the DPR identity managers construct understandings about the 
situation, self, and other in the Ukraine conflict, and the social cognitive framework that forms from this.  
 
5.4.1 Situation-Schema  
5.4.1.1 Conflict Cause  
In DPR’s situation-schema, the conflict is processed as one between the Ukrainian central government and 
agents in Donetsk, which occurred due to the new Ukrainian identity managers’ decision of socially 
excluding and attacking their in-group members. As the Chairman of the People’s Council, Denis Pushilin, 
stated in a congratulatory message to the inhabitants of the Republic on the anniversary of the DPR 
proclamation in April 2017: “We did not expect that all the weapons available to Ukraine would be used 
against us and a full-fledged civil war would be unleashed”588. Like the Russian identity managers, the DPR 
identity managers process the conflict as one between agents of the same social origin and, like Russia, 
they understand Maidan as a coup, which resulted in the inauguration of new Ukrainian identity managers 
who tried to force agents in Donetsk into changing their social identification. Where DPR’s situation-
schema differs from Russia’s is that Maidan is not merely processed as the conflict’s trigger point. Maidan 
is also processed as the time when the people of DPR were mobilised. Hence, although the conflict initially 
was an internal conflict between in-group members, it is processed as one that turned into an intergroup 
conflict as the people of DPR united around their shared social identification and acted upon the collective 
understanding that they should move towards independence. As Vladislav Berdichevsky, the DPR People’s 
Council deputy, stated in January 2018:  
 
Four years ago, in the face of the deadly danger in connection with the accomplished armed coup d’état in 
Ukraine, continuing the centennial tradition of state building and proceeding from the right of self-
determination provided for by the UN Charter and other international legal documents, the rights of the 
Donbass people were declared and in a few months the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republic were 
created589. 
 
In DPR’s situation-schema, there is a certain progression in the conflict as it has moved from an intragroup 
to an intergroup conflict, as the people of DPR collectively agreed that they should no longer identify as 
Ukrainians. These agents thus decided to consolidate their DPR group identity by moving towards 
statehood. This was followed by the election of DPR’s own identity managers who (according to the identity 
managers) were able to define and defend the identity and interests associated with the DPR group. In 
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DPR’s situation-schema, the conflict is hence processed equally as a time of upheaval as well as a time of 
liberation. DPR’s situation-schema thus resembles Ukraine’s situation-schema as both construct Maidan as 
a time where their respective groups reclaimed control over their existence due to the behaviour of an out-
group.  
A central feature of DPR’s situation-schema is the alleged split between Ukrainians and 
“Donetskians”, which is a social division the DPR identity managers use to make sense of the conflict and 
the agents involved. Rather than being an outcome of the conflict, this split between Ukrainians and 
Donetskians has for long been under way, as there has always been a tendency within Ukraine to socially 
exclude those who belonged to the Russian group identity. As Valery Skorokhodov, the DPR People’s 
Council deputy, stated in June 2017:  
 
The rewriting of history in Ukraine began long before the coup d’état in 2014. This process has its roots 
since the beginning of the 1990s[…]It was then that the scenario of Ukraine’s “uniqueness” started with 
its ethnic exclusivity, which included its own language, culture and, of course, history. Other cultures and 
peoples have been identified as hostile or neutral. Ukrainian historians were worked tirelessly – they 
developed national myths, formed a vocabulary and rhetoric, which could dissociate Ukraine from the 
cultural and historical space with the Russian world[…]In 2014, this process received a new round of 
development. Ukraine for the fourth year in a row with all the forces has been sculpting the enemy from 
the Russian people, not realizing that our common history cannot be crossed out, rewritten or reshaped, 
because it lasts more than 1000 years590. 
 
The conflict did hence not emerge with Maidan but is an outcome of amongst other Ukrainian historians’ 
attempt to change Ukraine’s history and construct Russians as a negative out-group. This eventually spurred 
grievances amongst those who socially identified as Russians. These grievances were further accentuated 
with the new Ukrainian identity managers’ attempt to remove the right to invoke the Russian group identity, 
by removing the right to speak Russian and attend Russian-speaking schools. As Ekaterina Martyanova, 
DPR People’s Council deputy, stated in October 2017:  
 
The Ukrainian authorities and the media under their control regularly assured the Russian-speaking 
population that there was no and there would not be any oppression. In parallel, the very same media 
reported officials saying that it would be nice to introduce quotas for broadcasting, reduce the number of 
Russian-language schools, remove the works of Russian classics from the education programme, stop the 
publication of books in Russian591. 
 
Such stimulus was processed as attempts to remove the Russian group identity and enforce people to 
identify with an alien group. As Miroslav Rudenko, the DPR People’s Council deputy, also stated in 
September 2017 following the adoption of the Law on Education according to which teaching must be done 
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exclusively in Ukrainian: “The Russian-speaking south of Ukraine quite naturally rejects the artificially 
imposed alien life rules”592.  
The split between Ukrainians and the people of DPR is an outcome that the Ukrainian 
identity managers imposed upon themselves, as the people who identified as Ukrainian/Russian were 
increasingly viewed and treated as an out-group. As Rudenko further stated in September 2017:  
 
The Kiev’s implementation of consistent policy of Russian culture’s eradication is bearing its poisonous 
fruits. Ideas for the creation of ghettos for Russian-speaking people are being developed and bills are 
being drafted for the forced ukrainization of the population[…]The Verkhovna Rada adopted a bill to 
strengthen the role of the Ukrainian language in all areas of society[…]And it is in addition to the fact that 
the absolute majority of the citizens of the country prefer to speak Russian language in their daily lives593. 
 
The Ukrainian identity manager’s implementation of e.g. new language policies functioned as stimulus, 
which led the people of DPR to process the Ukrainian identity managers as having the intent of removing 
the Russian group identity and enforcing people to identify as fully Ukrainians. The conflict did, however, 
not merely surface due to disgruntled agents who chose to voice the need to protect their right to speak 
Russian. It also arose due to the threat from Ukrainian group members who increasingly were opposed to 
the idea that Ukrainian in-group members could inhabit a dual-identity. As Elena Melnik, DPR People’s 
Council Deputy, stated in June 2017:  
 
In Ukraine, restrictive measures are routinely applied to citizens for their views[…]As time has shown, as 
a rule, citizens of Ukraine fall under the repression of the neo-Nazi Kiev regime. It turns out that citizens 
of one country are destroying their own compatriots. A similar phenomenon is known to the world 
community under the definition of “civil war”. Many former Ukrainian citizens were forced to leave 
Ukraine, and the Donbass and the Crimea did this together with their lands594. 
 
The suppressing of agents due to their social identification thus led agents of Donbass and Crimea to leave 
Ukraine and they did so by ‘leaving together with their territories’ – i.e. they opted for an ideational split 
from the Ukraine group identity and a physical split from the Ukraine territory.  
The conflict is also processed as an attempt by Donetskians to expose and defy the ridicule 
and suppression that Russians and Ukrainian/Russians for long have experienced in Ukraine. Another 
conflict characteristic that defines the conflict is hence the Donetskian wish of reinstating pride and honour 
in the ‘Russian world’. To do so, the agents in Crimea and Donbass needed assistance from Russia, which 
played a decisive role in aiding its fellow compatriots and ensuring that they regained control over their 
existence. As Alexander Zakharchenko, head of DPR, stated in March 2018 during the anniversary of the 
unification between Russia and Crimea:  
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The Crimean spring is a very big concept. In 2014, Russia said no – to humiliation, no to trampling on 
rights and yes to the pride, yes to the respect for itself as a country and every citizen of the Russian 
Federation and the Russian world. The words “Enough!”, “Stop humiliating Russia!” were heard here in 
2014 on the Crimean land. The people of the Crimea to the whole world said that it was a date after which 
no one can ever humiliate Russia595. 
 
In their conflict narrative, the DPR identity managers process the Crimean unification as stimulus where 
Russia and the people in Donbass and Crimea united around the common wish of restoring pride and honour 
in their shared identity. This understanding is now extended to the Ukraine conflict where the people of 
DPR continue to fight for the reinstating of pride in the Russian group identity. What emerges in DPR’s 
conflict narrative is thus that the identity managers share the Russian identity managers’ understanding that 
agents may be Ukrainians and Russians at the same time. The DPR identity managers equally share the 
Russian identity managers’ understanding that the conflict arose from an attempt to create a homogenous 
Ukraine group identity. Where their situation-schemas differ is that the DPR identity managers construct 
DPR as a group identity that is socially distinct from Ukrainians, whilst the Russian identity managers 
categorise people in DPR as Ukrainians.  
 
5.4.1.2 The Agents involved  
5.4.1.2.1 The West  
The DPR identity managers primarily attribute the onset of the conflict to the Ukrainian identity managers. 
They, however, also to a great extent attribute the onset of the conflict to ‘the West’. The West is processed 
as a collection of out-group identity managers who wanted the conflict in Ukraine to occur, because they 
wanted to use the Ukrainian identity managers as puppets for the reaching of their own interests. As Alla 
Barkhatnova, Deputy of the DPR People’s Council, stated in August 2017:  
 
The idea of Russophobic Ukraine is by no means new, but the West succeeded in an auspicious attempt to 
realize this project only in 2014. A crimson coup d’état by the hands of Ukrainian neo-Nazis allowed the 
overthrow of the legitimate authority and the placing in its place of puppets very hungry to the budget of 
Ukraine and the money of Ukrainian citizens. To date, Ukraine is a state managed from abroad596. 
 
The increased trend of “Russophobia” in Ukraine, i.e. the exclusion of the Russian group identity, is a 
Western imposed phenomenon that Ukrainian identity managers have adopted. This Western-inspired 
Russophobia is linked to geopolitics as the social exclusion of the Russian group identity is an outcome of 
the Wests’ attempt to weaken the Russian state. As Vladimir Bidyovka, DPR People’s Council deputy, 
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stated in July 2017 regarding Ukraine’s wish of joining NATO: “Western curators are willing to fulfill all 
their large-scale projects to preserve hegemony and weaken Russia as an enemy at the expense of the 
Ukrainians themselves[…]the state should be built with a focus on the well-being of its citizens, and not on 
hatred of others”597. The West is driven by an interest of excluding the Russian state, which has led to the 
social exclusion of all members of the Russian group identity in the post-Soviet space. In DPR’s situation-
schema, the conflict thus also occurred because Ukrainian identity managers adopted the Wests’ other-
schema of Russia, which led to societal divisions in Ukraine. As Melnick commented in August 2017 in 
connection to the nine-year anniversary of the Georgia/South Ossetia conflict: “The Ambassador of Georgia 
to Russia during the war, stated on November 25, 2008, that a green light for the beginning of the war in 
South Ossetia was given by U.S. President George Bush. The situation is horribly familiar when the 
American authorities incite the population of another country to engage in aggressive acts, as was the case 
on “Maidan” in Kiev”598. What may be inferred from this is that the West incites conflicts by imposing its 
cognitive processing on others. The West’ cognitive processing is also one of the causes for the 
Donetskians’ suffering, as the Western conflict narrative does not include any referral to a DPR group 
identity. According to the West, the people of DPR are devoid of agency and so this group identity does 
not feature in the West’s discourse. This Western discursive dismissal of the DPR group identity is 
processed as the dismissal of the people of DPR as it is taken to imply that the West indirectly approves of 
the atrocities the people of DPR experience. As Martyanova stated in November 2017 in a comment 
criticising Ukraine’s “military rhetoric”: “The West ignores direct threats of a military nature addressed to 
us”599. In DPR’s situation-schema is hence also the argument that some group identities have more social 
value than others, and that there is a tendency to disregard the presence of agents if they do not identify 
with what the West perceives to be positive group identities. The agents of DPR are thus in the eyes of the 
West non-existing, which is another reason for the conflict’s occurrence and continuation.  
 
5.4.1.2.2 Russia  
In DPR’s conflict narrative, Russia is a positive group that not merely assists in instilling pride into the 
‘Russian world’ but assists in advocating the presence of the DPR group members, their welfare, and 
interests. This is amongst other stated in the context of the conflict negotiations where Russian identity 
managers are the only agents who express the views and interests of the DPR group. As Skorokhodov stated  
in September 2017 regarding the peacekeeping mission that DPR refused to accept, which Russia then 
voiced on behalf of DPR at the UN: “In the near future we will witness how once again the Russian 
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Federation will defend the interests of the inhabitants of our region on the international platform”600. 
Russian identity managers socially validate the people of DPR, as Russian identity managers argue for the 
need to acknowledge the presence of this group. In this understanding is also the argument that Russia as a 
group is not a conflict party, but a third party that supports the DPR identity managers’ understandings and 
ambitions. As Makeyeva stated in August 2017: “Mr. Kravchuk believes that DNI and LNR should be 
excluded from it [negation process]. The initiative to change such document unilaterality is extremely 
unacceptable, especially when the DNI and LPR (rather than the Russian Federation and OSCE) are one of 
the parties to the conflict”601. Russian identity managers speak on behalf of DPR until the DPR identity 
managers are included on an equal footing alongside the other conflict parties. What unites Russia and DPR 
is hence that Russian identity managers ‘see’ the DPR group members - unlike Western and Ukrainian 
identity managers who dismiss their social existence. Another common feature between DPR and Russia is 
that these groups share the same Russian identity. This does, however, not imply that they are the same 
agents. Rather, the Russian group identity is a borderless identity, which encompasses Russia, the DPR, 
LPR, and Crimea. As Pushilin stated in December 2016 about the independence of DPR: “It consolidated 
exactly around the meaning center, which is the foundation of our identity. We united around our traditional 
values. History, memory, culture, religion, faith, language, awareness of our involvement in that huge and 
great concept that we call the Russian world, joined us”602. The DPR and Russian identities are thus same 
but different as these groups share the same identity through a shared memory network and shared social 
practices. The Russian group identity is thus not associated with a state but is a borderless group identity 
that unites agents from various states. Russian assistance in the conflict is therefore behaviour where in-
group members of the Russian group identity came to assist their DPR in-group members in the fight for 
protecting and restoring pride in the group identity they all share. Despite this, Russia and DPR are 
nevertheless also processed as two distinct groups, which is a social categorical confusion that will be 
elaborated further in the section on DPR’s self-schema.  
 
5.4.1.3 The Solution   
To solve the conflict, the DPR identity managers point to how Ukrainian identity managers must 
acknowledge the DPR group’s social equality vis-á-vis the Ukraine group, which implies acknowledging 
that Donetskians are distinct from Ukrainians. Ukrainian identity managers need to acknowledge that the 
DPR group identity exists and that the DPR identity managers represent the DPR group members. This is 
still not the case as Ukrainian identity managers continue to dictate the terms from which the people of 
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DPR should abide. As senior official of the Donetsk Republic, Andrei Purgin, stated in August 2014: 
“Everything that Kyiv does shows that they have to decide to find agreement but dictate their terms to 
us”603. The DPR identity’s social validation is a requirement, as the conflict has shown that the DPR group 
members can no longer be managed peacefully and equally by Ukrainians. As Zavdoveyev also put it in 
March 2018 in connection to Poroshenko signing the decree on the Joint Forces Operation: “to be led by 
Kiev means to put our citizens at even greater risk, so the only reasonable way out of the situation is a 
peaceful dialogue, negotiations and readiness of the parties to stop the war”604. In DPR’s situation-schema 
is thus also the understanding that groups need to be managed by in-group managers to ensure in-group 
members’ interests. This raises the question of how one distinguishes between a Ukrainian and a Donetskian 
and who gets to decide this distinction. It also points to a DPR understanding that the Ukrainian identity 
managers need to adopt the DPR identity managers’ cognitive systematisation of the agents present if the 
conflict is to end. For the conflict to end, Ukrainian identity managers need to acknowledge that DPR is a 
group identity, which should be applied in the sense making of contexts such as the conflict in Ukraine and 
beyond.  
The Minsk Agreements are presented as conducive for this social validation, as the 
agreements acknowledges the people of DPR’s existence. As Pushilin stated following the signing of the 
Minsk agreement in September 2016: “This is a great political victory for us. Before the signing of the 
Minsk agreements we were considered “terrorists” and “separatists”. With the signing of the Minsk 
agreements we become the subjects of the negotiation process. For us, this is a great chance to speak out in 
the international arena”605. The Minsk Agreements are imperative as they point to the existence of the DPR 
group identity and they create an opening for the subsequent social validation of this group. According to 
the DPR identity managers, the Minsk agreements validate DPR’s self-schema. The expressed support for 
the agreements is, however, not only rooted in the chance to exercise control over the DPR identity and the 
group’s existence. It is also linked to the opportunity of preventing a scenario where Ukrainian identity 
managers impose their cognitive systematisation upon the negotiation process. As Pushilin stated in April 
2017 during a TV program: “We do not intend to quit the Minsk agreements. It would be a gift for Ukraine 
if we went for such a step. We are doing everything possible to resolve the conflict on this platform”606. 
The solution to the conflict thus hinges on whose social cognitive framework triumphs and in this the DPR 
identity managers point to the imperative that their self-schema is included to ensure the continued existence 
of the DPR group and the reaching of this group’s interests.  
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5.4.2 Self-Schema  
5.4.2.1 The DPR Group  
Like the other conflict parties, the DPR identity managers have had difficulties defining who the people of 
DPR are and how they are socially distinct from Ukrainians and Russians. This difficulty continues even-
though the identity managers point to a distinct DPR group identity. Although the DPR group is presented 
as an independent group identity in the conflict, the identity managers continue to construct DPR and Russia 
as groups that share many of the same social identifications that define a ‘Russian’. Hence, although DPR 
is its own group identity, it is also a part of a Russian group identity defined as ‘the Russian world’. In 
DPR’s self-schema, the Russian world is not processed as the Russian state’s identity, but as an 
encompassing identity that DPR, LPR, Crimea, and Russia share. There is thus an understanding that group 
identities may be borderless and overarching and so the Russian group identity is an identification that 
agents regardless of state-affiliation may belong to. The DPR group is an expression of a borderless Russian 
group identity and not of the Russian state, which is a distinction that causes social cognitive confusion 
amongst the remaining conflict parties. This construction also challenges the researcher’s understanding of 
how the DPR identity managers socially position themselves vis-á-vis the others in the conflict. As will be 
seen in the following, the DPR identity managers also have difficulties socially separating the people of 
DPR from Russians. They nevertheless continuously try to construct DPR as an independent group, which 
should be approached from the terms the DPR identity managers proclaim.  
What derives from the analysis is that the referral to an encompassing Russian group identity 
and the DPR identity managers’ subsequent confused social categorization of the agents in DPR, is an 
example of how identities evolve and emerge. Because, given that the identity managers initially 
categorised their group members as belonging to the Russian state, and Russian identity managers refuted 
this construct, the DPR identity managers have had to determine how to continue to socially define 
themselves as Russians without belonging to the Russian state. The identity managers have thus landed on 
an in-between group construct, with one leg in the Russian category and one leg in the DPR category. This 
confused or in-between social categorization may be an example of a group identity in a “cognitive birth”, 
where identity managers are not merely mobilising and managing an identity but creating it. Since the DPR 
group identity spun from the Ukraine conflict, the DPR identity managers are required to make sense of 
where this group comes from and what kind of interests and dispositions are associated with it. As seen 
with the DPR identity managers emphasis on the need to be socially validated by the Ukrainian identity 
managers and others, it may, however, be argued that the full establishment of a group identity does not 
merely require time and appeal for it to manifest and become an identity that agents perceive themselves to 
belong to. It also requires a social cognitive validation from others around it. Others also need to “see” the 
group identity and use it as part of their cognitive processing for the identity to become a social category of 
141 
 
its own. In DPR’s self-schema we therefore find an example of how agents are trying to construct a 
somewhat new group identity from the understandings they have reached when processing stimuli such as 
Maidan. They are now trying to convince others that this identity exists and a way to do this is to establish 
a group that represents this identity and elaborate an understanding of “who” this group is and what it 
“wants”.  
A central feature of DPR’s conflict narrative is thus to reify the DPR group. A way the DPR 
identity managers do this is by establishing the time this group regained control over its existence, and the 
time it was mobilised in the conflict. In DPR’s self-schema, the DPR group is processed as a group which 
gained control over its existence following the events that unfolded around Crimea. As Zakharchenko said 
to Crimea’s representatives during the fourth anniversary of Crimea in March 2018: “What you did (in 
March 2014 – ed.) is a truly historic event. We, on our part, with a shuddering heart, were waiting for this 
referendum and thought what to expect next. Your act has become an example for us. Your victory inspired 
our people, too”607. Crimea was stimulus which socially validated the DPR group identity and the group’s 
collective interest of becoming independent. Another understanding is that Crimea served as a catalyst for 
the creation of the DPR group identity, as DPR’s identity managers discovered that their social 
identification and interests were shared with others around them in Donetsk. As Pushilin replied during the 
Crimea anniversary in March 2018:  
 
I was proud to look at what was happening in the Crimea four years ago, and this gave me strength, and, 
probably, to everyone who also did not accept the coup that had taken place in Kiev. Both I and 
Alexander Vladimirovich could tell a lot about the feelings and vibes that we were experiencing when we 
were watching on television what was happening here[…]But I can say for sure that one of the most 
memorable and the most important slogans in those days at rallies was “Crimea – Donbass – Russia!608. 
 
Crimea is hence processed as the time when the DPR group emerged and demanded its existence as an 
independent group devoid of Ukraine. The underlying understanding that permeates DPR’s self-schema, 
and assists in reifying the group, is thus that the DPR group has always existed and that the group members 
were merely waiting for the right time, and for external approval, to pursue the establishment of their group.   
Another way the DPR identity managers reify the DPR group is by referring to how members 
of this group share a common history. Here the identity managers point to how DPR consists of members 
who all share the same experience of being ridiculed for their Russian identification, and so the unifying 
feature of being a ‘Donetskian’ is the shared experience of being forced into identifying with an alien group 
identity. As Pushilin stated in his annual message to the DPR’s People’s Council in December 2016: “For 
20 years we have been tried to be depersonalize, devastated morally, combed with the same brush, made 
 




the faceless gray mass of. We are different, and this is our strength”609. Another trait that validates the 
historical roots of DPR, is that the DPR group members for long have struggled for control over their 
existence. This struggle has persisted for decades and so the current DPR group members stand on the 
shoulders of their ancestors who initiated the fight for freedom. As Zakharchenko stated during the 
celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Donetsk-Krivorozh Republic in February 2018:  
 
Exactly one hundred years ago, our ancestors said yes to equality, freedom, justice and brotherhood, and 
said no to the West. The Donetsk-Krivorozh Republic was created in a very difficult time: during war, 
revolution and ruin[…]almost a hundred years later, we, the descendants of these people, picked up their 
banner. Today, we are also building our Donetsk People’s Republic in difficult times, in times of 
war[…]A hundred years ago, our ancestors failed, but today we say: “We will not lose!” We are for 
freedom, equality, brotherhood and the Donetsk People’s Republic!610. 
 
The DPR group members hence have common ancestors who collectively sought to achieve what they have 
achieved today. The current conflict is thus nothing new but merely another conflict waged against the DPR 
group. However, whereas the DPR ancestors were too weak to defend themselves, the current DPR group 
members are capable of reaching their interests due to their mobilization following Crimea, and the 
assistance and validation they receive from the rest of the Russian world. The DPR identity managers hence 
reify the DPR group by amongst other pointing to where DPR comes from and what the DPR group 
members have in common. Unlike Russian and Ukrainian identity managers who can refer to a longer 
history of existence, and a stronger foundation of specific social practices and invocations for the agents 
who identify as Ukrainian and Russian, the DPR identity managers struggle to define what a Donetskian is. 
The identity managers therefore reify this group from somewhat vague characteristics such as a common 
struggle for freedom and a shared collective experience of ridicule.  
To potentially account for this, the DPR group is also reified through the construction of 
social dispositions, which are said to distinguish Donetskians from Ukrainians. This is amongst other visible 
in the identity managers’ processing of behaviour that both Ukrainians and Donetskians are said to 
undertake in the conflict. As Pushilin stated in connection to the Minsk Agreements in August 2016 
regarding the topic of amnesty, which DPR has also advocated for: “In relation to us the word “amnesty” 
sounds wrong. We simply use the term because it is clear what it is about[…]To be pardoned, it is necessary 
to plead guilty, but we are not guilty – on the contrary, we consider them guilty”611. Like the Ukrainian 
identity managers, the DPR identity managers apply a group attribution error when reifying their in-group, 
which results in an understanding that DPR is an entity that behaves in a consistent manner. Adding to the 
use of a group attribution error is the use of a fundamental attribution error, which the identity managers 
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use to construct the DPR group as a victim that merely responds to the situational forces the Ukrainians 
instigated. Like the other conflict parties, the DPR identity managers also point to how the conflict continues 
to be sustained due to the other’s behaviour. The use of the two attribution errors results in group reification 
where the DPR group is constructed around positive social dispositions such as the will to solve the conflict. 
As stated in a comment from the DPR People’s Council in March 2018: “Denis Pushilin, expressed doubts 
that the civil armed conflict in the Donbass will be resolved before the end of this year, provided that the 
position of the Ukrainian leadership remains unchanged”612. The attribution errors also result in processing 
where the DPR identity managers can construct their account of the situation and agents involved as the 
truth, as their group reification and cognitive systematisation is compared to the “false” claims that 
Ukrainian identity managers make. As Roman Malyutin, the DPR People’s Council deputy, stated in 
November 2017 in connection to a comment on how the West masks military plans as peace initiatives:  
 
The Ukrainian authorities and their admirers have already come up with numerous terms: they 
dehumanized us, marginalized, accused of shelling ourselves[…]And now we, local residents who have 
defended our land, culture and history, have also occupied ourselves. It turns out that by sending weapons 
to Ukraine, using pejorative terms, inciting hatred with their homebred Russophobia, the curators of 
Ukraine and their Kiev puppets thus try to establish peace? We, the representatives of the Donbass, 
perceive all these actions as preparation for military operations and the desire to seize the Donbass by 
force613. 
 
Like the other conflict parties, the DPR identity managers thus also construct their self-schema as factual 
and they point to how the others need to adopt DPR’s social cognitive framework if the conflict is to be 
resolved.  
 
5.4.2.2 DPR’s Motivation for Behaviour   
The DPR identity managers do not merely reify the DPR group through the construction of dispositions 
and shared memories, but through the granting of collective interests. In DPR’s self-schema, the DPR group 
members are agents who are driven by a collective interest of strengthening their group identity through 
statehood. Here the DPR identity managers do acknowledge that their state project is not supported by the 
outside world. This, however, is processed as the outcome of anti-Russian sentiments, which for long have 
run through the international community and denied statehood to those groups that identified themselves 
with the Russian group identity. As Berdichevsky stated in January 2018:  
 
Twenty-seven years ago, taking advantage of the collapse of the USSR and the actual coup d’état, 
Ukrainian nationalists instigated the Ukrainian separation and, within the framework of the “Anti-Russia” 
project supported by the West, were instantly recognized as an independent state. The political forces in 
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the Donbas were too weak to prevent this[…]And what’s wrong, gentlemen deciding which state to be 
recognized, and which is not? I think that we would be instantly recognized if we acted like Ukraine, 
Georgia or the Baltic countries – that is, within the framework of the “Anti-Russia” project614. 
 
To ensure statehood, groups must subscribe to the anti-Russian sentiment. Since the people of DPR, 
however, share the Russian group identity with the Russian Federation, this is not an option. Another 
interest that motivates DPR’s behaviour is then to ensure, in collaboration with the group members of 
Crimea and Luhansk, the strengthening of the Russian group identity. This was expressed during the 
celebration of Crimea’s Russian unification where the Head of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, presented the 
Order “For Fidelity to the Duty” to the DPR leaders: “for the maintenance of peace, active work on 
preserving and strengthening Russian traditions and culture among Russian compatriots in the territory of 
the DPR”615. To change the prospect of statehood there is a need to consolidate the Russian group identity 
and try to change others’ understanding of the groups that represent this identity. The DPR identity 
managers do, however, not elaborate further how the strengthening of the Russian group identity will 
strengthen the DPR group identity and enhance their prospects of statehood, as strengthening the Russian 
identity arguably continues to blur DPR’s social differentiation vis-á-vis Russia.  
Due to the social exclusion the DPR group members have experienced in Ukraine, another 
interest is the consolidation of a state where the people of DPR may have a free choice when it comes to 
deciding how they want to identify themselves and who should manage their identity for them. As Pushilin 
stated in August 2016 on the progress of the Minsk Agreements: “We want people to be able to choose 
whom they want to choose. Those who are able to protect their interests, who will not impose them which 
holidays to celebrate, who consider as our grandfathers and fathers, what movies to watch, what books 
children should study at school”616. The aim is to create a manager-member relationship within the DPR 
group where members may express their identity without being socially excluded or told to change their 
social differentiation. To reach this outcome there is a need to socially distance Donetskians from the 
distorted relations that characterises Ukrainians. As Pushilin stated in his annual message to the DPR 
People’s Council in December 2017: “Maximum attention should also be paid to the fight against corruption 
both in the field and in all executive authorities[...]It, like a terrifying serpent, crawled into practice for 20 
years, and the Ukrainian government, unfortunately, nourished and cherished this hydra. Our task is to drive 
it into the swamp from which it crawled out, and if necessary even to throw it to the other side of the 
frontline”617. Like the Ukrainian interest of distancing the Ukraine identity from the Russian identity, so 
too is there an expressed interest in DPR to correct the past trend of mis-identifying the people of DPR as 
 
614 DPR-95 (6) 
615 DPR-184 (6) 
616 DPR-52 (6) 
617 DPR-41 (6) 
145 
 
belonging to the Ukraine identity - and hereof governing them in accordance to “Ukrainian” social 
practices. This is of interest because rather than expressing interests not necessarily associated with the 
conflict (such as the Ukrainian ambition of correcting historical relations with Russia), the DPR interests 
are to a great extent linked to the conflict and the understandings that have arisen as a result of this situation. 
This again points to how this group identity somewhat emerged from the conflict as the DPR identity and 
interests are intrinsically linked with, and to a great extent dependent on, the conflict situation.  
Eventually the condition for reaching the DPR interest of consolidating the DPR group 
identity is that DPR group members continue to be united in the struggle against the Ukrainian antagonist. 
As Pushilin further stated in his annual message to the DPR People’s Council in December 2017: “But 
many have no doubt that we’ll win, even our enemies. They feel our victory, they see, but do not want to 
admit it. Our challenge with you for the near future is to do so that this victory was clearly visible not only 
to us, those who have no doubts about it, but also to those with whom we are fighting”618. The identity 
managers thus point to the ideational nature of DPR and how the existence of this group is dependent on 
agents’ subscription to and support of it. It is also implied that DPR as an identity will only exist if its’ 
group members adopt the identity managers’ reification of this group and conflict narrative, and if the DPR 
identity continues to receive social validation from the rest of the Russian world. As Pushilin stated during 
the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Donetsk-Krivorozh Republic in February 2018: “And with the 
support of the entire Russian world, we will be able to build a state we dreamed of in 2014, guided by goals 
we have set ourselves. We are united, determined, that is why the Donetsk People’s Republic to be and 
win!”619. To ensure the consolidation of the DPR group identity, there is a need for both internal and external 
adoption of the DPR identity managers’ self-schema. Another interesting feature is hence also that, like the 
Ukrainian identity managers, the DPR identity managers argue for the need to (re)establish the ‘true’ 
construction of the DPR group identity, which includes an exclusion of social practices and other social 
invocations associated with the out-group (Ukraine).   
 
5.4.3 Other-Schema  
5.4.3.1 The Ukraine Group 
Whereas the DPR identity managers have had difficulties establishing who the DPR group members are 
and where this group comes from, they have a more clear-cut understanding of who Ukraine is and how 
this group came to exist. As Melnik stated in September 2017 in a response to a speech Poroshenko gave 
on the “Day of Unity”: “Current Ukrainian politicians ignore the fact that Soviet Russia, in fact, created the 
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Ukrainian state. However, it is not customary to mention this in the ‘independent’. But even from the lips 
of hardcore liars the truth breaks through”620. In DPR’s other-schema, the Ukraine group originates from 
the Soviet Union and so the DPR identity managers share the Russian understanding that the Ukraine and 
Russian group identities have the same social origin. Russians and Ukrainians are thus the same. Whereas 
the DPR identity managers and the Russian identity managers are aware of this, Ukrainian identity 
managers fail to acknowledge this truth, and instead choose to lie about the time Ukrainians and Russians 
were socially categorised as in-group members. As Berdichevsky commented in August 2017 in response 
to Poroshenko’s comment on the Soviet Union:  
 
After quoting the former US president Reagan, Poroshenko with particular pleasure declared a break in 
relations with the ‘evil empire.’ Actually, this expression applied to the Soviet Union. “Association 
agreement and the visa-free regime. What can be more convincing evidence of our final – de facto and de 
jure – break with the empire’?! The one that Ronald Reagan called “the evil empire,” Poroshenko said. 
Any sane person is unlikely to be able to explain how the association with the EU and visa-free travel 
apply to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Ukraine was part of the USSR at the time of the “empire of evil” 
cliché, and therefore Reagan’s message related to all those who lived at that time, some of whom today in 
Ukraine are applauding their insults621. 
 
The Soviet Union offered the cognitive foundation for the construction of a Ukraine group identity and 
Ukraine’s existence stems from this rather than from a European origin. When Ukrainian identity managers 
denounce the Soviet Union they are, hence, denouncing themselves. Despite this, Ukrainian identity 
managers are in a process of removing Ukraine’s Soviet origin, and so they are fundamentally changing the 
Ukraine group identity. In DPR’s other-schema, the DPR identity managers thus reify the Ukraine group 
by establishing the social traits and history that bind the agents who belong to this group. It is from this 
foundation that the identity managers denounce the current Ukraine group construct advocated by Ukrainian 
identity managers, as it is a distorted version of “who” Ukraine is and “where” it comes from. In DPR’s 
other-schema there is only one true constellation of the Ukraine group and so the DPR identity managers 
argue that identities need to abide to a certain ideational structure for them to exist. If identity managers 
dismiss or change this structure, they are creating a false social identification marker with consequences to 
follow such as the conflict in Ukraine. The current mobilisation of Ukrainians around a pure Ukraine 
identity is thus a falsity, but it is also something which will fail as others will discover how the conflict is 
the result of identity tampering. As Melnick stated in July 2017 in a response to the Deputy Minister of 
Ukraine, who allegedly expressed the wish for the dissolution of Russia as a state:  
 
It is not that easy to plant russophobia in the descendants of the Victory, the Russian-speaking population, 
and simply among the people with friendly and kindred ties. Fake news is short-lived, and the degree of 
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hatred towards everything Russian related needs to be constantly promoted. But there is one problem. The 
demand for such rhetoric is falling. Customers, who generously paid for this ‘trend’ previously, are no 
longer interested in its promotion. This is why the Ukrainian politicians have to make increasingly 
eccentric statements, drawing attention to themselves622. 
 
There is a correct and a false Ukraine identity and for the Ukrainian identity managers to convince their 
group members and others that their false construct is correct, they have had to unleash a war against their 
own group members.  
  As the two other conflict parties, the DPR identity managers reify the out-group using a 
leadership attribution error as the Ukrainian identity managers are processed as agents that epitomise the 
Ukraine group. The DPR identity managers also point to how Ukrainian identity managers do not merely 
follow prototypical attitudes of the Ukraine group, but that these leaders are shaping the Ukraine group 
identity and interests out of their own image. As Skorokhodov stated in August 2017 in response to 
Ukraine’s alleged usage of propaganda:  
 
Pyotr Poroshenko certainly believes firmly that, enriching at the expense of the Ukrainians, he, by his 
actions, bears the blessings, in his words, for “his own” people[…]And this is after all that Poroshenko 
has done for the Ukrainians: queued for visa-free travel, but did not take care for the population to have 
means to travel to the EU; he achieved an “unprecedented” level of freedom of speech, when for a few 
phrases without exaggeration the one can be killed in broad daylight; he turned Ukraine from the 
victorious country into a begging country with neo-Nazi idols[…].Naturally, some disgruntled people 
should be fenced off from His Majesty, so as not to interfere with him creating “happiness” for his 
personal people623. 
 
It is understood that Poroshenko has, through his narrative and behaviour, convinced Ukrainians that the 
Russian enemy image is real and that it is justified to attack those who belong to this group. This was 
amongst other expressed in a comment by Zavdoveyev in March 2017, where he pointed to how Ukrainian 
authorities covered up the crimes of nationalists: “The fact is that Kiev bets precisely on nationalist 
battalions and groups of Western mercenaries in order to implement the plan of forceful seizure of the 
territory of Donbass[…]Kiev strengthens its position, gives a green light to the acts of violence of radicals 
and nationalists, and the ordinary people are simply intimidated and continue to remain silent”624. Like 
Ukraine’s situation- and other-schema, so too do the DPR identity managers point to how the out-group 
identity managers can mobilise their in-group members in the conflict, as these group members either 
uncritically adopt and react to their identity managers’ false enemy-image, or share the identity managers’ 
hostile intentions. In this sense, Poroshenko’s personality and ambitions are increasingly becoming social 
dispositions associated with the Ukraine group. Eventually, Ukrainian identity managers are not interested 
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in negotiating any alternative understanding of the conflict, nor do they wish to ensure a peaceful solution 
to the conflict. Rather, the conflict situation caters to Ukrainian identity managers’ ambition of power and 
presents a situation where they do not have to change the hierarchical manager-member relations that 
Ukrainians opposed during Maidan. As Alexander Kostenko, the DPR People’s Council deputy, stated in 
a comment in November 2017 titled “Ukrainian authorities see ‘Russian connection’ everywhere”:  
 
In my view, the first reason for such rhetoric [anti-Russian] is to obtain an official pretext for non-
compliance with the Minsk agreements and forcibly occupy Donbass. The second is to explain to the 
Ukrainians why everything is so bad in the country, putting blame on the Russian Federation for 
everything that happens[…]Moreover, the revolution in Ukraine has not ended yet, because Kiev (even if 
it denies) has not implemented the ideas of “Maidan”625. 
 
In DPR’s other-schema the conflict is thus attributed to the Ukrainian identity managers who are splitting 
the country apart due to their anti-Russian narrative, which incites negative behaviour and creates a situation 
where agents that once co-existed peacefully are encouraged to eradicate each other.  
 
5.4.3.2 Ukraine’s Motivation for Behaviour   
Since the DPR identity managers process the Ukrainian group identity as distorted by Ukrainian identity 
managers, they also argue that the collective interests that drive this group derive from the Ukrainian 
identity managers’ personal interests. As Zheynova stated in a comment in June 2017 titled “Ukraine’s 
begging worldwide”: “In order to attract the attention of Europeans, the Ukrainian government resorts to 
such actions as shelling our territory, which then they accuse us of. Like, we provoke them. Such an 
approach for getting money has been working for a long time”626. The primary motivation that drives 
Ukrainian identity managers in the conflict is the chance for them to personally enrich themselves. To 
ensure this, there is a need to continue pursuing the change of the Ukrainian group identity. Because linked 
to the interest of financial rewards is the need to uphold the façade of being attacked by Russians, and the 
expressed intent of retreating to a Ukraine group identity devoid of any Russian traits. As Bidyovka stated 
in May 2017:  
 
It was thanks to work on changing the population’s consciousness the Kiev authorities managed to 
suppress protests in the southeast regions of Ukraine[…]It is very important to tear its inhabitants 
mentally from the roots of a huge country[…]in order to reverse to the west side, not only calmly, but 
with enthusiasm, the history of the Soviet period of Ukraine is presented exclusively in a negative way, 
and today’s Russia, the successor of that vast country, is like an enemy627. 
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To reach personal financial rewards, Ukrainian identity managers need to change the Ukrainians’ collective 
consciousness about where they come from, and the relations they have (had) with the Soviet Union and 
Russia. What the Ukrainian identity managers do not understand is that the removal of Ukraine’s Russian 
affiliation will result in the destruction of the Ukraine group identity. As Barkhatnova stated in connection 
to Mariupol’s breaking of relations with Russian cities in July 2017: “There will always be a “Russian 
trace”. Dealing with the destruction of what their ancestors built and defended with such pride is, in fact, 
chop off their roots, without which death is a matter of time”628. Despite this, the Ukrainian goal is to rid 
the Ukraine group identity of any Russian trait, which means that alongside the changing of consciousness, 
is the physical eradication of those who identify as Russian. As Zakharchenko stated in October 2015 
following the Ukrainian announcement that elections in Donbass were to be held under Ukraine law, which 
is: “a sign that they have absolutely no idea how the people here really live[…]How can we allow (pro-
Kiev) parties take part in the vote when they provided the political cover for the[...]effective genocide of 
our people”629. This claim of genocide is not supported by any specific times where such an event has taken 
place, and so one may assume that the genocide node is used to refer to the tendency of removing the 
possibility to identify as a Russian in Ukraine.  
Like the other conflict parties, the DPR identity managers refer to a manager-member 
hierarchy when explaining the motivations of the other’s behaviour. Unlike Ukrainian identity managers 
who make sense of Russian identity managers by comparing them to leaders of Nazi Germany, the DPR 
identity managers point to how Ukrainian identity managers have an interest in turning Ukraine into a 
dictatorship. This understanding is reached by pointing at the distorted manager-member relationship that 
defines the Ukraine group, and the Ukrainian identity managers’ tendency to persuade Ukrainians into 
hating another group, whilst the identity managers are covertly reconstructing the Ukraine group identity 
in accordance to their personal interests. As Skorokhodov stated in June 2017 in a commentary accusing 
Ukraine of rewriting history: “Any fascism begins with the rewriting of history, the creation of new heroes, 
the inventing of non-existent ancestors, attempts to falsely associate with historical personalities, events or 
cultural values”630. The changing of the Ukraine group identity signals a shift towards a manager-member 
relation where Ukrainians are brainwashed into believing that hatred towards Russians and suffering at the 
expense of leaders’ enrichment is normal, or as Melnik expressed it in April 2018 in response to a Facebook 
post from Ukraine’s Acting Minister of Health, Ulyana Suprun:   
 
They are slowly creating in the information field the rationale for what is happening in Ukraine is quite 
normal[…]This stovepiping is designed for mass consciousness, for an average Ukrainian citizen who 
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does not understand the essence of the matter and is inclined to trust the authorities. So gradually, 
ministers[…]become unquestioned authorities[…]When the remnants of the Soviet past are destroyed, 
they will try to convince the Ukrainian citizen that freezing in cold apartments is useful, starvation and a 
meagre diet prolong life[…]In this sense, Suprun (read: Dr. Death) clearly fulfils the prescription from 
Dr. Goebbels: “If you repeat a lie often enough, it becomes the truth631. 
 
The future in the hands of Ukrainian identity managers is thus dystopian as the lives of Ukrainians are 
disregarded, and agents are indoctrinated into believing everything their identity managers tell them. This 
outcome has already occurred in Eastern Ukraine where Ukrainian identity managers are engaged in a 
military offensive against their own group members who dare to stand up against the lies these identity 
managers are expressing. As Melnik stated in August 2017 in a comment accusing Ukraine of applying a 
double standard when enforcing laws in Ukraine: “To my friends, everything; to my enemies, the law” – 
this phrase is attributed to the dictators Francisco Franco and Benito Mussolini[…]In Ukraine, where, as 
you know, “there is no fascism”, this phrase completely reflects the current state of affairs”632. In this sense, 
Ukrainian identity managers follow a behavioural pattern which is typical for dictatorships. It is thus also 
from the processing of past identity managers categorised as “similar” to Ukrainian identity managers that 
the DPR identity managers make sense of who Ukraine is, what this group wants, and what will happen in 
the conflict. This processing is then used as an overall justification for DPR’s actions and the continued 
establishment of the DPR group.  
 
5.4.4 DPR’s Social Cognitive Framework 
As with Ukraine and Russia, it is possible in DPR’s conflict narrative to explore a social cognitive 
framework. What is interesting in DPR’s framework is that the identity managers to a great extent rely on 
the same understandings as the Russian identity managers. There are, however, also differences and rather 
in some areas the DPR identity managers’ social cognitive processing more resembles the processing 
Ukrainian identity managers engage in. In their framework, the DPR identity managers systematise the 
conflict as an intragroup conflict caused by a change in Ukraine’s group identity (like Russia), but they also 
argue that the conflict has turned into an intergroup conflict between two distinct groups (like Ukraine). 
The DPR identity managers also share the Russian understanding that Russians and Ukrainians are the same 
but unlike Russia, the DPR identity managers reify the Ukraine and DPR groups as fundamentally different. 
Like the Ukrainian identity managers, the DPR identity managers seek to cognitively systematise the 
conflict by drawing sharp social boundaries between the agents present. What is of interests in DPR’s 
framework is, however, not so much how the DPR identity managers systematise the situation, and how 
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they reify the other groups. The interesting findings are how the DPR identity managers reify the DPR 
group because although the identity managers point to how the conflict is between two distinct groups, they 
have had difficulties establishing who it is that they represent and manage. The cause for this cognitive 
conundrum is found in the difficulty to socially categorise the agents present and socially position the DPR 
group members vis-á-vis the two more dominant identities of Russia and Ukraine. Eventually, the DPR 
identity managers arrive at a cognitive systematization where DPR is a group identity of its own. Like the 
other conflict parties, the DPR identity managers thus also seek to make sense of who is who, and they do 
so by largely constructing a new group identity, which they argue needs to be adopted in order to arrive at 
the factual understanding of what is going on and how the conflict should be resolved.  
The problem with this new identity is that it continues to have a strong association with the 
Russian group identity. This causes cognitive confusion amongst the other conflict parties because they do 
not know whether to position DPR within the Ukraine or Russian category. It also causes confusion amongst 
the DPR identity managers as they struggle to define what makes DPR unique and how these agents are 
distinct from and at the same time similar to Russians. What emerges from this cognitive confusion is the 
“cognitive birth” of the DPR group identity, as the DPR identity managers try to define what a “Donetskian” 
is, and why this identity should be used for making sense of the agents present. What the analysis of DPR’s 
framework hence points to is that identities emerge as part of social cognitive processing, as the DPR 
identity to some extent arose following the Crimea and Maidan events, which functioned as stimuli that 
needed processing. These events were processed through a group-prism. However, rather than processing 
these stimuli in accordance with a Russia/Ukraine group-prism, the DPR identity managers were forced 
into processing them from a DPR/Ukraine group-prism, as Russian identity managers did not act on the 
DPR identity managers’ claim for Russian unification. The DPR identity managers have since then sought 
to consolidate the DPR group identity further by making sense of how this group relates to the other groups 
involved in the conflict. A main aspect of DPR’s social cognitive framework is thus the argument that the 
DPR group exists, and that the members of this group are entitled to be recognised by the other conflict 
parties. The DPR identity managers argue that the other conflict parties need to change their social cognitive 
processing and include the new DPR group identity to make sense of who is present and what is going on. 
This attempt is to some extent supported by Russian identity managers, as they point to the existence of 
DPR. However, although Russian identity managers “see” the DPR group, they do not see DPR as an 
independent group identity. Russian identity managers rather categorise the agents of DPR as Ukrainians. 
Russian identity managers have hence not fully adopted the DPR identity managers’ social cognitive 
framework, nor do the DPR identity managers fully abide to the Russian situation, self, and other 




5.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter I addressed the social cognitive processes the conflict parties in the Ukraine conflict resort 
to. The chapter focused on how they construct situation-, self-, and other-schemas, and how these result in 
social cognitive frameworks. The reason for exploring these processes was to establish how the conflict 
parties process stimuli and the intergroup dynamics that may arise from this. This research takes the position 
that to understand conflict protraction we equally need to explore the ideational factors that shape them. In 
the Ukraine conflict all conflict parties argue for the need to implement the Minsk agreements and the 
various ceasefires made. They nevertheless continue to fail in doing so, even though these agreements 
seemingly cater to their interests. This research has hence set out to explore whether there are certain 
dynamics that arise from the conflict parties’ cognitive processing, which may continue to move them 
towards confrontation rather than reconciliation. Given that emphasis is on ideational factors, this research 
should be treated as a complementary study. It thus addresses the cognitive moment of conflicts, albeit the 
findings may complement e.g. post-structural studies, as it explores the underlying cognitive steps that may 
lead to competing discourses, and it may complement realist studies as it explores how clashing discourses 
may prove a hindrance in conflict parties’ pursuit of material interests.  
From the analysis it becomes noticeable that the conflict parties in Ukraine do not share the 
same social cognitive frameworks, as they all process stimuli differently and they emphasise different 
stimuli as of importance for understanding the conflict. This e.g. pertains to Maidan which the Ukrainian 
and DPR identity managers process as the liberation of their groups, but Russian identity managers process 
as the destruction of Ukraine’s group identity. Adding to this is that the Russian identity managers process 
the inauguration of the new Ukrainian identity managers as the event that caused the conflict, whilst the 
DPR identity managers point to the ridicule of the Russian group identity as stimuli that caused agents to 
dismiss their unification with Ukraine. Ukrainian identity managers, on the other hand, point to how the 
conflict is an outcome of the end of the Cold War as it is a result of Russian retaliation against Ukraine’s 
strive for independence. The conflict parties also disagree on whether the conflict should be cognitively 
systematised as an intragroup or intergroup conflict. The Ukraine conflict hence entails conflicting 
narratives, which have occurred because of different stimuli processing. This correlates with the theory on 
opposed conflict narratives. However, despite that the conflict parties process stimuli differently, as well as 
emphasise the importance of different stimuli, the analysis found that they rely on the same processing 
tendencies when systematising the conflict and reifying the groups present.  
The first of such tendencies is to change identities and interests when processing stimuli. In 
DPR’s conflict narrative, the identity managers have in the early days of the conflict had difficulties 
systematising the conflict and particularly making sense of who the people of DPR are and what they want. 
Initially these agents were socially categorised as Russians who strived for unification with the Russian 
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state. As the Russian identity managers did not react on this proclaimed in-group membership, the DPR 
identity managers were forced to change their systematisation of the conflict. This led to attempts of 
defining the people of DPR as agents who belonged to “Novorossiya” or “Malorossiya”. It was then from 
this systematisation that the conflict was to be understood as one between Ukrainians and “New” or “Little” 
Russians. This systematisation did not gain traction either, and so the DPR identity managers now 
cognitively systematise the conflict as one between a Ukraine and a DPR group identity. This identification 
has had implications for DPR’s interests, which the identity managers have adapted into being the creation 
of an independent DPR state. Whereas the DPR identity managers have explicitly changed their self-schema 
in accordance with incoming stimuli, the state actors in the Ukraine conflict have sought to process stimuli 
in accordance with their existing self-schemas or adapted the other’s identity and interests. Most noticeable 
is the Russian identity managers’ processing of Russian troop presence in Ukraine, which they first denied 
and eventually categorised as volunteers who were acting from their own interests. By categorising these 
agents as such Russian identity managers sought to process stimuli in accordance with their established 
self-schema of being a neutral actor. Rather than adapting their self- and situation-schema, Russian identity 
managers adapted the stimuli. Ukrainian identity managers, on the other hand, have changed their other-
schema, as the conflict initially was processed as one between Ukrainians and terrorists. With the 
annexation of Crimea and information on Russian troop presence nevertheless occurred a shift, as the other-
schema came to revolve around the Russia social category.  
 The second processing tendency which emerges from the analysis, is that all conflict parties 
seek to reify groups through the application of a group attribution error and, what I have chosen to call, a 
leadership attribution error. When reifying their in-group, all conflict parties either refer to how the group 
is an entity that behaves from a shared cognitive foundation, or how the attitude of the identity managers 
reflect the general attitude of their group members. In the case of Ukraine and DPR, the identity managers 
reify their in-group as groups that have been collectively mobilised from a shared understanding of who the 
in-group is, and who it is confronted with. Russian identity managers nevertheless do point to how they 
have an active role in shaping the Russian group identity and interests, but they argue that their identity 
management has the blessing of their group members. The in-groups are hence reified as either consistent 
entities, or as groups where there is a perfect relationship between group managers and members. When 
reifying the out-group, however, all conflict parties point to how the out-group managers are shaping the 
out-group’s identity and interest from their own image. Ukrainian identity managers e.g. reify the Russia 
group around Putin, who is processed as the individual that epitomises the Russia group. The reason why 
Russians are in a conflict with Ukrainians is hence not because all Russians have a hatred towards 
Ukrainians. It is because Putin has a negative personality from which he mobilises Russian group members 
around a goal of sowing conflicts and destroying other groups. Russian identity managers rather reify the 
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Ukraine group as a distorted group identity, which the new Ukrainian identity managers have taken hostage 
in their attempt to redirect attention away from their failure in governing. Ukrainians are hence mobilised 
around the Ukrainian identity managers’ identity and interests, and not the collective interests and identity 
that define Ukrainians. Similar understanding is expressed by the DPR identity managers who point to how 
Ukrainian identity managers have distorted the Ukraine group identity to the extent where the people of 
DPR can no longer identify with, and co-exist alongside, this group.  
 The third processing tendency is to process stimuli as a matter of alien identity management 
where the motivation of the out-group managers is to either destroy a group identity or impose their 
management on an out-group. All conflict parties systematise the conflict around this perceived motivation 
as they refer to alien identity management as the key characteristic of the conflict, which they and their 
members seek to defy. Alien identity management is also a processing tendency that they resort to when 
reifying groups. In their conflict narratives, all conflict parties refer to how there is a “true” and a “false” 
constellation of the group identities represented in the conflict, and they all argue that they possess the true 
account of who is who. In the case of Russia, Ukrainian identity managers reify this out-group by not merely 
processing Russian behaviour in the conflict, but also past Russian behaviour. It is thus by processing 
Russian behaviour in e.g. the Georgia conflict and during the times of the Soviet Union that Ukrainian 
identity managers reach an understanding of who Russia really is and what it wants in the Ukraine conflict. 
This reification is also reached by processing the behaviour of Nazi Germany during WW2. It is hence also 
by referring to other actors and events deemed as similar to Russia and the Ukraine conflict that Ukrainian 
identity managers make sense of Russia. This other-understanding is then presented as factual and 
something that others need to adopt if future conflicts are to be prevented, and the Ukraine conflict is to 
end. Similar understanding is visible in DPR and Russia’s conflict narrative where the identity managers 
dismiss Ukraine’s removal of everything Russian from the Ukraine group identity, as they argue that 
Russians and Ukrainians are past in-group members who share the same social origin and interests. It is 
thus the current distortion of the Ukraine group identity that has led to the conflict and so to end the conflict, 
there is a need to either reverse to the true account of the Ukraine group identity (as Russian identity 
managers advocate) or move towards a split between Ukrainians and Donetskians (as the DPR identity 
managers advocate).  
 Eventually there is a tendency to support parts of another conflict party’s social cognitive 
framework. The DPR identity managers e.g. seek to validate their group constructs by pointing to the 
support their self-understanding is granted from Russian identity managers. Russian identity managers’ 
attempt to include the DPR identity managers in the negotiation process is also used by the DPR identity 
managers as a validation of DPR’s group identity. This, however, despite that Russian identity managers 
do not refer to a distinct Donetskian group identity in their conflict narrative, but instead identifies these 
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agents as Ukrainians. Adding to this is also the Russian argument that Ukrainian identity managers’ 
attempts to distort the Ukraine group identity is receiving support from the West. This is then presented as 
another cause for the conflict’s continuation as Ukraine’s social cognitive framework is validated by others. 
From the Ukraine analysis thus emerges the finding that the conflict parties do not process stimuli in the 
same way, and they do not rely on stable self/other understandings. This is of interest as it challenges the 
existing conflict protraction theories that protraction occurs from cemented self/other understandings. It 
also challenges the realist notion that state actors think in the same way. These findings will be discussed 
further in chapter 7. In the next chapter I draw my attention to the Georgia conflict and the social cognitive 

























6.0 Social Cognitive Processing in the Georgia Conflict  
This chapter will proceed in a similar fashion as the previous. Here, focus is on the second case study, the 
conflict in Georgia, and the conflict narratives of the conflict parties: The Georgian government, Russian 
government, and the de-facto South Ossetian government. As in the previous chapter, this too will focus on 
the social cognitive processes the conflict parties use to reach an understanding of the situation, self, and 
other. The Georgia analysis is also based on a thematic analysis, which can be found in appendix 7. 
 
6.1 Schematic Changes   
As in the Ukraine conflict, it is possible in the Georgia conflict to explore a development in the conflict 
parties’ situation-, self-, and other-schemas. Although there have been several developments through-out 
the conflict, which have had an influence in shaping and changing the conflict parties’ schemas, the most 
significant stimuli that led to schematic changes are the 2008 events.  
 
6.1.1 Georgia 
Georgia’s conflict narrative has changed over the years alongside the change in Georgian identity managers. 
The most significant change happened with the inauguration of Mikheil Saakashvili in 2004 and the 2008 
events where Georgian identity managers adopted a more consistent understanding of the conflict as one 
between Russia and Georgia. This is a development from the early 1990s where Georgian identity mangers 
processed the conflict as one between Georgia and South Ossetia. The understanding that the conflict was 
a Georgian/South Ossetia conflict emerged around 1991 when the first clashes (within the dataset used for 
this analysis) occurred between South Ossetia and Georgia. During this time, the official conflict documents 
defined the situation as a Georgia/South Ossetia conflict with amongst other the Sochi Agreement of June 
1991 stating the need for: “the immediate cessation of bloodshed and achieving comprehensive settlement 
of the conflict between Ossetians and Georgians”633. In 1994, initiatives were expanded with the Joint 
Control Commission agreement where the conflict parties agreed that there was an urgent need for “a whole 
scale settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict”634. In 1995, Georgian identity managers welcomed an 
OSCE peace proposal that proposed giving the greatest possible degree of autonomy to the South Ossetians 
under Georgian management635. Under this proposal, South Ossetians would enjoy a stronger management 
of their interests and territory in comparison to what they had during the Soviet Union636. Since the 1990s, 
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Georgian conflict resolution agreements have entailed an element of autonomy637. This includes one 
presented by then-Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in 1998, which proposed transforming Georgia 
into an “asymmetric federation”638. In the 1990s, all conflict parties hence shared the understanding that the 
conflict was between Georgians and South Ossetians. 
The understanding that the conflict was between Georgia and Russia started to emerge in the 
early 2000s. In 2002, Russian identity managers adopted a citizenship law, which granted agents with no 
citizenship, and who were living in the former territories of the Soviet Union, the right to apply and receive 
Russian citizenship639. To this, Shevardnadze responded that the law was “a hidden annexation”640. During 
the same time, Georgian identity managers increasingly referred to Russian identity managers’ lack of will 
in implementing the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit Agreement, which called for the removal of Russian 
bases from Georgian territory641. When Saakashvili was inaugurated as president in 2004, he initially 
embraced the situation-schema that the conflict was between South Ossetia and Georgia, and that the 
primary point of contestation was how to ensure peaceful co-existence between these two groups. As he 
stated in January 2005 in an address to the Georgian Parliament:  
 
Our vision for a peaceful and united Georgia is based on the respect for the desire for autonomy of the 
Tskhinvali region-South Ossetia[…]We want to have a strong Georgian state, and we want 
the[…]conflict to be solved peacefully. The price we must pay for that is that we should give that territory 
certain political rights642. 
 
During the early 2000s, South Ossetia was thus treated as a group within Georgian territory, which could 
be persuaded to refrain from independence if its demands were met through greater autonomy. In 2004, 
tensions continued between Russia and Georgia, as Georgian identity managers accused Russian 
peacekeepers of neglecting their duties and siding with South Ossetia643. In the same year, Saakashvili 
declared that “certain forces in Russia” were preparing an “aggression against Georgia”644. What is 
interesting is that although Georgian identity managers in 2004/2005 started processing the conflict with a 
reference to a looming Georgia/Russia conflict, they continued to categorise South Ossetia as an 
independent group. Russia and South Ossetia’s relation was hence understood as a mutual beneficial 
relationship where Russian identity managers were backing the South Ossetians. As Saakashvili stated in 
July 2004: “Due to coordinated activities by the Georgian government[…]Georgia has avoided the bloody 
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conflict which [South Ossetian leader Eduard] Kokoev and his backers in Russia wanted to launch”645. In 
the mid-2000s, Georgian identity managers thus started processing the conflict and the agents involved 
differently, and greater emphasis was put on South Ossetia and Russia’s relations. The reason for this may 
be due to the inauguration of new Georgian identity managers. It may also be related to stimulus such as 
the Russian citizenship law, which resulted in a majority of South Ossetians becoming Russian citizens646.  
The full transition towards processing the conflict as a Russia/Georgia conflict may be linked 
to the 2008 events, where Russian identity managers claimed to invade Georgia on behalf of the South 
Ossetians, but which Georgian identity managers processed as an unprovoked Russian invasion. As 
Saakashvili stated in November 2008 when the Georgian opposition accused him of provoking the conflict 
with Russia: “It was a difficult decision, but it was an inevitable one[…]When we asked the Russians 
through the Americans what was the goal of their intervention, their answer was “the complete destruction 
of Georgia””647. The 2008 events functioned as stimuli where the South Ossetian social category was 
discarded for a fully activated Russia social category. Since 2008, Georgian identity managers have applied 
the Russian social category and nodes such as “proxies”, “invasion”, and “annexation” in their sense making 
of the conflict and the agents involved. Russia has thus since 2008 been categorised as the antagonist and 
the South Ossetia/Georgia conflict situation-schema has been discarded. As stated on the Georgian 
President’s homepage, retrieved July 2018: “That time, after 90s, there were conflicts in two regions of 
Georgia, in Abkhazia and Samachablo (the South Ossetia). For that period the ethnic problems were named 
as the reason for the conflict, though later on it was proved that the party of conflict was neither Abkhazia, 
nor Tskhinvali region (the South Ossetia), but Russia, supporting separatism in the region”648. Like Ukraine, 
Georgia’s situation-, and other-schema changed once the Russia category was activated. The conflict is 
now processed as a situation where Russian identity managers have mobilised South Ossetians and 
deployed Russian group members in a fight against Georgians on Georgia’s territory. During the Giorgi 
Margvelashvili Presidency, Georgian identity managers have slightly altered their situation-, and other-
schema in what may be regarded as an attempt to improve relations with Russia. There was e.g. an increased 
focus on the onset of the conflict with the argument that the previous Georgian identity managers equally 
provoked the conflict. The onset of the conflict is hence no longer unilaterally blamed on Russian identity 
managers. The understanding that the conflict is a Russia/Georgia conflict, however, remains. As 
Margvelashvili stated in October 2016: “how can a friendly country[…]attack and invade its neighbors - 
Georgians, who, along with Russians[…]created a united cultural social community?! I find it hard to 
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understand[…]in the future, the Georgian occupation will not be considered as the “great campaign” of the 
Russian warlords”649. The Georgian conflict narrative thus continues to be shaped around the 
understandings largely reached during the Saakashvili presidency, and the previous conflict agreements 
made with South Ossetia no longer features in the Georgian identity managers’ situation- and other-schema.  
 
6.1.2 Russia 
Russia’s conflict narrative has also changed over the years albeit this tendency is more related to the 
processing of unfolding events, than a change in identity managers - as these agents have largely stayed the 
same. Unlike Georgian identity managers, Russian identity managers have consistently processed the 
conflict as one between Georgians and South Ossetians. What has changed is how vocal they have been 
about who the antagonist is. In the early 1990s, Mikhail Gorbachev, as one of the identity managers of the 
Soviet Union, initially condemned the South Ossetian move towards independence alongside a 
condemnation of the Georgian abolition of South Ossetia’s autonomy650. The Soviet situation-schema thus 
placed blame on both sides. This schema was somewhat adopted by Russian identity managers as, during 
the 1990s and until the mid-2000s, Russian identity managers refrained from acknowledging either 
situation- or other-schema expressed by South Ossetia or Georgia. This did not refrain them from being a 
part of the conflict resolution process, as Russian identity managers in 1990, alongside Georgian identity 
managers, dispatched troops to South Ossetia651. The Russian identity managers also joined Georgian 
identity managers in signing the 1991 Joint Commission agreement where the Georgian and Russian 
Ministries of Internal Affairs were to jointly assess the situation and cooperate on matters such as the 
resettling of refugees652. In the early 1990s, Russian and Georgian identity managers hence agreed to 
cooperate not merely in the resolution of the conflict, but also in reaching a joint understanding of the 
situation and agents involved.  
The idea of a shared understanding deteriorated in 2004, as a disagreement arose regarding 
the presence of Russian peacekeepers. Georgia’s Conflict Resolution Minister, Giorgi Khaindrova, amongst 
other stated in June 2004 that the Russian peacekeepers should leave Georgia as “they do not wish to 
perform their functions”653. To this Russia’s Foreign Ministry responded that: “The Georgian authorities 
are intentionally vilifying the Russian peace-keepers deployed in the Georgia-South Ossetian conflict 
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zone”654. Adding to this dispute were Russian accusations that Georgian identity managers had dispatched 
illegal groups into South Ossetia with Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stating in July 2004 that 
Georgia had: “illegally brought into the conflict zone hundreds and thousands of armed forces who do not 
come under the peacekeepers' control”655. In the mid-2000s, Russia’s situation-schema hence started 
moving away from an expressed need for Georgian-Russian cooperation, to an increased focus on how 
Georgian identity managers were trying to circumvent the agreements made.  
Russia’s conflict narrative changed in 2008, where Russian identity managers became more 
vocal in terms of which conflict narrative they supported and in presenting their understanding of how the 
conflict should be resolved. Prior to 2008, Russian identity managers processed the conflict’s resolution as 
a matter that should be resolved between Georgian and South Ossetian identity managers. In 2008, Russian 
identity managers’ approach was nevertheless presented as they decided to acknowledge South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as two independent states656. They also started processing the conflict as one Georgian identity 
managers had caused. As Lavrov stated in an Interview to Russian TV in February 2010: “The main trouble 
which led to the tragedy in August 2008 was the failure of the whole galaxy of post-Soviet Georgian leaders 
to act so as to take into account and follow the fundamental interests of their own people”657. Russia’s 
conflict narrative has since 2008 entailed a strong stance towards Georgia, and the identity managers are 
now explicitly presenting themselves, and the Russia group, as a party that shares the South Ossetians’ 
understanding of the situation and agents involved.  
 
6.1.3 South Ossetia 
South Ossetia’s conflict narrative has been relatively consistent over the years as all incumbent identity 
managers continue to process the conflict as one Georgia has imposed upon South Ossetia. What has 
changed, is how South Ossetian identity managers process their own and Georgian interests. In South 
Ossetia’s self-schema, the identity managers have consistently reified the South Ossetian group as socially 
distinct from the Georgians, and it is from this social categorisation that the identity managers have 
advocated for more agency over matters concerning the South Ossetian territory and prospects. This was 
visible in the early 1990s, when South Ossetian identity managers sought to change South Ossetia’s status 
from Autonomous Region to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic658, and the subsequent referendum 
on independence from Georgia659. Although South Ossetian identity managers have continuously reified 
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South Ossetians as socially distinct from Georgians, they have pointed to how South Ossetians enjoy 
positive relations with the Russians and share a group membership with the North Ossetians residing inside 
Russian territory. This led to a declaration in November 1991 that South Ossetia was to be a republic within 
the Russian Federation, and a referendum in January 1992 where South Ossetians declared their wish of 
integrating with the North Ossetian region660. Since the early 1990s, South Ossetia has held several 
referendums on independence, and the ambition towards unification with Russia has ebbed and flowed. 
Although Georgian identity managers have consistently denounced these South Ossetian referendums, the 
mid-1990s saw a slight improvement in Georgia-South Ossetia relations. Georgian identity managers 
amongst other stated in November 1996 that the South Ossetian presidential election should not undermine 
the improved conditions in the South Ossetian-Georgian relations661. These relatively consoling narratives 
continued during the early 2000s as the two groups engaged in trade662 and Lyudvig Chibirov, de-facto 
President of South Ossetia, told journalists in April 2000 that he hoped for the re-election of Shevardnadze, 
as he was: “a man who keeps his word, [and who is] sincerely interested in settling the Georgian-Ossetian 
conflict by political means without military interference”663.  
In 2002, tensions resumed as South Ossetian identity managers stated that they feared the 
increased build-up of Georgian forces inside Georgian territory and strengthened military relations with the 
US, might prove a threat towards the South Ossetians664. The outbreak of violence in 2008 was used as a 
proof of Georgians’ hostile intentions towards the South Ossetians. What is noteworthy is that although the 
South Ossetian identity managers processed the 2008 events as proof of their other-schema, they also 
changed their understanding of Georgian interests. Because following 2008, South Ossetian identity 
managers more systematically started processing Georgian intentions as being the eradication of the South 
Ossetians. As South Ossetia’s President, Eduard Kokoity, stated in August 2009 on the first-year 
anniversary of the 2008 events: “The goal of the operation was the destruction and exile of the South 
Ossetian people”665. Whereas the other-schema initially was constructed around a disagreement over “who” 
had the right to exercise control over the South Ossetian territory, the 2008 events defined Georgian 
behaviour in the conflict as attempts of ethnic cleansing. This other-schema is now combined with the 
expressed South Ossetian interest of independence/Russian-unification. The situation- and other-schemas 
that currently define South Ossetia’s conflict narrative is thus that the South Ossetians need to be removed 
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from Georgians – either through independence or Russian unification – to prevent a South Ossetian 
genocide.  
 
6.1.4. Schematic Changes  
As in Ukraine, the Georgia conflict parties have changed their schema’s in accordance with stimuli they 
have encountered. This stimulus particularly pertains to the 2008 events where Georgian identity managers 
changed their situation-schema from one between Georgia and South Ossetia, to one between Russia and 
Georgia. It was also following 2008 that Russian identity managers became more vocal in their 
understanding of who the antagonist was, and it was the time when Russian identity managers started 
communicating South Ossetia’s situation-, and other-schema. South Ossetian identity managers also 
slightly changed their situation- and other-schemas and particularly their understanding of Georgian 
interests following the 2008 events. Since then, South Ossetian identity managers have referred more 
consistently to a Georgian intent of annihilating the South Ossetians. It is thus possible to explore a 
development in the conflict parties’ conflict narratives. This is of importance as it indicates that the conflict 
parties have not processed the situation and agents involved in a consistent manner. Rather, they have 
changed their conflict narratives, and adapted significant aspects of their schemas in connection to stimulus 
that occurs, and the identity managers that have been in power. This is of interests as it challenges the 
opposed conflict narrative theory, which argues that conflict protraction is rooted in cemented narratives. 
What my finding instead indicates is that conflict narratives are mouldable and reactive to stimulus. As with 
the adaptable identities in the Ukraine conflict, these reactive narratives in the Georgia conflict present a 
positive opportunity for conflict resolution, because it implies that the conflict parties can change their 
narratives and settle on a more stable and consistent understanding of the conflict and how it should be 
resolved. However, as will be seen in the next section, it also presents an opportunity for the conflict parties 
to continuously process stimulus in accordance with their negative understanding of the situation and the 
other. This then feeds into a continued negative interaction between their social cognitive processes and has 
negative consequences for the resolution of the conflict. These findings will, alongside the findings in the 
next sections, be further discussed in chapter 7.  
 
6.2 Georgia’s Social Cognitive Framework  
The following section will explore how the Georgian identity managers reach schematic understandings 




6.2.1 Situation-Schema   
6.2.1.1 Conflict Cause  
In Georgia’s situation-schema, the conflict is processed as an intergroup conflict between Georgia and 
Russia and it is a conflict that Russia has caused as Russia is in the process of annexing Georgian territory. 
When making sense of the situation the Georgian identity managers thus cognitively systematize agents in 
accordance with a Georgian and Russian group identity. The Russia/Georgia group-prism is, as stated, a 
development as the Georgian identity managers’ initially processed the conflict as one between Georgia 
and South Ossetia. This schematic change is, however, not acknowledged in Georgia’s conflict narrative. 
Rather, Georgia’s conflict narrative now revolves around a consistent understanding that the conflict 
between Georgia and Russia has been long running, as it emerged in the early 1990s following Georgia’s 
secession from the Soviet Union. As Margvelashvili stated in an address to participants of a roundtable 
discussion in July 2018: “The war of 2008 was certainly a war between Georgia and Russia that involved 
Russian regular armed forces; however, the Russian-Georgian war began much earlier, more precisely, 
occupation of these two regions of Georgia began in 92-93’s. This decision[…]was triggered by Georgia’s 
decision to become an independent and free country”666. When processing the onset of the conflict, 
Georgian identity managers rely on a fundamental attribution error, as they argue that Russian identity 
managers caused the conflict. From this attribution error, the conflict is understood as an outcome caused 
by Russian intent, as Russia’s identity managers for long have tried to prevent Georgians from gaining full 
control over their existence. Georgian identity managers more specifically process the conflict as a matter 
of alien identity management, as the conflict occurred because Russian identity managers are against the 
free choice of other groups. As Georgia’s Foreign Ministry stated to the “treaty on alliance and integration” 
Russia signed with South Ossetia in March 2015:“Russia’s policy vis-à-vis Georgia[…]illustrates that 
Moscow does not accept the independent choice of sovereign states and strives for the restoration of zones 
of influence in the region, including through the use of force, occupation, annexation and other aggressive 
acts”667. The conflict is hence processed as a situation that occurred because Russian identity managers 
want to prevent developments where out-groups gain control over their own identity and interests. The 
conflict is thus not caused by all Russians. It is the outcome of Russian identity managers’ negative 
dispositions and interests of wanting to reclaim power over groups and their territory.  
The Georgian identity managers process the situation as one where Russian identity 
managers have mobilised their group members in an attempt to annex Georgia’s territory. To reach this 
understanding, they point to stimuli such as the Russian invasion in 2008, Russian acknowledgement of 
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South Ossetia, and the agreements made between Russia and South Ossetia. These events are processed as 
“hidden-”, “creeping-”, or “factual annexation” with the Foreign Ministry stating in September 2016, in 
connection to the Russian military exercise taking place in the Southern parts of Russia and South Ossetia: 
“Military maneuvers take place against the backdrop of continuing militarization of Georgia’s occupied 
territories and creeping annexation through their integration into the military and security systems of the 
Russian Federation”668. Like the Ukrainian identity managers, Georgian identity managers activate an 
annexation node when processing stimuli. This node is linked to an occupation node, as the identity 
managers process the physical presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia as Russian occupation of 
Georgia’s territory. As the Foreign Ministry expressed it in a statement in August 2015 on the 7th 
anniversary of the 2008 events: “Seven years after the August 2008 war, 20 percent of Georgia's territory 
remains under occupation, resulted in[…]hundreds of thousands of victims of ethnic cleansing, which are 
still denied the right to safe and dignified return to the places of their original residence”669. The conflict is 
thus one where Russian identity managers (through the mobilisation of their Russian in-group members) 
are occupying Georgia’s territory, with the intent of annexing it to the Russia group. In Georgia’s situation-
schema, groups hence represent, and exist within, a certain territory. This is of interest as it constructs 
Russian identity managers as agents who are trying to remove territory from a group identity, which has 
this territory as its ‘place of origin’. In Georgia’s conflict narrative, group identities originate from physical 
places and their existence hinge on group members ability to continue to inhabit these places. The Georgia 
conflict is thus also a matter of regaining control over territory that rightfully belongs to a group, as this is 
linked to the management of the group and its identity and interests. Russia’s annexation and occupation 
therefore threatens the physical existence of the Georgian group identity, as Russian identity managers are 
gradually chipping away at the Georgian identity’s geographical location.  
The threat against the Georgian group identity’s existence is not merely geographical but 
existential, as Georgian identity managers process the conflict as one where ethnic cleansing and genocide 
have occurred. As Saakashvili stated in August 2008 following Russia’s acknowledgement of South 
Ossetia, which he argued was: “a blatant attempt to legalise the results of ethnic cleansing[which]Russian 
troops are continuing to commit, right now as we speak, and that have been committed during the last 
several years”670. From Georgian processing arises the understanding that the existence of a group identity 
does not merely hinge on who gets to control it and whether it may continue to exist within its own territory. 
It also hinges on the continued physical existence of group members. In Georgia’s situation-schema, 
Russian behaviour in 2008 is not merely processed as an invasion, but as the intent of cleansing the South 
 
668 GFM-22 (5) 
669 GFM-10 (5) 
670 BBC-7 (4) 
165 
 
Ossetian (i.e. Georgian) territory of Georgians. This understanding is expanded to the processing of other 
stimuli such as events related to IDP’s, which are presented as examples of how Russian identity managers 
are trying to exterminate those who identify as Georgians. As the Foreign Ministry stated in connection to 
the 41st round of international Geneva Discussions in October 2017: “Representatives of Georgia sharply 
raised the issue of mass demolition of houses of Georgian IDPs in Eredvi village, as the continuation of 
ethnic cleansing and deliberate attempt to completely root out Georgian traces in Tskhinvali region”671. 
Russian identity managers are hence threatening the Georgian group identity as they are seeking to take 
control over the Georgian identity’s place of origin and eradicate Georgians in the process.  
The situation is eventually defined by a Russian attempt to change agents’ social 
differentiation as Russian identity managers restrict social practices that invoke the Georgian group identity. 
As the Foreign Ministry stated in connection to the Geneva talks in December 2017: “It was explicitly 
stressed that the forced registration of local population as foreigners, followed by restriction of their 
fundamental rights and freedoms, compulsion to change their surnames and national identity, can become 
a ground for another wave of ethnic cleansing in the occupied regions”672. Georgia’s situation-schema is 
hence constructed around an understanding that Russian identity managers are seeking to take control over 
Georgians, their identity, interests, and territory. This poses a threat towards the Georgian group’s existence 
as territory associated with the Georgian group identity is in the risk of becoming “Russian”, whilst 
Georgians are physically eradicated or forced to change their social identification. The situation is therefore 
processed as one where Georgians are opposing Russian identity managers’ attempt of removing their right 
to identify as Georgian and to socially differentiate themselves from Russians.  
 
6.2.1.2 The Agents Involved 
Whereas the Georgian identity managers can clearly refer to “who” Russia is and what this group “wants” 
in the conflict, they have had difficulties categorising the South Ossetians and particularly the extent to 
which these agents are “Russians” or distinctly “South Ossetians”. This confusion may be explained from 
the same premise as Ukraine’s categorisation of DPR, namely that the Georgian identity managers have 
had difficulties establishing whether South Ossetians are acting from their own interests, whether they are 
acting on behalf of Russian interests, or whether Russian and South Ossetian identity managers are acting 
together in pursuit of common interests. This confusion of how to categorise the non-state actors has not 
been a persistent conundrum in Georgia’s conflict narrative, as South Ossetia was initially categorised as 
an independent group that was in conflict with Georgia. In the beginning of the conflict, there was hence a 
clear-cut referral to who the South Ossetians were, and what they wanted. Gradually South Ossetia was 
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nevertheless processed as a group backed by Russian identity managers, till the point where the non-state 
actors were made sense of through the Russian social category. As Saakashvili stated in a televised speech 
in September 2005: “In reality, Russia is ruling this small enclave[…]not just through its officials, but with 
ethnic Russians sent there by Russia and appointed by Russia”673. The non-state actors are now categorised 
as a mixture of Russians and Russian proxies. As stated in the EU fact finding mission on the section 
presenting ‘Georgia’s view’ of the conflict: “Russian claim about genocide committed by Georgians against 
ethnic Ossetians proved to be propaganda aimed at justification of Russia’s illegal activities and 
encouragement of Ossetian proxy militants and other armed formations to commit brutalities against ethnic 
Georgians”674. The non-state actors are processed as agents whom Russian identity managers have 
mobilised and control. Unlike Ukrainian identity managers who clearly refer to the non-state actors as 
Russian group members, there is, however, greater confusion in Georgia’s conflict narrative over the extent 
to which South Ossetians are Russian group members or actually South Ossetians. This confusion may 
derive from the fact that many South Ossetians have Russian citizenship, but it may also be linked to the 
issue that the conflict still includes a South Ossetian conflict party, which demands certain outcomes.  
 To solve the cognitive conundrum over who South Ossetia is, Georgian identity managers 
draw a distinction between South Ossetian identity managers and group members, as South Ossetian 
identity managers are categorised as Russians, and the group members are categorised as Ossetians. It is 
then from this categorisation that Georgian identity managers infer why the South Ossetians engage in 
behaviour that is detrimental towards conflict resolution, and why there is an increased cooperation between 
South Ossetia and Russia. As Georgia’s State Minister for Reintegration, Temur Iakobashvili, stated in 
August 2010: “The war has demonstrated something that was not clearly evident before – our main problem 
is not relations with Abkhazians and Ossetians[…]Our major problem is Georgian-Russian relations. 
Russia is using separatists and separatism against the Georgian statehood”675. It is also from this 
categorisation of South Ossetia that Georgian identity managers process the negative relations between 
South Ossetia and Georgia as something that is easily fixed, as the problem does not originate between the 
two groups per se. As Margvelashvili stated in a report to the Georgian Parliament in February 2014 
regarding Georgia-South Ossetia relations:  
 
Our unity was violated due to many mistakes and by rough interference of other parties, for which we 
paid with the blood of our peoples. Today, the identity and self-cognition of Abkhazian and Ossetian 
people is in jeopardy. The strongest warrant for the protection of these principles is in our unity and co-
habitation. Therefore, if the future of Abkhazians, Ossetians and all the peoples living on these territories 
is the least precious for you, don’t leave them in isolation676. 
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The South Ossetia group identity is thus currently distorted because Russian identity managers have taken 
over the management of this identity, and so Russian identity managers are now commanding which 
interests should drive these agents’ behaviour. What this understanding results in, is the argument that the 
problem lies with the South Ossetian identity managers, and not with the South Ossetian group members 
who, unlike their leaders, can naturally and peacefully be re-integrated with the Georgians. In the end, the 
Georgian identity managers’ categorisation of South Ossetia is somewhat blurred, and the reason for this 
may be due to a difficulty in making sense of a conflict that started between South Ossetians and Georgians, 
but continuously has included references to Russians and finally came to include an intervention from this 
party. What is also interesting in Georgia’s situation-schema is that the identity managers rarely process the 
cause of violence and the agreements signed between Georgia and South Ossetia in the 1990s and 2000s, 
nor do they process the claims South Ossetian identity managers have made since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. These stimuli no longer activate any nodes in the Georgian processing of who South Ossetia is. 
Rather, the conflict is to a greater extent constructed around 2008 and the subsequent interpretations made 
around the Russian social category. Despite this lack of processed stimuli, Georgian identity managers 
nevertheless present their reification of the South Ossetian group as factual. They are thus trying to manage 
the South Ossetian group identity by pointing at who this group is and what it really wants. This then 
indicates another area where a conflict party seeks to manage the identity of the other and how group 
identity management is equally applied when processing stimuli that the out-group produces.   
 
6.2.1.3 The Solution  
The presence of Russia sow’s confusion as it creates a sense-making where South Ossetia as a territory is 
wanted, but where social reintegration with the South Ossetians is more dubious due to this group’s Russian 
affiliation. The solution to the conflict is nevertheless processed as straight forward as it depends on Russian 
identity managers removing their group members from the South Ossetian territory. As the Foreign Ministry 
stated following the opening of customs points in South Ossetia in January 2018: “The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs calls upon the Russian Federation to cease the provocative actions against the Georgian statehood, 
abide by its international commitments, de-occupy Georgia’s territories and take steps aimed at peaceful 
conflict resolution in accordance to the principles of international law”677. The physical removal of Russian 
group members is a requisite for Georgian identity managers to regain control over the South Ossetian 
territory, which legally belongs to the Georgians. What is noteworthy is, however, that this conflict 
resolution effort is in contradiction with the categorisation of the South Ossetians. Because, since South 
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Ossetian identity managers are categorised as Russian members/managers, this challenges the Georgian de-
occupation solution as it requires the physical removal of South Ossetian identity managers - who claim to 
be South Ossetians. This complication is not further elaborated in Georgia’s conflict narrative. Rather, as 
stated by the Advisor to the President, Mr. Tengiz Pkhaladze, in January 2018: “This reality will be changed 
only when the occupation lines no longer exist on the territory of Georgia and when the occupant troops 
leave the country”678. Like Ukrainian identity managers, the Georgian identity managers also point to the 
need to physically remove Russian group members to re-establish the territorial distribution, which 
complies with the Georgian group identity’s place of origin. There is also a need to change minds and 
particularly to change the South Ossetians’ minds when it comes to Russia. Such actions will, however, 
automatically ensue once Georgia is modernized, as this will serve as an incentive for South Ossetian group 
members to retreat to an arrangement where their identity is managed by Georgian identity managers. As 
Georgia’s Prime Minister, Irakli Garibashvili, stated in September 2014 following a question about the EU 
association agreement and whether Georgia is leaving South Ossetia and Abkhazia behind:  
 
Of course we are not leaving them behind. In my speech to the European Council, I sent a clear message 
to our brothers and sisters, Abhkazians and Ossetians, that we offer them to share with us this 
process[…]Here is my vision: when our brothers and sisters, Ossetians and Abkhazians will see those big 
changes in our country, in Georgia; developing infrastructure, agriculture, educational programmes, 
improved healthcare and social conditions – they will also want to one day join and reconcile679. 
 
The diffuse understanding of how to reintegrate South Ossetians is thus solved by linking de-occupation 
with modernisation, as Georgian identity managers process EU integration as something that will make the 
South Ossetians dismiss their Russian managers. EU integration will hence function as stimuli which will 
make the South Ossetians change their processing of the situation and agents involved.  
This perceived future outcome is not merely linked to the positive understanding of the EU 
and the benefits the EU can offer. It is also linked to the understanding that integration between Russia and 
South Ossetia is illogical, as it does not align with the group identity of the agents who live in South Ossetia. 
As Margvelashvili responded in May 2016 to a question regarding the upcoming referendum between South 
Ossetia and Russia: “This is illegal, illogical and artificial method[…]Russia’s expectations that South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia can be united with Russia, is unrealistic. What will be their identity without 
Georgia?”680. Russian integration is bound to fail as it counters the interests of the agents residing in South 
Ossetia and does not correlate with their social identification. Georgia’s situation-schema is thus also 
constructed around the understanding that Russian identity managers are distorting South Ossetians’ sense 
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making in order to mobilise these agents into pursuing Russian interests. Conflict resolution is hence a 
matter of changing understandings, and particularly for the South Ossetians to realise the truth Georgian 
identity managers are proclaiming about Russia and Georgia. To this understanding is also the argument 
that the South Ossetian group will thrive under Georgian management. As Margvelashvili stated in an 
address to the Georgian parliament in February 2014 where he addressed South Ossetians: “We are offering 
you to live in a European, free, developed, democratic and peaceful state, which will be the guarantee of 
well-being, protection of ethnic, religious and cultural identity of its each citizen and the immunity of their 
political rights”681. In Georgia’s situation-schema there is hence a division between Georgian and Russian 
identity management, with the argument that Georgian identity managers can offer the South Ossetians a 
consistent management of this group’s identity and interests, which is contrasted to the distorted 
management this group currently experiences under Russian management.  
 
6.2.2 Self-Schema  
6.2.2.1 The Georgia Group  
When cognitively systematising the conflict, the Georgian identity managers socially categorise agents in 
accordance with a Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian group identity. These groups are used to make 
sense of the situation, but they are also used to make sense of self and other as they explain who the different 
agents are, why they are fighting each other, and what they are fighting for. In Georgia’s conflict narrative, 
the identity managers point to the presence of a Georgian group, which is a group of agents who represent 
the Georgian identity. These agents exist within the ‘Georgian territory’, they are agents united around a 
long history of shared experiences, and they are agents driven by shared desired outcomes and dispositions. 
As stated on Georgia’s President’s homepage, accessed October 2019:  
 
Georgia is the country of ancient civilization. This area was inhabited 1.7-1.8 million years ago[…][The 
Silk Road passes through Georgia and] it used to be the object of attack from the invaders and be under 
the influence of others, loss the territories, but Georgian people always found the forces to release from 
the rule of foreign tribes. Many great Empires were ruined, but Georgia still stands on his feet and 
continued struggle for protection of its own interests682 
 
In Georgia’s self-schema, Georgia is reified as a group of agents who have a long and shared history and a 
specific place of origin in the South Caucasus. To this reification is the processing that the Georgians share 
a common understanding of who they are, and the troubles they have been exposed to over the years. A 
central feature of the Georgian group reification process is that Georgia is a group that is re-experiencing 
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the same events. One of these events is, as seen in the previous quote, the experience of being invaded by 
out-groups and as a result of this being managed by alien identity managers. As is also stated on the 
homepage of the Georgian Embassy to the United States in July 2018: “In February of 1921, Tbilisi was 
occupied by the Red Army of Soviet Russia, and the democratic government of Georgia was forced to flee. 
For the next 70 years (1921--1991), the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia was one of the 15 constituent 
republics of the Soviet Union until the breakup of the USSR”683. Georgians share a common understanding 
that the fight for their independence has been under continuous threat. This self-understanding is used to 
make sense of the conflict with Russia, as the conflict is processed as nothing new, but a repetition of history 
where an out-group is once again threatening Georgians. As Margvelashvili stated in August 2018 in an 
address to Georgian politicians and journalists: “We should know that we will be victorious in this fight, 
like we were victorious in other fights that we won against the larger empires than Russia”684. When making 
sense of who Georgians are and the experiences that unite these group members, the identity managers 
hence apply the same group reification process as the DPR identity managers, who also construct a unique 
group around an understanding of consistently being under attack and forced under the management of out-
groups.   
Despite this turbulent past, the Georgian group is now independent and so the group enjoys 
the freedom to manage its own identity, interests, and territory. This is an outcome Georgians have had to 
reclaim at a certain point in time. As Margvelashvili put it during a meeting with Georgian students in May 
2016: “Twenty-five years ago we gained independence and since then we have started the construction of 
our country and our freedom”685. Georgia’s independence is a result of the end of the Cold War, which is 
processed as the time when Georgians liberated themselves from the Soviet Union i.e. from alien identity 
management. The early 1990s is thus the time when the group was once again managed by Georgian identity 
managers, who share the Georgian group members’ identity and interests. In 2008, the Georgians were 
nevertheless once again mobilised in a struggle for their independence, as Russian identity managers tried 
to re-impose their control over the Georgians. As Margvelashvili stated in August 2018 during a visit to a 
cemetery honouring the victims of 2008: “Ten years ago we witnessed another wave of brutal attack. Today, 
when we think about the past, we see that we are getting closer to the victory and unification of our country, 
because our morality and faith have not been broken and the number of Georgia’s supporters is 
increased”686. When constructing their self-schema, Georgian identity managers apply a fundamental 
attribution error, as they argue that Georgians are continuously responding to conflicts that out-groups 
(particularly Russia) have imposed upon them. Adding to this attribution error is a group attribution error 
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as the Georgia group is reified as an entity, which shares the same understanding of self, situation, and 
other. The mobilisation of Georgians in the fight against Russia is hence not something Georgian identity 
managers have instigated. It is behaviour rooted in a collective memory network, as Georgians’ shared 
experiences of past invasions and relations with Russia has united them around a goal of defying this 
common enemy. Georgian identity managers thus reify the Georgia group as one which consists of a perfect 
symbiosis between leaders and members, and a group that behaves collectively and consistently from the 
same self-understanding.  
Adding to this group reification, is the construction of social dispositions. When processing 
the conflict and how Georgians respond to this situation, Georgian identity managers reify the group as one 
which is stoic and resilient, as Georgians have consistently fought for their collective existence and their 
group’s independence. As Margvelashvili stated in August 2018 in an address titled “We Are Partially 
Occupied Country, but Victory Is Inevitable Because Georgian Society Will Never Accept Occupation”: 
“The will of the Georgian people to determine own fate and future has not been changed either. Georgian 
people maintained this fate for centuries and it will continue in the future”687. Georgian identity managers 
and group members are united in the same struggle and they have been so with the same tenacity for 
decades. Georgians are thus agents who follow a consistent behavioural pattern, which they should continue 
to abide to in order to ensure victory and their group identity’s continued existence. As Margvelashvili 
stated in a New Year address to the nation in January 2016: “And the freedom means that we should be just 
the way we are. Be as talented as we are, and as unique as we are”688. The other disposition that defines the 
Georgia group is that it is guided by the truth about who it is and what is happening in the conflict. This 
truth is something Russian identity managers are trying to distort, as they try to impose a false conflict 
narrative and make Georgians believe that there is a new social reality, which they should think and act in 
accordance with. As Georgia’s Foreign Minister, David Zalkaliani, stated in June 2018 to a comment made 
by the press-speaker of the Russian Foreign Minister: “We try to dispel the narrative being imposed on us 
that there is allegedly some new reality in Georgia. But there is no new reality whatsoever in Georgia. The 
reality is that Georgian territories are occupied and need to be de-occupied”689.  
This new reality pertains to the acknowledgment of South Ossetia, which Russian identity 
managers are demanding that the Georgians accept and hereof adopt their social cognitive processing in 
accordance with. Doing so, however, implies adopting Russia’s social cognitive framework and the 
understanding that Georgians attacked the South Ossetians, which generated the need to declare this group 
independent. This understanding does not correlate with Georgia’s self-understanding and so Georgian 
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identity managers dismiss this account. Rather, the conflict continues to be processed as a Russia-Georgia 
intergroup conflict where Russian identity managers and group members have attacked Georgians. As the 
Foreign Ministry responded in June 2015 to a report published by Russia’s Foreign Ministry on Russia’s 
policy accomplishments in 2014: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation continues to 
impose on us its own reality resulting from its large-scale military aggression against Georgia in 2008 and 
still persists in referring to Georgia’s integral territories – Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region as 
“independent republics””690. Unlike the Russian identity managers, Georgian identity managers speak the 
truth about self and other, and so when Georgia’s group members think and act in accordance with their 
identity managers’ conflict narrative, they react in accordance with reality. As in Ukraine, there is therefore 
also in Georgia a conflict over whose ‘truth’ is correct and who gets to define the social reality from which 
the remaining conflict parties should think and act. As Margvelashvili stated in an address to Georgian 
journalists in August 2018: “It is your contribution that the world has heard about the August War and the 
Russian aggression against Georgia. Georgian journalists, sacrificing own lives and health have managed 
to broadcast the truth in parallel to cyber-attacks”691.  
Despite the expressed Georgian unity, there is in Georgia’s conflict narrative a division 
between Georgian group managers and members, as the managers are those who guide the members and 
ensure that their thoughts and actions are in line with the group identity that defines and unites them. When 
reifying the Georgia group, the identity managers apply a group attribution error in order to link leaders 
and group members, as the attitude of the leaders is said to reflect the general attitudes of the members. 
This constructs a group which is seemingly unified and a group where group managers and members act in 
accordance with the same positive dispositions. As seen in the Ukraine conflict, there is thus also in the 
Georgia conflict a disagreement over which group is united, and which group is experiencing internal 
turmoil. In Georgia’s self-schema, the Georgia group is processed as unified and consistent in not merely 
its behaviour towards the out-group, but also towards the resolution of the conflict. Georgian identity 
managers point to how they are peaceful and rational agents who, alongside their group members, seek to 
ensure a proper outcome to the conflict. This is a peaceful trait which is not shared with the Russian identity 
managers, as these agents continue to dismiss resolution efforts and pursue hostile intentions. As the 
Foreign Ministry expressed it in commemoration of the 2008 events in August 2018: “In response to the 
constant provocative steps, Georgia stays committed to its peaceful conflict resolution agenda[…]Georgia 
has many times unilaterally reaffirmed and implemented the non-use of force commitment, still awaiting 
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the reciprocity from Russian side”692. Like Ukrainian identity managers, so too do the Georgian identity 
managers point to how their group is different and unique vis-á-vis the Russia group.  
 
6.2.2.2 Georgia’s Motivation for Behaviour   
The Georgia group is not driven by merely common identification and shared memories, but also by 
collective interests, which unite group members and managers and motivate their behaviour in the conflict. 
Whereas one Georgian interests is modernisation (as this will benefit both Georgians and South Ossetians 
and provide a foundation for Ossetian re-integration) another interest that shapes Georgian behaviour in the 
conflict, is to ensure that the Georgia group will continue to have full control over its identity and interests. 
As Margvelashvili stated in February 2014 in a speech to the Georgian parliament: “We are building a 
peaceful and democratic country, which aims at building kind neighborly relations only based on the 
protection of our sovereignty and territorial integrity – only by respect to these values”693. Georgian identity 
managers point to the same interests as many of the other conflict parties in Georgia and Ukraine. This is 
to exist on their own terms and to ensure that Georgians will continue to inhabit and manage Georgians 
territory and the group itself. To ensure this, there is a need to manifest Georgia’s independence, which will 
only ensue once relations with Russia have changed. As Margvelashvili stated in July 2018 during a meeting 
with media representatives: “This fight is going on for ten years to break Georgia’s morale. What Russia 
aims is simple: they attempt to make us believe that Georgia does not have any other choice than Russia 
and the Russian Federation is the only guarantor of security in the region. This is a lie! The lie that is shaken 
by the resilience of the Georgian people”694. There is thus a need to change the intergroup relations that 
currently shape and define the conflict. Because, following 2008, the Georgians have come to realise that 
Georgia-Russia relations have been shaped around a lie and a hierarchy, as Russian identity managers have 
convinced Georgians that their security is only guaranteed if they are managed by Russians. Since 
Georgians now know the truth about self and Russia, Georgians can resist this lie. Whereas South Ossetians 
need to change their understanding of Russia, Georgians have discovered the truth about the Russia group 
and particularly its identity managers. It is then by acting in accordance with this truth that the conflict will 
end and the Georgia group will once again be freed from the grasp of a hostile out-group.  
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6.2.3 Other-Schema  
6.2.3.1 The Russia Group  
Apart from reifying their in-group, the Georgian identity managers reify the Russia out-group as they 
construct a clear understanding of who Russia is, where it comes from, and what it wants. What is 
interesting in this construction, is that whereas the Ukrainian identity managers construct Russia as a group 
identity that is epitomised through its leadership, Georgian identity managers point to how Russia as a 
group has behaved in a consistent manner for decades. Russia is hence not merely the hologram of Putin, 
but the outcome of consecutive Russian identity managers who have constructed a wholly negative group 
around them. In their narrative, the Georgian identity managers thus also apply a leadership bias, but they 
focus on how consecutive leaders have constructed the Russian group. This then still indicates a cognitive 
tendency to process the other and its behaviour as the outcome of individuals. Also, unlike Ukrainian 
identity managers who argue that the Russia group is the successor of the Soviet Union, Georgian identity 
managers categorise Russia as an independent group, which has a long history of suppressing others. As 
stated on the homepage of the Georgian Embassy in the United States in July 2018:  
 
In 1891, Georgia was annexed completely by the Russian Empire. The Russians ignored Georgian habits 
and traditions and sought to eradicate Georgian culture and the Georgian language. Most frescos in 
Georgian cathedrals were white-washed; Russia abolished both the status of the Patriarch of Georgia and 
the autocephaly of the Georgian Church. Georgia gained short-lived independence from czarist Russia in 
1917 as Russia descended into revolutionary chaos695 
 
Georgia’s other-schema deviates from Ukraine’s, as Georgian identity managers point to a longer social 
existence of the Russia group, and a longer history of the behavioural patterns witnessed from this group 
today. Russia’s current behaviour and ambitions as seen in the conflict is nothing new. It is behaviour, 
which was temporarily subdued during the Soviet Union but resumed once this collapsed. As stated by H.E. 
Tamar Beruchashvili, Georgia’s Foreign Minister, in a lecture given to Argentinian students in June 2015: 
“Unfortunately, Russia has been practicing expansionist policies towards Georgia for more than two 
decades. We are under this aggression since early 1990’s[…]Russian actions of fomenting and fueling 
separatism, beginning already during the final days of the Soviet Union, did cost us a great ordeal in 
Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, Georgia”696. Russia is a group that has 
consistently pursued the same collective interests through the same behavioural tendencies for years.  
Although Russia is reified as a group with a decades-old behavioural pattern, it is also a 
group which has adopted many of the Soviet practices, and Russian identity managers are in the process of 
reinstating the Russian empire/Soviet Union. As Saakashvili stated in March 2012, Russia is: “trying to 
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create or restore a Soviet empire[…]They are mentally taking their country back to the past”697.  To reify 
the Russia group, Georgian identity managers process it as a group which has merged with the Soviet Union. 
Stated differently, the Russian group identity merged with the Soviet Union making these two categories 
two sides of the same coin. Despite the attempt to categorise Russia and the Soviet Union as the same, there 
is nevertheless in Georgia’s other-schema a slight inconsistency in how the identity managers distinguish 
between Russia and the Soviet Union. This includes the extent to which Russia and the Soviet Union 
represent the same group managers and members, or whether Russia’s identity managers seek to reinstate 
a certain level of control that their group enjoyed during the Soviet Union. Whereas Ukrainian identity 
managers process the Soviet Union and Russia as the same group and agents, Georgian identity managers 
create a slightly more confused understanding of these two. What is noteworthy is nevertheless that the 
Soviet Union does not feature in Georgia’s conflict narrative to the same extent as it features in Ukraine’s. 
Rather, in Georgia’s conflict narrative focus is primarily on Russia as a group that has behaved in a 
consistent manner since the 1700s.  
The understanding that Russia is a repressive group is not merely used to define who Russia 
is but also used for making sense of Russian behaviour in the conflict. Like the Ukrainian identity managers, 
Georgian identity managers process how other seemingly similar out-groups have acted in the past, which 
is used as an indication of what Russia will do, and an inference of what Russia has done in the conflict. 
This is amongst other visible in the quote by Saakashvili in 2008, where he stated that the Russian 
acknowledgement of South Ossetia was: “the first attempt in Europe after Nazi Germany and the Stalinist 
Soviet Union to[...]change the borders of Europe by force”698 and Saakashvili’s comparison of Russia’s 
behaviour to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Finland in 1939699. Russia is thus reified as a group which 
replicates much of the oppression witnessed from other dictatorships as well as the oppression witnessed 
during the Soviet Union. As the Foreign Ministry stated in August 2011 following accusations from Russia 
that Georgia was preparing “a large-scale provocation” in South Ossetia: “Such Soviet-style propaganda 
aims at creating artificial tensions on the ground, and in doing so to prepare for possible future 
provocations[…]We will all keep a watchful eye on possible developments, as we can never be sure what 
aggressive intentions Russia may be hiding behind such statements”700. Russia is compared to former 
groups where identity managers also have mobilised members around distorted understandings of self and 
other, and it is from this processing that Georgian identity managers define Russia as a group that will most 
likely continue to engage in hostile activities against others. Georgian identity managers process Russian 
identity managers as agents who are seeking to regain power over other groups and dictate their identity 
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and behaviour in accordance with the managers’ personal interests. Georgian identity managers hence also 
apply a leadership attribution error when reifying the Russia group, as it is argued that the Russia group is 
shaped around the leaderships’ personality and personal interests. What defines the Russian out-group is 
therefore a distorted manager-member relation. As Saakashvili stated in 2010, Russia is a “feudal 
country”701 and as Margvelashvili also stated in March 2014 in a speech at Chatham House:  
 
What happened in 2008 in Georgia was the punishment for independent choice; what happened in 2014 in 
Ukraine is the punishment for independent choice. Both of those cases are concrete cases of a global 
theory, of a global approach to newly created independent and democratic states. We were discussing 
during the interview that the politicians from the Russian Federation have very specifically defined what 
they want, how they view future of what they call areas of special interest702. 
 
To reach their personal interests, Russian identity managers continuously incite hostilities, and they violate 
laws and norms meant to guide intergroup relations. As the Foreign Ministry stated in August 2018 on the 
10-year anniversary of the events in 2008: “Russia blatantly violated the fundamental norms and principles 
of international law and created a dangerous precedence of attacking the rules-based international order. 
Russia’s actions in 2008 served the ambition to redraw the borders in Europe by force and undermine the 
entire European security architecture”703. Russian identity managers are thus agents who behave with full 
intent and control, and so the violation of laws, agreements, and norms is a tendency which is typical for 
these identity managers.  
Although Georgian identity managers have discovered this truth about Russia and its 
leadership, Russian identity managers are trying to present their decisions and their group members’ 
behaviour as legal situational responses. As Saakashvili stated in April 2009 to the border cooperation 
signed between Russia and South Ossetia: “you cannot legalize something that is fundamentally illegal. It 
is very dangerous to everybody, including Russia itself,”704. Georgian identity managers process Russian 
identity managers as rogue agents who are not merely bent on distorting the truth to regain power over 
others, but blatantly violates agreements to reach these desired outcomes. Since Russian identity managers 
are hostile and selfish agents, they do not have the political will to solve the conflict. As the Foreign 
Ministry stated in March 2017 in a response to the South Ossetia/Russia agreement on the inclusion of 
South Ossetian troops into the Russian military forces: “The Russian Federation is seriously harming the 
Geneva International Discussions and is intentionally obstructing any potential progress in the peace 
process”705. This understanding is also extended to the South Ossetia group. Because whereas the South 
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Ossetian identity managers are categorised as the “Russian occupation regime”706, South Ossetians are 
brainwashed yes-men who have come to believe and act in accordance with Russia’s false narrative about 
the conflict and Georgia. As Georgian Agriculture Minister, Davit Shervashidze, stated in June 2004 in 
connection to a failed Georgian aid delivery to South Ossetia: “The majority of local residents are avoiding 
contact with our mission[...]They seem to have been brainwashed to such an extent that they are rejecting 
any assistance. In fact, they are being terrorized”707. South Ossetians’ lack of will to engage with Georgians 
is because they have been manipulated into believing the falsities Russian identity managers construct about 
the situation and agents involved. Russian management will thus not merely lead to suppression, but to 
distorted consciousness amongst those who succumb to it.  
As Georgian identity managers construct their other-schema as factual, this leads them to 
advocate for others to adopt this schema, as it is only by doing so that the conflict will end. As 
Margvelashvili stated in July 2018: “We should not be afraid of words[…]This is a war against Georgia; 
this is aggression[…]As long as we do not say these words with full courage, we create more risks to 
ourselves and the environment in which we exist”708. Like the Ukrainian identity managers, Georgian 
identity managers argue that the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine could have been avoided, had the 
international community merely responded to the truth Georgian identity managers proclaimed about 
Russia. As Margvelashvili stated in an interview with Radio Liberty in October 2016: “Unfortunately, the 
West failed to comprehend the absurdity and tragedy of what happened in 2008. As a result, in 2014 we got 
the “Ukrainian Front”; and Russia, having the “experience of 2008”, was much more organized and rapid, 
because the Russian leadership considered the aggressive style of action acceptable”709. Russian behaviour 
in Ukraine is thus processed as a validation of Georgia’s other-schema and so in Georgia’s processing is 
also an argument that Russian identity managers are driven by clear-cut dispositions, interests, and 
behaviour. It is only once others understand this that future conflicts will be prevented and the conflicts in 
Ukraine and Georgia will end. This then also once again indicates a tendency amongst the conflict parties 
to resort to a form of alien identity management where they seek to present a clear-cut understanding of 
who the other is and advocate for others to adopt this understanding in order to end the conflict.  
 
6.2.3.2 Russia’s Motivation for Behaviour  
From the processing of who Russia is, comes the understanding that Russian identity managers are driven 
by clear-cut and negative interests. This includes controlling other groups and so Russian identity managers 
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are driven by power, which is ensured by expanding their identity management. To expand Russian identity 
management, there is a need to take control over territory that belongs to other group identities. As 
Margvelashvili stated in July 2017 in a speech at Chatham House: “This is clearly and vividly elaborated 
foreign policy and message from Russia - Russia’s neighboring countries are in the interest zone of Russian 
federation and everything that occurs on those territories is considered by Russian politicians as sphere, 
where they can make decisions through any form, including military intervention”710. Russian identity 
managers are seeking to create “areas of special interest”711, which implies the enforced Russian identity 
management of other groups in order to align these groups’ identity and interests with Russian interests. 
Russian identity managers’ ambition of managing other groups will, however, only result in destruction 
and the suffering of those agents who give in to, or are forced to be managed by, Russian managers. As 
Margvelashvili put it in 2017, there is a need to prevent Russia from reaching its goals and establishing its: 
“spheres of privileged interests, which leads only to destabilization, human tragedy and parting of 
peoples”712. As the Ukrainian identity managers, Georgian identity managers process Russian identity 
management as something that will result in spheres of suffering due to Russian identity managers’ negative 
dispositions and interests. This is visible in e.g. the South Ossetian territory where Russian management of 
the South Ossetian group identity has created a lawless area, where agents are suppressed and deprived of 
their basic human rights. As Grigol Vashadze, Georgia’s Foreign Minister, stated about South Ossetia in 
February 2009: [South Ossetia is] “a territory where no law exists, no human rights exists and where there 
is no respect for international agreements”713. Georgian identity managers hence also point to how group 
identities and interests may be distorted if these come under the management of alien identity managers.  
Since Russian identity managers have an interest in managing other identities, they deploy 
various means to destroy the good relations that exist between Georgian identity managers and group 
members. One of these is to sow discontent amongst Georgians by misleading them into believing the lies 
Russian identity managers spread about the Georgian group identity. As noted in a press release published 
on the homepage of Margvelashvili in December 2017: “Russian soft power and propaganda try to build 
unacceptance of differences in Georgia, which should be confronted by strong identity[…]Russia tries to 
break Georgia’s moral and resilience, tries to get Georgians used to the fact that they are occupying the 
territories, tries to drag the Georgian party to negotiations. Georgia will never accept this historic 
injustice”714. To gain control over other identities, Russian identity managers use a range of tactics including 
the annexation of territory, military pressure, ethnic cleansing, and propaganda. These tactics are directed 
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towards changing relations between in-group managers and members and destroy the control these groups 
have over their identity, territory, and interests. In Georgia’s conflict narrative is hence also a referral to the 
ideational nature of identities, and how there is a need for group members to fight for, and believe in, certain 
ideas for their group identity to exist. As in Ukraine, the Georgia conflict is also to some extent an ideational 
conflict as Russian identity managers are seeking to change self/other understandings. This tactic is, 
however, countered by Georgian identity managers who express the truth about who Russia is and what 
this group wants.  
 
6.2.4 Georgia’s Social Cognitive Framework  
In the previous sections I have in this chapter analysed how the Georgia identity managers process stimuli 
and how they combine nodes into schemas, which come to make up their social cognitive frameworks. This 
has been done to get an insight into the processing tendencies the Georgian identity managers resort to. 
These findings will in section 6.5 be compared to the tendencies of the other conflict parties. The reason 
for comparing these tendencies is to explore the intergroup dynamics that exist between the conflict parties 
and to explore the role their social cognitive processes may play in shaping conflict protraction.  
In Georgia’s conflict narrative, the identity managers construct specific situation, self, and 
other-schemas, which make up Georgia’s social cognitive framework. The central aspect of this framework 
is that the conflict is an intergroup conflict between Georgia and Russia, and one Russian identity managers 
have unilaterally imposed upon Georgians. Georgian identity managers hence apply an intergroup prism to 
distinguish between agents and make sense of who is fighting who and why. Here ‘Russia’ and ‘Georgia’ 
are distinct identities, which are reified as groups that have come into conflict because these groups are 
driven by different interests and dispositions. What is interesting in Georgia’s framework, is that unlike the 
Ukrainian identity managers who point to how Russian identity managers are seeking to suppress or 
physically eradicate agents that do not identity as Russian, Georgian identity managers mainly process 
Russia from an alien identity management perspective. What this means is that Russian identity managers 
are processed as agents who seek to take control over the management of other group identities, as this 
ensures that these out-groups’ interests are aligned with Russia’s. Rather than eradicating group identities 
per se, Russian identity managers are bent on controlling them. This is the understanding used to make 
sense of why Georgia and Russia are in conflict (because Russian identity managers oppose Georgians’ re-
established independence in the early 1990s) and why South Ossetian identity managers are opposed to 
Georgian conflict resolution efforts (because the South Ossetian group is managed by Russians). In 
Georgia’s framework, groups can hence be taken over by alien identity managers, as Georgians are defying 
Russian identity managers’ attempts to manage the Georgian group identity. This is an outcome Georgians 
are opposed to as they share a common memory network of past alien management, and an understanding 
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that only Georgian management will ensure Georgians collective interests and well-being. This is an 
understanding that Georgian identity managers reach by processing the past Georgia-Russia/Soviet 
relations, and the current Russia-South Ossetia relations, where Russian management of the South Ossetian 
group has led to lawlessness and human rights abuses. In Georgia’s framework is thus also a construction 
of “true” and “false” identity managers and the implied argument that identity management needs to follow 
a certain ideational structure for group identities, and the agents that make up these groups, to exist and 
thrive. What is, however, not elaborated is who gets to establish who is a true representative of an identity, 
and how one may tell the difference between these agents.  
 Despite Georgian identity managers’ attempt to present clear-cut differences between the 
agents fighting in the conflict, they have had difficulties making sense of who the non-state actors are and 
how they are different or similar to Russians. This difficulty may be linked to the development in Georgia’s 
situation- and other-schema, as it may be argued that the increased cooperation between Russia and South 
Ossetia prior to 2008 led to a social cognitive confusion of how to link the South Ossetia node with the 
Russia node. Prior to 2008, Georgian identity managers granted equal cognitive attention to South Ossetia 
and Russia as both social categories featured in the understanding of what was happening. With the 2008 
events, which functioned as new stimuli that needed processing, the Georgian situation- and other-schema 
were changed and somewhat simplified into a pure focus on Russia. This simplification challenged the 
understanding of who South Ossetia was as this group continued to express demands. Georgian identity 
managers eventually arrived at an understanding that the South Ossetian group was a mismanaged group 
identity as it does consist of real Ossetians, but it is managed by Russians. By relying on such a 
categorisation, it becomes possible for Georgian identity managers to cognitively systematise the conflict. 
What this systematization, however, results in is a dismissal of the previous clashes and events in the 1990s 
and 2000s. It also dismisses the previous Georgian understanding that the conflict is between Georgia and 
South Ossetia over the extent to which the South Ossetians should be managed by Georgians. As also seen 
in Ukraine’s conflict narrative, Georgian identity managers are trying to manage their own as well as the 
identities of others and so, like the others, Georgian identity managers argue that others need to adopt their 
social cognitive processing for the conflict to end. The problem with this is that Georgia’s framework 
consists of a highly negative reification of the Russia group and it reifies South Ossetia as a Russian puppet, 
which are constructs these two conflict parties reject.  
 
6.3. Russia’s Social Cognitive Framework  
The following section will explore how the Russian identity managers reach understandings about the 
situation, self, and other, and the social cognitive framework that forms from this.  
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6.3.1 Situation-Schema   
6.3.1.1 Conflict Cause  
In Russia’s conflict narrative, the situation is processed as an intergroup conflict between South Ossetia 
and Georgia, with the main point of contestation being the extent to which Georgians and South Ossetians 
can co-exist in the same territory. To make sense of the Georgia conflict, the Russian identity managers 
cognitively systematize agents around a Georgian and South Ossetian group identity, as they argue that the 
conflict has occurred and sustained as a result of the Georgian identity managers’ hostile intentions towards 
the South Ossetians. When processing the onset of the conflict, the Russian identity managers point to the 
early 1990s, as they argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union caused Georgian identity managers to 
become more hostile in their pursuit of creating an exclusive space for the Georgians. As Russia’s Foreign 
Ministry stated in August 2008 when it pointed to how the conflict drew roots to the “chauvinistic policy 
pursued by Tbilisi”: “That policy is based on the slogan "Georgia for Georgians" advanced in 1989 by 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia who tried to implement it in 1992 by abolishing the autonomies in the Georgian 
territory and ordering Georgian troops to take[…]Tskhinval with a view to enforcing unlawful practices. It 
was as early as then, that South Ossetia was subjected to genocide”715. The conflict is more specifically the 
outcome of Georgian identity managers’ decision to consolidate and expand the reach of the Georgian 
group identity onto perceived Georgian territory. As Lavrov stated in an interview with Russian media in 
February 2010: “It is true that Zviad Gamsakhurdia in one of his first political statements demanded that 
all the peoples be deprived of any autonomy. Then the titular nation, he declared, must run the show in 
Georgia. The Ossetians he proposed to deport to North Ossetia altogether”716. In Russia’s situation-schema, 
the conflict occurred in the 1990s and it occurred as a result of Georgian intent. To make sense of the 
conflict, the Russian identity managers hence apply a fundamental attribution error, as the conflict is not an 
outcome of situational causality but an outcome of personal causality. They also apply a leadership 
attribution error, as they point to how the conflict is an outcome of the Georgian identity managers personal 
ambitions.  
Whereas the onset of the conflict is attributed to the early Georgian identity managers, the 
conflict’s protraction is extended to all Georgian identity managers. Because, according to the Russian 
identity managers, the early Georgian hostility towards the South Ossetians has since been passed on to 
succeeding Georgian identity managers. To make sense of who sustains the conflict, the identity managers 
apply a group attribution error, as it is argued that the attitude of the early Georgian identity managers has 
come to reflect the general attitude of the Georgian leadership. All Georgian identity managers thus follow 
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a consistent behavioural pattern. As Lavrov expressed it in a joint press conference with South Ossetia’s 
President in April 2011: “Mr. Gamsakhurdia pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing, and in the person of Mr. 
Saakashvili, found a worthy successor”717 and as Russia’s Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, Andrei 
Nesterenko, stated in September 2010: “the approaches of the Tbilisi rulers haven't changed in the slightest 
compared with the period of the 1990's and 2000's, when Georgia imposed a suffocating blockade on the 
population of these republics”718. The negative group relations that exist between Georgia and South Ossetia 
have hence been consistent, and they have been so because current Georgian identity managers continue to 
rely on the same other-understanding that the early Georgian leadership constructed around South Ossetia. 
The conflict was and is therefore caused and sustained because Georgian identity managers continue to 
think and act in accordance with a distorted understanding of the situation and agents involved.  
It is from this construction of the Georgian leadership that one should understand the 2008 
events. As the Foreign Ministry stated in November 2010 in a response to a speech given by Saakashvili at 
the European Parliament:  
 
Saakashvili is still trying to convince the international community that there is a conflict between Russia 
and Georgia, while at issue is actually the long-running conflict between Tbilisi and the peoples of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which as a result of yet another military gamble by Georgia in August 2008 
was resolved with the final national self-determination of these peoples719. 
 
In Russia’s situation-schema, 2008 is processed as a conflict escalation and a continuation of the Georgian 
identity managers’ behavioural pattern. 2008 was hence not a time when Russian identity managers took 
advantage of an opportune moment to seize Georgian territory. Rather, this was another Georgian attempt 
to exterminate the South Ossetians. As it was expressed by the Foreign Ministry in August 2008: 
“the Georgian leadership, illegally invaded and attempted to seize South Ossetian territory on August 8, 
2008[…]This act constitutes genocide against the South Ossetian people”720. Russian intervention in 2008 
was a situational response, which occurred because Russian identity managers observed Georgian 
behaviour, and from this observation re-assessed their understanding of the situation and the role that Russia 
should play in this regard. The events in 2008 should, however, also be compared to what occurred in the 
1990s and early 2000s. As the Foreign Ministry stated in August 2008: “In May 2004, special forces and 
troops of the Internal Ministry of Georgia were deployed in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, and 
in August that year Georgian troops shelled Tskhinvali and tried to take it”721. In Russia’s situation-schema, 
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the conflict is hence processed as one where violence has ebbed and flowed because Georgian identity 
managers have continuously sought to fulfil the hostile intentions their predecessors failed to achieve.  
 
6.3.1.2 The Agents Involved 
6.3.1.2.1 South Ossetians  
The Russian identity managers have a clear-cut understanding of who is involved in the Georgia conflict 
as they construct the conflict as one between two distinct groups. Unlike in the Ukraine conflict where they 
had difficulties categorising the non-state actors, the Russian identity managers have no complications 
socially categorising the non-state actors in the Georgia conflict, as they are understood as agents who 
represent and belong to their own group identity. According to the Russian identity managers, the South 
Ossetia group has always existed within the South Ossetian territory and so it is a group that has a place of 
physical origin, and a history of managing its identity and interests within this space. This has over the 
years led South Ossetian identity managers to pursue relations with other groups, such as Russia. Relations 
between South Ossetia and Russia, as seen in the current Georgia conflict, are thus nothing new, as South 
Ossetian identity managers already sought to establish such relations in the 1700s. This fact has, however, 
been distorted as Georgian identity managers are constructing such relations as an early example of Russian 
occupation. As Lavrov stated in an interview with Russian media in April 2013:  
 
It is a fact that the Ossetians sent their first embassy to St Petersbourg[…]before the Treaty of 
Georgievsk. We all know how they were slighted in Soviet times[…]However, the Treaty of Georgievsk 
was the result of the Georgians' request for protection from the Russian throne. Mikheil Saakashvili in 
one of his emotional speeches called this event in the history of our relations the first occupation of 
Georgia by Russia. To knock such things into heads of youths who do not remember the period of good 
relations is his crime to his own people722. 
 
The Georgian narrative that Russia-South Ossetia relations implies that Russian identity managers are 
controlling the South Ossetian group, is thus refuted. The two groups are instead understood as groups that 
have a long tradition of interacting and cooperating on a socially equal footing. South Ossetia-Russia 
relations therefore represent relations between two independent groups who each have full control over 
who they are and what they want.  
Compared to this understanding, is the Russian argument that there has been a continued 
hostile relationship between Georgians and South Ossetians. These negative relations already existed during 
the Soviet Union where Georgians “slighted”723 the South Ossetians. These relations escalated into a 
conflict in the 1990s and in 2008 the South Ossetians finally decided to reclaim full control over their group 
 




identity in order to ensure their social and physical survival. As the Foreign Ministry stated in August 2008: 
“By the aggressive attack against South Ossetia on the night of 8 August 2008[…]Mikhail Saakashivili has 
himself put paid to the territorial integrity of Georgia. Using repeatedly brutal military force against the 
peoples, whom, according to his words, he would like to see within his State, Mikhail Saakashvili left them 
no other choice but to ensure their security and the right to exist through self-determination as independent 
States”724. The Georgian claim that South Ossetians and Georgians can co-exist peacefully is hence wishful 
thinking, as Georgian identity managers’ decisions to attack the South Ossetians in 2008 cemented the need 
to separate the two groups. The South Ossetian decision to separate from Georgia is processed as a natural 
outcome of Georgian-South Ossetia relations, as South Ossetians and Georgians are understood as different 
agents who each seek different outcomes. As Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, 
stated in April 2018 regarding Georgia’s policy towards South Ossetia and Abkhazia: “The residents of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not consider themselves and do not want to become citizens of Georgia, 
even in exchange for generous promises[…]Recognition of this crucially important aspect gives us hope 
that over time, Tbilisi will fully recognize and accept the [new] political reality, that Georgia’s neighbors 
are[…]independent”725. To make sense of the South Ossetians’ wish for self-determination and the 
subsequent Russian acknowledgement of this, the Russian identity managers rely on situational causality 
as they argue that these events were outcomes of the Georgian identity managers’ behaviour. The Russian 
support for the separation between Georgians and South Ossetians, however, also derives from an 
understanding that the Georgians and South Ossetians are inherently different people. The Russian identity 
managers hence also draw in their cognitive systematisation of the conflict when processing stimuli, as they 
argue that the conflict lies in not merely clashing interests, but in clashing groups that do not share the same 
identity nor dispositions. As Nesterenko stated in September 2010 in response to media questions about the 
Georgian prosecution of foreigners who have visited Abkhazia and South Ossetia: “The Georgian 
authorities' pathological hatred of the Abkhaz and Ossetians is so great that it gets projected, as we see, 
onto third country nationals as well, up to and including the application of lawless repression to them”726. 
In their situation-schema, Russian identity managers thus present a clear-cut understanding of who is 
involved in the conflict, and the intergroup relations that led to the situation. 
 
6.3.1.2.2 Western States   
Although the conflict is an outcome of Georgian identity managers’ hostile intentions towards the South 
Ossetians, the Russian identity managers refer to the presence of other parties that equally have an influence 
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on the Georgians’ behaviour. In Russia’s situation-schema, the presence of the US and the prospect of 
Georgian NATO membership are stimuli that have caused Georgian identity managers to think that they 
can continue to pursue their hostile interests towards the South Ossetians. As Russia’s Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Grigory Karasinstated, stated in December 2017: “We are carefully observing the process of 
[Georgia’s militarization by western nations] and are adjusting the security assistance to Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia accordingly[…]the Western allies [have] completely forgotten what Georgia’s militarization 
had once brought about”727. Cooperation between Georgia and Western states, and particularly American 
military assistance, is stimulus that Georgian identity managers interpret as validation of their behaviour. 
This Russian understanding of the conflict is particularly rooted in the processing of the 2008 events, which 
the Russian identity managers process as a time of conflict escalation that the American identity managers 
supported. As Medvedev stated in August 2011 when he presented his interpretation of the lead-up to the 
2008 events: “The moment of truth for me, as I realised later while analysing those events in hindsight, 
came with the visit by secretary of state Condoleezza Rice[…]Following that visit, my Georgian colleague 
simply dropped all communication with us[...]It was apparent that he had new plans”728. In 2008, Western 
states functioned as cognitive supporters of Georgian behaviour, as they supported the Georgian identity 
managers’ social cognitive processing and thus validated these identity managers’ negative ambitions.  
Although Western states did not cause the conflict, they assisted in its escalation and in the 
construction of a situation where the South Ossetians were exposed to genocide and subsequently sought 
for independence. Western states also continue to exacerbate the conflict and prevent conflict resolution, 
as they continue to support the Georgian identity managers’ understanding that it is a Georgia-Russia 
conflict, and that Georgians need military protection to deter this Russian threat. As stated by the Foreign 
Ministry in March 2018: “The Russian, Abkhazian and South Ossetian delegations expressed their concerns 
regarding Georgia’s military cooperation with NATO. They pointed out that there are no guarantees that 
Georgia, which is being equipped with Western weapons, will not resume its militarist policy regarding its 
neighbours”729. Hence, although the conflict is between Georgia and South Ossetia, the increased 
cooperation between Georgian identity managers and Western states is processed as a tendency where 
Georgia’s social cognitive framework is validated by others. This encourages Georgian identity managers’ 
and assists in sustaining the conflict. In Russia’s situation-schema is thus also a referral to how the conflict 
is a conflict over whose social cognitive processing should direct thoughts and actions. This then also 
indicates a tendency amongst the Russian identity managers to process the conflict as an outcome of 
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cognitive support as it is argued that the conflict to a great extent occurred and sustains because Western 
states support the Georgian narrative. 
 
6.3.1.3 The Solution 
Since the primary cause of the conflict is negative relations between Georgians and South Ossetians, the 
solution is to build trust between these two groups. To ensure this, South Ossetians should be included on 
a socially equal footing in the negotiation process, and the concerns and interests the South Ossetian identity 
managers express on behalf of their in-group members, should be heard and respected. As Russia’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Alexander Grushko, stated in an interview with a Russian newspaper in August 2008: 
“We have always said that the questions of status can be tackled only by the parties in conflict without the 
use of force or outside pressure. But you have to move from the simple to the complex[…]You have to start 
with confidence-building measures[…]People in such territories should not feel isolated”730. Russian 
identity managers point to the same resolution efforts as they express in the Ukraine conflict, namely that 
the non-state actors need to be accepted as equal to the other actors present in the negotiation process. As 
the Foreign Ministry stated in a press release in March 2018: “Georgia should start thinking about ways to 
restore trust in relations with its neighbours, launch a direct dialogue with[…]South Ossetia based on 
mutual respect, stop encouraging other countries to deny visas to these republics’ residents[…]and stop 
hindering the republics’ cultural and humanitarian events abroad”731. To build trust, Georgian identity 
managers should allow the social validation of the South Ossetian group identity and stop hiding the reality 
that such a group exists, and that it is the other conflict party in the conflict. Russian identity managers 
hence apply the same understanding that the existence of a group identity is not merely rooted in agents’ 
possibility to invoke this identity through social practices, but also in others’ acknowledgement of this 
identity’s existence. The Georgian identity managers should also change their behavioural pattern and 
promise that they will end their policy of hostility. As was outlined by Russia’s Foreign Ministry in response 
to the upcoming Geneva talks in May 2009: “It is necessary to sign legally binding agreements on non-use 
of force between Georgia and South Ossetia[...]It is necessary to create reliable security regimes on the 
borders of these states, envisaging full and consistent fulfillment of the provisions of the Medvedev-Sarkozy 
agreements by the Georgian side”732. To solve the conflict, Georgian identity managers should create a new 
incentive for the South Ossetians to change their other-schema, which includes promising to end the 
negative behavioural pattern Georgian identity managers have pursued against the South Ossetians since 
the 1990s. What Russian identity managers are arguing is thus that Georgian identity managers should 
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adopt Russia’s situation- and other-schema, and admit that the conflict is an intergroup conflict, which the 
Georgian identity managers are solely responsible for.  
The solution to the conflict also lies in the physical separation of the two groups. As stated, 
Russian identity managers process Georgians continued hostility as stimuli that led South Ossetians towards 
a claim for independence. Given that Georgian identity managers have continuously denied these demands 
and continued their hostile behavioural pattern, there is no longer any possibility for the two groups to exist 
within the same territory. Rather, there is a need to create a relationship between the two groups, which will 
allow them to manage their existence without the interference of the other. This is particularly the case with 
the South Ossetia group which has yet to be granted full social validation, but nevertheless is required to 
gain so to ensure these agents’ survival. The other solution is thus to follow in Russia’s footsteps and 
acknowledge the South Ossetian group identity through statehood. As Medvedev stated in August 2008 in 
connection to Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia: “I signed Decrees on the recognition by the Russian 
Federation of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence. Russia calls on other states to follow its 
example. This is not an easy choice to make, but it represents the only possibility to save human lives”733. 
Since Russian identity managers process the separation of the two groups as a necessity for ending the 
conflict, they also argue that this decision is refutable. As the Russia’s State Secretary, Grigory Karasin, 
expressed at the Session of the OSCE Permanent Council in June 2009:  
 
Does anyone think again of refuting by force the right of South Ossetia to determine its future for itself? 
Equally futile are the attempts to start long-standing echeloned pressure on Russia to change its adopted 
decisions recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In this case we shall simply 
condemn ourselves to a protracted nonconstructive standoff734. 
 
The other argument is hence that if the Russian decision to grant South Ossetians full control over their 
existence is not adopted by others, then the conflict will continue to be protracted as conflict parties and 
mediators will continue to disagree on the resolution efforts. This also entails the understanding that Russian 
identity managers are the only ones who have taken the initiative to end the conflict, and that the conflict 
(to some extent) has ended, as the two sides have been separated. For the conflict to be effectively 
terminated others need to follow in Russia’s footsteps. The problem with this, however, is that the 
acknowledgement of South Ossetia was a Russian initiative. The adoption of this behaviour thus implies 
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6.3.2 Self-Schema  
6.3.2.1 The Russia Group  
In Russia’s self-schema, the identity managers use the Russian group identity to make sense of who they 
are and who they represent in the conflict. They are more specifically managers of a Russia group, which 
is used to distinguish them from other agents present in the conflict. As in Ukraine, the Russian identity 
managers mainly point to their own behaviour in the conflict, as the Russia group is constructed as a neutral 
party in the conflict. The only Russian group members involved in the conflict are those that were deployed 
to deter the situation in 2008, and the Russian peacekeepers who continue to patrol the area. The 
understanding of being a neutral party is generally a construct the Russian identity managers use when 
reifying the Russia group, as they construct Russians as the guarantors of security and peace between 
Georgians and South Ossetians, as well as other groups in the post-Soviet space. As Medvedev stated in 
August 2008: “Russia, as guarantor of security in the Caucasus and the region, will make the decision which 
unambiguously supports the will of these two Caucasus peoples”735. The Russian group identity is reified 
as a peaceful group that consists of identity managers who seek to ensure peaceful co-existence between 
others; and group members who act on behalf of this objective. This self-schema is reached by amongst 
other pointing to how Russian identity managers responded to the South Ossetians’ precarious situation in 
2008. As Medvedev put it in April 2009 in connection to the signing of bilateral agreements between Russia 
and South Ossetia:  
 
While defending the borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, we are of course aspiring to achieve 
the most important goal, the same we have always had: to ensure long-awaited peace in the region. 
For a long time now people there have grown tired of living in constant fear and in anticipation of attacks, 
although we must of course say that after the decisions that Russia took the situation has radically 
changed736. 
 
The Russian identity managers thus seek to associate themselves and the Russian group identity with the 
ending of suffering and the ensuring of stability and security.  
When the Russian group identity is represented in a conflict, such as the one in Georgia, this 
should be processed as agents engaged in stabilisation. As Putin stated in November 2017 following a 
meeting with the South Ossetian President, Anatoly Bibilov: “We are aware of what was happening ten 
years ago, back in 2008[…]The situation has undoubtedly stabilized since then. Russia is doing a lot to 
ensure sustainable security”737. To this understanding is also the argument that the Russian identity 
managers have an overview of (and a correct understanding of) what needs to be done to end the conflicts 
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in the post-Soviet space. As Medvedev stated about Russia in August 2008 during a meeting with veterans 
from the battle of Kursk: “We do not attack anyone. On the contrary, in a number of cases we are protecting 
the lives and dignity of people, our citizens and foreign citizens, through our presence as peacekeepers 
in different countries, including in states that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union”738. The 
Georgian argument that Russian identity managers are hostile and driven by the interest of re-gaining 
territory and power, is hence a falsity as Russian identity managers allow other groups to regain control 
over their identities and interests. As Putin stated in July 2010: “While some think that it [South Ossetia] is 
occupied, others think it is liberated”739. Russian identity managers are hence agents who seek to ensure 
that others can continue to express their social identification.  
Although Russian identity managers have been present in the conflict since the early 1990s 
as conflict mediators, they point to how Russian group members were mobilised following reports that 
Georgian identity managers sought to eradicate the South Ossetians. As Lavrov stated during a press 
conference about the situation in South Ossetia in August 2008:  
 
The situation there is worsening with each passing hour. The Georgian side, as you can see on TV 
screens, is using heavy weapons, heavy equipment and, as a matter of fact, has unleashed aggressive 
actions against the South Ossetian people. Massed fire is being conducted at residential quarters of 
Tskhinvali and other populated areas, including those outside the South Ossetian zone of 
conflict[…]There have appeared reports of ethnic cleansings in South Ossetian villages740 
 
These reports of ongoing ethnic cleansing eventually caused Russian identity managers to mobilise their 
group members in an intervention to prevent further deterioration of the situation. The Russian decision to 
intervene was reached by processing the events that unfolded, and so Russian behaviour was shaped around 
an understanding of the threat that existed towards South Ossetians. Russian group members were, however, 
also mobilised to protect members of the Russian group identity who served as peacekeepers in the conflict. 
As the Foreign Ministry stated in August 2018 on the 10th anniversary of the 2008 events: “The participation 
of the Russian armed forces in repelling the attack on South Ossetia was legitimate[…]The Russian 
Federation used its armed forces in response to a large-scale Georgian attack on the Russian peacekeeping 
units that were deployed in South Ossetia legally and with Georgia’s permission”741. The mobilisation of 
Russian group members was two-fold: it was driven by the need to alleviate a threatened out-group; and a 
need to protect Russian in-group members. In the Georgia conflict, the Russia group is hence granted a 
more active role (compared to the Ukraine conflict) as the Russian identity managers acknowledge that 
their, and their group members’, behaviour shaped parts of the situation. The Russian identity managers 
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nevertheless continue to apply situational causality when processing their own behaviour, as they argue that 
they did not cause the conflict. They instead mobilised and deployed their group members in a response to 
the situation.  
From this causality, the Russian identity managers process their behaviour as guided by 
peaceful intentions. As Lavrov stated in an article titled ‘On the Caucasus Crisis and Russia’s Ukrainian 
Policy,’ published in September 2008: “The outcome of the talks between Presidents Medvedev and 
Sarkozy in Moscow on August 12 and September 8[…]serves as a convincing testimony that Russia has 
not had any aims, and will not have any aims, other than those declared. There no "hidden agendas" 
extending beyond what we were forced to do”742. It is also from situational causality that the identity 
managers construct themselves as agents who have the political will to solve the conflict. As the Foreign 
Ministry expressed in August 2018 in connection with the 10th anniversary of the 2008 events: “Over the 
ensuing period, Russia has been working in the South Caucasus to resume dialogue and comprehensive 
negotiations between Georgia on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other hand[…]We 
hope that common sense will prevail after all”743. The Russian identity managers therefore process 
themselves as agents who have the stamina and rationality needed to solve the intergroup conflict between 
Georgia and South Ossetia. The understanding that the Russian group is peaceful is, however, not merely 
used to make sense of the conflict and Russian managers and members’ role in it. It is also used to make 
sense of issues such as the presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia. As Karasin stated in an interview 
with the Kommersant newspaper in January 2018: “The United States is actively building up its presence 
in Georgia, which is a source of growing concern for us. We want peace and quiet on our borders. This is 
why we have two military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They are not to threaten anybody but 
guarantee that nobody will attack these young Caucasian republics”744. It is from situational causality that 
the Russian identity managers process the Russian presence in South Ossetia as not a threat, as the 
mobilisation of Russian troops will only occur if the Russian identity managers are once again forced to 
respond to a situation where South Ossetians or Russians are threatened.  
Like the other conflict parties, the Russian identity managers argue that they are speaking 
the truth about the situation and agents involved and as seen in the Russian solution to the conflict, they 
advocate the adoption of their version of the truth. This advocacy in rooted in an understanding that Russian 
behaviour is guided by what is happening on the ground. Because the truth spoken by Russian identity 
managers is not something the identity managers have reached from their own social cognitive processing. 
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Their understanding of the situation and agents involved is guided by the truth South Ossetians speak. As 
Medvedev stated in August 2009 during conversations with residents in South Ossetia:  
 
There will always be different views of what happened of course. It is your view of events that matters 
most to us, rather than the assessments of foreign political analysts who do not even know where South 
Ossetia is on the map, and the assessments of specialists who have spent their lives studying the Soviet 
Union and Russia, but have no idea how life is actually organised in our countries and how our peoples 
lived and live. For us, for Russia’s people and leadership, it is your view of events, your assessment that 
matters most of all745. 
 
The Russian identity managers hence mobilised their group members in accordance with reality, which, 
according to the identity managers, is the reality proclaimed by the South Ossetians. The Russian identity 
managers thus argue that they share the same social cognitive framework as South Ossetians, and it is from 
this similar cognitive processing that the two groups cooperate and interact in the conflict. Apart from this, 
is also the understanding that Russian identity managers present a correct and true account of who Russia 
is and what this group wants in the conflict. As Karasin stated in August 2012 to Russian media in 
connection to the scheduled ‘Caucasus 2012’ military exercises: “There are exclamations about some 
aggression plans on the part of Russia, about demolition of Georgian statehood and suchlike propagandistic 
ravings. The political government representatives of Russia, Russian military officials and diplomats 
repeatedly explained both the exercise and our intentions”746. The Russian identity managers are telling the 
truth about Russians. There is hence also a Russian argument that the other conflict parties need to stop 
their attempts to distort the Russian group identity and interests in their conflict narratives, and instead 
adopt the Russian identity managers’ self-schema when they process stimuli that includes Russia.  
 
6.3.2.2 Russia’s Motivation for Behaviour   
The primary motivation for the Russian identity managers in the conflict is to ensure the security of their 
Russian group members and the South Ossetians from the revanchist Georgian identity managers. The 
primary interest is therefore the protection of human life. As Medvedev stated in August 2009 during talks 
with residents from South Ossetia: “I want to say how extremely important this is to me not just as Russia’s 
president, but as an ordinary person, because everything we did, we did it for you. We acted not in pursuit 
of geopolitical aims and victories – this is all worthless. What counts above all is human life”747. The 
protection of human life is linked to social existence, as the Russian identity managers construct the 
continued existence of the South Ossetian group identity as something that hinges on this group’s ability to 
be safe from external aggression. As the Foreign Ministry stated in July 2017 in connection to talks taking 
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place between Lavrov and South Ossetian’s, Foreign Minister, Dmitrii Medoev: “Russia, which recognised 
the independence of South Ossetia in 2008, pledged to guarantee its sovereignty and also the peaceful future 
of the South Ossetian people”748. To ensure South Ossetians survival, there is a need to assist these agents 
in strengthening their group identity by providing them stability. This does not imply that the Russian 
identity managers are controlling the South Ossetia group. It is through Russia-South Ossetia cooperation 
that the Russian identity managers are seeking to aid these alien agents. As Lavrov stated in an interview 
with Russian media in February 2010: “You certainly know that the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
with the acquisition of independence are in the process of the establishment of national self-consciousness. 
This is a completely natural process and, of course, requires an extremely delicate attitude, especially on 
our side, considering that we have undertaken, at the request of these peoples, the obligation to ensure their 
security”749. Russian identity managers are hence not managing the South Ossetians but supporting them 
until the situation has changed in accordance with what the Russian identity managers perceive to be a 
preferred direction.  
 
6.3.3 Other-Schema   
6.3.3.1 The Georgia Group  
In Russia’s other- schema, the antagonists are processed as the Georgian identity managers as these are the 
agents who caused the conflict and continue to sustain it. As seen in the Ukraine conflict, the Russian 
identity managers draw a line between Georgian identity managers and group members as it is argued that 
Georgian identity managers are distorting the Georgian group identity, which leads to negative behaviour 
amongst the group members. However, whereas Ukrainian identity managers are distorting the Ukraine 
group identity by denying its Soviet origin and Russian affiliation, Georgian identity managers are 
distorting the Georgian group identity by pursuing interests Georgians do not wish for. These interests 
pertain to the wish of eradicating the South Ossetians, expelling other groups from Georgia’s territory, and 
creating negative relations between Georgia and Russia. These are interests Georgian identity managers 
have continuously pursued on behalf of Georgians, but which do not reflect Georgians true interests. Rather, 
the true Georgian interests is peaceful co-existence between groups in the post-Soviet space, including with 
the Russians. Georgian identity managers have, however, constructed a twisted understanding of what 
drives Georgians and the relations that they have with others. As Lavrov stated in an interview with Russian 
media in July 2010: “We were not going to break off diplomatic relations, knowing full well that the regime 
of Mikhail Saakashvili does not personify the Georgian people, but is an anomaly which in general does 
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not grow from within Georgian society but was brought there from outside750.” The Georgian group identity 
is hence a mismanaged identity. Although this mismanagement has existed since the 1990s, where then-
Georgian identity managers constructed the hostile interests towards the South Ossetians, this 
mismanagement is not irreversible. It may be reversed if Georgian group members decide to elect new 
identity managers who are better capable of expressing their group identity and interests. As the Foreign 
Ministry stated in August 2008: “Russia has sincere good and friendly feelings towards the Georgian 
people, and is confident that Georgia will eventually find worthy leaders who would be able to show proper 
concern over their country and develop mutually respectful, equal, and good-neighbourly relations with all 
the peoples of the Caucasus”751. 
The understanding that Georgian identity managers are distorting the Georgian group 
identity by pursuing interests that contradict Georgian interests, is to a great extent an understanding that 
hinges on the processing of the stimuli that unfolded during the Saakashvili administration. In Russia’s 
other-schema, Saakashvili is processed as the architect behind the 2008 events. Whereas the former 
Georgian identity managers distorted Georgian interests by pursuing the eradication of the South Ossetians, 
Saakashvili is the agent behind the ‘anti-Russian’ hysteria, which has gained cognitive traction within the 
Georgian group. As Karasin stated in an interview with Russian media in July 2011:  
 
Our relations after Georgia's aggression continue to undergo severe tests. There is a growing anti-Russian 
hysteria in Tbilisi. The authorities are zealously developing in Georgian society, an "enemy image" of 
Russia. Their harsh attempts to eradicate all that for ages united Russians and Georgians are hitting many 
thousands of our citizens, cutting the spiritual, cultural, and just family and kinship chords752. 
 
In Russia’s other-schema, identity and interests are interlinked as to ensure that a group identity complies 
with its true ideational structure, it must not merely be managed by the correct identity managers but also 
pursue certain interests. In the Russian identity managers’ processing, these true interests are the interests 
that the Russian identity managers grant the Georgian group identity. As in the Ukraine conflict, the Russian 
identity managers hence also point at true and false identity constructs in the Georgia conflict, and how the 
deviation from these true constructs has generated a conflict. They also point to how they know the true 
contours of the identities that exist in the post-Soviet space and argue that there is a need to return to these 
constructs to reverse the conflicts that exist within this space.  
In Russia’s other-schema, there is thus a ‘true’ and a ‘false’ Georgian group identity. 
Whereas the real Georgian group is associated with peaceful intentions and defined by agents who wish for 
good relations with others, the false Georgian group identity is characterised by the Georgian identity 
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managers’ hostile intentions and behaviour. As Medvedev stated in June 2009: “It is our view that that this 
political regime has committed a crime and we will have nothing common with this [regime]”753. The 
Russian identity managers hence resort to a similar understanding as seen in the Georgian identity 
managers’ conflict narrative about South Ossetia, namely that the group identity that defines the out-group 
has been taken hostage by identity managers whose mismanagement of this identity is leading group 
members to destruction and ruin. Rather than processing the Georgian identity managers as alien, however, 
the Russian identity managers process the Georgian identity managers as unlikable Georgians. The Russian 
identity managers hence rely on an understanding of alien identity management in order to make sense of 
the groups present and the behaviour that these groups engage in. It is also from this negative understanding 
of the Georgian leadership that the Russian identity managers do not wish to engage with the Georgian 
leaders. They do nevertheless wish to engage with Georgian group members who are said to personify the 
true Georgian group identity. This categorisation of Georgian identity managers and group members is then 
again, an example of a Russian attempt to manage identities.  
Another central aspect of Russia’s Georgian group reification is the use of a leadership error 
as the Russian identity managers seek to make sense of Georgian behaviour by referring to the Georgian 
leaderships’ irrationality and hostility. As Medvedev stated in August 2008 regarding Georgian identity 
managers’ behaviour: “You know, lunatics’ difference from other people is that when they smell blood it 
is very difficult to stop them”754. Although Georgian identity managers, and particularly Saakashvili, are 
processed as the architects of Georgians’ negative interests, the Russian identity managers also point to 
how Georgian identity managers’ false narrative about South Ossetians and Russians has gained traction 
within the Georgia group. The negative dispositions associated with Georgian identity managers are 
increasingly becoming Georgian dispositions. As Lavrov stated in an interview with RTVi in April 2013: 
“We always wanted to be friends, to cooperate with our Georgian neighbours[…]Our relations were 
constantly "tensioned" by Mikheil Saakashvili. I think that he made a destructive contribution into souls 
and minds of many young Georgians”755. There is now a slight confusion as to how big of a percentage of 
Georgian group members have adopted Saakashvili’s self/other understanding, and thus how big of a 
percentage act and think in accordance with the social cognitive framework Saakashvili imposed on the 
Georgians. What is noteworthy in Russia’s other-schema, is, however, that following Saakashvili’s end as 
president, the Russian identity managers continue to point to hostile relations between Georgians and 
Russians as a trend that endures. The negative social dispositions and interests now associated with the 
Georgia group hence derives from the narrative Saakashvili introduced during his presidency. In Russia’s 
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other-schema is thus also a referral to how the management of identities – and the narratives this 
management produces - manifests into the minds of those who belong to a given group identity. It is then 
implied that cognition arises amongst the leadership, but it spreads and becomes the collective cognition of 
a group.  
The hostile intentions towards the South Ossetians and hatred towards the Russians is the 
outcome of the lies Georgian identity managers have spread about the situation and agents involved. As 
Karasin stated in an interview with Russian media in August 2012:  
 
First of all, during four years it may have been realised that it is necessary to stop the warlike rhetoric, 
which leads to nothing. It is impossible to solve difficult political issues by propaganda, this is an absolute 
axiom. It is necessary to admit the existence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to try to develop normal, 
respectful and equal relations with them756. 
 
Apart from lying about the conflict; the existence of the South Ossetians; and the relations Georgians have 
with this group, is also the continued lie that Russians have annexed Georgian territory. This is a falsity as 
it should be understood from the Russian processing of the situation. As stated by the Foreign Ministry in 
June 2018: “The Georgian side[…]continued to bring up the absurd claims about "Russian occupation" of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia[…]All sides at the talks, with the exception of the Georgian representatives, 
agreed that the situation near the border areas remains stable and under control”757. The conflict is also 
sustained because Georgian identity managers continue to lie and force others to adopt this lie, which 
distorts minds and leads to detrimental conflict resolution efforts. This behavioural pattern shows that the 
Georgian identity managers do not have the will to solve the conflict. The South Ossetian identity managers, 
on the other hand, do have the political will because as stated in a joint Russian, North-, and South Ossetian 
statement from February 2006, following Georgia’s refusal to attend the Mixed Control Commission talks: 
“While the South Ossetian side demonstrates a striving to find compromise peaceful ways for settling the 
conflict and has put forward concrete proposals for joint work on a common action program to settle the 
conflict, the Georgian side actually ignores the peace initiatives and is building up arms and stepping up 
bellicose rhetoric”758. The South Ossetian group is hence a peaceful group that has experienced an attack, 
but which still seeks to ensure a peaceful and fair solution. In the end, the Russian identity managers 
construct their South Ossetian and Georgian group reification attempts as factual and they argue for others 
to adopt this truth. As Medvedev stated in a meeting with the State Council in September 2008: “We are 
meeting to discuss the new situation in the world, created as a result of the Georgian aggression against 
South Ossetia.[…]Let us call a spade a spade: a real war occurred in the region where the aggression was 
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launched, a war which claimed the lives of Russians, Ossetians and Georgians”759. The Russian identity 
managers are thus speaking the truth, and the conflict will only be resolved once others adopt this social 
cognitive framework. 
 
6.3.3.2 Georgia’s Motivation for Behaviour   
In Russia’s other-schema it has been a consistent Georgian intent to gain control over the South Ossetian 
territory and remove the South Ossetians to ensure that this space becomes “Georgian”. Although this 
motivation continues to drive Georgian identity managers’ decisions and behaviour, there has been a slight 
shift in these identity managers’ ambitions, as the 2008 events and the following acknowledgement of South 
Ossetia, forced them to change their tactics. The interests that now shape Georgian identity managers’ 
behaviour is to revenge the humiliation that 2008 imposed on them. Georgian identity managers are 
processed as agents who are trying to right this wrong and ‘prove’ that their distorted understanding of the 
situation and other is correct. As Nesterenko stated in April 2010, in response Saakashvili’s accusation that 
Russia was complicit in smuggling nuclear materials in the South Caucasus:  
 
The desire to engage in settling of accounts and try to take revenge for past defeats is evident here. 
Obvious is the discontent of the Georgian regime with the increasingly strong sovereignty of these two 
countries. But Saakashvili has no one to blame but himself for this. No one else did more than him for 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia's secession from Georgia760. 
 
Georgian identity managers find themselves in a self-imposed conflict, which they need to justify to their 
group members. However, rather than changing their understanding to end the conflict, Georgian identity 
managers are, as stated by the Foreign Ministry in June 2014: “The Georgian authorities are not concerned 
about this. For them it is more important to "cement" their idea, which has nothing to do with the reality, 
that the independent Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia "belong" to Georgia. 
Unfortunately, such an approach confirms that Tbilisi is still not ready to have a constructive dialogue with 
its neighbours about a long-term settlement of the situation in the region”761. The other interest that 
motivates Georgian identity managers is hence the ambition of imposing their social cognitive framework 
on the conflict and ensure that others adopt this, as this will validate their re-pursuance of the South Ossetian 
territory and eradication of the South Ossetians. Unfortunately, Georgian identity managers have to some 
extent succeeded in this ambition as several Western states have adopted Georgia’s conflict narrative. As 
the Foreign Ministry put it in May 2017: “Tbilisi, supported by its Western sponsors, continues to generate 
political and propaganda non-issues at international venues, which are designed solely to legitimise 
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Georgia’s reluctance to normalise relations with its neighbours”762. The Russian identity managers thus also 
point to how the conflict is defined by the presence of cognitive clashes and it is a situation, where a 
particular social cognitive framework has gained traction, which has resulted in a re-direction of conflict 
resolution efforts and further deterioration of intergroup relations.  
According to Russian identity managers, Georgian identity managers are trying to exclude 
the South Ossetians from the international community as this ensures the exclusion of social cognitive 
processes that contradict the Georgian identity managers’ manufactured understanding of self, other, and 
the conflict. As Lavrov stated in an interview with the Russian media in April 2013:  
 
An UNGA opened after some time, and Georgia entered there the resolution concerning the problem of 
refugees and destitutes[…]South Ossetians asked to provide the possibility to make a speech in the UN 
and to present "their portion of the truth"[…]They turned for a visa to the USA, but no visa was issued to 
them[…]they [Georgia] do not discuss it in places, where all participants to the process are [p]resent and 
these issues may be solved in a pragmatic way763. 
 
To ensure the full adoption of the Georgian identity managers’ understanding, there is a need to exclude 
South Ossetian identity managers from the conflict resolution process, as this will veil the Ossetians’ 
account of reality. This behaviour exposes the Georgian identity managers’ intention because, as stated by 
Nesterenko in September 2010: “The purpose of this practice is obvious – Georgian authorities are trying 
by all means available to block[…]South Ossetia communication with the outside world”764. Georgian 
identity managers are trying to prevent the outside world from gaining an insight into the existence, 
interests, and struggles of the South Ossetians. This is an attempt to prevent the social validation of the 
South Ossetian group identity, as the social validation of South Ossetians validates the inclusion of their 
conflict narrative. The “proof” of Georgian identity managers’ discontent towards South Ossetians’ 
validation is amongst other reached by processing the time Georgian identity managers created an interim 
administrative in South Ossetia, which, according to the Georgian identity managers, was meant to promote 
the “peaceful resolution of the conflict”765. The administration was to be led by Dmitry Sanakoyev, a former 
Defense minister and later Prime Minister in South Ossetia766. In Russia’s other-schema this administration 
is processed as one made up of “fake” South Ossetian identity managers and the primary cause of its 
existence was to divert the peace process in Georgia’s favour. As the Foreign Ministry stated in March 2007 
in a response to the creation of the administration: “The "rebel Tskhinvali regime," as they customarily call 
it among the Georgian political elite, naturally is not the most convenient negotiation partner for Tbilisi. To 
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have dealings with its own placemen is far easier - they are preprogrammed for chorus singing with their 
creators. Only as a result that design will evolve not into a dialogue, but a monologue on an arbitrary theme, 
a conversation with oneself”767.  
The administration was one where Georgian identity managers disguised themselves as 
South Ossetian identity managers, as this created an opportunity for Georgian identity managers to impose 
their social cognitive processing on the conflict resolution process. What is interesting here is that the 
Russian identity managers do not consider that Sanakoyev was a former Defence Minister and later Prime 
Minister of South Ossetia. He has thus previously functioned as a South Ossetian identity manager. This is 
not included in the Russian processing, as the administration is processed as one which excluded the “real” 
South Ossetian identity managers in an attempt to fool the international community. As the Foreign 
Ministry stated in 2007, the objective of the administration: “is obvious - to produce in the eyes of a not 
quite experienced internal and external observer a semblance of respectability for this agent group, a 
creation of Georgian special services, that has landed itself in one of the Georgian enclaves on the territory 
of South Ossetia”768. The administration hence represented another Georgian attempt to overtake the 
management of the South Ossetian identity. The main aspect that drives the conflict is thus, according to 
the Russian identity managers, who gets to manage the South Ossetian group identity – South Ossetians or 
Georgians. 
 
6.3.4 Russia’s Social Cognitive Framework  
As in the Ukraine conflict, the Russian identity managers rely on a specific social cognitive framework in 
the Georgia conflict. A central aspect of Russia’s framework is that the conflict is between South Ossetian 
and Georgians, and it is a conflict that Georgian identity managers have unilaterally imposed upon the 
South Ossetians. The conflict is processed through an intergroup prism with the main argument being that 
the two groups have come into conflict because they inhabit different identities, interests, and dispositions. 
What is interesting in Russia’s framework is that the Russian identity managers adopt the same 
understanding as Georgian identity managers, namely that the conflict is a matter of regaining full control 
over an identity. However, whereas Georgian identity managers argue that Russian identity managers have 
taken control over the South Ossetian identity by installing Russian group members in the area, the Russian 
identity managers argue that Georgian identity managers are seeking to retake control over the South 
Ossetian identity. Unlike Georgian identity managers who argue that Russian identity managers have an 
ambition of managing other identities, the Russian identity managers argue that the Georgian identity 
managers are seeking to manage the South Ossetians in order to eradicate them. The Russian identity 
 




managers hence systematise the conflict as a struggle over who gets to control who, and particularly a 
struggle over a group’s right to socially exist. This construction is rooted in a group reification process 
where the Russian identity managers process group identities as natural constructs that can be mismanaged, 
as alien identity managers can take over a group’s identity and interest management with horrific 
consequences to follow.  
Groups may, however, also be mismanaged by their own group members. In Russia’s 
framework, the identity managers point to how the Georgian identity managers are mismanaging the 
Georgian group identity. This mismanagement is not due to alien identity managers per se, as Georgian 
identity managers are real Georgians. This mismanagement has instead occurred because Georgian identity 
managers are pursuing interests that do not comply with the actual interests of the Georgians. The Russian 
identity managers hence point to how a group can be mismanaged if identity managers do not construct and 
pursue correct interests for their group. Identities are thus interlinked with interests and here it is argued 
that a change in one may distort the other. Group identities are, however, not merely constructs which need 
to follow certain ideational structures for them to be true. They are also physical constructs as they are 
represented in the form of agents and territory. Group identities derive from certain physical places and 
their continued existence hinges on agents’ ability to stay within and control these spaces. The Russian 
identity managers share the Georgian understanding that identities and territories are interlinked. What they 
do not agree on is who belongs to and by an extension of this has the right to inhabit a certain territory. The 
construction of territorial belonging, just like the construction of social identification, also hinges on social 
categorisation and on the reification of where certain groups “come from” and “who” they are. This is a 
contested process as all conflict parties claim that they know the truth about which territory belongs to who.  
Another interesting aspect of the Russian conflict narrative is the Russian identity managers’ 
focus on group relations. In Russia’s framework, there is a great focus on how group identities need to be 
‘seen’ by others for them to exist. It is from this understanding that the Russian identity managers process 
Georgian identity managers as agents who are trying to socially exclude the South Ossetians, as this ensures 
that the South Ossetians and their conflict narrative are forgotten. Hence, if the international community is 
not made aware of the existence of the South Ossetian group identity, the agents who belong to this group 
do not exist. To ensure the continued existence of the South Ossetians, there is thus a need to include its 
identity managers in the negotiation process and validate this group identity through statehood. This, 
however, is a trend that the Georgian identity managers are seeking to prohibit. Instead the Georgian identity 
managers continue to advocate the false understanding that the events in 2008 were not an escalation in 




6.4 South Ossetia’s Social Cognitive Framework  
This final section will explore how the South Ossetian identity managers construct understandings about 
the situation, self, and other, and the social cognitive framework that forms from this.  
 
6.4.1 Situation-Schema 
6.4.1.1 Conflict Cause 
In South Ossetia’s conflict narrative, the conflict is processed as an intergroup conflict between Georgians 
and South Ossetians and it is a conflict caused by the Georgians intent of eradicating the South Ossetians. 
The conflict is hence processed through an intergroup prism as agents are categorised in accordance with a 
distinct Georgian and South Ossetian group identity. According to the South Ossetian identity managers, 
the conflict can be traced back to the 1920s, as this was the first time the Georgians sought to commit an 
act of genocide and ethnic cleansing against the South Ossetians. As Alan Kochiev, South Ossetia’s Foreign 
Minister, stated in October 2015: 
 
It should be noted that South Ossetia had been attacked by Georgia several times before August, 2008. 
Genocide and total ethnic cleansing of the Ossetian organized by Georgian troops in 1920 resulted in 
thousands of causality[…]Thousands of guiltless people became victims of Georgian military 
aggression[…]when Georgian forces and bands of guerrillas committed to flames and destructed dozens 
of villages in South Ossetia in early 1990s. Next time South Ossetia was attacked by Georgia in 2004. 
These crimes of Georgian authorities were left unpunished and affirmed their self-believed right to 
freedom of action with respect to South Ossetia, and led to another bloody war in August, 2008769. 
 
The conflict is hence defined by years of negative South Ossetia-Georgian relations where violence has 
ebbed and flowed, but where a consistent feature has been the Georgian attempt to annihilate the South 
Ossetia group. To make sense of this situation, the South Ossetian identity managers draw a division 
between Georgian identity managers and group members, as it is Georgian identity managers who instigated 
the conflict. It is also these agents who sustain the conflict, as they continue to mobilise their group members 
in an attack against the South Ossetians. To make sense of the situation and agents involved, the South 
Ossetian identity managers thus apply a fundamental attribution error, as they construct the onset and 
continuation of the conflict as an outcome of Georgian identity managers’ intent.  
 The South Ossetian identity managers activate ethnic cleansing and genocide nodes and they 
tend to treat these two concepts as the same, namely as the eradication of a group. There is no further 
differentiation between ethnic cleansing and genocide in South Ossetia’s narrative. The two terms are 
instead used interchangeably when the identity managers process events that unfold. According to the 
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identity managers, ethnic cleansing and genocide has consistently occurred and it has been pursued in two 
ways: One is the physical extermination of the South Ossetians, and the other is identity assimilation. As 
South Ossetia’s Foreign Minister, Dmitriy Medoev, stated in an interview with a South Ossetian newspaper 
in September 2017:  
 
From the beginning of the 20th century till the beginning of the 21st century Georgian authorities 
regularly organized ethnical cleansings of the Ossetians, forcibly resettled them from one place to 
another, unleashed massacres and drove out from the ancestral territories[…]Later, in 1949-1953 the 
Georgian Communists were doing the same, but with the use of so-called soft power, the policy of 
assimilation and cultural genocide770. 
 
To eradicate the South Ossetians, the Georgian identity managers have sought to physically eradicate South 
Ossetian group members through force; they have sought to drive them out of their territory; and they have 
forced South Ossetian members to change their social identification. This behaviour has been a general 
Georgian tendency or as South Ossetia’s Foreign Minister, Kazbulat Tskhovrebov, stated in an interview 
with a German magazine in December 2012: “There are more than enough data on the genocide of the 
Ossetian people”771. The current conflict between the South Ossetians and the Georgians is hence long 
running and it includes a clear-cut antagonist and protagonist. This understanding of the situation also 
means that the events that unfolded in 2008 do not signal the onset of the conflict but is another time of 
conflict escalation. Unlike the Georgian and Russian identity managers who argue that the conflict emerged 
in the 1990s and genocide occurred in 2008, the South Ossetian identity managers argue that the conflict 
emerged in the 1920s and genocide/ethnic cleansing has consistently occurred through-out the years, hereby 
making it the main characteristic of the situation.  
 
6.4.1.2 The Agents Involved 
6.4.1.2.1 Russia  
Since the conflict is cognitively systematized around a South Ossetian and Georgian group identity, the 
South Ossetian identity managers have no qualms in pointing to who is involved in the conflict. Apart from 
these two groups is also the presence of Russia, which the identity managers process as a positive out-group 
that supports and ensures the survival of the South Ossetians. The events of 2008 are particularly referred 
to when shaping the South Ossetian understanding of Russia, as the Russian intervention in 2008 and later 
acknowledgement of South Ossetia, is behaviour that ended Georgian aggression and prevented the 
occurrence of another South Ossetian genocide. As Tskhovrebov stated in an interview in December 2015 
to a German magazine regarding the Russian acknowledgement of South Ossetia: “It was a logical end of 
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the act of peace-enforcement and a firm guarantee of not repetition of our people genocide”772. When 
reifying the Russia group, there is primarily an emphasis on the Russian identity managers as these are 
treated as agents who have a positive understanding of the South Ossetians, and agents who treat the South 
Ossetian leadership (and hereof the group) as equals. As Medoev stated following a meeting between South 
Ossetia’s President and Vladimir Putin in November 2017: “The warm reception and hospitality extended 
to our delegation indicate the high level of respect of Russian leadership to our country and people.773”. It 
is hence the positive interaction between Russian and South Ossetian identity managers, as well as the 
Russian identity managers response to the conflict, which points to the existence of positive South Ossetia-
Russia relations.  
Although the Russian identity managers actively sought to ensure a peaceful end to the 
Georgia-South Ossetia conflict, the Russians merely joined a struggle the South Ossetians initially fought 
on their own. The conflict was hence not instigated by Russian identity managers. As Medoev stated in an 
interview with a South Ossetian Newspaper in September 2017: “Nobody in the so-called civilized world 
is interested neither in the fate of the Serbs from the Serbian Krajina nor in the genocide in Ruanda. The 
same would have happened to the South Ossetians, unless the nation raised the banner of the national 
liberation struggle in distant 1990’s, unless Russia interfered in 2008, unless the Russian Federation made 
the decision on recognition of our Republic”774. Adding to this understanding is also the argument that the 
West did not come to aid the South Ossetians. They neglect(ed) this group and so the Russian identity 
managers and group members are the only agents who fought for, and continue to fight for, the South 
Ossetians’ existence. What immediately emerges from South Ossetia’s conflict narrative is hence that the 
Russians and South Ossetians do not share the same group identity. Rather, when processing the 2008 
events, Russia is constructed as a distinct out-group, which came to aid the South Ossetian in-group. As 
will be seen further on, this separation between the Russian and South Ossetian group identities has, 
however, increasingly become blurred, as the South Ossetian identity managers struggle to explain the 
rationality behind the increased South Ossetia-Russia relations. When explaining the 2008 events, this 
separation is nevertheless still clear-cut, as Russia is processed as the only out-group that validates the 
South Ossetians’ struggle. The Russians are thus also a positive out-group in the eyes of the South Ossetian 
identity managers, as they are the only ones who support South Ossetia’s situation-schema.  
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6.4.1.2.2 Western States   
The South Ossetian identity managers point to other parties that have a role to play in shaping the conflict. 
This particularly pertains to Western states, which is an overarching group identity used to classify out-
groups who oppose South Ossetia’s social cognitive framework. In South Ossetia’s situation-schema, the 
identity managers of Western states are agents who feed into the Georgian identity managers’ negative 
behaviour. The South Ossetian identity managers share the same understanding as the Russian identity 
managers that e.g. the US’ continued militarization of Georgia serves as a validation of the Georgian social 
cognitive processing and hereof hostile intentions. South Ossetian identity managers also process Western 
identity managers as agents who for long have enticed behaviour and narratives that support the exclusion 
of specific groups in the post-Soviet space. As South Ossetia’s Foreign Minister, David Sanakoev, stated 
in May 2014:  
 
Current events in Ukraine and events in Georgia during the last twenty years are a link of one chain. For 
twenty years both in Georgia and Ukraine through different foreign organizations, that were funding local 
NGOs, were brainwashing the public. During that time foreign agents were able to create groups of 
nationalists that were used as the main striking force[…]It should be reiterated that in case of Georgia 
tragic aberration of national consciousness resulted in loss of ten thousand people775. 
 
The South Ossetian identity managers thus share the same understanding as the Russian and DPR identity 
managers that the West has had a role to play in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, as the West’s support 
for the Georgian and Ukrainian conflict narratives enticed these identity managers into pursuing negative 
interests and hereof launch and escalate the conflicts. Both conflicts are therefore cases of “aberration of 
national consciousness” or the distortion of group understandings and the mobilization of groups against 
each other. Whereas Russia is a positive out-group, as it has adopted the South Ossetian social cognitive 
framework, the West is a collection of negative out-groups as they support the Georgian social cognitive 
framework.  
Adding to this understanding is the argument that the Georgian identity managers have a 
patron relation with the West, as much of Georgian behaviour in the conflict is attributed to the wish of 
pleasing Western out-groups. Like the DPR identity managers, the South Ossetian identity managers 
process Georgian behaviour as directed by the appeasement of Western states, as this ensures the social 
validation of the Georgian self/other understanding and by extension of this Georgian interests. However, 
unlike the DPR identity managers who point to how Western out-groups only support groups that deny 
their Russian identification, South Ossetian identity managers process the Georgian attempt to disguise the 
presence of the South Ossetians, as behaviour meant to create the illusion that the Georgian identity 
managers have the situation under control. This is a way for Georgian identity managers to convince out-
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groups to adopt Georgia’s conflict narrative. As the Foreign Ministry stated in April 2015 in a response to 
Margvelashvili’s address to the Georgian parliament: “The main addressee of such declarations made by 
Georgia has always been western audience inexperienced in subtlety of Tbilisi word usage; the purpose has 
been improvement of not very respectable image of the Georgian state and attempt to convince the Western 
world that Georgia was a regional “democracy beacon” that needed a great support”776. The conflict is thus 
characterised by negative intergroup relations, which the West to a great extent is validating and enticing 
as they support Georgia’s social cognitive processing.  
 
6.4.1.3 The Solution  
Since Georgian identity managers have had a consistent behavioural pattern of attacking the South 
Ossetians, the only solution is to dismiss any attempts of restoring peaceful co-existence between these two 
groups within the same territory. Instead there is a need to support South Ossetians’ strive for reclaiming 
full control over their existence. As the Foreign Ministry stated in December 2011 in a comment on 
Georgia’s “Concept of national safety”: “The leadership of Georgia for the last 20 years by its criminal 
actions the apogee of which became an aggression in august 2008 against South Ossetia, with its own hand 
spelt the death of the issue of territorial integrity of Georgia within the framework of former Georgian SSR. 
As a consequence of such aggressive policy became creation of two new recognized democratic states777”. 
The solution hence already exists, and it has been acted upon by Russian identity managers. As Kokoity 
stated in January 2005: “All our history dictates that autonomy within Georgia does not guarantee the 
security of the South Ossetian people”778. Resolving the conflict entails that Georgian identity managers 
and the rest of the international community recognise South Ossetia’s independence. South Ossetian 
identity managers therefore share the same processing as Russian identity managers that to end the conflict, 
there is a need to create a new foundation for more equal intergroup relations, which can only be ensured 
through South Ossetian statehood. To create a foundation for positive intergroup relations the Georgian 
identity managers must also admit that they and their predecessors caused the conflict. As the Foreign 
Ministry expressed it in October 2014:  
 
South Ossetia confirms that no relations between South Ossetia and Georgia can be established until a 
legally binding document on non-use of force is signed[…]Moreover, adequate political and legal 
assessment of Georgian aggression in South Ossetia has to be made and first of all by Georgia itself. 
Georgia has to admit the fact of genocide of Ossetian people, recognize the independence of the Republic 
and indemnify the damage caused as a result of the military aggression imposed on South Ossetia779. 
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Georgian identity managers hence need to adopt South Ossetia’s social cognitive framework. The problem 
with this, however, is that it entails a negative construct of the Georgia group and a different understanding 
of who is fighting who and why.  
 
6.4.2 Self-Schema  
6.4.2.1 The South Ossetia Group  
In South Ossetia’s self-schema, the South Ossetians are reified as a group of agents who share a common 
history, interests, and dispositions. When reifying the South Ossetia group, the identity managers identify 
it as a group that has a specific place of origin. As the Foreign Ministry stated in June 2011: “The history 
of South Ossetia as an ethno-geographical territorial unit numbers over two thousand years. The data 
provided by the antique, old Georgian and old Armenian narrative sources are an unequivocal testimony of 
Ossetian (Scytian-Sarmatian) origin of the ancient and medieval population, which inhabited the southern 
slopes of the Central Caucasus”780. The South Ossetian group identity arose from a physical place in the 
South Caucasus, and it continues to exist within this place. What is interesting in the South Ossetian group 
reification is, however, not the proclaimed social origin of this group, but how the identity managers 
construct South Ossetia’s agency. Because, when the identity managers construct the group’s history, they 
refer to how it over time has shifted between having full and partial control over its existence, as alien 
identity managers have at times managed the South Ossetian identity. Rather than always being an 
arrangement imposed on the South Ossetian group, alien identity management has at times been a decision 
South Ossetians made for themselves, as the group members voluntarily included themselves under Russian 
management up until the 1918s. As the Foreign Ministry stated in a document outlining the cause of the 
Ossetian genocide in the 1920s: “Ossetia legally entered the Russian Empire in the 70-ies of the XVIII 
century”781. The identity managers also point to how South Ossetians collectively decided to oppose 
Georgian management in the early 1920s. As the Ministry further stated in November 2012: “Georgia has 
never had a legal right to the territory of South Ossetia, which has been incorporated into the Georgian 
Soviet Socialist Republic in 1922 against the will of the Ossetian people”782. South Ossetians thus represent 
an independent group, which has always had full control over who manages, or should manage, them.  
The end of the Soviet Union equally shapes South Ossetia’s self-schema, as it is argued that 
this was when the group reclaimed full control over its existence. As the Foreign Ministry responded in 
February 2015 to a statement made by Georgian leaders regarding the possibility of a Georgia-South Ossetia 
dialogue: “The statehood of South Ossetia was defined by its people and is in no way a subject of discussion. 
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The independence of the Republic[…]was proclaimed in the Declaration, dated December 21, 1991”783. 
Full South Ossetian control over the South Ossetian group was thus manifested prior to the Russian 
recognition of the group in 2008. In connection to this understanding is also the argument that all South 
Ossetians share a common memory network and a common self-understanding, which guides their 
behaviour in the conflict. As the Foreign Ministry responded in October 2014 to statements from the 
Georgian leadership that friendship exists between the South Ossetians and Georgians: “The repetitive 
massacres and ethnic cleanings of the Ossetian, organized by Georgian officials as well as attacks on South 
Ossetia and the August war of 2008, launched by Georgia can’t be forgotten, no matter how Georgian 
authorities seek for razing that from social memory”784. In their group reification attempt the identity 
managers thus apply a group attribution error, as the South Ossetians are constructed as unified in their 
understanding of self and other. The decision to seek independence to escape the Georgians was hence not 
one Russian identity managers, or the South Ossetian identity managers, imposed on the South Ossetians. 
It derived from a collective South Ossetian understanding of Georgia and the conflict situation. As the other 
conflict parties, South Ossetian identity managers also seek to present a perfect symbiosis between them 
and their group members, as they point to how they are merely following the interests and demands of their 
group members.  
Despite South Ossetia’s unity, the group is divided as it represents one half of an Ossetian 
group identity. The other half of this identity, the North Ossetians, are managed by Russian identity 
managers. This division between the Ossetians draws roots to the conflict and the onset of negative relations 
between Georgia and South Ossetia, as the Ossetian division is largely an outcome of Georgian behaviour 
in the 1918s. In 1918, following the Russian revolution, South Ossetians expressed their wish to continue 
being managed by the Russians and so the South Ossetians dismissed the Georgian attempt to seize control 
over them and their territory. This wish was not an act of reprisal against the Georgians but symbolised a 
collective South Ossetian interest of uniting with their in-group members in North Ossetia. As the Foreign 
Ministry stated in a declaration published in June 2011 regarding the 1920 genocide:  
 
The revolutionary movement in South Ossetia was by no means an act of reprisal against anyone, neither 
was it directed against Georgia[…]The demands put forward by the leaders of the national movement in 
South Ossetia were of a particularly democratic character directed at the attainment of the lawful right of 
the 100 thousand men strong peasantry to self-determination, which implies: a) having the form of a 
political system in South Ossetia acceptable for the local population, i. e. the Soviets. b) having the right 
to remain within the political system the population of South Ossetia has the right to choose, i. e. within 
the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic together with the other part of Ossetia – North Ossetia785. 
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This understanding links to the positive reification of the Russia group, as it is argued that Russian 
management of the Ossetians has always been an Ossetian interest, since it entails being managed within a 
“political system” more “acceptable for the local population” 786. This wish was, however, misinterpreted 
by Georgian identity managers as they processed the “revolutionary movement in South Ossetia” as an 
attempt of Russian annexation, and from this misunderstanding chose to mobilise their Georgian group 
members in an attack against the South Ossetians. This decision split the Ossetian group identity into two 
and caused a conflict that continues to this day. In South Ossetia’s conflict narrative is hence also a referral 
to how Georgian identity managers for long have sought to eradicate the Ossetian identity, as they have 
consistently prevented the Ossetian in-group members from existing in unity. As the other conflict parties, 
the South Ossetian identity managers point to how they and their group members are driven by a wish to 
re-establish the true contours of their group identity, which can only ensue once they are freed from 
Georgian management.  
In South Ossetia’s self-schema, the group is reified as a peaceful group of agents who wish 
to live in peace with others. Like the other conflict parties, the South Ossetian identity managers deny that 
the conflict is caused by any negative South Ossetian interests or social dispositions. The South Ossetians 
and their identity managers are willing to solve the conflict peacefully and in accordance with the 
agreements made. As the Foreign Ministry stated in August 2013 in connection to the five-year anniversary 
of the 2008 events: “South Ossetia highly appreciates value of peace and security and strives for 
strengthening of regional security through interaction with the regional countries and cooperation with 
International Organizations. South Ossetia again confirms its committal to basic principles and norms of 
the International Law, open dialogue and cooperation with all the members of the International 
Community”787. South Ossetians are driven by positive social dispositions in the conflict, and the South 
Ossetian identity managers are willing to cooperate with Georgia and others to reach a fair outcome for all 
conflict parties. To this understanding is also the implied argument that the reason why the conflict is 
sustained, is because of Georgian behaviour. Despite South Ossetia’s peaceful nature, the identity managers 
do point to how they and their group members continuously need to be prepared to respond to Georgian 
aggression. As, it was stated in June 2004 by a representative from the Interior Ministry in connection to 
South Ossetian training exercises aimed at combating terrorism: “We have to do it[…]Georgia still 
maintains illegal police posts in the conflict zone and keeps troops on the border with South Ossetia”788. 
When the South Ossetians respond with force towards the Georgians in the conflict, this is thus an act of 
self-defence as the reification of the South Ossetians as peaceful agents prevent them from inhabiting any 
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negative intentions. South Ossetian aggression in the conflict is, however, also based on the other-
understanding of the Georgians, as South Ossetian identity managers have the Georgian identity managers 
“figured out” and so they are two steps ahead of Georgian behaviour. South Ossetian preventive and self-
defence activities are therefore driven by both an understanding of “who” Georgia is, what Georgia “wants”, 
as well as what Georgia will do in the future.  
The South Ossetian identity managers eventually argue that they are telling the truth about 
the situation and the agents involved. South Ossetia’s self-schema is thus built around the argument that 
the South Ossetian social cognitive framework is the correct account of reality. This includes the 
understanding that the conflict is an intergroup conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia, and that the 
Russians merely function as an out-group that assists the South Ossetians. As the Foreign Ministry 
responded to comments made by Georgia regarding the border agreement signed between South Ossetia 
and Russia in February 2015: “This document has emphasized once again the full absurdity of the 
statements made by Georgian politicians and their western patrons about so-called "occupation" of South 
Ossetia”789. Adding to this is also the expressed truth that the South Ossetian territory belongs to the South 
Ossetian group, and so it is legitimate and justified for the South Ossetian identity managers to engage in 
whatever way they see fit with the territory and the agents who inhabit it. As the Ministry further stated in 
response to Georgian remarks about the territorial integrity of Georgia in January 2012: “Recognition or 
non- recognition of the Republic of South Ossetia by Georgia does not abolish the fact of existence of the 
country, which has appeared as a result of implementation of the nation`s right to self-determination, and 
the Republic of South Ossetia will exist regardless of Georgia`s attitude towards it”790. Like the other 
conflict parties, the South Ossetian identity managers hence also reify their group through a fundamental- 
and group attribution error, as they process their behaviour as responses to Georgian intent, and they 
construct the South Ossetia group as a unified and unique entity, which behaves and thinks in a collective 
manner.   
 
6.4.2.2 South Ossetia’s Motivation for Behaviour   
Although the South Ossetian identity managers process the conflict as a situation that arose from a 
misunderstanding regarding South Ossetia’s decision to unite with Russia, and although they reify the South 
Ossetian group as unified and independent, there is confusion in South Ossetia’s self-schema regarding the 
interests that drive the group. This confusion particularly pertains to South Ossetia’s increased relations 
with Russia which, as seen in Georgia’s conflict narrative, has created cognitive confusion amongst the 
other conflict parties regarding the extent to which the South Ossetians are Ossetians or Russians. When 
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exploring South Ossetia’s conflict narrative, there has been a development in the expressed interests as 
these have moved between autonomy (now largely discarded), independence, unification with the 
Ossetians, and unification with Russia. Here it could be interpreted that Russian unification indirectly refers 
to a unification with the Ossetians – as North Ossetia is a region in Russia. Russian unification is, however, 
not explicitly presented as the unification between the Ossetians. It is instead at times communicated as the 
unification of in-group members. As South Ossetia’s President, Leonid Tibilov, put it in October 2015: 
“The political reality is that we have to make a historic choice to be reunited with brotherly Russia[…]to 
ensure the security and prosperity of our country and our people”791. At times, the South Ossetian identity 
managers hence present Russian unification as the unification of agents who share the same group identity. 
This has caused confusion in how the other conflict parties make sense of South Ossetia, as Georgian 
identity managers point to South Ossetia’s unification with Russia as proof of how this group is managed 
by Russians. Although South Ossetian identity managers in their self-schema refer to a distinct South 
Ossetian group, the interests of increased relations with Russia has thus blurred the social categorisation of 
the South Ossetians. This has caused confusion of whether the South Ossetians in fact are Russians.  
The expressed interest of uniting with brotherly Russia has also caused confusion for the 
researcher, as it has been difficult to discern how South Ossetian identity managers position the South 
Ossetian interests and identity vis-á-vis Russia. The conclusion is that ‘unification with Russia’ seems to 
refer to unification between the South and North Ossetians. Russians are hence not South Ossetians’ in-
group members. Russia is an out-group which is able to manage South Ossetians’ collective interests - such 
as protecting them from the Georgians. As the Foreign Ministry responded in January 2012 to Georgia’s 
comment on wanting to ensure territorial integrity: “While there is no agreement between South Ossetia 
and Georgia on nonrenewal of hostilities supported by international guarantees the people of South Ossetia 
do not see the alternative to Russian military presence in the region”792. The cognitive confusion of “who” 
South Ossetia is, does hence not arise because the South Ossetian identity managers are not able to construct 
a consistent understanding of South Ossetians’ social origin. It occurs because they are not capable of 
communicating consistent South Ossetian interests. This creates a group identity that seemingly has one 
leg in the South Ossetian social category, and the other in the Russian category. The South Ossetian identity 
construct is thus like the DPR identity construct. However, whereas the DPR identity is in a cognitive birth 
as the DPR identity managers are largely constructing a DPR identity from the Russian group identity, it 
could be argued that the South Ossetian identity is in a “cognitive death” as this group’s identity and 
interests are increasingly linked to the Russian group identity. What previously was a distinct identity is 
now becoming more diffuse. The increased relations with Russia, and confused incentives that lie behind 
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the wish to unify with Russia, is therefore threatening the social existence of the South Ossetian group 
identity. 
The irony of this is that the primary interest expressed in South Ossetia’s conflict narrative 
is to ensure the group’s existence. To ensure this, there is a need to build an independent South Ossetian 
republic, which is capable of existing from its own agency. As Bibilov stated in August 2017 in connection 
to an event titled “I couldn’t imagine myself without Russia, without its love or without my love”:  
 
Recognition of the independence and sovereignty by Russia has allowed the people of South Ossetia and 
fraternal Abkhazia to embrace stable peace and security[…]We have to take the full advantage of the 
unique historical chance, we have to develop the Republic, rebuild our statehood so that nobody has 
doubts regarding solvency of our country793. 
 
This understanding contradicts the beforementioned wish of uniting with Russia, and the primary finding 
when exploring South Ossetian interests is that these tend to be self-contradicting. It may eventually be 
argued that the main interest that drives the South Ossetians is to socially exist, with a confusion of how to 
ensure this existence – via independence or Russian unification. Social existence, however, does not merely 
depend on who manages the South Ossetian group (Russians or South Ossetians), but also hinges on the 
need to make others acknowledge that the South Ossetian group identity exists. Because the South Ossetian 
identity managers also point to how they wish to be seen and heard by other out-groups. As Tskhovrebov 
stated in July 2015 in an interview to Interfax News Agency: “South Ossetia repeatedly has declared of 
readiness to interact with international organizations not as a part of Georgia as they try to hold us out in 
western countries, but as an independent state. To mould their own objective opinion based on their 
impressions, but not on a data obtained from Georgia, we invite representatives of international 
organizations to visit South Ossetia”794. There is thus also an emphasis on the wish to be recognised by 
others within the international community. As the non-state actors in Ukraine, South Ossetian identity 
managers equally point to the importance of social validation, as this will ensure that the South Ossetian 
group identity and interests will continue to feature in the consciousness (and social cognitive processing) 
of others.  
 
6.4.3 Other-Schema  
6.4.3.1 The Georgia Group  
In South Ossetia’s reification of the Georgia group, the identity managers do not refer to where this group 
comes from or how it gained control over its existence. Focus is on when and what mobilised this group in 
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the conflict with South Ossetia. As stated, South Ossetian identity managers process Georgian identity 
managers as agents driven by the intention of eradicating the South Ossetians. The reason for this intention 
is because the Georgian identity managers inhabit inherently negative interests and social dispositions, 
which they pass on to Georgian group members. As the Foreign Ministry stated in April 2016 regarding an 
investigation into the 2008 events: “It is not clear, for how much longer will the occurrences of August 
2008 and other fascist crimes of the Georgian leadership, that took place during the last twenty years, will 
be cover with mist. It is time to open eyes of Georgian people and the International Community on the 
ruinous inadequate policy of Georgian leadership towards people of South Ossetia”795. Like the Russian 
identity managers, South Ossetian identity managers point to the distinction between Georgian identity 
managers and group members. They more specially argue that Georgian group members are fooled into 
believing the negative group construct their leadership shape around the South Ossetian identity. According 
to the South Ossetian identity managers, the negative understanding of the South Ossetians is passed on 
over time and it has now manifested as part of the Georgian collective cognition. As the Foreign Ministry 
responded in April 2013 to statements made by Georgia’s Prime-Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili, during a 
speech at the Council of Europe:  
 
People of South Ossetia know that generations Georgians were brought up in context of chauvinism and 
xenophobia where Ossetians were not brothers but just neighbors. For some reason Ivanishvili forgot 
about shelling of South Ossetia as well as about the Georgian tanks that entered Tskhinval shooting 
helpless residents. This is probably how Georgia demonstrated love to its brothers796. 
 
There is hence a mismanagement of the Georgian group members and it is a group of agents who 
increasingly abide to their leadership’s false construction of self and other. In South Ossetia’s conflict 
narrative, the Georgians are processed as agents who thus share the same negative dispositions. When 
reifying the Georgia group, the South Ossetian identity managers therefore apply a combined group and 
leadership attribution error, as the negative attitude towards the Ossetians is perceived as deriving from the 
leadership. It is, however, also an attitude that now generally reflects Georgians understanding of South 
Ossetians. 
 Xenophobia towards the South Ossetians is a phenomenon that draws roots back to the 1918s 
where South Ossetians were used as scapegoats for the negative relations Georgians had with the Russians. 
As stated in “The Declaration of the Genocide of 1920 in South Ossetia” posted on the Foreign Ministry’s 
homepage in June 2016: 
 
Apparent persecution of Ossetians was started as far back as 1918. They were declared ‘highwaymen’, 
‘anarchists’ and the blame was put on them for all the misfortunes that befell the Georgians. One of the 
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leaders of the Georgian punitive squads, colonel Kasishvili said at a meeting in the village of Eredvi: ‘It is 
already 118 years that Russia has subjugated Georgia and deprived it of freedom. We have suffered this 
age-long torture through the fault of Ossetians797. 
 
The mobilisation of Georgians against the South Ossetians is rooted in the Georgian identity managers’ 
tendency to understand the South Ossetian territory as a bargaining chip between them and the Russians. 
The Georgian identity managers have thus for long treated South Ossetia as a Russian substitute. The 
negative understanding of the South Ossetia group is, however, also a result of early disagreements over 
the legal right to territory. As the Foreign Ministry expressed it in January 2017 on the 25th anniversary of 
South Ossetia’s first referendum for independence: “Demonstratively having left the legal framework of 
the USSR before legal dissolution of the Union, Georgia couldn't become the successor of GSSR and lost 
any basis for claims to South Ossetia territory. However, instead of settling legal relations with its neighbor, 
Georgia unleashed armed aggression against people of South Ossetia that culminated in tragic events of 
1992, 2004 and 2008”798. The conflict between the two groups hence draws roots to negative Russia-
Georgia relations and it was originally a disagreement over territory. It, however, turned into an armed 
conflict once Georgian identity managers decided to disregard the legal settlement of this dispute and launch 
an aggression against the South Ossetians.  
The mobilisation of the Georgian group members around ‘territorial integrity’, i.e. the right 
to exercise control over the South Ossetian territory, is therefore a lie as Georgians do not possess the 
rightful ownership of the South Ossetian territory and so the Georgians are not experiencing the annexation 
of their land. As the Foreign Ministry also stated in January 2012 in a response to Georgia’s continued 
claim for territorial integrity:  
 
Georgia has never had a legal right on the territory of South Ossetia which was included as a component 
of Georgian SSR in 1922 under protest of the Ossete people[…]By the time of recognition of Georgia by 
international society as an independent country, South Ossetia had been its part neither politically nor 
juridical and had been external to its ‘territorial integrity799. 
 
This true account of the conflict’s origin, and the Georgia group’s role in it, is refuted by Georgian identity 
managers who seek to justify their choice of settling a legal disagreement using force. By removing the 
Georgians from the Soviet Union, Georgian identity managers nevertheless removed their right to manage 
the South Ossetians and their territory. Georgian identity managers have since then had to adapt to this fact 
but has refused to do so. As the Foreign Ministry stated in February 2014: “Georgian leadership, cursing 
Soviet era in the history of their nation, refuse to realize that by denouncing of all the state acts, adopted 
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since 1921, Supreme Council of Georgia abolished all legal grounds for South-Ossetian Autonomous 
Oblast be part of Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic”800. Georgian identity managers have instead had to 
fabricate a negative identity around the South Ossetian group due to their own decision in the 1920s and 
early 1990s. This is a fact that the Georgian identity managers do not wish to admit to, and so they continue 
to communicate the negative construction of South Ossetia and distort this groups’ relations with Russia. 
As the Foreign Ministry responded in December 2017 to a Georgian statement regarding Georgia’s 
readiness for dialogue with South Ossetia: ”It is time for Georgian party to realize that the reality isn’t 
related at all with the picture drawn by imagination of the Georgian politicians”801. 
It is from this reification of the Georgia group that the South Ossetian identity managers 
process Georgia as a conflict party that disregards any peaceful solution to the conflict. As stated in an 
interview with Sanakoev to Informational Agency ‘Res’ in August 2013: “All the prerequisites for war 
were created by Georgia. Georgia ignored the existing at that time negotiation format, discredited the 
peacekeeping forces that were located here. It was Georgia who attacked peaceful population802”. The South 
Ossetian identity managers thus have a clear understanding of who the Georgians are, and this is an 
understanding the South Ossetian identity managers rely on when processing the behaviour that Georgia is, 
and will be, undertaking in the conflict. As the Foreign Ministry stated in October 2011: “And Georgia up 
till now is not ready for signing of binding document of non-use of force against South Ossetia and its 
leadership is still maturing revanchist plans”803. Georgian identity managers’ current behaviour, such as the 
unwillingness to sign a non-use of force agreement, is thus used as validation of South Ossetia’s other-
schema as it is used to infer about the intentions that motivate the Georgians in the conflict.  
 
6.4.3.2 Georgia’s Motivation for Behaviour  
The main motivation said to drive the Georgians is the eradication of the South Ossetians as there is a 
Georgian interest of annexing the South Ossetian territory. As Kochiev stated in December 2015 in a 
response to Georgia’s claim for territorial integrity: “They keep on fantasizing about their territorial claims 
in Tbilisi. It appears that one should use applied psychology to comment such statements as it is evident 
that being frustrated because of the impossibility of getting the desired, Georgian authorities are forced to 
use psychologically manipulative techniques”804. Since the Georgian identity managers have been 
prevented from fully eradicating the South Ossetians, and since they cannot make a legal claim to the South 
Ossetian territory, there is a need to continue to disguise the Georgian identity managers’ lies in order to 
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validate their behaviour. The need to disguise the truth about the conflict is an agreement that has been 
made between Georgian identity managers, as they continue to construct the situation and agents involved 
in a similar manner. As Sanakoev stated in an interview in August 2013:  
 
Georgian authorities have partly changed but continue to use rhetoric of their predecessors. Comparing 
rhetoric of Saakashvili in 2003 and rhetoric of current authorities in respect of South Ossetia one can even 
find the same sentences. They do not even change the wording. Georgia ‘changes’ the approaches but the 
goal is the same to subdue South Ossetia and Abkhazia805. 
 
Georgian identity managers are now also motivated by the attempt to impose their social cognitive 
framework onto the conflict, as this may allow them to reach their hostile intentions. Georgia’s conflict 
narrative is hence a manipulative technique and it leads to negative outcomes as it distorts the 
understandings that Georgians and others rely on in the conflict. What is interesting about this 
understanding is that South Ossetian identity managers argue that conflict narratives are vital tools in times 
of conflict. However, as the Foreign Ministry responded in October 2014 to Georgian statements that 
Ossetians and Georgians are able to co-exist peacefully: “It should be emphasized that nobody possesses 
the monopoly for the truth and nobody is allowed to distort it for as its own sake if there is no alternative. 
The policy of lie doesn't meet the needs of modern world and comes up with the objective order of a 
democratic world regime formation. It is high time to realize that only efforts based on the principles of 
mutual respect can result in stability and peace in the region”806. In the South Ossetian processing is 
therefore also the argument that if the South Ossetian identity managers’ conflict narrative is not adopted, 
then this implies the dismissal of facts with horrific consequences to follow. Hence, although no one has 
the monopoly on truth, South Ossetian identity managers do possess the right account of what is happening 
and why. 
 
6.4.4 South Ossetia’s Social Cognitive Framework  
Like the other conflict parties, South Ossetian identity managers’ social cognitive processing results in a 
social cognitive framework, which consists of a situation-, self-, and other-schema. The central aspect of 
South Ossetia’s framework is that the conflict is an intergroup conflict between South Ossetians and 
Georgians. Like the other conflict parties, South Ossetian identity managers reify distinct groups when 
processing stimuli that arise in the conflict. When reifying the Georgia group, the identity mangers point to 
how this group follows a specific behavioural pattern, as Georgian identity managers have been consistent 
in their ambitions and consistent in passing their understandings on to Georgian group members - who 
uncritically adopt them and act in accordance to them. From this understanding arises the argument that the 
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conflict is one Georgian identity managers have initiated against the South Ossetians in the 1920s, and that 
the conflict continues to persist because Georgians have come to believe that it is justified to eradicate the 
South Ossetians and claim their territory. Whereas Russians identity managers process Georgian group 
members as agents with a conscious and the ability to change the situation (if they elect new leaders), South 
Ossetian identity managers process the Georgian group members as agents who unquestionably believe the 
things their identity managers tell them about the conflict and agents involved. In the South Ossetian in-
group, there is, however, a perfect symbiosis between identity managers and group members as it is argued 
that all South Ossetians have experienced the same events, and so their behaviour and interests are guided 
by collective cognition. The South Ossetia group is thus reified as a unified and united entity, which acts in 
a consistently peaceful manner. The conflict is hence cognitively systematized around a distinct South 
Ossetia and Georgia group, and it is processed as one that has occurred because the South Ossetians and 
the Georgians inhabit different identities, interests, and social dispositions.  
Despite this, there has been confusion regarding South Ossetia’s self-schema and the reason 
for this, is the interests the South Ossetian identity managers associate with the South Ossetian group 
identity. South Ossetian identity managers have over the years been expressing inconsistent understandings 
of the South Ossetian interests, and particularly how these interests align with Russia. Interests have ebbed 
and flowed between autonomy, independence, Ossetian unification, and Russian unification. This 
inconsistency, and particularly the groups’ increased relations with Russia, has had implications for South 
Ossetia’s group identity. The interest of uniting with Russia and the increased relations that have occurred 
between these groups has led to cognitive confusion amongst Georgian identity managers, as these 
managers have difficulties separating South Ossetians from Russians. The inconsistent interests and the 
increased relations with Russia have thus led to a situation, where the South Ossetian group identity is being 
diluted. Whereas DPR is in a “cognitive birth” - as the identity managers are trying to distinguish the DPR 
identity and interests from Russia and Ukraine - the South Ossetia identity is in a “cognitive death” as this 
identity and associated interests, are increasingly linked with the Russian group identity. South Ossetian 
identity managers, with their shifting expressed interests, are thus running the risk that the South Ossetian 
group identity loses its value as an identity that agents identify with, and a social category that others use 
for sense making in the conflict. South Ossetia’s social existence does hence not merely hinge on the social 
validation of others but also on the identity managers’ ability to construct a consistent self-schema. Despite 
this, South Ossetian identity managers seek to present their in-group as a clearly distinguishable group of 
agents who share a common understanding of who they are, and how they relate to the other conflict parties. 
Like the other conflict parties in Ukraine and Georgia, South Ossetian identity managers thus seek to present 
clear-cut group constructs and a cognitively systematized reality, which they argue that the other conflict 
parties need to adopt if the conflict is to be resolved.  
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6.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter I addressed the social cognitive processes the conflict parties in the Georgia conflict resort 
to. The chapter focused on the conflict parties’ situation-, self-, and other-schemas, and how these result in 
social cognitive frameworks. The reason for exploring these processes was to establish how the conflict 
parties process stimuli and the intergroup dynamics that may arise from this. As in the Ukraine conflict, it 
is possible in the Georgia conflict to locate conflicting social cognitive frameworks as all conflict parties’ 
resort to different understandings of the situation, self, and other. The Georgia conflict parties process 
stimuli differently and they place different emphasis on, and even exclude, certain stimuli when 
systematising the conflict. Common for all conflict parties is that the 2008 events serve as key stimuli, 
which are processed to make sense of why there is a conflict and who is confronted with who. They 
nevertheless process 2008 differently. Whereas Georgian identity managers process 2008 as the onset of a 
Russian invasion, Russian identity managers process it as a conflict escalation where Georgian identity 
managers once again sought to claim South Ossetian territory. South Ossetian identity managers share the 
Russian identity managers’ understanding that 2008 was a conflict escalation, but they equally point to how 
2008 was the time when the South Ossetian group reclaimed its full existence as a result of its Russian 
acknowledgment. Additionally, the conflict parties systematise the conflict differently as Russian and South 
Ossetian identity managers process it as a South Ossetia-Georgia conflict, whilst Georgian identity 
managers process it as a Georgia-Russia conflict. When systematising the conflict, the conflict parties also 
point to different events. Georgian identity managers e.g. point to the 1990s as the root cause of the conflict, 
as this was when Georgians claimed independence and the time when Russian identity managers started 
their revanchist policy of reversing this independence. In this processing, Georgian identity managers 
exclude the South Ossetia-Georgia clashes that occurred in the early 1990s and 2000s. Russian identity 
managers also point to how the conflict arose in the 1990s but as a result of Georgian identity managers’ 
interests in expanding the Georgian identity onto more territory. South Ossetian identity managers, on the 
other hand, point to how the conflict arose in the 1920s, as this was when Georgian identity managers 
launched their first genocide attempts against the Ossetians. In the Georgia conflict there is hence the 
existence of opposing conflict narratives, which have occurred because the conflict parties process stimuli 
differently. Like in Ukraine, the conflict parties nevertheless share similar processing tendencies. Hence, 
despite them reaching different conflict narratives, they resort to the same processing tendencies when 
systematising the conflict and reifying the groups present.  
 The first processing tendency of adapting identities and interests in accordance to incoming 
stimuli is visible in Georgia’s conflict narrative, where the identity managers have adapted their 
understanding of the conflict from an intragroup conflict, to an intergroup conflict as a result of Russians’ 
increased presence and influence in South Ossetia. Georgian identity managers have also altered their other-
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schema as they have gone from defining the antagonist as South Ossetia, to focusing purely on Russia. The 
South Ossetian identity managers have adapted their in-group interests. Initially these were greater 
autonomy and independence. However, in the 2000s it increasingly came to be the expressed wish of uniting 
with Russia. South Ossetian interests have eventually ebbed and flowed, which has made it difficult to 
establish what this conflict party wants. The continued adaptation of South Ossetian interests has also had 
implications for the South Ossetian group identity, as South Ossetia’s increased relations with Russia, has 
led Georgian identity managers to identify South Ossetians as Russians/Russian puppets. Through the South 
Ossetian identity managers processing of stimuli and subsequent change in interests, has hence occurred a 
(presumably involuntary) change in the South Ossetian identity. This has implications as to how South 
Ossetia is reified by others, but it also has implications as to how the conflict is cognitively systematised. 
The Russian identity managers have also altered identities and interests as they have moved from 
identifying the conflict as a South-Ossetia/Georgia conflict, where the conflict parties needed to reach a 
common agreement, into a conflict where Georgians identity managers have consistently attacked South 
Ossetia.  
 Another tendency visible in the conflict parties processing is to reify out-groups from a 
leadership attribution error, and in-groups from a group attribution error. In Georgia’s conflict narrative, 
Russian behaviour is processed as the outcome of Russian identity managers’ interests and personal 
identities. Rather than reifying the Russia group as the spitting image of Putin (as seen in Ukraine), 
Georgian identity managers point to how the Russia group has behaved in a consistent manner for decades. 
Russia’s group identity and interests are thus an outcome of consecutive Russian identity managers who all 
have had negative personalities and interests. Apart from this, is the Georgian tendency to reify the Georgia 
in-group as a united entity that acts from the same understanding of self and other. From this understanding 
it is argued that it is not the Georgian identity managers who have mobilised Georgians in the conflict, as 
Georgians have collectively mobilised themselves when they discovered that Russia was, once again, 
threatening their existence. A similar tendency is seen from the South Ossetian and Russian identity 
managers who point to how Georgian behaviour is an outcome of the Georgian leaderships’ personal 
identity and interests. Here South Ossetian and Russian identity managers slightly differ in their processing. 
Whereas the Russian identity managers point to how Georgians are mobilised around fake interests, South 
Ossetian identity managers point to how the hatred that Georgian identity managers inhabit towards 
Ossetians has manifested and become a general Georgian attitude. As seen in the Ukraine conflict, there is 
thus also in the Georgia conflict a tendency to reify the identity and interests of in- and out-groups 
differently, and to process the mobilisation of group members as either the outcome of collective cognition 
or leadership manipulation.  
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 There is also the tendency to process the conflict as a matter of alien identity management. 
Here, Georgian identity managers e.g. point to how Georgians are seeking to resist the Russian identity 
managers’ attempt to reimpose their management on them, whilst Russian identity managers point to how 
Georgians identity managers are seeking to impose their management on the South Ossetians. South 
Ossetian identity managers point to how the conflict is a matter of defying alien Georgian management of 
the Ossetian group. South Ossetian identity managers equally point to the wish of uniting with Russia, as 
Russian management of the South Ossetian identity is processed as a positive development. Apart from 
relying on alien identity management to process the conflict, is the tendency amongst the conflict parties to 
advocate for the adoption of their other-schema. As in Ukraine, all conflict parties in Georgia point to how 
they possess the true understanding of the other and how there is a need for others to adopt this 
understanding for the conflict to end. Georgian identity managers e.g. point to how their Russia group 
reification is the true account of who Russia is and what it wants, which is an understanding reached by 
processing Russian behaviour in the Georgia conflict, but also past Russian behaviour and the behaviour of 
the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Russian identity managers also point to how they know the true 
contours of the Georgia group identity, and how there is a need for others to adopt the understanding that 
the conflict is one Georgian identity managers have initiated and now sustain. Something similar can be 
seen in South Ossetia where the identity managers seek to advocate the adoption of their processing that 
Georgian identity managers have consistently sought to eradicate the South Ossetian group identity.  
 The conflict parties also resort to cognitive support. South Ossetia’s social cognitive 
framework is e.g. partly supported by the Russian identity managers, as Russian identity managers support 
the understanding that the conflict is defined by the Georgian attempt to eradicate the South Ossetians. At 
the same time is also the Russian argument that the conflict is held in place because Western states are 
supporting Georgia’s social cognitive processing, which causes Georgian identity managers to continue 
their pursuit of negative behaviour. Georgian identity managers, on the other hand, argue that others need 
to support their social cognitive framework if the conflict is to end. The four processing tendencies are thus 
also visible in the Georgia conflict. These analysis findings will serve as a foundation for discussing, in the 
next chapter, the intergroup dynamics that exist in the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts and how these may 









7.0. The Conflicts’ Intergroup Dynamics      
The puzzle that shapes this research is how come the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts continue to be 
protracted when the conflict parties all agree that the various conflict agreements and ceasefires they have 
reached, need to be implemented and respected in order for their interests to be attained. This puzzle raises 
the question of whether there are certain understandings that continue to move the conflict parties towards 
confrontation rather than reconciliation. To explore these ideational factors, I focus my attention on the role 
cognitive processes play in shaping conflict protraction. The aim is to explore how the conflict parties’ 
cognitive processes interact, and how these interacting processes construct intergroup dynamics that may 
hinder the conflict parties in reaching common ground. To this end, the objective was to explore how the 
conflict parties process stimuli, how they compartmentalise this into specific understandings about the 
situation, self, and other, and how these understandings interact. What emerged from the analysis findings, 
is that the conflicts are protracted because the conflict parties engage in processing tendencies that shape a 
cognitive struggle over which conflict party gets to reify the groups present. Adding to this is also the 
finding that the conflict parties’ processing change. The conflicts are hence not only protracted because the 
conflict parties’ self/other understandings have become cemented. Rather, what the analyses findings 
indicate, is that their self/other understandings are flexible. The conflicts’ protractions are thus shaped by 
processing tendencies, which the conflict parties continuously engage in as well as seek to counter. The 
principle of these processing tendencies is that they dismiss the out-group’s group reification attempts. 
When making sense of stimuli, all conflict parties reach certain group constructs, which they argue should 
be applied to make sense of the conflicts and used as the shared understanding for solving the conflicts. 
These constructs include an outlining of which groups are present in the conflict and what the different 
groups want. It also includes an outlining of what defines members of these groups, where the groups 
originate from, and how they relate to one another. The conflict parties are in their social cognitive 
processing therefore not merely providing an overview of how the conflicts progressed and who the 
antagonist is. They are to a greater extent engaged in reifying the groups present and establishing the 
distinctions between them. Through these processing tendencies, however, each conflict party comes to 
question whether the group constructs the out-group resorts to, exist. This does not merely imply 
questioning whether the groups that the out-group refers to in its narrative are correctly described. Instead, 
through the processing tendencies, the conflict parties construct the other’s group constructs as fake. Their 
intergroup dynamics are thus defined by clashing attempts to establish the social boundaries that exist 
between the agents who are engaged with, or entrapped in, the conflicts.  
In the Ukraine conflict, the Ukrainian identity managers systematise the conflict around a 
Ukrainian and Russian group identity, which are presented as the classifications that agents engaged in the 
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conflict belong to, or do not belong to. From this systematisation, the identity managers draw a sharp 
distinction between Ukrainians and Russians as the means for making sense of stimuli that occur. In this 
process, they dismiss the existence of people identified as Donetskians, which has implications as to how 
the Ukrainian identity managers approach the conflict and the conflict narrative that they produce. The 
Russian identity managers do not share this cognitive systematisation, as they only rely on the Ukraine 
group identity to make sense of the agents present. The Russian identity managers do, however, resort to 
the Russian group identity when processing the social origin of the Ukraine group identity. Here it is argued 
that the Russian and Ukrainian group identities derive from the same origin and so, in Russia’s conflict 
narrative, Ukrainians and Russians are the same people. In this systematisation the Russian identity 
managers also dismiss the use of a DPR group identity, as these agents are characterised as Ukrainians with 
a stronger Russian heritage than the rest of the Ukraine group members. The DPR identity managers, on 
the other hand, draw a cognitive systematisation around a Ukraine and DPR group identity. This results in 
a conflict narrative where the conflict is between agents who are either distinctly Ukrainian or Donetskian. 
To make sense of stimuli, the DPR identity managers also include the Russian group identity, which they 
treat as a group identity that the people of DPR, Luhansk, and Crimea share with the Russian state. The 
Russian group identity is hence a borderless identity that encompasses a range of sub-identities.  
In the Georgia conflict, the Georgian identity managers systematise the conflict around a 
Georgian, South Ossetian, and Russian group identity. From this systematisation the identity managers 
draw a sharp distinction between all three identities as Georgians, South Ossetians, and Russians are 
processed as different agents. There is, however, confusion over the distinction between Russians and South 
Ossetians, as the cooperation between these two groups has led to bewilderment over who is who. In 
Georgia’s conflict narrative, there is thus an added sub-distinction between the South Ossetians, as the 
South Ossetian identity managers are processed as Russians, and the South Ossetian group members are 
processed as Ossetians. The Russian identity managers also draw a clear-cut distinction between all three 
group identities, as these are treated as distinct groups with their own characteristics. In this systematisation 
the Russian identity managers seek to soften the distinction between Russians and Georgians, as these are 
processed as agents who share the same interests. The South Ossetian identity managers equally systematise 
the conflict around the Georgian, South Ossetian, and Russian group identities. The South Ossetian identity 
managers have, however, increasingly struggled to draw a sharp distinction between Russians and South 
Ossetians. This shapes a confused South Ossetian group identity and leads to cognitive confusion amongst 
the Georgian identity managers, as they do not know “who” South Ossetia really is. Despite this confusion, 
all conflict parties seek to present their cognitive systematisation and group constructs as real and the 
opponent’s systematisation and group constructs as fake.  
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The conflicts are thus defined by a struggle over how to, as well as who gets to, define the 
social boundaries that define these conflicts. This shapes intergroup dynamics where the conflict parties’ 
relations are defined by an action/reaction pattern where each conflict party seeks to counter the other’s 
social cognitive processing, whilst at the same time bolstering their own processing. From the analysis, this 
action/reaction pattern has found to be shaped and sustained by four processing tendencies: 1) The first 
process that shapes the cognitive struggle over who gets to systematise agents and reify the groups present, 
is the tendency to adapt identities and interest. All conflict parties have engaged in this tendency when 
processing stimuli, and it has led to cognitive confusion and inconsistent expressions of who is fighting 
who in the conflict and why. When e.g. confronted with stimuli that does not fit into an existing self/other 
understanding, this has been processed by either changing the in-group’s identity/interests or changing the 
out-group’s identity/interests. In some cases, stimulus has been adapted to fit it into an existing self/other 
understanding. The tendency to change identities and interests indicates an opportunity for the conflict 
parties to reach a shared understanding of the conflicts and agents involved. It has, however, led to 
continued group mobilisation, as group leaders seek to maintain that they have a consistent self/other 
understanding, and that the other is the one who has manufactured a fake self/other understanding. 2) The 
second process is leadership and group bias. This is the tendency to process the out-group’s identity/interest 
as the outcome of the out-group leaders’ personality, and the in-group’s identity/interests as the outcome 
of group think. When confronted with stimulus, such as an out-group attack or an out-group dismissal of 
conflict resolution efforts, the conflict parties process such stimulus by pointing at the out-group’s 
leadership. Here, they argue that the out-group leaders are the fault of such behaviour as they have distorted 
their in-group’s identity and interests to fit their hostile personalities and personal interests. When, on the 
other hand, similar actions are undertaken by the in-group, the conflict parties point to how such behaviour 
occurs from a shared in-group understanding and memory of who they are and who the enemy is. What this 
processing tendency does is that it denies the other its’ self-understanding and particularly its “groupness”. 
It thus denies that the other is a real group, which feeds into out-group mobilization to ensure that this group 
continues to be regarded as a group.  
3) The third process is alien identity management. This is the tendency to process the out-
group’s intention as wanting to manage the in-group’s identity/interests, and the in-group tendency to 
manage the out-group’s identity/interests. When stimulus occurs, such as the increased presence of troops 
or the walkout from negotiations, this may be processed as an outcome of the out-group’s intention to 
manage the in-group. Such behaviour is processed as the outcome of an intention to seize control over the 
in-group and either eradicate this in-group or distort its’ identity, so it supports the out-group’s interests. 
What this process does, is that it seeks to present the “truth” about who the out-group is and what it wants. 
The in-group is hence trying to manage the out-group’s identity/interests. This feeds into out-group 
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mobilization in order to counter the identity imposed upon it by the other, and to ensure the continued 
existence of the out-group’s expressed distinctiveness. 4) Eventually there is cognitive support, where parts 
of a conflict party’s social cognitive framework are supported by others or perceived to be supported by 
others. When e.g. processing why the conflict is protracted or why an out-group receives military support 
from a third party, this may be understood as an outcome of cognitive support. By processing such stimulus 
as cognitive support, the conflict parties reach an understanding that the out-group continues to engage in 
negative behaviour because its’ distorted situation, self, and other understanding is supported by others. 
Cognitive support hence validates the out-group’s negative behaviour. At the same time is the tendency to 
support parts of another conflict party’s social cognitive framework. When e.g. a conflict party defines an 
attack as a genocide attempt, this may find cognitive support from another conflict party who also comes 
to process such stimulus from this understanding. This feeds into continued in-group mobilisation as a 
conflict party’s social cognitive framework is validated by others. Although such support may only pertain 
to certain aspects of a social cognitive framework, it shapes a united cognitive front, which allows the 
conflict parties to uphold their cognitive systematisation and group constructs.  
These four processes interlink to form an action/reaction pattern where each conflict party 
tries to deny, and at the same time manage, the out-group’s social cognitive processing. This is done to 
ensure that the in-group’s social cognitive processing gains validation, and that the in-group can continue 
to approach self and other from the social boundaries the identity managers have presented in their 
systematisation of the conflicts. Rather than leading to a favourable outcome for the conflict parties, 
however, the action/reaction pattern shapes a protracted cognitive interaction, as the conflict parties’ 
processing tendencies threaten to nullify all group constructs applied for sense making. The conflict parties 
can hence not deviate from their processing tendencies, as it may imply losing the capacity to manage the 
group identities they have accentuated, and particularly loose the capacity to manage their in-group. In the 
end, deviation from their cognitive systematisation and group constructs would create a cognitive void for 
interactions, which would have implications for the conflict parties’ self-understanding and the pursuit of 
interests in the conflict. It would also have implications for the mobilisation of in-group members, and it 
would cause general confusion about the existence of the group identities being accentuated in the conflict. 
In their social cognitive processing, the conflict parties do hence not merely dismiss conflict narratives. 
They also dismiss the cognitive systematisation of agents and the group reification attempts that the other 
is using in its sense making. They thus all want to manage all group identities perceived to be present, 
whilst at the same time define which group identities are present. The Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ 
protraction are therefore not merely an outcome of clashing interests or negative state relations. They are 
also about the social boundaries that the identity managers position around the agents present in the conflict 
contexts, and the distinctions attached to these groups. This cognitive conundrum has not been tackled in 
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current conflict resolution attempts as such efforts tend to focus on clashing interests. It is, however, 
imperative to build bridges between these incompatible social boundaries (or fully remove and rebuild 
commonly shared boundaries) as this will change the cognitive roadmaps used for interactions in the 
Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. A way to do so would be to address the four processing tendencies and to 
further dig into their individual characteristics in order to understand how they interlink and how they shape 
a cognitive action/reaction pattern, which is inconducive for resolving the conflicts.  
 
7.1 The Action/Reaction Pattern  
The Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protractions are shaped by a cognitive action/reaction pattern, which is 


















7.1.1 Identity and Interest Adaptation   
The first process that shapes and sustains the action/reaction pattern is the tendency to change self- and/or 
other identities and interests when processing stimuli. This is a process all conflict parties engage in and it 
is a process that has led to flexible and contradicting social cognitive frameworks. Both DPR and South 
Ossetian identity managers have adapted their own identity or interests in response to either the reactions 
their own behaviour has generated, or in response to stimuli that has occurred in the conflicts. In DPR’s 
conflict narratives, the identity managers have from the beginning had difficulties cognitively systematising 










the agents involved in the conflict, and particularly establishing “who” the people of DPR are. Initially the 
people of DPR were socially categorised as Russians who had an interest in reuniting with the Russian 
state. As Russian identity managers, however, did not react to this proclaimed Russian identity and interest, 
but continued to categorise the people of DPR as Ukrainians, the DPR identity managers found themselves 
in an identity vacuum. To fill this vacuum, the identity managers proposed the establishment of Novorossiya 
and Malorossiya as social categories that could cognitively systematise the conflict and identify the people 
of DPR. These projects equally failed in gaining traction as there was limited support in Eastern Ukraine 
for the establishment of such identities. The DPR identity managers eventually settled on a DPR group 
identity, which now functions as the cognitive systematization of the conflict (as one between Ukrainians 
and “Donetskians”) and as the identity from which DPR’s interests (such as independence) are pursued.  
The South Ossetian identity managers have also adapted their own identity and interests. 
However, whereas the DPR identity adaptation has been explicit, the South Ossetian identity adaptation 
has occurred involuntarily as a result of interest adaptation. In the 1990s, the South Ossetian identity 
mangers pointed to the South Ossetian interest of independence but also to the interest of uniting with fellow 
Ossetian group members in North Ossetia. In the 2000s, this changed into an expressed wish of uniting with 
“brotherly Russia” and increased relations between Russia and South Ossetia. This change may have 
occurred as a response to various stimuli, including a change in South Ossetian leadership, the increasingly 
negative Russian stance towards Georgia in the 2000s (which opened up pathways for South Ossetia to 
increase its relations with Russia), and the 2008 events where Russia intervened on behalf of South Ossetia. 
It is, however, noticeable that the South Ossetian identity managers have been consistently inconsistent in 
their expressed interests, as these have shifted between greater autonomy, independence, Ossetian 
unification, and Russian unification. The change in interest is thus not definitive but refers to a reactive 
change where interests are adapted on a regular basis. Despite this inconsistency, the South Ossetian identity 
mangers try to construct a conflict narrative around a consistent South Ossetia group.  
 The non-state actors’ identity and interest adaptations have had a significant impact on the 
social cognitive processing that arises in the conflicts. These adaptations have not merely had an influence 
on how the non-state actors make sense of their own group identities and interests, but also how the states 
make sense of the non-state actors. In both the Georgia and Ukraine conflict, the states have had difficulties 
establishing who South Ossetia and DPR are, and the extent to which they represent their own group identity 
or whether they are “Russian”. To this end, Ukrainian and Georgian identity managers have settled on two 
different options for cognitive systematization with Georgia drawing a social distinction between South 
Ossetian leaders (categorised as Russian) and South Ossetian civilians (categorised as Ossetian). The 
Ukrainian identity managers have, on the other hand, categorised DPR by applying the Russia social 
category. In Ukraine’s conflict narrative, DPR is thus not a group identity as the agents who claim to 
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represent and belong to this group are categorised as Russians. The non-state actors’ identity and interest 
adaptations have led to cognitive confusion, and to a situation where the states have reacted to this 
adaptation by changing their social cognitive processing of the conflicts. It has also led to a situation where 
identities are in the process of birth and death as the DPR identity managers’ construction of the DPR group 
identity has forced these identity managers to establish how this identity is different from the Russian group 
identity, whilst at the same time being similar. South Ossetia’s ties with Russia and the identity managers’ 
expressed interest of uniting with Russia has, on the other hand, blurred the South Ossetian group identity, 
as others struggle to draw a distinction between South Ossetia and Russia. The South Ossetian identity 
managers now find themselves in a situation where their processing of stimuli may have jeopardized the 
usage of the South Ossetian social category in the sense making of the conflict. This challenges South 
Ossetia’s inclusion in the conflict negotiation process (as others perceive Russia as the antagonist and South 
Ossetia as a proxy) but also challenges the non-state actor’s interest of reaching international recognition 
for its independence.  
 The process of identity and interest adaptation is not merely confined to the non-state actors, 
as the states have also adapted identities and interests. However, whereas the non-state actors have adapted 
their own identity and interests, the states have processed stimuli in accordance with their existing self-
schemas or adapted their understandings of the others’ identity and interests. The Russian identity managers 
have e.g. sought to adapt information about Russian troop presence in Ukraine into their existing self-
schema of being a neutral party. This was done by changing the categorisation of the Russians present in 
Ukraine, as their existence was first denied and, eventually, they were categorised as volunteers. By doing 
so, the Russian identity managers have been able to (somewhat) maintain Russia’s expressed neutrality, as 
the volunteers are treated as Russian group members who are acting from their own interests, rather than 
the collective interests of the Russian group identity. In the Georgia conflict, the Russian identity managers 
have adapted their understanding of Georgia. This change occurred approximately around 2004 with an 
increase in Georgia-Russia tensions and it culminated in 2008 where Russian identity managers identified 
the Georgian identity managers as the conflict instigators. The Georgian identity managers have also 
changed their understanding of “the other”, as they have gone from processing the conflict as an intragroup 
conflict to an intergroup conflict. Whereas the other initially was identified as South Ossetia (which 
threatened to separate from Georgia) the other was later identified as Russia (which threatened to annex 
Georgia’s territory). A similar change is seen in the Ukraine conflict where the Ukrainian identity managers 
initially categorised DPR as terrorists who sought to disrupt order. These agents are now categorised as 
Russians who are seeking to eradicate the Ukraine group identity. Although both states and non-state actors 
adapt their schemas, there is a difference in how they process stimuli and the extent to which this leads to 
an adaptation of their own identity and interests. The states are in the end more capable of keeping a 
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consistent self-schema. The reason for this may be because the states’ applied group identities (such as 
Ukrainians and Russians) are well established as a result of them being socially validated through statehood. 
The non-state actors’ group identities have not received such a social validation, which forces them to 
engage in social cognitive processing that may significantly alter their own identities and interests.  
What is interesting about the identity and interest adaptation process is that it leads to flexible 
social cognitive frameworks. This challenges the conflict supportive narrative and radical disagreement 
theories, which argue that conflict protraction occurs as the result of opposed situation, self, and other 
understandings that have become cemented. What the analyses find is that the conflict parties do not abide 
to the same conflict narrative through-out the conflicts, nor do they stick to a consistent understanding of 
self and other. They instead engage in a process of identity and interest adaptation where self or other-
identities and interests are changed as a reaction/action to stimuli that occurs. This change is from a conflict 
resolution perspective opportune as it opens the possibility to introduce “new” or more compatible 
self/other understandings, which can be conducive for peaceful relations. This has, however, not been the 
case as all conflict parties have continuously adapted identity/interests along negative and opposed group 
lines. This cognitive flexibility has led to in-group mobilisation, as the in-group identity managers seek to 
maintain the image that they have a consistent self/other understanding, and that the out-group identity 
managers are the ones who have manufactured a fake self/other understanding. The first process that shapes 
the action/reaction pattern is hence the tendency to adapt identities and interests, which is a processing 
tendency sustained and shaped by the remaining processes.  
 
7.1.2 Leadership and Group Bias  
The second processing tendency that shapes and sustains the action/reaction pattern is the application of a 
leadership and group bias. In the conflict parties’ conflict narratives, they all resort to certain biases when 
processing stimuli. They amongst other rely on a group attribution error, which is the tendency to process 
the in-group’s identity/interests as the outcome of group-think. Through this bias, the in-group is 
constructed as an entity that acts and thinks from a shared self-understanding, and a unit that presents a 
perfect interaction between leaders and members. In contrast to this is the use of a leadership bias where 
the out-group’s identity/interests are processed as the outcome of the out-group leaders’ personality and 
personal interests. From this bias, the out-group’s behaviour does not derive from collective memory, but 
from the manipulation of out-group members. Whereas the in-group thus experiences unity and behaves in 
accordance to collectively agreed upon interests, out-group members are manipulated into behaving and 
thinking in accordance with their leaders’ wishes.  
In the Ukraine conflict, the Ukrainian identity managers process out-group stimuli through 
a leadership bias, which constructs the Russian group identity and interests as something that has been 
227 
 
shaped from Putin’s image and ambitions. In Ukraine’s conflict narrative, the conflict is therefore not 
between Ukrainians and Russians per se, but between Ukrainians and Putin, as Putin has mobilised some 
of Russia’s group members in the pursuit of his own interests. What this process leads to is an understanding 
that the Russia group is not an authentic group, but a construct that the Russian leadership has formed and 
mobilised agents around. Hence, although the Russia group is rooted in the Russian group identity, this 
identity has been manipulated and de-constructed in order to comply with Putin’s personality. The 
Ukrainian identity managers use a similar processing tendency for DPR, which they fully disqualify as a 
group, as the people of DPR are categorised as the beforementioned Russians that Putin has mobilised. This 
creates the understanding that “the other” is a fake group. Stated differently, the Russians/Donetskians who 
fight in Ukraine are not agents who unanimously act from a group identity, but Russian group members 
who have been forced/manipulated into thinking and acting in accordance with a fake self-understanding. 
Ukraine is, however, not the only conflict party that demonstrates leadership bias in their processing as the 
Russian and the DPR identity managers also resort to this bias when making sense of out-group stimuli. In 
both DPR and Russia’s conflict narratives, the identity managers construct the Ukrainian leaders as agents 
who are in the process of distorting the Ukraine group identity in order to shape the Ukraine group from 
their own image. The conflict is thus not between Russians/Donetskians and Ukrainians per se. It is a 
conflict that the Ukrainian identity managers have instigated and control through the distortion of 
Ukrainians’ self-understanding. The conflict hence derives from a hierarchy in the Ukraine group and from 
the Ukrainian leaders’ ambition of pursuing their own personal enrichment through the mobilisation of their 
group members around a fake self-understanding.  
The leadership bias does not merely result in a certain construction of the out-group’s self-
understanding as it also generates a reaction pattern where the groups seek to counter the leadership bias 
with a group bias. In Ukraine’s conflict narrative, the identity managers seek to counter the argument that 
the Ukrainian leaders are manipulating Ukrainians’ self-understanding. They do so by processing in-group 
stimuli through a group bias where they construct the Ukraine group as a united and authentic group, which 
has collectively mobilised against the Russian threat. In Ukraine’s conflict narrative, Ukrainians 
unanimously think and act from the same self-understanding. The Ukrainian identity managers are therefore 
not controlling the Ukraine group members, as they represent a collective understanding that unites all 
Ukrainians. Something similar is seen in DPR where the identity managers construct the DPR group as one 
that has collectively arisen against the Ukraine threat to reclaim control over its existence. The DPR group 
is hence not a leadership construct but a group of agents who for centuries have fought for independence. 
All Donetskians thus share the same self-understanding and all act/react from the same memory network. 
The only conflict party which does not resort to a stark division in the use of the leadership and group bias 
is Russia. In Russia’s conflict narrative, the identity managers do point to how it is their role as identity 
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managers to manage and maintain the Russian group identity. This identity is, however, not the unilateral 
outcome of the Russian leaders’ personality. Rather, the Russian group identity that the Russian identity 
managers represent in the conflict, is a group construct their group members support. The leaders’ 
management of the Russian identity and interests is hence validated by a perfect interaction between 
Russian leaders and members, and a unanimous understanding of who Russia is.  
 Similar action/reaction pattern is seen in the Georgia conflict where Georgian identity 
managers construct the Russia group as an outcome of Russian leaderships’ personalities and interests. 
However, rather than referring directly to Putin as the mastermind behind the Russia group, the identity 
managers construct the Russian group identity as an outcome of consecutive Russian leaders who all have 
pursued the same negative interests. Russia’s self-understanding has hence developed over time, but it is 
still a distorted self-understanding that Russian group members have been forced or manipulated into 
adopting. The Russians fighting in Georgia are thus fighting based on a fake self-understanding and they 
are pursuing interests that only benefit their leaders. The South Ossetian identity managers also construct 
the Georgian group identity and interests as the outcome of Georgian leaders who have installed xenophobia 
within the Georgia group against the South Ossetians. The South Ossetian identity managers thus also point 
to how the out-group’s identity and interests have been formed over time by the leaders who manage the 
out-group. Rather than merely being a case of out-group member manipulation, however, the South 
Ossetian identity managers argue that the Georgians have adopted the self/other understanding their identity 
managers communicate to them. Georgian leaderships’ negative personalities have hence manifested as 
general Georgian dispositions, and so Georgians do not merely fight South Ossetians because they are told 
to, but because they harbour an inherent hatred towards the Ossetians. Similar processing tendency is seen 
in Russia’s conflict narrative where the Georgian group identity and interests are regarded as the outcome 
of consecutive Georgian leaders who since the 1990s have sought to expand the Georgian group identity 
onto more territory. Unlike South Ossetia, however, the Russian identity managers do not point to an 
inherent hatred in the Georgia group. The Georgian group members are instead misled to follow interests, 
which do not confine with their identity. This may change if the Georgians decide to elect new leaders who 
are more capable of representing their group identity and interests. As in Ukraine, the Georgian and South 
Ossetian identity managers seek to counter these leadership biases with a group bias. They thus point to 
how their in-group is an authentic and united group, which has collectively decided to rise and fight against 
the common enemy. The only exception is again the Russian identity managers who point to how they, in 
confinement with Russian group members’ wishes, decided to mobilise Russians in the Georgia/South 
Ossetia conflict to ensure the safety of the South Ossetians and the Russian in-group members stationed in 
South Ossetia as peacekeepers.  
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What is interesting about the leadership and group biases is that they shape and sustain an 
understanding that the groups present in the conflicts are not only different in terms of who they are and 
what they want, but also in terms of their genuineness. This is an interesting finding as it adds to the 
exploration of intergroup relations in times of conflict. In the intergroup conflict theories, there is a general 
argument that conflicts are sustained because groups perceive their interests to be colliding and 
incompatible. What the analyses findings nevertheless indicate is that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts 
are not merely upheld by perceived clashing interests between groups, but also by attempts to deny the 
other its’ group construct. Hence, although the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties may also perceive their 
interests to be clashing, they equally interact from an attempt to construct the other’s in-group as not a real 
group, but a fake construct that out-group leaders have manipulated or made-up in order to reach personal 
ambitions. The leadership bias is therefore a process where the groups try to deny the other group its 
existence and particularly its groupness. Since this is part of an action/reaction pattern, this means that the 
in-group’s identity is being externally disqualified. This feeds into in-group mobilisation as identity 
managers continuously need to reassure their group members, and onlookers, that their in-group is unified 
and authentic. The problem with the leadership bias is, however, not merely that it leads to a group biased 
reaction but that it dismisses the relation between group leaders and members. As stated in the theory on 
identity managers, identity managers will not construct a group identity solely out of their own image. 
Rather, in their attempt to cognitively systematise a situation they will highlight the importance of an 
existing social identity and accentuate this on amongst other the basis of stimuli their group members 
produce. The identities that the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties’ resort to are thus identities that already 
exist in their societies (with DPR as somewhat of an exception) and so it is identities that their group 
members identify with and behave and think on behalf of. The leadership bias therefore dismisses the 
importance and existence of certain social identities and removes agency from group members, as they are 
constructed as yes-men or puppets who do not have the ability to determine right from wrong. This also 
feeds into in-group mobilisation as group leaders and members seek to continuously emphasise their 
identity and their ability to think for themselves.  
 
7.1.3 Alien Identity Management  
The third process that shapes the action/reaction pattern is alien identity management, which is the tendency 
to construct the out-group as bent on managing the in-group’s identity and interests. It also refers to the in-
group tendency to manage the out-group’s identity and interests. Through this processing tendency, the 
conflict parties try to provide the truth about who the out-group is and what it wants. In the Ukraine conflict, 
the Ukrainian identity managers continuously construct the intentions of the Russia group to be the 
management of the Ukrainian identity and interests. This management is framed in various ways with the 
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dominant one being that Russian behaviour in Ukraine is driven by an intention of reinstating the Soviet 
Union, and retaking control of the Ukraine group in order to eradicate those who identify as Ukrainians. 
Russia’s intention is hence to prevent agents from identifying with other social identities than the Russian 
one, and hereof prevent agents from pursuing interests that do not cater to Russia. This leads to the 
understanding that Ukrainians are fighting for the right to identify as Ukrainian and have Ukrainian identity 
managers manage the Ukraine group identity. In Ukraine’s conflict narrative, the identity managers point 
to how this construction of Russia is the truth, as Ukrainians have had past experiences with this out-group, 
and previously been correct in terms of predicting what Russia wants. They hence construct Russia as a 
group that behaves in a consistent manner, which is an understanding reached by e.g. processing and 
comparing the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, and Russian behaviour during the Soviet Union and World 
War 2. From this follows the argument that others need to adopt the Ukrainian Russia-construct if future 
conflicts are to be prevented and the current one in Ukraine is to be resolved. The tendency to manage the 
out-group’s identity and interests is also found in DPR’s conflict narrative, where the identity managers 
construct the DPR group as one that is trying to rid itself of Ukraine’s alien management. The Ukrainian 
management of the DPR group, it is argued, has long led to suffering to the point where Donetskians’ 
survival was jeopardized. The DPR identity managers thus now seek to separate the two groups to ensure 
that the Donetskians are managed by their own people, and hence may come to live in accordance with 
their true identity and interests. Similar argument is found in Russia’s conflict narrative. However, rather 
than processing stimuli as a matter of alien management, the Russian identity managers process the Ukraine 
group as one that is threatened by mis-management. In Russia’s conflict narrative, Donetskians, Ukrainians 
and Russians are not three distinct groups but the same people as they all derive from the same social origin 
– the Soviet Union. This truth is distorted by Ukraine’s new leaders who are trying to remove any Russian 
trace from Ukraine. This has led to an internal conflict as Ukrainians fight amongst themselves over the 
extent to which they have a Russian origin or not. It is thus, according to the Russian identity managers, 
imperative that the Russian Ukraine-construct is adopted, as this provides the factual foundation for 
improving intragroup relations and solving the conflict.  
In the Georgia conflict, the Georgian identity managers construct the conflict as a matter of 
defying Russian identity managers’ attempt to reimpose their control over the Georgian group identity and 
interests. According to the Georgian identity managers, the Russian identity managers have had a consistent 
tendency to impose their control on other groups and use these groups for the pursuit of their interests. The 
South Ossetia group is e.g. processed as one that the Russian identity managers currently manage. This 
alien identity management then accounts for the suffering that occurs in South Ossetia and why the South 
Ossetian conflict party continues to dismiss conflict resolution efforts. The alleged Russian tendency to 
control groups is generally a Russian disposition, as the Georgians have been exposed to Russian identity 
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management during the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. It is also a tendency that one may witness in 
the Georgia and Ukraine conflict. To resolve the conflict, there is thus a need for others to accept this 
Georgian truth and act accordingly. The Georgian identity managers are, however, not the only ones who 
point to how the other is seeking to manage their in-group. The South Ossetian identity managers also point 
to how South Ossetians are seeking to rid themselves of Georgian management, which they for long have 
been exposed to, and which increasingly has put South Ossetians at risk. The identity managers e.g. point 
to how the Georgia group has consistently followed a pattern since the 1920s of trying to exterminate the 
South Ossetian group identity. South Ossetians now seek independence in order to rid themselves of this 
threat. What is interesting in South Ossetia’s conflict narrative is, however, that the group does not oppose 
alien identity management per se. Rather, it is an expressed Ossetian ambition to be unified with Russia as 
this represents a positive form of alien identity management. As the other conflict parties, the South 
Ossetian identity managers also argue that they speak the truth about the other and that this other-
understanding needs to be adopted to end the conflict. Eventually there is Russia, whose identity managers 
share the South Ossetian Georgia-construct. The Russian identity managers also point to how it has been a 
consistent Georgian ambition since the 1990s, to manage and eradicate the South Ossetian identity. This 
Georgia-construct is then presented as the factual other-understanding, which should be adopted to ensure 
proper conflict resolution measures in the Georgia conflict.  
 The alien identity management process is interesting as it shapes and sustains the 
understanding that the out-group is trying to claim the management of the in-group’s identity in order to 
use the in-group as a platform for reaching the out-group’s interests. This form of alien management is not 
merely processed as detrimental for the in-group’s interests. It is also detrimental for the in-group’s 
existence as alien identity management threatens the in-group members’ ability to identify with a certain 
group identity. In the conflict parties’ narratives is hence the consistent argument that for the in-group to 
thrive it must be managed by its own in-group members. Yet, what defines an in-group member is fluid as 
the identity managers at times struggle to draw a clear-cut distinction between the agents present. They 
nevertheless try, and so group differentiation is rooted in traits such as the territory an agent resides in, the 
language s/he speaks, and the outcomes that s/he supports in the conflict. The identity managers are thus in 
their conflict narratives trying to reach somewhat consistent group constructs, which they seek to reinforce 
and validate in their interactions with the other. The other outcome of the alien identity management 
processing tendency is also the attempt to manage the out-group’s identity and interests. In their conflict 
narratives, all conflict parties try to present their group constructs as factual. The conflict parties are, 
however, not merely trying to present an understanding of who they are but an understanding of who the 
other is. This creates an action/reaction pattern as the conflict parties fight over whose group construct is 
real. Since these group constructs are juxtaposed this leads to the understanding that there is not cognitive 
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space for all group constructs, and so the conflicts are not merely zero-sum in terms of interests but also in 
terms of identity management. This results in continued in-group mobilisation to ensure that the in-groups’ 
constructed identity is maintained. This is of interest as it points to how conflict protraction does not merely 
derive from protracted understandings of the conflicts, but also from protracted attempts to offer the 
“correct” understanding of who the out-group is, and the traits that define members of this group. Alien 
identity management thus leads to intergroup dynamics where the conflict parties argue for the right to 
identify, pursue, and uphold a certain self-understanding, whilst at the same time argue for the need of 
others to adopt their other-understanding.  
 
7.1.4 Cognitive Support   
The final processing tendency that shapes and sustains the action/reaction pattern is cognitive support where 
parts of a conflict party’s social cognitive framework are supported by others - or perceived to be supported 
by others. Cognitive support is particularly noticeable when comparing Russia and the non-state actors’ 
conflict narratives. When analysing the non-states’ narratives, it becomes noticeable that they rely on many 
of the same understandings as Russia. Their social cognitive frameworks are however not identical. The 
South Ossetian identity managers e.g. construct the conflict as a long-standing conflict between Ossetians 
and Georgians, which occurred in the 1920s following Georgia’s genocide attempts. The Russian identity 
managers, on the other hand, construct the conflict as an outcome of the end of the Cold War where 
revanchist Georgian identity managers decided to claim the South Ossetian territory. In the Ukraine 
conflict, the DPR identity managers construct the conflict as an intergroup conflict between DPR and 
Ukraine and argue that to solve the conflict there is a need to declare DPR as an independent state. The 
Russian identity managers instead point to how the Ukraine conflict is an intragroup conflict between 
Ukrainians and that the conflict can only be resolved through federalism reform. These differing 
understandings suggest that the Russian identity managers do not solely dictate the thoughts and behaviour 
of agents in DPR and South Ossetia, but rather their connectedness is shaped by similar social cognitive 
processing and the reinforcing of each other’s understandings. This particularly pertains to their self-
understanding. As found in the analysis, there generally seems to be an agreement amongst the conflict 
parties that for a group identity to exist it is not enough that in-group members subscribe to it, as others also 
need to “see” this identity and subscribe to its constructed dispositions and interests. A central feature of 
Russia’s relations with the non-state actors is that the Russian identity managers socially validate the non-
states’ in-group constructs. Although the Russian identity managers do not support all aspects of these 
constructs (such as DPR’s claim that there is a Donetskian group identity), the Russian identity managers 
point to the groups’ existence and argue for their continued inclusion in the negotiation process. Adding to 
this is also that the Russian identity managers support aspects of the non-state actors’ other- and situation-
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schemas. This results in cognitive support which decreases the need for the non-state actors to change their 
processing tendencies, as Russian support feeds into the continued possibility of mobilising agents around 
their existing group constructs.  
This cognitive support is contrasted with Georgia and Ukraine’s conflict narratives. Unlike 
Russia, Georgia and Ukraine do not share the non-state actors’ social cognitive frameworks. The Ukrainian 
identity managers e.g. dismiss the existence of the DPR group, and thus dismisses the relevance of using a 
DPR group identity when processing stimuli and establishing conflict resolution attempts. The people of 
DPR are rather treated as Russians, which is an understanding that draws Ukraine’s attention to Russia’s 
alleged dispositions and interests. The Georgian identity managers, on the other hand, do not dismiss the 
existence of South Ossetia, as they point to the existence of a South Ossetian group identity. Their 
categorisation of South Ossetia as a Russia-led group, however, leads them to treat South Ossetia as a group 
that merely echoes Russia’s interests, which has implications as to how South Ossetia is treated. Where 
Russia plays a role in Georgia and Ukraine’s social cognitive processing is hence that Russia features as a 
social category that both the Georgian and Ukrainian identity managers resort to when processing the 
conflict and the agents involved. Russia is the central identity around which social cognitive processing 
evolves and so Russia is the social category that Georgian and Ukrainian identity managers use to mobilise 
their in-group members against. Eventually, the states’ social cognitive processing is not without cognitive 
support either. Georgia and Ukraine’s social cognitive frameworks are to a great extent supported in policy 
circles, and they function as the dominant narratives used in the conflict negotiation setting. Like Russia 
and the non-state actors, so too are Georgia and Ukraine exempt from changing their processing tendencies 
as their group constructs find support amongst others. 
 Although the conflict parties support parts of another conflict party’s understanding, they 
also process cognitive support as a significant hindrance towards resolving the conflicts. When interpreting 
stimuli, the conflict parties may process out-group behaviour as an outcome of cognitive support. In 
Ukraine’s conflict narrative, DPR’s behaviour is e.g. processed as an outcome of the support this conflict 
party receives from Russia. This leads to the understanding that the behaviour that occurs would not be 
possible without Russian support of this out-group’s self-understanding. Similar is seen in DPR’s conflict 
narrative where the identity managers point to how the conflict is sustained because Ukrainian identity 
managers have adopted the West’s Russophobia. It is hence due to the adoption of the West’s other-
understanding that the conflict has occurred as well as continues. The Russian identity managers also point 
to how the conflict is an outcome of Russophobia. However, instead of being a cognitive construct from 
the outside, Russophobia is something the Ukrainian identity managers have fabricated and which the West 
supports. In the Georgia conflict, the Georgian identity managers point to how the conflict is sustained 
because the South Ossetian group supports (or is forced into supporting) Russia’s social cognitive 
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processing. The South Ossetian identity managers, on the other hand, argue that Georgian behaviour in 
particularly 2008 was supported and to a great extent encouraged by the West. The Russian identity 
managers also argue that the Georgia conflict is sustained by cognitive support, as the West’s support of 
Georgia’s social cognitive processing continues to validate Georgia’s negative behaviour. Cognitive 
support is hence also used for processing stimuli and it is a process that contributes to in-group mobilisation, 
as it shapes the understanding that it is imperative to maintain the current social cognitive framework, and 
convince others to adopt it, in order to end the conflict. 
 
7.2 Who Gets to be a Group    
The four processing tendencies lead to an action/reaction pattern that shapes and sustains negative 
interactions between the conflict parties, as it generates intergroup dynamics defined by clashing group 
reification attempts. What emerged from the analyses and the exploration of the conflict parties’ social 
cognitive processing, is thus that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are not sustained by cemented conflict 
narratives and self/other understandings. Instead of being the outcome of stagnated cognition, the conflicts’ 
protractions are shaped around intergroup dynamics where the conflict parties continuously fight over who 
gets to be a group. This has implications as to how we understand the conflicts as this implies that they are 
to a great extent outcomes of group reification attempts gone astray. The conflict parties currently find 
themselves in a vacuum between cognitive systematisation, group reification, and intergroup relations as 
neither of these processes have been established from a shared understanding. Although cemented situation, 
self, and other understandings may lead to protracted situations, it may also, in the case of the Ukraine and 
Georgia conflicts, be a preferred outcome in terms of conflict resolution. This is because it would offer a 
more clear-cut understanding of who is who and a shared cognitive foundation for reaching consensus 
regarding interests. The Ukraine and Georgia conflicts have not reached such a stage. They are stuck as the 
conflict parties are still debating who is present in the conflicts and whether these agents are actually groups. 
Regardless of whether such intergroup dynamics are the result of deep held beliefs about the world or 
carefully crafted conflict strategies (or both), it shapes conflict protraction as the conflict parties have not 
reached a stable intersubjective understanding. The only shared understanding between them is that there 
is a conflict and so the other aspects of shared understandings, i.e. who is present and why they are fighting, 
have not been reached. Instead the conflict parties dismiss the other’s group constructs and argue for a 
fundamental reshuffling of who is who. This attempt to change understandings of the groups present does 
not mean that an in-group fully dismisses the existence of an out-group. The conflict parties do to some 
extent acknowledge that the group identities applied for sense making, exist (with DPR as the exception). 
But they argue that these group identities are either not applicable in the conflict situation, or that the out-
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group leaders have distorted these group identities and manipulated their group members into thinking and 
acting based on a fake self-understanding.  
This shapes conflicts where the question is not merely a matter of whose interests prevail 
but whose group constructs prevail. For the non-state actors this is an existential question as their group 
identities have not been socially validated through statehood. Their group’s existence continues to hinge on 
others using these social categories in their social cognitive processing. This accounts for amongst other 
the importance of having good relations with Russia, as the Russian emphasis on the non-state actors’ 
existence upholds these non-states’ group constructs. For the states, the action/reaction pattern is also 
essential as it is a matter of generating certain group constructs, which can be used for the pursuit of 
interests. All conflict parties hence need to convince others of their groups’ genuineness for their own 
existence to be claimed and for their pursuit of interests to be valid. What becomes noticeable in the analyses 
is nevertheless that these group reification processes are surrounded by a great deal of confusion and a, at 
times, desperate attempt to maintain a certain narrative. This points to the socially constructed nature of 
identities but also to the human tendency to group agents in times of conflict and to insist on these groups 
existence despite difficulties in maintaining their distinctiveness. An area of complication is particularly 
the non-state actors who all conflict parties have struggled to include in their conflict narratives and 
maintain a consistent understanding of. This confusion essentially derives from the fact that social 
categories are human constructs that agents use to systematise and simplify complex social interactions 
with. These reified groups’ actual existences are thus by definition questionable.  
An example of this is the “Russia/Pro-Russian” category applied in the Ukraine conflict. 
Although this social category makes it easier for the Ukrainian identity managers to distinguish antagonist 
from protagonist, and easier for them to point at the interests that are colliding in the conflict, the agents 
represented under this category are not as easily classified. The constellation of those categorised as 
Russians/pro-Russian are most likely a mixture of: Russian citizens who fight for DPR or Russia, Ukrainian 
citizens who now identify as Donetskian, Ukrainian citizens who have Russian parents but want to be 
identified as Ukrainian, Ukrainian citizens who think Russia is the antagonist but still speak Russian, and 
Ukrainian citizens who identify as Russian but still want to live in Ukraine. In the end it is not the 
composition of agents which is of interest. What is of interest is the way they are cognitively systematized 
into groups, and the steady argument from identity managers that this systematization is correct, as it is this 
systematization which shapes the action/reaction pattern that sustains the conflicts. The conflicts are hence 
not between “Russians” and “Ukrainians” but between agents who perceive themselves to be, or have been 
classified by others as being, Russian and Ukrainian group members. Although the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflicts are rooted in such processes, this does not imply that the conflicts are all in the conflict parties’ 
heads and that the behaviour that occurs is without responsibility. The consequences of these clashing and 
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shifting processes are very tangible with casualties and wrecked cities to which the implicated need to be 
held accountable. But it does imply that the conflicts also spring from social cognitive processes, which 
feed into understandings that validate and justify the continuation of certain behaviour. There is hence a 
need to unravel these cognitive processes as much as there is a need to unravel conflicts’ material factors 
as they are co-constitutive, and so it is their joint forces that make conflicts real.  
What this research contributes with is that it highlights the role cognitive processes and 
intergroup dynamics play in times of conflicts. The findings reached to some extent challenges the realist 
dismissal of cognition and the realist tendency to treat states as actors that think in the same way. What this 
research finds, is that there are differences between the conflict parties’ cognition and it finds that conflict 
protraction does not merely occur from political systems, but also because the conflict parties disagree on 
how to process the stimuli that occurs. This research does, however, not dismiss the realist, geopolitical, or 
political geographic accounts of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, as it does acknowledge that political 
systems and geographic positions shape identities and interests that equally come to define the conflicts. 
What it does is to offer a complementary study to these accounts as it addresses how cognition is equally a 
process that should be pulled to the forefront for us to understand how and why these conflicts sustain. 
What emerges from the analysis is the argument that the conflicts do not merely sustain because of clashing 
interests, but also because the conflict parties clash over the intersubjective knowledge that is to guide them 
in the conflicts. This argument is reached by exploring the social cognitive steps the conflict parties resort 
to. It is, however, also a finding that emerges because the non-state actors are included into the study of 
these conflicts. Rather than rendering these actors mute, or as puppets of the state actors, the non-state 
actors are treated as equal conflict parties, whose cognition has an influence on how the conflicts develop. 
By including these actors into the study of conflict protraction, I have been able to present how conflicts 
equally occur from state/non-state relations, which is another complementary insight that can be combined 
with the established understandings of the great power relations that define these conflicts. Eventually the 
focus on states and non-states as group identities has allowed me to move beyond the dominant approach 
in IR which tends to treat states/non-state actors as units or actors - without exploring further where these 
“actors” come from and how they come to behave and think in the first place. By approaching the conflict 
parties as group identities, I have been able to explore how conflict parties such as “Ukraine” and “Georgia” 
can act in the conflicts, as they are group identities that agents perceive themselves or others to belong to, 
and hence Ukraine and Georgia come to act because agents adapt their understandings and actions in 
accordance to these group identities. The group identity approach equally allowed me to explore where 
these conflict parties emerge from as my focus on group identity management allowed me to explore how 
group identities arise from the narratives that leaders produce. It is then by focusing on the leaders’ attempts 
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to construct these group identities that I was able to explain the inter-group dynamics that shape these 
conflicts and eventually why the conflict parties continue to fail in ending the conflict between them.  
 
7.3 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the processing tendencies that the conflict parties in Ukraine and Georgia resort to 
when making sense of stimuli, and it discussed how these tendencies shape a cognitive action/reaction 
pattern inconducive for resolving the conflicts. What was found from the conflict parties social cognitive 
processing is that they are in a cognitive struggle over who gets to cognitively systematise the agents 
involved in the conflicts and reify the groups present. This leads to intergroup dynamics where the in-group 
questions whether the out-group’s group constructs are real, which generates the need for the out-group to 
counter this claim by emphasising their group constructs’ authenticity. This intergroup dynamic is found to 
be shaped and sustained by four processing tendencies: 1) the tendency to adapt identities/interests to fit 
stimulus, or adapt stimulus to fit identities/interests 2) to process in-group stimulus as the outcome of group 
think, and out-group stimulus as the outcome of leadership manipulation 3) to process out-group intent to 
be the management of the in-group’s identity/interests, and the in-group tendency to manage the out-group’s 
identity/interests and 4) to support parts of a conflict party’s social cognitive framework, whilst referring 
to how such a tendency results in conflict protraction. This cognitive action/reaction pattern keeps the 
conflict parties in protraction, as they cannot deviate from their processing tendencies as this may result in 
the dismissal of their group constructs. They cannot dismiss their group constructs as this will question their 
self-understanding, have implications for in-group mobilisation, and generally question the understanding 
of the group identities being accentuated in the conflicts.  
The processing tendencies thus threaten to nullify all group constructs presented in the 
conflict, which keeps the conflict parties in cognitive suspension. There is hence a need to address these 
clashing attempts to establish the conflicts’ social boundaries if a shared understanding conducive for 
conflict resolution is to be reached. What the analyses thus also found is that the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflicts’ protractions are not outcomes of cemented conflict narratives and cemented self/other 
understandings. Rather, the present situation, self, and other understandings are flexible and so the forces 
that shape conflict protraction are instead to be found in processing tendencies. This research hence 
answered the research question: How do social cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics contribute to 
the protraction of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts? It answered that processing tendencies have shaped a 
cognitive struggle over how to, and who gets to, cognitively systematise the agents and reify the groups 
present in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. A contributing factor to the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ 
protraction are hence intergroup dynamics defined by a struggle over who gets to be a group.  
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8.0 Conclusion    
The aim of this research was to explore the social cognitive processes the conflict parties in Ukraine and 
Georgia resort to when processing stimuli in the conflict contexts. This was done to explore the intergroup 
dynamics that are present in the conflicts, and how these may hinder the conflict parties from reaching 
common ground. The dissertation finds that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are protracted because the 
conflict parties’ interactions are shaped by a cognitive action/reaction pattern, which sustains a struggle 
over who gets to systematise the agents involved in the conflicts and reify the groups present. The conflicts 
are hence not between fixed groups over incompatible interests per se. Rather, they are to a greater extent 
conflicts over whose group constructs are real and whose are fake, which is a struggle that arises from four 
interlinked processing tendencies: 1) identity and interest adaptation, 2) leadership and group bias, 3) alien 
identity management, 4) cognitive support. The first process refers to the tendency amongst all conflict 
parties to adapt self or other identities and interests. Rather than sticking to consistent conflict narratives 
and fixed self/other understandings, the conflict parties change their narratives and understandings hereby 
resulting in flexible social cognitive frameworks. This adaptability opens a doorway for introducing more 
compatible conflict narratives and positive self/other understandings. However, rather than doing so, the 
conflict parties continue to process stimuli by either adapting identities/interests or adapting stimuli to fit 
their identities/interests. The second process is the tendency to process the in-group’s identity/interests as 
the outcome of group think, and the out-group’s interests/identity as the outcome of leaders’ personality 
and personal interests. This tendency denies the other its “groupness”, which leads to a reaction and an 
adaptation of identity management strategies to uphold the understanding that the in-group is a group. The 
third tendency is to define the out-group’s intention as the management of the in-group’s identity/interests. 
It also refers to the in-group tendency to manage the out-group’s identity/interests. This denies the other its 
expressed identity/interests and leads to a reaction where the other seeks to maintain its group’s 
distinctiveness. The fourth process is cognitive support, which is the tendency to support parts of a conflict 
party’s social cognitive frameworks. This support removes incentives for changing the processing 
tendencies and it leads to a reaction whereby group constructs are maintained as they are validated by 
others. The Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are hence sustained by this cognitive struggle, which is a struggle 
over how to, and who gets to, establish the social boundaries between the agents engaged with, or entrapped 
in, the conflicts. This cognitive struggle contributes to conflict protraction as the conflict parties cannot 
deviate from their processing tendencies without challenging the group identities that they resort to - and 
particularly without challenging the in-group identity they rely on for in-group mobilisation and self-
understanding in the conflict context.  
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This research went beyond the dominant leanings in the literature, which approach the 
Georgia and Ukraine conflicts from a historical/systemic perspective, Russia/Eurocentric perspective, or 
group/individual perspective. This does not imply that I disregard such literature but that the aim of my 
research was to move beyond the dominant arguments that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are mainly 
outcomes of the Soviet Union, Russia’s relations with the West, ethnic group relations, or individuals’ 
interests. These perspectives have merit in terms of explaining the conflicts’ outbreak, but they do not 
sufficiently account for how and why the conflicts sustain. If one treats the conflicts as systemic or structural 
outcomes, this implies that the conflict parties are automatically reacting to structures largely beyond their 
control. This removes their agency and dismisses the fact that conflicts are not automated outcomes, but 
situations shaped around understandings that there is a need to take up arms. If one, on the other hand, treats 
the conflicts as outcomes of clashing interests, this implies that the conflicts have not been resolved because 
such interests have not been addressed. Since, however, the conflict resolution efforts primarily target 
clashing interests, this questions why such efforts have not been conducive for ending the conflict parties’ 
negative interactions. Eventually, there is a tendency in the literature to treat the causes for the conflicts’ 
outbreak as the same factors that cause their protraction. There is thus a lack of literature that addresses the 
Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protraction specifically, and that does so by focusing on how these conflicts 
sustain because of the cognitive processes that the conflict parties bring to the situation. This was the gap 
that this research sought to fill, and it did so by asking the research question: How do social cognitive 
processes and intergroup dynamics contribute to the protraction of the Georgia and Ukraine conflicts?  
 To address how and why conflict protraction occurs in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, I 
established a theoretical framework that allowed me to explore and explain the role social cognitive 
processes play in shaping protracted intergroup dynamics. In this research, a conflict is defined as a situation 
where two or more parties “perceive their goals, intentions, and actions as being mutually incompatible and 
act in accordance to this perception”807. A protracted conflict is defined as a conflict situation that has yet 
to be resolved, as the conflict parties continue to engage in negative interactions and dismiss the conflict 
resolution efforts put forward. Rather than exploring conflict protraction from a purely structural approach, 
I applied an agent-structural perspective as I conjoined social constructivism with social psychology and 
its sub-field of social cognition. The combination of these fields was conducive for my research as it allowed 
me to explore how self/other understandings occur as cognitive processes, and how these understandings 
as discursive practices assist conflict parties in shaping their negative interactions. Combining these fields 
also allowed me to explore how self/other understandings are sustained as a result of contextual interactions. 
Hence, rather than focusing on how self/other understandings arise from e.g. collective memory, this 
 
807 Bar-tal, Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations and Dynamics, 5 
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research focused on how self/other understandings are formed, changed, and sustained as a result of the 
conflict parties’ continued cognitive interactions in the conflict contexts. To explore this further, I focused 
on the conflict parties’ social cognitive processing. Such processing refers to information processing about 
“people, including the self, and about the norms and procedures of the social world”, which leads to 
structured understandings of a situation, self and other808. The result of cognitive processing is the creation 
of a social cognitive framework, which is a contextual roadmap that agents use as an ideational foundation 
for their interactions. The theoretical framework also presented the concept of intergroup dynamics, which 
refers to the trends that shape how groups interact with each other based on their understandings of self and 
other. To explore the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts’ protraction, I thus constructed a theoretical framework 
which could explain the steps that allow conflict parties to reach and maintain self/other understandings. 
To this end, I focused my attention on the theories of social categorization, social identity, and attribution 
processing. Whereas social categorization and social identity allowed me to explain how and why the 
conflict parties draw identity boundaries between them, attribution theory allowed me to address how and 
why they attach interests to identities. I particularly focused on how interests are formed by inferring the 
intent behind behaviour from personal and situational causality, and from attribution biases such as 
fundamental and group attribution errors. Whereas the fundamental attribution error refers to the tendency 
to process behaviour as the outcome of intent, rather than as a result of the situation, group attribution error 
is the tendency to process the behaviour of a group member, as something that reflects the general attitude 
of the group. To these theories and concepts, I linked the theories of conflict supporting narratives and 
radical disagreements, which explain how conflict protraction occurs because of cemented situation, self, 
and other understandings. The theoretical framework therefore addressed the concepts and theories used to 
explore and explain the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties’ social cognitive processing and the intergroup 
dynamics that arise from this.  
 In the analysis, I focused on how the conflict parties process the conflict situation, self, and 
other and how this leads to social cognitive frameworks that come to define their relations. When doing so, 
I did not engage with general societal understandings of the conflicts, but with how leaders of states and 
non-states cognitively systematise the conflicts. The social cognitive processes analysed are thus processes 
that leaders produce as my focus is on group identity management and how leaders construct group 
identities that others are meant to abide to or think in accordance with. The reached understandings were, 
however, not treated as the personal beliefs of leaders, nor as outcomes of group think. They were treated 
as official frameworks that leaders construct on behalf of those who belong to a given group identity by 
amongst other processing the stimuli the perceived group members produce. The social cognitive 
 




frameworks reached are hence official narratives where leaders seek to highlight an existing social identity 
and from this identity, construct an understanding of the situation, self, and other, which is to guide the 
thoughts and behaviour of perceived group members in the conflict situation. To analyse the social 
cognitive processes at play, I focused my attention on the conflict parties’ conflict narratives. More 
specially, I explored how these narratives are shaped around steps that define social cognitive processing. 
These steps refer to the: deconstruction of stimuli into nodes and the compartmentalising of nodes into 
schemas, which come to constitute the social cognitive frameworks. To explore which nodes the conflict 
parties activate in their narratives, I applied a thematic analysis. This allowed me to explore the 
nodes/themes that run as patterned meanings through the conflict parties’ narratives. Such an analysis was 
conducted by reading through data and exploring the themes or topics present in the various texts. The most 
salient themes were further explored through a frame analysis, which sought to address how the conflict 
parties group nodes into situation-, self-, and other-schemas. By unravelling these steps, the analysis 
explored how the conflict parties process stimuli and compartmentalise this into social cognitive 
frameworks. It is then by analysing these steps and frameworks that I was able to detect the processing 
tendencies that the conflict parties resort to and the dynamics that arise from this. 
 The timelines used for the analyses were for the Georgia conflict 1990-2018 (with primary 
attention on the timeframe 2008-2018) and the Ukraine conflict 2013-2018. In my dataset, I used online 
data retrieved from the conflict parties’ own homepages (the homepages of Foreign Ministries, Presidents, 
and the Republic) and online data retrieved from media outlets and organisations. Whereas data from the 
conflict parties’ homepages were used for the thematic and frame analyses, data retrieved from media and 
organisations were used to construct a timeline of each conflict, and used to locate additional texts that may 
be of use for the analyses. The number of texts retrieved from media outlets and organisations are in total 
for Ukraine: 487 and Georgia: 905. The number of texts retrieved from the conflict parties’ own homepages 
are in total for Ukraine: 611 and for Georgia: 365. The conflict parties analysed were the Ukraine 
government, Russian government, Georgian government, de-facto South Ossetian government and the 
Donetsk People’s Republic. The reason for choosing these conflict parties is that they claim certain territory, 
needs and rights, and they have had a consistent presence in the conflicts. They are thus deemed as central 
to the resolution of the conflicts and essential to analyse to explore the conflicts’ protraction. The choice of 
these conflict parties was also made from a wish of engaging with parties that do not commonly feature in 
the literature, which tends to mainly focus on actors such as Russia, EU, and NATO. Although this research 
focuses on the conflicts in Ukraine and Georgia, other conflicts in the post-Soviet space and beyond could 
have been addressed. I decided to focus on the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, as they have seen significant 
developments in present time between the conflict parties (particularly in 2008 and 2014) and these 
developments have occurred in times where the conflict parties have been connected via online media. 
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These conflicts hence offered a “fresh” insight into the dynamics that may contribute to conflict protraction, 
and access to online data offered a more detailed insight into how these dynamics may have evolved.  
 What resulted from the analyses is that the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are sustained by 
processing tendencies that shape and sustain a cognitive struggle over who gets to cognitively systematise 
the agents present in the conflict and reify the groups present. What is interesting about this finding is that 
it challenges the theories of radical disagreement and conflict supporting narratives, which argue that 
conflict protraction occurs because of cemented self/other understandings. What the analyses found is that 
the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts are characterised by flexible cognitive processing and adaptable 
self/other understandings. Conflict protraction is hence not to be found in cemented situation, self, and other 
understandings per se, but in the interaction between the conflict parties’ processing tendencies. This 
challenges the argument that intergroup conflicts occur because of clashing groups who compare 
themselves and perceive their interests to be incompatible. Although the conflict parties do compare 
themselves and see their interests as incompatible, they do not share an understanding of who the different 
agents are and which group they belong to. Rather than being rooted in clear-cut intergroup relations, the 
conflict parties are stuck in between cognitive systematisation, group reification, and intergroup relations 
as they continue to struggle over how to, and who gets to, systematise the agents present in the conflict. 
There is thus a cognitive element behind these perceived group relations which equally needs to be 
highlighted and included to understand why conflict protraction occurs, and why the Ukraine and Georgia 
conflict parties continue to deny conflict resolution efforts. The contribution of this research is thus that it 
addresses the flexible nature of protracted conflicts and it presents how conflict protraction does not merely 
occur as a result of clashing groups, but also from a cognitive struggle over who gets to be a group. This 
highlights how negative interactions do not merely occur and sustain because of fixed structures of 
meaning. Negative interactions may also be the result of conflicting cognitive processes that compete over 
how to structure the overall meaning that is to guide relations in times of conflict.  
The findings on how cognitive processes play a significant role in protracted conflicts is of 
relevance for future research on e.g. the power relations that exist between the conflict parties, but it is also 
of relevance for the material analyses of the conflicts, as it offers a complementary insight into how flexible 
self/other understandings may hinder the rational pursuit of interests. The role of cognition is often 
dismissed in realist studies. What this research nevertheless finds is that cognition is not a background 
factor that should be rendered mute in the analysis of interests. Rather what my findings show is that conflict 
parties do not share the same understandings, nor are they stable in their cognition, as they rely on differing 
and flexible cognitions, which may turn out to be an essential hindrance in their attainment and alignment 
of interests. What this research also addresses is the IR tendency to dismiss the role of non-state actors and 
to perceive the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts as outcomes of great power relations and geopolitical 
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contexts. Although such relations and contexts unquestionably do shape these conflicts, they are not the 
only factors that need to be considered as intergroup dynamics between states and non-states actors equally 
need to feature if we are to get a more holistic understanding of how and why these conflicts continue to 
endure. Adding to this is also that this research addresses how conflict protraction may not only occur due 
to collective memory and historical developments. Conflict protraction is also a phenomenon which is 
shaped from the conflict parties continued interactions, which we may discover further by opening the 
cognitive processes that the conflict parties’ resort to when they are confronted with conflict information. 
Eventually, this research presents an additional insight into how self/other understandings are constructed 
and how identities may occur and change because of stimuli that arises between conflict parties. The 
inclusion of social cognitive processing and intergroup dynamics in the study of conflicts thus offered a 
complementary analysis of the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts, which should be included if we are to get a 
better insight into why these conflicts sustain.   
 Since this research is of a complementary nature, there are a plethora of options for future 
research as it opens the possibility for digging further into how material/discursive factors intertwine to 
shape conflict protraction. This would particularly be of relevance for conflict resolution efforts as the focus 
on the interlinkage between material and discursive factors, may prove vital for the resolution of the 
conflicts. As of now the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts tend to be addressed through an interest-centred 
approach, with attention to how the conflict parties’ interests can be aligned or how their interests 
(particularly Russia’s) should be curbed to end the deadlock between them. As this research finds, however, 
conflict protraction can equally be detected in the conflict parties cognitive processing tendencies, and so 
this is also an avenue that needs to be addressed. What this means is that to open up further space for 
negotiations, and potential possibilities for reconciliation, there is a need to address the conflict parties 
incompatible group identities, as these currently serve as hindrances towards the conflict parties “rational” 
pursuit of interests. It is questionable that these conflict parties will ever fully abide to conflict agreements, 
if these agreements run counter to the group identities that they have constructed for themselves and others. 
Where this research may be of assistance is to address these cognitive tendencies as it offers an insight into 
how, why, and where cognitive contestation occurs and how this may be resolved. Resolution may e.g. 
arise if the conflict parties change their processing tendencies as this will open a cognitive pathway, which 
could lead to a more stable intersubjective understanding, from which interests can be pursued. This does 
not imply that the action/reaction pattern is the silver bullet, but that this pattern provides a toolkit for 
addressing these very contested cognitions, which equally define the conflicts.  
Another avenue that this research opens is for future research on how power shapes these 
conflicts. As I have argued, this research merely offered an insight into the cognitive moment that defines 
these conflicts, therefore leaving out any further exploration of the power relations that define these 
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conflicts. This does not mean that I have declared power as obsolete, but that I have had to put it aside for 
now to explore the neglected cognitive processes. For future research it would, however, be of interest to 
explore how cognitive processes assist in shaping the power relations that exist between the conflict parties. 
Such an exploration could be done from both a post-structuralist as well as a critical geopolitical account, 
with focus on how e.g. the Ukraine and Georgia conflict parties’ cognitive processing tendencies feature as 
part of their competition over the power to manage knowledge. The conflict parties’ social cognitive 
frameworks could also be used to study their rhetorical strategies and how the pursuance of “rhetorical 
dominance” occurs from amongst other cognitive processing tendencies809. Such a knowledge-power 
analysis is particularly of interest in the context of Russia. In this research I have treated Russia as an 
“equal” conflict party as I have wished to focus on cognitive processes and the resulting intergroup 
dynamics specifically. Russia, however, undoubtedly plays a special role in these conflicts as it has 
significant ideational value for all conflict parties. In the state actors’ cognition, Russia is treated as the 
opponent who has caused the conflict and the opponent that these conflict parties wish to be ideationally 
(and materially) detached from. In the non-state actors’ cognition, Russia is the actor that allows these 
conflict parties to continue having a significant presence and leverage in the conflicts. These are power 
relations which I have not addressed further, but which should be addressed in future research as it is a 
factor that equally shapes the conflicts’ characteristics. What my research findings however suggest is that 
although Russia has a significant influence over the non-state actors, Russia does not outright control these 
actors (as is suggested in much literature and particularly in policy circles). Russia and the non-state actors 
have differing cognitions, and at times conflicting cognitions, which points to how their relations may be 
more of a mutually benefiting interaction, rather than outright control. Adding to this is also that Russia and 
the state actors struggle over how agents should be categorised in the conflicts and how the constructed 
group identities relate to one another. Russia’s emphasis that e.g. Ukrainians are Russians, and Ukraine’s 
emphasis that Ukrainians are not like Russians at all, is an example of how power relations are sought 
through discourses. These findings are of interest and something that should be studied further in the context 
of post-structuralism where one may explore how particularly the Russian leadership seeks to exert power 
in these conflicts through their discursive practices. 
Other avenues for future research should be to focus on how cognition and emotions 
intertwine in times of conflict. As of now there is a tendency, with this research included, to primarily focus 
 
809 Gerard Toal. “Geopolitical discourses: A new geopolitics series”, Geopolitics, 5, no. 1 (2000), 126 
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on either cognition810 or emotions811. As established in the theory chapter there is, however, a general 
agreement in social psychology that emotions and cognitions intertwine to shape behaviour812. To further 
understand behaviour in times of conflict, and international politics in general, it would be imperative to 
unravel how such processes interlink. A way to start could be to combine the findings of this study with an 
analysis of the emotional processes at play in the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts. As the cognition-emotion 
relation is still an unfolding debate, it is, however, questionable whether a single research will be able to 
establish these links. But a future step in terms of pairing social psychology and IR would be to marry the 
growing literature on cognition-emotion relations, as this offers insight into the interplay between conscious 
and unconscious processes. Future research may also be to explore the interplay between inter- and 
intragroup dynamics, and how clashing social identities within a state leads to group identities in times of 
conflict. This internal contestation is of interest and importance if one is to explore the intricacies of 
conflicts, as it addresses the diverse nature of societies, conflicts, and identities, and offers an opportunity 
to move beyond the tendency in IR to treat conflict parties as united in their struggle. Such research would 
also open opportunities for further studying the domestic processes that assist in shaping e.g. foreign policy 
behaviour. Another avenue for future research, which this research has only touched upon, is the need in 
IR to not merely link agents and structures, but to further establish the link between individual identities 
and group identities. As of now, there is a tendency in IR to either treat state behaviour as the outcome of 
a unit or as the outcome of leadership - hereby somewhat dismissing the role citizens play in shaping and 
upholding behaviour that comes to define situations such as conflicts. Although scholars have focused on 
e.g. the international-national nexus in the context of foreign policy, this tends to be approached from an 
understanding that public opinion shapes foreign policy behaviour, or that leaders try to shape public 
opinion in order to pursue specific objectives813. Focus is not on how the leaderships’ processing of citizens’ 
behaviour shapes group identities and thus how the behaviour of citizens extends situations such as 
 
810 Casier “From Logic of Competition to Conflict: Understanding the Dynamics of EU–Russia Relations.”; Martha 
Cottam. “Foreign policy decision making: The influence of cognition”. (Routledge, 2019); and Michael D. Young 
and Mark Schafer. "Is there method in our madness? Ways of assessing cognition in international relations." 
Mershon International Studies Review 42, supp. 1 (1998): 63-96. 
811 Heller "Russia’s Power Politics Towards Ukraine: Social Status Concerns and the Role of Emotions."; Neta C. 
Crawford, "The passion of world politics: Propositions on emotion and emotional relationships." International 
Security 24, no.4 (2000): 116-156; and Gries. "Social Psychology and the Identity-Conflict Debate: Is a ‘China 
Threat’Inevitable?".  
812 Norbert Schwarz. "Emotion, cognition, and decision making." Cognition & Emotion 14, no.4 (2000): 433-440; 
Joseph P. Forgas, Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition. (Cambridge University Press, 2001); 
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conflicts. Focusing on the link between group identities and individual identities offers a better 
understanding of these processes, as it allows one to explore how individual traits, such as thinking and 
feeling, manifests into collective traits. It hence further opens the “black box” of the state. The contribution 
of this research has thus also been to address the “group level” of analysis, and to point to the role leaders 
play as group identity managers in times of conflict.  
Eventually this research was of a complementary nature and the overall aim of it has been 
to explore the role cognitive processes and intergroup dynamics play in times of conflicts. This research is 
thus merely one piece of a larger puzzle, as the findings reached should be paired with the existing literature 
on the Ukraine and Georgia conflicts for one to understand the various intersecting factors that shape these 
conflicts. The findings reached in this research are thus not conclusive, nor do they replace existing findings. 
The findings do, however, explore the gaps located in the literature and they allow us to gain a better 
understanding of how conflicts also derive from the cognitive processing tendencies conflict parties apply 
in their interactions. It is then by combining this insight with the insights on e.g. material interests, 
geopolitical contexts, collective memories, and power relations that we may come to understand why the 
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November 21, 2013: Ukraine suspends preparation for the Association Agreement and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU814. A government decree pointed to the need for further 
analysis of the impact the agreements would have on industrial production and trade with Russia815. Russia 
had equally threatened with economic sanctions with a reference to protecting its economic interests816. In 
the same timeframe Russia suggested the creation of a tripartite commission between Russia, EU and 
Ukraine prior to the signing817. Russia reacted positively to the suspension while the EU and the US stated 
their disappointment818. 
 
December 2, 2013: Protests erupt in Kiev with demands for the resignation of president Yanukovych, 
prime minister Mykola Azarov and the Cabinet819. Members of the opposition equally demanded the 
president to stand down and for the release of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko820. The Prime 
Minister in a meeting with western ambassadors referred to the protests as a coup821. Vladimir Putin 
responded to the protests by saying “The events in Ukraine seem more like a pogrom than a revolution.”822 
There were equally protests in Armenia over the customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
and Armenia’s abandonment of talks with the EU823.  
 
December 17, 2013: In a meeting between Russia and Ukraine, Russia announced that it would provide 
Ukraine a $15 billion loan and discounts on the price of natural gas import824. Russia also announced that 
talks of the accession with the custom union had not come up during the meeting and that the loan would 
prevent Ukraine from implementing the austerity measures set up by the International Monetary Fund825. 
Yanukovych stated: “I know that this work wouldn’t have been done at this optimal speed if not for the 
Russian president’s political will”826. Both the EU and the US announced their support for the protesters 
with senator John McCain addressing protesters onstage in the independence square and Catherine Ashton, 
 
814 “After Kyiv Snub, Kwasniewski Says EU-Ukraine Deal Is Off”, RadioFreeEurope, December 21, 2013, 
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December 17, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/europe/russia-offers-ukraine-financial-
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lifeline.html?pagewanted=all 









January 2014: The Ukraine Parliament, the Rada, passes a legislation which restricts the right to protest828. 
 
February 16, 2014: The government and the opposition agree on an amnesty deal which lead to 
demonstrators vacating the city hall and the riot police withdrawing from some locations829. Amnesty was 
granted to protesters for violations committed between December and February830.  
 
February 18-20, 2014: Clashes occur between the protesters and riot police with 88 people killed and 
hundreds wounded831.  
 
February 21, 2014: Russia, Germany, France and Poland mediated a settlement between the Ukraine 
government and the opposition. The agreement urged for early presidential elections by the end of the year, 
the creation of a national unity government and the return to Ukraine’s 2004 constitution832. Demonstrators 
opposed the signing of the agreement and a leader of the Right Sector, an ultranationalist group833, 
threatened armed attacks if Yanukovych did not step down by the morning834. Following the signing of the 
agreement, Yanukovych flees the country835. 
 
February 22, 2014: Ukrainian MPs vote to impeach Victor Yanukovych and hold early elections in the 
spring836. The vote was passed by a constitutional majority837. The vote also included the passing of a law 
which makes Ukrainian the official language in the country838. Prior to the vote Yanukovych denounces the 
oppositions control of parliament as a coup in a recorded interview839. Following the vote Yulia 
Tymoshenko is released from prison and Yanukovych is stopped by Ukraine border police in an attempt to 
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828 “Ukraine parliament pushes through sweeping anti-protest law” Reuters, January 16, 2014, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-law/ukraine-parliament-pushes-through-sweeping-anti-protest-law-
idUSBREA0F12M20140116 
829 Balmforth, Richard “Ukraine protesters and police pull back in contest over president” Reuters, February 16, 
2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine/ukraine-protesters-and-police-pull-back-in-contest-over-president-
idUSBREA1F05G20140216 
830 Balmforth “Ukraine protesters and police pull back in contest over president” 
831 “Timeline: Ukraine's political crisis” Aljazeera, September 20, 2014, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2014/03/timeline-ukraine-political-crisis-201431143722854652.html 
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New York Times, February 21, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/world/europe/ukraine.html?hp&_r=2 
835 Ukraine Crisis Timeline “Yanukovych, Opposition Sign Settlement Agreement” CSIS, February 21, 2014, 
http://ukraine.csis.org/kyiv.htm#9 
836 “Ukrainian MPs vote to oust President Yanukovych” BBC News, February 22, 2014, 
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flee to Russia840. Following this he flees to the Donetsk region841. Demonstrators walk unhindered into the 
president’s office and residence842.  
 
February 23, 2014: The Rada appoints speaker of parliament, Oleksander Tuchynov, as president until the 
scheduled presidential election on May 25843. Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, accuses the 
Ukrainian opposition of “seizing power” in a telephone call with US secretary of state, John Kerry844. 
Lavrov also said that “the most important thing now is to provide for the complete fulfilment” of the 
agreement signed on February 21845. Kerry expressed support for the impeachment.846 White House 
National Security Adviser Susan Rice responds to a quote by an unidentified Russian official in a report by 
the Financial Times, who allegedly stated that Moscow could intervene in Ukraine in order to protect ethnic 
Russians in Crimea847. Rice warns Russia not to send in troops848. Russia recalls its ambassador to 
Ukraine849. Russia also puts a hold on its purchase of Ukrainian Eurobonds, which was another part of 
Russia’s $15 billion loan to Ukraine, until a new government has been formed850. Violence flares in Eastern 
Ukraine in Odessa between “maiden and anti-maiden” protesters851. 
 
February 25, 2014: In a statement from the foreign ministry, Russia called on all involved in Ukraine: “to 
take action to prevent the further degradation of the situation, to bring it back into the legal framework, and 
to crack down on the extremists who are trying to get established in power”852. It also stated “"In the last 
few days, the capital and some other cities in the country have been sites of armed clashes between young 
rioters and militants from ultra-right nationalist organizations and law enforcement units that were 
defending the security of civilians and national interests[…]The militants have not been disarmed, refuse 
to leave the streets of the cities that they de facto control and to vacate administrative buildings, and 
continue acts of violence[…]The agreement of February 21 on the settlement of the crisis in Ukraine is not 
being complied with, though its signature was authenticated by the ministers of foreign affairs of Germany, 
 




843 Conal Urquhart “Ukraine MPs appoint interim president as Yanukovych allies dismissed – 23 February as it 
happened” The Guardian, February 23, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/ukraine-crisis-
yanukovych-tymoshenko-live-updates 
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February 24, 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10657466/Ukraine-revolution-as-
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26318816 
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Poland and France whereas the United States and the European Union, and other international structures 
have welcomed this document"853 
 
Calls for secession grow in Crimea following the impeachment vote in Kiev854. In Sevastopol pro-Russian 
supporters gathered around the city hall where the Aleksei Chaliy, a Russian citizen, was appointed as 
mayor855. As stated by a protester: “Sevastopol is a Russian town and will always be a Russian town[…]we 
will never surrender to those fascists in Kiev”856. Protesters called for the creation of self-defense squads 
and checkpoints857 were placed on roads leading into Sevastopol858. Russia stated that it would support 
greater federalism in the country859. 
 
February 27, 2014: The Crimean parliament passes a resolution on the holding of a referendum for 
autonomy860. The parliament also stressed its support for Yanukovych as the legitimate president861. From 
Russia, Yanukovych stated that he continues to hold the presidency whilst the US said he had “abdicated 
his responsibility” 862. Masked gunmen barricade government buildings in Crimea and raise Russian 
flags863. NATO states it has no intention of responding to any Russian intervention in Crimea864. Russia 
prepares a military exercise in the region, which it states was scheduled prior to the unrest and hence had 
no relation to the situation in Ukraine865. The acting president of Ukraine, Oleksandr V. Turchynov, stated: 
“I am addressing the Russian Black Sea Fleet command with a demand: all military servicemen should stay 
within the boundaries of the territories stipulated by agreement[…]Any movement of military servicemen 
with weapons outside this territory will be viewed as military aggression.”866 
 
February 28, 2014: Unidentified armed men take control of the airport in Simferopol and the military 
airport in Sevastopol as well as other strategic locations867. A Russian military vessel was positioned close 
to Sevastopol and Russian marines were stationed at the Ukraine border868. Russia denies any placement of 
Russian troops in the area but does agree to having stepped up their “anti-terror units” in Ukraine in order 
 
853Ibid 
854 Howard Amos “Ukraine crisis fuels secession calls in pro-Russian south” The Guardian, February 23, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/23/ukraine-crisis-secession-russian-crimea 
855 Howard Amos, “Ukraine: Sevastopol installs pro-Russian mayor as separatism fears grow” The Guardian, 
February 25, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/25/ukraine-sevastopol-installs-pro-russian-mayor  
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tensions – live” The Guardian  
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to protect its navy staff869. Russia’s ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, states that Russia military 
movement in Crimea is within the agreement with Ukraine on deployment of military assets870. The speaker 
of the Crimean parliament states that Crimea will not be separated from Ukraine and that he does not know 
who the troops belong to871. 
 
March 5, 2014: Russia, the US, UK, France, Germany and Ukraine initiate talks over the Ukraine crisis 
without reaching an agreement872. John Kerry called the talks “the beginning of a negotiation”873. Russia 
states that an agreement has been made with the US with the objective of implementing the February 21 
agreement874. The US does not mention this agreement875. In Donetsk protesters called for a referendum of 
the status of the region and for more autonomy876.  
 
March 6, 2014: The Ukraine Rada invalidates the upcoming referendum in Crimea and act to dissolve the 
parliament in Crimea877. Obama denounces the referendum and authorizes sanctions against Russian 
individuals and entities878. The Eu also announces suspension of talks with Russia including on a visa 
deal879. Preparations for the G8 summit are also suspended880. NATO also suspends cooperation with Russia 
in certain areas881 and the US deploys fighter jets to the Baltics to join air patrols over the Baltic states882. 
On March 6, the Crimean parliament votes to join Russia, making the referendum as a means of merely 
ratifying this decision883. The referendum is moved from the 30th to the 16th of March884. The Russian State 
Duma begin working on a bill which would “make it easier for new territories to join Russia885. Meanwhile 
Putin announces that Russia is “not considering” the annexation of Crimea886. Crimean Prime Minister 
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http://ukraine.csis.org/crimea.htm#3 
872 Catherine E. Shoichet, Laura Smith-Spark and Michael Holmes “Kerry on Ukraine: Solution is tough, but 






877 Ukraine Crisis Timeline “Ukrainian Government in Kyiv, Russia React to Crimea Vote” CSIS, March 6, 2014, 
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878 “Statement by the President on Ukraine” The White House, March 6, 2014, 
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879 “Western powers move to punish Russia” Aljazeera, March 6, 2014, 
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Sergei Aksyonov refuses to negotiate with the government in Kiev because “We do not consider this 
government that proposes talks to us to be legitimate, that is the main issue”887.  
 
March 8, 2014: US warns of closing diplomatic option should Russia take any further steps towards the 
annexation of Crimea888. Obama stresses the need for Russia to withdraw its troops back to their bases and 
to allow international observes into Crimea889. Russia considers cancelling the nuclear inspections required 
by the START treaty as a response to the suspension of US-Russia military cooperation and the imposing 
of sanctions890. As stated by Russian ministry of defense in a statement: “The unfounded threats towards 
Russia from the United States and NATO over its policy on Ukraine are seen by us as an unfriendly 
gesture”891.  
 
March 9, 2014: In a conversation with German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, Putin defends Russia’s actions 
in Ukraine892. He stated: “The steps taken by the legitimate leadership of Crimea are based on the norms of 
international law and aim to ensure the legal interests of the population of the peninsula,”893. UK and 
Russian officials discuss the formation of a contact group with the aim of establishing direct talks with 
Ukraine894. 
 
March 11, 2014: The Crimean Parliament declares Crimea independent of Ukraine895. The Russian Foreign 
Ministry compares the referendum with the accession of Kosovo from Serbia, hereby pointing to the vote 
as “absolutely legitimate”896. 
 
March 12, 2014: Obama meets with the interim Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk897. Obama 
states: would ask that you deliver a message on behalf of the American people to all the Ukrainian people, 
and that is that we admire their courage; we appreciate their aspirations898.  
 
March 13, 2014: Ukraine creates national guard ahead of the referendum which is to consist of recruits 
from the Maidan demonstrations and military academies899. The guard is, according to Ukraine's national 
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889 Ibid 
890 Ukraine Crisis Timeline “Russia Considering End to START Inspections” CSIS, March 8, 2014, 
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security chief Andriy Parubiy, to “ensure state security, defend the borders, and eliminate terrorist 
groups”900. Addressing the UNSC, the interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk urged Russia to “pull 
back its military forces deployed in Crimea to barracks and to start real talks and negotiations”901. Russian 
ambassador to the UN, Churkin, responded by saying that Russia “does not want war” but also stated that 
Crimea had the right to hold a referendum on joining Russia902. The Ukraine parliament furthermore 
approved a resolution confirming Ukraine’s aspiration of further integration with the EU and authorized 
Yatseniuk to conclude an Association Agreement with the EU903. Talks at the parliament also included a 
debate regarding the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission904.  
 
March 14, 2014: Talks are held between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister, 
Sergei Lavrov905. The US had proposed expansion of the Peninsula’s autonomy and safeguarding the rights 
of the Russian speaking population906. As stated by Kerry: “After much discussion, the foreign minister 
made it clear that President Putin is not prepared to make any decision on Ukraine until after the referendum 
on Sunday.”907 The Russian foreign ministry released a statement saying: “Russia is aware of its 
responsibility for the lives of compatriots and fellow citizens in Ukraine and reserves the right to take people 
under protection,” 908 The UN announces that the UN will deploy a monitoring team to Ukraine to “help 
establish the facts surrounding alleged human rights violations, including in Crimea, and serve to de-
escalate tensions in the country”909. More Russian troops and hardware was reportedly sent to Crimea and 
opponents of the referendum protested on the Peninsula910.  
 
March 15, 2014: Russia vetoes an US UN resolution declaring the referendum illegal911. Churkin defended 
Crimea’s right to self-determination and stated: “Up until 1954, Crimea was part of the Russian Federation. 
It was given to Ukraine in violation of the norms at that time under Soviet law and without taking into 
account the view of the peoples of Crimea, who nevertheless remained within a single state — the USSR. 
When the USSR fell, Crimea became part of Ukraine automatically. The view of the people of Crimea — 
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March 16, 2014: In phone call with Putin, US president Obama stated that the referendum: “violates the 
Ukrainian constitution and occurred under duress of Russian military intervention, would never be 
recognized by the United States and the international community”913. Putin stated that the referendum was 
“fully consistent with international law,” and “it pointed to Kosovo’s 2008 vote to separate from Serbia as 
setting the precedent for Sunday’s balloting”914. The referendum is held and according to Crimean Electoral 
Commission, 95,7% of the Crimean population voted to return to union with Russia915. A Crimean official 
announced that 80% of the population had voted916. Refat Chubarov, leader of the Tatars' unofficial 
parliament, said the referendum was illegal and stated “The fate of our motherland cannot be decided in 
such a referendum under the shadows of the guns of soldiers”917.  
 
March 17, 2014: Following the referendum, the President Obama announced a new executive order which 
expands the scope of sanctions against Russia918. The EU considers “a visa ban and an asset freeze against 
a number of Russian officials”919. Putin signs a decree recognizing Crimea as a sovereign state as the first 
step to integrating Crimea into Russia920. 
 
March 18, 2014: Following a confrontation between Ukraine and Russian forces in Crimea and the death 
of a Ukrainian serviceman, the Ukraine ministry of defense issues an order using deadly force in case of 
self-defense921. Prime Minister stated the conflict was moving: ”from a political one to a military one 
because of Russian soldiers”922. Putin signs a treaty on the reunification between Crimea and Russia and 
addresses the Russian Federal Assembly923. Putin stated: “To understand the reason behind such a choice 
it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have always meant for each 
other.”924 
 
March 19, 2014: In a statement made by NATO secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, he stated that 
NATO was “considering providing assistance to Ukraine” in order to deter Russian from committing 
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another military intervention925. He equally stated that Ukraine had asked the military alliance for 
assistance926. 
 
March 19, 2014: Ukraine announces plans of evacuating its military personnel from the peninsula927. 
Ukraine also announced that it would leave the CIS928 and proposed the UN to declare Crimea a 
demilitarized zone929.   
 
March 20, 2014: The US announces new sanctions against Russia and penalties against “key sectors of the 
Russian economy”930. Obama stated: “This is not our preferred outcome. These sanctions would not only 
have a significant impact on the Russian economy, but could also be disruptive to the global economy931”. 
The EU equally expanded their sanctions against 12 Russian officials932. Russia responded by banning nice 
US lawmakers and officials from entering Russia933. According to an opinion poll, Putin’s public approval 
rating hit a five-year record high of 75,1%934.  
 
March 21, 2014: The EU and Ukraine sign the Association Agreement935. The agreement is designed to 
provide Ukraine with economic and political support936. Yatsenyk stated: "We want to be a part of the big 
European family and this is the first tremendous step in order to achieve for Ukraine its ultimate goal, as a 
full-fledged member."937 The EU also announced that it would proceed with similar deals with Georgia and 
Moldova and that it has cancelled a summit with Russia in June938. In an address to the Russian parliament, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that any reference to annexation was an insult to "people, to 
their inalienable rights to self-determination, which they have exercised to the full"939. Vladimir Putin 
signed a law which formally included Crimea into the Russian Federation940. The Permanent Council of the 
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OSCE agrees on sending a Special Monitoring Mission of international observers to Ukraine941. As stated 
by the OSCE: “Throughout the country, the mission will gather information and report on the security 
situation as well as establish and report facts regarding incidents, including those concerning alleged 
violations of fundamental OSCE principles and commitments. It will also monitor the human rights 
situation in the country, including the rights of national minorities.”942.  
 
March 22, 2014: A rally is held in Donetsk with demands for a referendum in the region and the return of 
Yanukovych943.  
 
March 24, 2014: U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip M. Breedlove, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in 
Europe, warns that Russia may have the intention of expanding its borders into Eastern Ukraine944. As 
stated by Breedlove: “There is absolutely sufficient force postured on the eastern border of Ukraine to run 
to Transnistria if the decision was made to do that, and that is very worrisome”945. Russia is expelled from 
the G7946.  
 
March 25, 2014: At a press conference with Prime Minister Rutte of the Netherlands, US president Obama 
stated: “Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors not out of strength, 
but out of weakness. Ukraine has been a country in which Russia had enormous influence for decades, since 
the breakup of the Soviet Union.  And we have considerable influence on our neighbors.  We generally 
don’t need to invade them in order to have a strong, cooperative relationship with them”947.  
 
March 26, 2014: A court decision in Ukraine bans the broadcasting of four Russian TV channels in 
Ukraine948. The Russian foreign ministry calls it a violation of international obligations and an attack on 
freedom of expression949.   
 
March 27, 2014: Former Prime Minister, Yulia V. Tymoshenko announces her candidacy for the 
presidency alongside Petro Poroshenko950. The UNGA adopted a measure which stressed the illegality of 
the Crimean referendum951.   
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March 28, 2014: Putin and Obama have their first direct conversation after the referendum952. Yanukovych 
called on the country to “Demand a referendum on the determination of the status of each region within 
Ukraine,”953 instead of the presidential election954. He further stated: “Everything that has happened in 
recent months and is happening in Ukraine is an armed coup that was conducted by the opposition with the 
use of arms of terrorist groups with full support of some Western states”955. In a speech, presidential 
candidate, Petro Poroshenko stated that the “I'm convinced it would be a betrayal of Maidan if we were not 
united”956. Lavrov called for “deep constitutional reform” in Ukraine and stated that “Frankly speaking, we 
don't see any other way for the steady development of the Ukrainian state apart from as a federation” 957. 
Inside Crimea, the Tartar population demanded autonomy958. In the Russian Security Council, talks were 
held on beginning the process of withdrawing Russia from a number of bilateral agreements with Ukraine 
on the issue of the Black Fleet959. In a statement the Russian foreign ministry targeted the UN resolution 
which declared the Crimean referendum had no validity960. The statement said that Western states had used 
“the full force of the unspent potential of the cold war-era propaganda machine” to push the vote through961. 
Russian ambassador to the UN further added “Very many countries complained that they were undergoing 
colossal pressure on the part of Western powers to vote in support of that resolution”962. Members of the 
right sector organization in Ukraine protested outside of the parliament following the death of one of their 
leaders963. They demanded an investigation into the death and the resignation of the interior minister964. The 
interim president condemned the organization and stated that they were bent on destabilizing the country965. 
 
March 29, 2014: Lavrov states in a television interview with Russian media that “"We have absolutely no 
intention of - or interest in - crossing Ukraine's borders." 966. But also that Russia was prepared to 
protect:"the rights of Russians and Russian-speaking people in Ukraine, using all available political, 
diplomatic and legal means"967. A proposal has been drafted between the US and other European countries 
calling for the “halting the military build-up near Ukraine's border, the deployment of international monitors 
in Crimea to protect the rights of Russian speakers, and the return of Russian troops there to their bases.”968. 
Putin had however drawn the US attention to "the continued rampage of extremists" in Kiev and other 
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regions of Ukraine969. NATO described the movement of Russian troops near the borders of Ukraine as a 
“huge military build-up”970. Kerry and Lavrov plan to meet for a discussion over a “working document” on 
the crisis in Ukraine971. According to UN envoys, Russia threatened countries ahead of the vote on the 
referendum resolution972. A Russian spokesperson stated that “We never threaten anyone. We just explain 
the situation.”973 The Crimean Tartars Assembly voted in favor of seeking “ethnic and territorial autonomy” 
on the Peninsula.  
 
March 30, 2014: The meeting between Lavrov and Kerry does not lead to any outcome, but both agree on 
the need to find a diplomatic solution974. General Philip Breedlove, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe and the head of the U.S. military’s European Command, is sent back to Europe to continue 
consultations with NATO allies975. Fear rise in the US over a possible Russian intervention into Ukraine. 
The number of US aircrafts in regular air patrols over the Baltics are increased976.  
 
March 31, 2014: Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, visits Crimea for a government meeting on 
the socioeconomic development of Crimea977. In Russia, Putin signed an executive order establishing the 
Ministry of Crimean Affairs978. In a telephone call with Chancellor Angela Merkel, the German 
Bundesregierung pointed to Putin allegedly informing of the partial withdrawal of Russian troops from the 
border of Ukraine979. In a Russian statement however, Putin called for constitutional reform in Ukraine and 
spoke of ways to reach a settlement of the conflict in Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria980.  
 
April 1, 2014: The Ukraine parliament votes to “disarm illegal groups” including the Right Sector, 
following a fatal shooting on the city’s main square981. The resolution stated: “In line with the extreme 
sociopolitical situation in the country, the escalation of crime and systematic provocations from foreign 
citizens in southeastern Ukraine and Kiev, the Verkhovna Rada orders the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
the Special Services to immediately disarm the illegal groups”982. The resolution follows a call from France, 
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endorsed by Russia984. NATO suspends “all practical civilian and military cooperation" with Russia985. 
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that Russia’s aggression “is the gravest threat to 
European security in a generation and it challenges our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace986" 
NATO and Ukraine also announce and intensification of their cooperation and the promotion of defense 
reforms in Ukraine through training and other programs987. Russia warned Ukraine of further integration 
with NATO and as past attempts as “led to a freezing of Russian-Ukrainian political contacts, a headache 
between NATO and Russia and[…]to a division in Ukrainian society” and that future economic ties 
between Russia and Ukraine “will largely depend on the actions Ukraine takes in its foreign policy”988. 
Gazprom eliminates the discount on gas import prices given to Ukraine in November 2013989. The US 
House of Representatives pass two bills, one which includes aid to Ukraine and further sanctions towards 
Russia and the other providing money to increase the broadcasting of “Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
and Voice of America to eastern Ukraine, including Crimea, to counter pro-Russian broadcasts in the 
area”990. This comes as a response to reports that Russian forces have seized control of media stations in 
Crimea from where misleading reports about attacks against the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine991.   
 
April 2, 2014: Yanukovych states in an interview that the annexation of Crimea is “a tragedy” and that 
ways should be found to reunite Crimea with Ukraine992. Ukraine plans to file a lawsuit against Russia in 
the International Court of Justice for the annexation of Crimea993. Western and US diplomats stated that 
based on the UNGA resolution on the Crimean referendum, the UN would continue to treat Crimea as part 
of Ukraine994. The government in Ukraine moved towards decentralization of power and approved a plan 
granting more power to the regions by replacing the appointment of regional governors with elections995.   
 
April 3, 2014: Gen. Philip Breedlove, NATO's supreme allied commander Europe states that Russian 
troops were capable of moving on Ukraine within 12 hours of an order and that at present time 40.000 
Russian troops were stationed at the border996. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated 
that Russia is trying to “reestablish a Russian sphere of influence covering the former Soviet space” 997. To 
NATO, Sergei Lavrov responded by saying “there are no restrictions on the movements of military units 
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within the territory of the Russian Federation”998. Lavrov also pointed to the NATO presence in Poland and 
elsewhere and stated “Our point is that Russia and NATO are also bound by a certain set of rules, including 
the Rome Declaration and the Fundamental Act of the NATO-Russian Council, according to which there 
must be no permanent excessive military presence on the territories of the Eastern European states” 999. 
Russia also recalled its ambassador to NATO following NATOs suspension of the Russia-NATO 
collaboration1000. US announced the suspension of bilateral projects with Russia and stated that the funding 
for these projects would be funneled to Ukraine1001. A report by the Ukraine Interior Ministry, alleges that 
Yanukovych and the Russian FSB were involved in the plans to open fire at protesters in February, which 
resulted in the killing of 100 people1002.  
 
April 5, 2014: Ukraine interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, accuses Russia of economic aggression 
and threatens to sue Russia over the increase in the price of natural gas import1003. 
 
April 6, 2014: In Donetsk protesters stormed the regional government demanding the authorization of a 
referendum on allowing the Donetsk Republic to join Russia1004. Protests continued in other parts of the 
country including in Luhansk, Odessa and Kharkiv1005. 
 
April 7, 2014: The local government building in Donetsk is taken over by pro-Russian activists1006. Donetsk 
declares itself independent from the central government in Kiev and announces an upcoming referendum 
on joining Russia1007. The president of Ukraine denounced it as a part of Russia’s plan to invade Eastern 
Ukraine1008. 
 
April 8, 2014: In Luhansk pro-Russian activists hold hostages and are demanding a referendum1009. Kerry 
states that “It is clear that Russian special forces and agents have been the catalyst behind the chaos of the 
last 24 hours” referring to the increased tensions in the Eastern part of Ukraine and calls from Luhansk and 
Donetsk for a referendum1010. He also stated that this move “could potentially be a contrived pretext for 
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military intervention just as we saw in Crimea”1011. Russia responded by saying that “One should not seek 
to put the blame on someone else”1012. Right-wing groups in Russia have sought for volunteers to go to 
Ukraine although there are no reports that they have succeeded in this1013. Russia warns that any use of 
force in the eastern part of Ukraine could lead to civil war1014.  
 
April 9, 2014: Plans are made for US, EU, Ukraine and Russia to meet for talks1015. A statement by the 
Russian Foreign Ministry stated: “Lavrov noted that this format could be useful if it is aimed not at 
discussing various aspects of one bilateral relationship or another, but on helping to arrange a broad and 
equal internal Ukrainian dialogue with the aim of agreeing mutually acceptable constitutional reform,”1016. 
Both expressed the wish of a peaceful solution to the situation in eastern Ukraine1017. A support group 
within the EU is established with the aim of advising Ukraine on political and economic reforms1018. The 
work of the group could also be extended to Georgia and Moldova1019. At a Cabinet meeting, Ukraine’s 
interior minister stated on the situation in Eastern Ukraine: “I think that a resolution of this crisis will be 
found in the next 48 hours,'…'There are two possible ways it can happen: either through the negotiation 
process or through forceful intervention.'1020.  
 
April 10, 2014: Ukraine offers the pro-Russian activists in Eastern Ukraine who have occupied government 
buildings and are armed, amnesty1021. According to Russian media, Ukraine was sending military hardware 
to Eastern Ukraine in preparation for the use of force against the pro-Russian activists1022.   
 
April 12, 2014: Pro-Russian forces seize more government facilities in several cities in Eastern Ukraine1023. 
Ukraine’s Interior Minister Arsen Avakov stated that special forces had been sent to the area and that "Our 
response will be very severe[…]There is zero tolerance for armed terrorists,"1024  
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April 13, 2014: The UNSC meets to discuss the situation in Ukraine. While Ukraine and the US blamed 
Russia for the unrest, Russia stated that the conflict was fueled by terrorists and that “The international 
committee must require that henchmen of Maidan stop war with their own people[…]Western sponsors of 
Maidan including USA should stop this.”1025 Churkin continued: “Russia has been in favor, not of 
worsening of the crisis, not destabilize the country, we dont’ want that. It is not our fault that the situation 
has come to this[…]Apparently Maidan was a cry for democracy but apparently in Crimea or East Ukraine 
it’s an act of defiance, what is the difference? U.S. is going to encourage the criminal use of force? It makes 
no sense”1026 
 
April 14, 2014: Pro-Russian activists seize the police station in the city of Horlivka and raise the Russian 
flag1027. The sitting mayor is removed and replaced with a “people’s mayor” from the self-defense forces1028. 
Ukraine President Oleksandr Turchynov, announces that “anti-terrorist operations” are soon on the way in 
Eastern Ukraine1029. The US and EU agree to widen the sanctions on Russia for its “plot to dismember 
Ukraine”1030. In a talk with UN General Secretary Ban Ki-Moon, the Ukraine president suggests the 
deployment of UN peacekeepers alongside the anti-terrorist operations1031. The president also announced 
that he was not opposed to a national referendum and that such a vote could accompany the presidential 
elections in May1032. Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that the Russian-speaking Ukrainians 
in Eastern Ukraine should be part of the drafting of a new constitution1033. As he stated: “Fashioning some 
kind of text with the Verkhovny Rada (Ukrainian parliament) without the participation of the regions and 
then putting it to a referendum: that does not respond to the criteria we speak about or that the south east 
(of Ukraine) has spoken about and we back their stance.1034”  
 
April 15, 2014: The US states that the anti-terrorist operations Ukraine has announced in Eastern Ukraine 
are warranted1035. As stated by White House Spokesman, Jay Carney: “The Ukrainian government has the 
responsibility to provide law and order and these provocations in eastern Ukraine are creating a situation in 
which the government has to respond,”1036. The US also announced that it was considering further sanctions 
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albeit it was not considering providing lethal aid to Ukraine1037. Ukraine launches its anti-terrorist 
operations in Eastern Ukraine. In a conversation with Ban Ki-Moon, Putin stated that “he expected “clear 
condemnation” of the “anti-constitutional” operation by the international community”1038. Interim president 
of Ukraine, Turchynov stated that: “along with the Russian special forces and the terrorists there are 
hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens in the Donbass who were tricked by Russian propaganda.1039” 
According to head of the Ukrainian National Security Council, Andriy Parubiy, many of the right-wing 
nationalists of Maidan were poised to join the fight in Eastern Ukraine1040. In a tweet he wrote: “Reserve 
unit of National Guard formed from #Maidan Self-defense volunteers was sent to the front line this 
morning,”1041 
 
April 16, 2014: The are talks of defections on the Ukraine side in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine1042 with 
Russian media stating that many of the Ukraine soldiers have switched sides to join the pro-Russian 
activists1043. A Ukraine officer reportedly stated that he had not “come to fight" and would never obey 
orders to shoot his "own people"1044. NATO announces that it increases the defense of its eastern 
members1045. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen promised "more planes in the air, mores 
ships on the water, more readiness on the land"1046. Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated that: 
“Certainly, no one can impose a scheme of organising a state system on Ukraine[…]But Ukrainians should 
begin dialogue making it all-embracing and comprehensive[…]All regions and political forces in Ukraine 
should participate in it on par, have equal rights in settling pressing issues[…]All this should be reflected 
in a reformed Constitution which would be taken by a poly-ethnic Ukrainian society as reliable foundations 
of a rule-of-law state intended for a far future.1047”. Ukraine's acting President Olexander Turchynov 
announces the start of an "anti-terrorist operation" against pro-Russian separatists which is meant to “protect 
Ukrainian citizens, to stop the terror, to stop the crime, to stop the attempts to tear our country apart"1048. 
 
April 17, 2014: Russia, Ukraine, US and the EU meet for a four-way talk on deescalating the conflict in 
Ukraine1049. A deal was reached which consists of 5 points: 1) All sides refrain from violence, and reject 
expressions "of extremism, racism and religious intolerance, including antisemitism"; 2) All illegal armed 
groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be returned; all illegally occupied streets and 
other public places in Ukrainian cities and towns must be vacated. 3) Amnesty will be granted to protesters 
and to those who have left buildings and other public places and surrendered weapons, with the exception 
of those found guilty of capital crimes. 4) The OSCE would play a leading role in helping the authorities 
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implement the agreement. 5) Constitutional reform would be inclusive, transparent and accountable.1050. 
The agreement does however not address neither the Russian nor the NATO troop build-up in the area1051. 
The OSCE was made responsible for ensuring the implementation of the agreement1052. The US, EU and 
Russia will provide monitors to the OSCE. Kerry later stated that the US would hold Russia accountable 
for the compliance of the pro-Russian protesters in eastern Ukraine1053. The US announced reports regarding 
the distribution of antisemitic leaflets to Jews in Donetsk, calling on them to register with the separatists1054. 
Apart from pro-Russian activist activities, demonstrations were also held in Donetsk calling for the 
territorial integrity of Ukraine1055. 
 
April 18, 2014: The separatists do not comply with the Geneva agreement. A leader of the People’s republic 
of Donetsk stated that “Lavrov did not sign anything for us, he signed on behalf of the Russian Federation”. 
Meanwhile the separatists in Slovyansk stated that they needed more assurance about their immunity from 
prosecution1056, whilst other separatists in Donetsk stated that they would not withdraw before the "illegal" 
Western-backed government in the capital Kiev stood down and until the pro-European demonstrators left 
Kiev's Independence Square1057. US national security adviser, Susan Rice, stated: “If we don’t see action 
commensurate with the commitments that Russia has made yesterday in Geneva[…]then obviously we’ve 
been very clear that we and our European partners remain ready to impose additional costs on Russia.”1058. 
“Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged additional Russian troops were moved close to the 
Ukraine border "due to the instability of the political situation."”.1059 He also stated that "Russia should not 
be addressed or treated like a schoolgirl with a checklist of things to do"1060 
 
April 19, 2014: Ukraine decides to suspend the anti-terrorist operations during Easter in an “Easter 
Truece”1061. If the separatists have not left government buildings following Easter, the anti-terrorist 
operations will continue1062. A mediator from the OSCE travels to Eastern Ukraine with the purpose of 
mediating the removal of the separatists from the government buildings and their disarmament1063. 
According to Swiss envoy Christian Schoenenberger, whose country is chair of the OSCE, there is currently 
no political will to move out of the buildings and that the task of the OSCE is to create this political will 
and “inform the people, so eventually they will understand that the best option for them is to move out” 1064. 
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or perhaps just Kiev’s total impotence,” “If it’s impotence, then we’ve won. If they’re getting ready to 
provoke us, then we will hit back with force.” 1065 . In an interview with Russia media, Putin stated on the 
topic of Russia-west relations: “I think there is nothing that would hinder a normalization and normal 
cooperation[…]This does not depend on us. Or rather not only on us. This depends on our partners.”1066 
Russia states that it only has an interest in protecting its borders and Russian-speakers in Ukraine from 
“fascists”1067. Ukraine’s foreign minister responded to the separatist demands of the removal of protests 
from Kiev’s Independence Square by stating that these protests were not illegal as they had "asked 
permission from the city council"1068.  
 
April 20, 2014: The Easter Truce is violated with a shootout near the city of Slovyansk between separatists 
and unknown fighters1069. The Russian Foreign ministry blamed the Right Sector, which the Right Sector 
denied1070. Following the incident the Russian Foreign Ministry stated: “The Easter truce has been 
violated[…]This provocation[…]testifies to the lack of will on the part of the Kiev authorities to rein in and 
disarm nationalists and extremists.”1071 The self-proclaimed mayor of the time appealed to Russia to 
consider sending in peacekeeping troops1072. The spokesman of the Right Sector stated that the shootout 
was a “blasphemous provocation from Russia: blasphemous because it took place on a holy night for 
Christians, on Easter night. This was clearly carried out by Russian special forces.”1073 In an interview, 
Ukraine’s interim Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of trying 
to "restore the Soviet Union"1074. "It's crystal clear that for today, Russia is the threat to the globe, and the 
threat to the European Union, and a real threat to Ukraine1075," Photos are published in the New York Times 
showing Russian military involvement in Eastern Ukraine1076. The photos were provided by the government 
of Ukraine and handed over to the OSCE1077. Putin denied that Russian special forces were present in 
Eastern Ukraine1078. As he stated: "It's all nonsense, there are no special units, special forces or instructors 
there,"1079 He did however admit that the troops in unmarked green uniforms who took part in seizing the 
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April 21, 2014: The US announces assistance package to Ukraine including financial aid and the provision 
of advisers1081. Joe Biden visits Kiev1082. 
 
April 22, 2014: Ukraine relaunches the anti-terrorist operation following the kidnapping, torture and killing 
of the Town Councilor in Horlivka and another man, by a pro-Russian group1083. The towns self-declared 
mayor blamed the Right Sector and stated “This is all being done by the Right Sector. They are constantly 
trying to discredit us,”1084 Ukraine’s state security service accused a rogue SBU officer from their service 
and an officer in Russia’s GRU military intelligence for being involvement in the murder1085. Joe Biden 
visits Kiev where he states: “this is a second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by the 
Orange Revolution.  This is a genuine opportunity to get right what is always difficult to do the first time 
when coming out from under the oppression or control of another power.”1086 In a phone call between John 
Kerry and Sergei Lavrov, Kerry stated that Russia should engage with the government of Ukraine and the 
OSCE and publicly call on the separatists to disarm and accept amnesty1087. Lavrov however called on the 
Ukraine government to end the anti-terrorist campaign against its own population, disarm ultranationalist 
groups and engage in constitutional reform1088. The Pentagon announces that it will send 600 troops to 
Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia1089. The troops will participate in trainings and exercises and rotate 
on a monthly basis1090. 
 
April 23, 2014: In an interview to RT, Sergei Lavrov states: “Yes, they announced a pause in what they 
call “counter terrorist operation”. But now that Joe Biden visited Kiev this counter terrorist operation was 
declared in the active phase again. Well, it’s quite telling that they chose a moment of vice-president of the 
United States visit to announce the resumption of this operation because the launching of this operation 
happened immediately after the John Brennan’s visit to Kiev. So I don’t have any reasons not to believe 
that the Americans are running the show in a very close way”1091. Russia and Ukraine announce that they 
will meet for “energy talks”1092. 
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April 24, 2014: Following the resumption of the anti-terrorist operations, Russia announces renewed 
military exercises at its Ukraine borders1093. Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu stated: "We are forced 
to react to such a development of the situation." 1094. On Russian TV, Putin stated: "If the regime in Kiev 
has begun using the army against the population inside the country, then this is undoubtedly a very serious 
crime." And that this would have consequences and inter-state relations would be affected1095.  
April 25, 2014: The leaders of the G7 countries issue a statement condemning Russia and stated: “Russia 
has taken no concrete actions in support of the Geneva accord.”1096. They also stated that they would impose 
further sanctions1097. Referring to Russia’s military exercise on its borders, the acting head of Ukraine’s 
presidential administration, Serhiy Pashynskyi stated: “In the event of any crossing of the border by Russian 
troops, we will qualify this as an invasion and we will eliminate the invaders,”1098.  
 
April 26, 2014: Russia violates the airspace of Ukraine1099. Ukraine Prime Minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 
stated: "We do understand the reason Russian military did it. The only reason is to provoke Ukraine to 
strike missile and to accuse Ukraine of waging the war to Russia"1100. Russia denied the incident and also 
vowed to assist in freeing “a team of international military observers who are being detained by pro-Russian 
separatists who suspect the observers are "NATO spies."”1101.  
 
April 28, 2014: Obama reconfirms that the US will not consider a military involvement in Ukraine1102. As 
he stated: "Do people actually think us sending some additional arms into Ukraine could deter the Russian 
army?"1103. The mayor of the city Kharkiv in Eastern Ukraine is shot in the back but survives1104. Pro-
Russian and pro-Ukrainians clash in protests in Donetsk1105. Russia announces that it is ready to discuss the 
military aspects of the conflict in Ukraine within the framework of the OSCE’s Forum for Security 
Cooperation1106. The discussion should first and foremost “be held about “an immediate end to the active 
phase of the Kiev regime’s deadly punitive operation against residents of southeastern Ukraine.”1107.  
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April 29, 2014: A tape is leaked in which John Kerry states that the pro-Russians in eastern Ukraine are 
receiving orders from Russia: “Intel is producing taped conversations of intelligence operatives taking their 
orders from Moscow and everybody can tell the difference in the accents, in the idioms, in the language. 
We know exactly who's giving those orders, we know where they are coming from”1108.  
 
April 30, 2014: IMF approves a $17 billion aid package to Ukraine1109. Russia plans to invest approx. $4 
billion in Eastern Ukraine and “promote that investment as a contrast to the IMF-run program, which 
stresses austerity”1110. Ukraine's acting President Olexander Turchynov states that his forces are "helpless" 
in ending the unrest in Eastern Ukraine and that the goal now was to prevent the spreading of the unrest1111. 
Moscow warns that its troops are ready to act if its interests are threatened1112.  
 
May 1, 2014: Ukraine reinstates military conscription in order “to increase the state defense potential” and 
because of the “interference of the Russian Federation into the interior affairs of Ukraine"1113. In a 
conversation with Angela Merkel, Putin stated that: “the most important thing now is to withdraw all 
military units from the south-eastern parts [of Ukraine], stop the violence, and immediately start a national 
dialogue that would involve all regions and all political forces within the framework of a constitutional 
reform"1114. 
 
May 3, 2014: Moscow blames Kiev and the West for the bloodshed in Ukraine and also states that it is now 
impossible to convince people to disarm because their lives are under threat1115. Spokesperson for Vladimir 
Putin, Dmitry Peskov stated: “Desperate people call, they ask for help. The vast majority want Russia’s 
help,”..“All of these calls are reported to President Vladimir Putin.” 1116.  
 
May 5, 2014: Moldova puts its borders on alert in fear of the violence in Odessa spreading to the break-
away region of Transnistria1117.  
 
May 6, 2014: Russia and Ukraine participate to a ministerial session at the Council of Europe1118. One of 
the topics at the meeting was a new round of Geneva talks1119. Both Russia and Ukraine were open to the 
idea but had different conditions1120. Ukraine Foreign Minister Andriy Deshchytsia stated that: “If Russia 
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is ready to commit itself to support these elections and to eliminate this threat and eliminate its support for 
the extremist elements in Ukraine, we are ready to have such a round of meetings"1121. Lavrov however 
stated that “To convene in this format again, when the opposition to Kiev regime is absent from the 
negotiating table, that would hardly add anything,” 1122. 
 
May 7, 2014: Putin states that the presidential elections scheduled in Ukraine for May 25 is a step "in the 
right direction"1123. 
 
May 8, 2014: Putin states that the scheduled referendum in Eastern Ukraine by the separatists should be 
postponed1124. Putin however insisted that “a presidential election should be preceded by constitutional 
changes in Ukraine aimed at federalising the country and handing greater powers to the regions.1125“ The 
separatists however decide to continue with the referendum1126.  
 
May 9, 2014: Moscow celebrates Victory Day and Putin visits Crimea1127. In a speech given in Crimea he 
stated: “I think 2014 will also be an important year in the annals of Sevastopol and our whole country, as 
the year when people living here firmly decided to be together with Russia, and thus confirmed their faith 
in the historic truth and the memory of our forefathers”1128.  
 
May 11, 2014: The referendum is held in Eastern Ukraine with reports of election fraud1129. “Russian police 
officers oversaw voting at a Moscow polling station erected for expat Ukrainians to vote in the Donetsk 
and Luhansk referendums.”1130 According to a Pew Research Centre polling, 70% of the population in the 
area wish Ukraine to remain united1131.  
 
May 12, 2014: Following the referendum, the Donetsk People’s Republic appeals to Moscow to consider 
absorbing the region into the Russian Federation to “restore historic justice”1132. The separatists claim the 
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area to declare independence rather than seeking for secession1134. Russia did not respond directly to the 
request but rather stated that it has “respect” for the decisions made at the referendums1135.  
 
May 13, 2014: Clashes intensify between Ukrainian servicemen and the separatists1136. The Luhansk 
People’s Governor, Valeriy Bolotov, survived an attack against him1137. Interim Ukrainian President 
Oleksandr Turchynov stated about the referendum: "That farce the terrorists call a referendum is nothing 
else but a propagandist cover for killings, kidnapping, violence and other grave crimes."1138. The US 
government releases satellite photos showing the presence of Russian troops at the Ukraine border, hereby 
discrediting Russia’s claims that the troops had been withdrawn1139. Colonel Martin Downie, spokesman 
for Allied Command Operations at NATO stated: “The reality is that Russia continues to have 40,000 high 
readiness troops massed on Ukraine’s border and another 25,000 troops in Crimea. The units on the latest 
satellite pictures show mechanised infantry, armoured vehicles and combat helicopters”1140. In a response 
to sanctions, Russia bars the United States from using Russian-made rocket engines for military satellite 
launches1141. Russia also rejected the prolongation of the US use of the International Space Station after 
20201142. Last month the US said “it would deny export licenses for any high-technology items that could 
aid Russian military capabilities and would revoke existing licenses”1143. 
 
May 14, 2014: Ukraine starts national talks without the separatists1144. Ukraine stated that the separatists 
had to disarm before receiving an invitation1145. Interim prime minister, Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk, stated “To 
fight corruption and provide people with jobs is our main task[…]And that will unite our country.”1146. The 
framework of the talks was the peace plan agreed at the four-way talks on April 17, currently being 
implemented by the OSCE1147. The majority of the participants in their talk were aligned with the 
government in Kiev1148. The mayor of Donetsk, Aleksandr A. Lukyanchenko, urged Kiev to pay attention 
to the outcome of Sunday’s referendum as these show a lack of faith in the central government1149. The EU 
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announced that Moldova and Georgia would sign Association Agreements with the EU1150. Sergei 
Naryshkin, speaker of the Duma, stated that there were still reserves and resources to stop the crisis but that 
“The road to that lies through a dialogue only, through a dialogue of all political powers inside Ukraine.”1151. 
In a TV interview, Sergei Lavrov states that Ukraine is at the brink of a civil war and he stated: “In east and 
south of Ukraine there is a war, a real war, with heavy weaponry used. And if this is conducive to free and 
fair elections, then I don't recognize what free and fair is."1152. Sergei also stated that: “The seeds for the 
current crisis were sown in 2008 in April during the NATO summit in Bucharest, when NATO leaders 
stated in a declaration that Georgia and Ukraine would be in NATO,”1153. He pointed to this move leading 
Saakashvili to believe that he could solve the issue over the breakaway regions with force1154. Sergei also 
stated: “The attempts to draw Ukraine into NATO would be negative for the entire system of European 
security and we would be categorically against it.”1155. Russia would however not oppose to Ukraine joining 
the EU1156. Sergei also stated: “If the next morning somebody in Washington woke up in a bad mood and 
decided to start a coup elsewhere – not in Ukraine, but in Latin America, in their own backyard as they 
perceive it – those people must be prepared for this situation”. 1157 
 
May 15, 2014: Thousands of steelworkers and miners in Donetsk reclaim control over streets from 
separatists1158. The workers are employed by Ukraine’s richest man, Rinat Akhmetov, who had urged his 
employers to retake control over their city and support the unity of Ukraine1159. 
 
May 16, 2014: The UN monitoring mission in Ukraine release a report on the state of human rights in 
Eastern Ukraine. It points to a deterioration with primarily the pro-Russian groups being responsible for 
this. The report states: “Primarily as a result of the actions of organized armed groups, the continuation of 
the rhetoric of hatred and propaganda fuels the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine, with a potential of 
spiraling out of control”1160. It points to abuses such as kidnapping, beating, detention and killing of locals, 
politicians and journalists1161. As a response to the UN report, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated: “The 
complete lack of objectivity, blatant discrepancies and double standards leave no doubts that (the report's) 
authors were performing a political put-up job aimed at clearing the name of the self-declared authorities 
in Kiev”1162. In another event, Russia threatened to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine if it fails to pay a bill by 
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May 17, 2014: A second round of the national talks begin, this time in Eastern Ukraine1164. Representations 
from the regions was broader however the separatists were still not represented1165. The participants agreed 
on passing on a 12-point “Memorandum of Understanding to restore order in our country” which included 
a pledge to change the constitution to extend more power to Ukraine’s regions, grant a limited amnesty to 
separatists, condemn the unlawful use of weapons and secure the status of the Russian language1166. Overall, 
Kiev supports a “decentralization” plan to give more budget authority to local governments1167. The 
separatists however favor a federalization model that would give more overall power to governors1168. The 
central government is opposed to federalization proposed by Russia and the separatists as it is believed that 
this is a way for Russia and its supporters to divide the country and empower regional governors who are 
loyal to Russia1169. Tensions remained between the eastern and western representatives of Ukraine at the 
talks with the Eastern representatives demanding to know who backed the civil uprising in Kiev and the 
west demanding to know who is financing the separatists1170. Disagreements also exist over the fate of 
Yanukovych with the east declaring he was ousted and the west declaring that he was impeached1171. The 
Ukraine constitution has no provision for the steps of impeachment1172.  
 
May 18, 2014: There are concerns over the upcoming presidential elections, particularly in terms of 
ensuring access and safety for voters in eastern Ukraine1173. In a video by Igor Strelkov, the commander of 
the militia’s so-called “army of the southeast” complains that there was a lack of fighters because “tens of 
thousands are calmly watching TV and drinking beer and expecting Russia to intervene on their behalf”1174. 
 
May 19, 2014: In a statement from the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, Russian troops are ordered to 
withdraw from the Ukraine border and back to their garrisons1175. The statement also says: “President 
Vladimir Putin welcomes the first contacts between Kiev and supporters of federalisation, seeking to 
establish direct dialogue in which all parties concerned should take part”1176. NATO states that no signs of 
a withdrawal have so far been observed1177. Ukraine border guards however reported a decrease in Russian 
activity at the border1178. The EU announces two more rounds of talks between Russia and Ukraine over 
the row of gas prices1179.  
 
1164 David M. Herszenhorn “Talks in East aim to ease tensions in Ukraine” The New York Times, may 17, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/world/europe/talks-on-ukraine-crisis-move-to-separatist-region.html 
1165 Ibid 
1166 “Ukrainian officials hold unity talks as tension remains high” The Washington Post, May 17, 2014, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukrainian-officials-launch-unity-talks-as-tension-remains-
high/2014/05/17/59058d82-d81d-4621-807a-676dbcc44644_story.html?utm_term=.51e5cc05d9ec 






1173 “Ballots or barricades for Ukraine voters?” DW, May 19, 2014, https://www.dw.com/en/ballots-or-barricades-
for-ukraine-voters/a-17644562 
1174 Harriet Salem “Ukraine Election Officials: It May Be Impossible to Hold the Vote in Rebel Regions” Vice 
News, May 14, 2014, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/3kejm9/ukraine-election-officials-it-may-be-impossible-
to-hold-the-vote-in-rebel-regions 
1175 “Russia appeals for an immediate end to use of force in southeast Ukraine” President of Russia, May 19, 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/21035 
1176 Ibid 








May 20, 2014: In a TV interview with Bloomberg, Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev where he 
responds to questions about troop withdrawal, Crimea and the US policies1180. As he stated: “First, we did 
not annex any part of Ukraine. This is the Russian position. If you're referring to Crimea, the situation is 
radically different. The population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea held a referendum and voted for 
self-determination and for joining Russia in accordance with the existing procedure. And that's what they 
did…Crimea is a special and unique story”1181.  
 
May 21, 2014: Putin states that the order to withdraw Russian troops was made in order to create “favorable 
conditions for Ukraine's presidential vote and end speculations”1182. Putin also stated that that it would have 
made more sense for the Ukrainian authorities to have a constitutional referendum that would approve a 
new constitution before the election1183. As he stated: "It will be very difficult for us to develop relations 
with people, who come to power amid a punitive operation in southeastern Ukraine," 1184. 
 
May 23, 2014: Putin states that Russia will respect the result of the Ukraine presidential election1185. He 
also stated that he hoped US-Russia relations would improve are the resolution of the Ukraine crisis1186. A 
Russian military commander said Russia would respond to NATO’s troop buildup and exercises in Poland 
and the Baltics1187.  
 
May 25, 2014: Poroshenko wins the presidential elections1188. Access to polling stations in Eastern Ukraine 
were however restricted or not possible at all1189. 
 
May 26, 2014: Ukraine continues its anti-terrorist operations1190. In a statement President Poroshenko 
pointed to the separatists in eastern Ukraine and stated: “Their goal is to turn Donbass [east Ukraine] into 
Somalia. I will not let anyone do this to our state and I hope that Russia will support my approach”1191. 
Russia stated that it was “open to dialogue” with Poroshenko but that the anti-terrorist operations must 
end1192.  
 
May 30, 2014: According to US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Russia has made progress in pulling 
back its troops1193. He stated: “We do know that thousands of Russian troops have been pulled back and are 
moving away, but we also know that there are still thousands of Russian troops still there that have not yet 
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moved” 1194. NATO announces that its ambassadors will meet with their Russian counterparts1195. Increasing 
evidence emerges of the involvement of fighters from Russia and Northern Caucasus, including 
Chechnya1196. Ukraine states that Russian border guards do nothing to stop fighters entering Ukraine from 
Russia with trucks of ammunition and weapons1197.   
 
May 31, 2014: Russia criticizes the OSCEs suggestion of pulling out its international observers due to 
safety concerns1198. A statement by Russia said: “amid Kiev's intentionally intensified punitive operation in 
the east of the country, it is essential to step up the work of international observers."1199.  
 
June 5, 2014: Medvedev stated that the military operation in Eastern Ukraine has forced thousands to seek 
refuge in Russia1200. Claims which are denied by Ukraine1201. It has however become increasingly difficult 
for Ukraine to control its borders1202. Russia submits a resolution to the UNSC on the creation of 
humanitarian corridors and the cessation of Ukraine’s military operations1203. Russia also announced that it 
would return its ambassador to Ukraine to attend the inauguration of Poroshenko1204. Obama states that 
further sanctions will be imposed on Russia if it continues to destabilize Ukraine1205. He stated: “First, the 
status quo is unacceptable; the continuing destabilization of eastern Ukraine must stop.  Second, there are 
a set of things that need to happen.  President Putin must recognize the legitimate election of President 
Poroshenko.  He must stop arms crossing the border into Ukraine.  He must cease Russian support for 
separatist groups.  And third, if these things don’t happen, then sectoral sanctions will follow.  The next 
month will be vital in judging if President Putin has taken these steps, and that is what I will urge President 
Putin to do when I meet him later today.”1206 
 
May 6, 2014: A brief meeting is held between Putin and Poroshenko1207. They agreed detailed talks on a 
ceasefire would begin within few days1208. Putin stated that he had welcome a plan proposed by Poroshenko 
(no details on it given) and stated: “I felt the attitude was right as a whole[…]If this (plan) happens, then it 
creates conditions for the development of relations in other areas, including the economy.”1209.  
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June 7, 2014: Poroshenko is sworn in as President1210.  
June 9, 2014: In a trilateral group meeting between Germany, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, Poroshenko 
states that Ukraine “must cease fire by the end of this week”1211. He also promised that the negotiators 
would meet daily until the crisis is resolved1212. Russia and Ukraine reach a “mutual understanding on key 
stages of the implementation of the plan and on a list of priorities which will contribute to a de-escalation 
of the situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine”1213. Ukraine also announced that it would 
deploy police officers to eastern Ukraine1214. 
 
June 10, 2014: Poroshenko orders the creation of escape corridors for civilians1215. Russia and the US 
welcomes the decision1216. Russia however stated that ending the military operations against the separatists 
is key to solving the crisis and stated if this was done: "the people you call separatists will reciprocate” 1217. 
 
June 11, 2014: Ukraine rejects a Russian gas discount offer saying it “won’t fall into another Russian gas 
trap”1218.  
 
June 12, 2014: Ukraine condemns reports of three Russian tanks entering Ukraine through a border 
checkpoint controlled by separatists in the Luhansk region1219. Russia denied the report and said it was 
“another fake piece of information”1220. Russia also accuses Ukraine on not delivering on its promise of 
ending the fighting1221. As stated by Lavrov: “The lack of any progress whatsoever in efforts to stop the 
violence and halt military operations[…]is causing increasing concern”1222.  
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June 13, 2014: Ukraine offers an interim gas agreement with Russia1223. Russia does not respond to the 
proposal1224. Separatists shoot down military transport plane and Poroshenko promised an adequate 
response stating: “All those involved in cynical acts of terrorism of this magnitude must be punished”1225. 
 
June 14, 2014: Russia’s embassy in Kiev is attacked by demonstrators throwing stones and Molotov 
cocktails at the building1226. Russia and the US condemn the attack and calls on Ukraine to provide adequate 
security1227.  
 
June 16, 2014: Poroshenko vows to recover control of its eastern borders and proposes a ceasefire with the 
separatists1228. Once the borders are closed and secure the government plans to declare a ceasefire1229. 
 
June 17, 2014: A gas pipeline carrying Russian gas to Europe through Ukraine explodes. Ukraine treat it 
as a possible act of terrorism and states that the event is: “the latest attempt by the Russian side to discredit 
Ukraine as a partner in the gas sector”1230. A Russian journalist dies in eastern Ukraine after being caught 
in a mortar fire1231. Russia condemns the act and stated in a statement: "The death of the Russian journalist 
near Lugansk has shown in its entirety the criminal nature of the forces that launched the military operation 
in the country’s east”1232.  
 
June 18, 2014: Poroshenko announces plans for a unilateral ceasefire1233. The ceasefire follows a 
conversation between Poroshenko and Putin1234. The ceasefire is part of Poroshenko’s peace plan which is 
meant to offer the separatists the possibility of laying down arms or leave the country1235. It also includes 
amnesty for those who have not committed grave crimes1236. Poroshenko stated: "I can say that the period 
of the ceasefire will be rather short. We anticipate that immediately after this, the disarming of the illegal 
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military formations will take place."1237. An insurgent leader from Donetsk said Poroshenko’s plan was 
“senseless” stating: “They cease fire, we lay down weapons, and then they will capture us weaponless”1238. 
Other pro-Russian activists join in rejecting the ceasefire1239. Lavrov stated that any ceasefire should be 
“comprehensive” and not just temporary but that if the cease fire was followed by negotiations “then it 
could be the step President Poroshenko has promised and which in general we were all waiting for."1240 
 
June 19, 2014: NATO states that Russia has resumed its military build-up at the border. Secretary General 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated: "I can confirm that we now see a new Russian military buildup — at least 
a few thousand more Russian troops deployed to the Ukrainian border, and we see troop maneuvers in the 
neighborhood of Ukraine[…]If they're deployed to seal the border and stop the flow of weapons and fighters 
that would be a positive step. But that's not what we're seeing[…]I consider this a very regrettable step 
backwards and it seems that Russia keeps the option to intervene further[…]So the international community 
would have to respond firmly if Russia were to intervene further. That would imply deeper sanctions which 
would have a negative impact on Russia."1241. Separatists reject the planned ceasefire and violent clashes 
erupt between Ukrainian servicemen and the separatists1242. A spokesman of the forces stated: “We issued 
an ultimatum to the terrorists overnight to surrender their weapons. We guarantee their safety and 
investigation in line with Ukrainian law[…]They refused,”1243.  
 
June 20, 2014: Poroshenko announces the beginning of the ceasefire which is to last until June 271244. In a 
statement he states: "Those who will not lay down their weapons will be destroyed,"1245. Details emerge on 
a 15-point peace plan which includes the creation of a 10-kilometer "buffer zone” at the Russian-Ukrainian 
border, which will be “jointly patrolled.”1246. A spokesman for Putin stated that Russia had taken measures 
to "strengthen the protection of Russian borders"1247. Valery Bolotov, head of the Lugansk People’s 
Republic stated: “Our people will not lay down arms until Ukraine pulls out all troops from our 
territory,”1248.   
 
June 22, 2014: Putin declares his support for the 15-point peace plan and ceasefire as he states: “The fact 
that President Poroshenko has declared a ceasefire is without question an important step towards reaching 
a final settlement, and perhaps is one of the most important conditions for this to happen. Russia will 
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certainly support these plans.”1249. He however also urged that the ceasefire open up plans for dialogue 
which includes the separatists “so as to find solutions that will be acceptable to all sides, in order to ensure 
that people in southeast Ukraine have no doubt that they are an integral part of the country, have the same 
rights as all other citizens, and know that these rights are guaranteed, including by Ukraine’s 
constitution”1250. The office of President Putin also “welcomed the news that Ukraine’s Choice public 
movement has started making contacts in Donetsk and Lugansk. Ukraine’s Choice is led by Viktor 
Medvedchuk (Ukrainian politician and oligarch), who has consistently supported the idea of federalism in 
Ukraine. At the same time he is a respected figure in Kiev and is known in the West.”1251 
 
June 23, 2014: Separatists in Eastern Ukraine agree to a four-day ceasefire and to start negotiations with 
the government1252. A trilateral contact group meeting between the government and the separatists was held 
in Donetsk and attended by Donetsk separatist leaders, the head of the Ukraine mission of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine and former Ukrainian president 
Leonid Kuchma1253. Putin offered, pro-Russian Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk and close friend 
of Putin as an interlocutor on the behalf of the separatists1254.  
 
June 24, 2014: Russia cancels the resolution which allows the use of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine1255. 
The resolution was first submitted to the Russian Federation Council in March due to the situation in 
Ukraine and as a mean to ensure the protection of Russians in Ukraine1256. The resolution was to permit the 
use of the Armed Forces “until the normalization of the social and political situation in that country.”1257 
The cancelling of the resolution comes in connection to the trilateral contact group talks1258. Peskov stated: 
“Because of the beginning of the three-party talks to settle down the situation in the eastern parts of Ukraine, 
the head of state has addressed to the Federation Council to repeal the resolution on the use of Russian 
armed forces on the territory of Ukraine,”1259. The ceasefire is violated as a military helicopter is shot 
down1260. Ukraine stated that "the head of state does not exclude that the ceasefire regime may be revoked 
ahead of schedule"1261. Alexander Borodai, leader of Donetsk People's Republic stated that: “I say officially 
now that there has been no ceasefire and, judging by everything, there will not be any,"…"In general, all 
that is left to us is to continue fighting,"1262. Igor Strelkov, commander in Slovyansk stated about the 
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ceasefire: "We should not trust a single letter," "They [Ukrainian troops] are trying to quickly and calmly 
take and reinforce new positions under the cover of the ceasefire treaty."1263.  
June 27, 2014: Ukraine signs the Association Agreement with the EU and declares that the country will 
one day become a full member of the union1264. Whereas Ukraine made to show it as a defiance against 
Russia, Putin blamed the crisis on Western leaders stating: “The acute crisis in this neighboring country 
seriously troubles us,” Mr. Putin said after a ceremony to receive the credentials of foreign diplomats. “The 
anti-constitutional coup in Kiev and attempts to artificially impose a choice between Europe and Russia on 
the Ukrainian people have pushed society toward a split and painful confrontation.”1265. The Russian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin said the deal would “no doubt[…]have serious consequences,”1266 
 
June 28, 2014: Sergei Lavrov accuses the US of pushing Ukraine into confrontation with Russia stating: 
“Our American colleagues still prefer to push the Ukrainian leadership toward a confrontational path.”1267 
 
June 29, 2014: Russian cameraman Anatoly Klyan is killed in Ukraine1268. Russia condemned the killing 
and stated that it undermined the ceasefire and showed that Ukraine was not willing to deescalate the 
conflict1269.  
 
June 30, 2014: Violence continues on the ground with both sides accusing the other1270. 
 
July 1, 2014: Poroshenko ends ceasefire and the anti-terrorist operation resumes1271. Putin condemned the 
renewed violence and stated: “All of us in Europe need a sort of safety net, so the Iraqi, Libyan, Syrian and 
Ukrainian precedents will not turn into an infectious disease”1272. He also stated: “Unfortunately President 
Poroshenko took the decision to restart military operations and we – I mean myself and my European 
colleagues – could not convince him that the road to stable, strong and long-lasting peace does not lie 
through war[…]Up until now (Poroshenko) was not directly linked to the order to start military operations 
but now he has taken on this responsibility fully, not only militarily but also politically”1273. The Russian 
foreign ministry hinted that the United States was behind Poroshenko’s decision1274. “There is an impression 
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that the change in Kiev’s position[…]could not have come about without influence from abroad, despite 
the position of leading EU member states”1275. 
 
July 2, 2014: Russia, Germany, Ukraine and France meet in Berlin for four-way talks1276. The group agrees 
on holding three-way talks with the separatists later that week1277. This comes as an initiative to reach a 
multilateral ceasefire1278. The three-way talks will be called trilateral contact group and consist of Ukraine, 
Russia and the separatists with the OSCE as mediator1279. The agreement also included Russia allowing 
Ukraine border guards to cross and control the checkpoints in Donetsk and Gukovo1280. 
 
July 3, 2014: The Ukraine parliament adds Poroshenko’s bill on amending the constitution concerning the 
powers of government bodies and self-government bodies to their agenda1281. This is to be followed by 
public debates and has to be approved by a simple majority in the Rada1282. 
 
July 5, 2014: Poroshenko proposes a time and venue for the trilateral contact group talks and as stated by 
his office: “Ukraine has proposed a place and time for the meeting and is waiting the other party's 
confirmation”1283. Ukraine states that the separatists continue to attack Ukrainian border checkpoints in 
Luhansk and Donetsk regions with assaults originating from both within Ukraine and from Russia1284. 
Ukraine recapture the city of Slovyansk, a strong-hold of the separatists, with Poroshenko stating: “This is 
not a complete victory. But the cleansing of Slovyansk from armed-to-the-teeth gangs of animals has great 
symbolic importance,”1285. He also promised that the military would soon “liberate” the rest of the 
separatist-held territories and promised humanitarian aid and legal amnesty to civilian in the areas1286. Denis 
Pushilin, leader of Donetsk People’s Republic, suggested that the group had been let down by Russia1287. 
He stated: “What to say. They encouraged us. Encouraged us and abandoned us[…]Putin’s words about 
protecting the Russian people, protecting Novorossiya, they were beautiful. But they were only words,”1288. 
In an interview with Russian TV, Igor Strelkov, the separatist military commander stated: “If Russia does 
not negotiate a ceasefire or intervene with its armed forces for us, for the Russian people who live here, we 
will be destroyed[…]It will happen in a week, two at most[…][The fighters] are people who consciously 
took up arms to defend their language and their culture, to defend Russia[…][But] Russia does not want to 
help them unify with their people.” “It is very difficult to accept that in nearly three months in Slavyansk 
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practically no real help has reached us,”1289. Strelkov also drew a distinction between assistance via “private 
channels” and the intervention by the Russian state that “we really need”1290. Russia called for an UN 
inquiry into the killing of civilians in eastern Ukraine and said it would stop returning Ukraine military 
equipment from Crimea to Ukraine until peace was restored in Eastern Ukraine1291.  
 
July 6, 2014: The anti-terrorist operation prepares its siege of Donetsk and Poroshenko states “My order is 
now in effect - tighten the ring around the terrorists…Continue the operation to liberate Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions,”1292. Ukraine calls it a turning point in the fight for control over Eastern Ukraine1293.  
 
July 7, 2014: The separatists fortify Donetsk1294. Sergei Lavrov calls the situation in eastern Ukraine worse 
than in Belgrade ahead of the civil war that broke apart Yugoslavia and urges the resumption of peace 
talks1295. Germany also called for the cessation of hostilities and the need for talks including the 
separatists1296.  
 
July 8, 2014: Ukraine’s new defense minister rules out negotiations until the separatists have disarmed1297. 
Self-declared Prime Minister of the Donetsk People’s Republic stated in an interview that he had been in 
“consultations” in Russia1298. Many of the separatists however now criticize President Vladimir Putin 
administration for giving them too little help1299. OSCE confirms that Ukraine, Russia met in Kiev, however 
the separatists where not represented1300. 
 
July 10, 2014: A Ukrainian air force pilot, who has captured by separatists, show up in Russia where she 
is charged for the killing of two Russian journalists in Ukraine1301. She is suspected of tipping off Ukrainian 
troops to the whereabouts of the journalists1302. Russia claims she crossed the Russian border under the 
guise as a refugee1303. Ukraine claims she was kidnapped by separatists and “illegally trafficked” to 
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Russia1304. EU announces new sanctions for 11 individuals over the Ukraine conflict1305. Their assets will 
be frozen and travel bans imposed1306. 
 
July 14, 2014: Russia vows to respond to the alleged artillery fire which killed a Russian civilian in the 
Russian border town, also called, Donetsk1307. The Russian foreign ministry stated: “The Russian side sees 
this provocation as the latest aggressive act from the Ukrainian side towards sovereign Russian territory 
and citizens of the Russian Federation[…]It must be underlined that this incident demonstrates the 
extremely dangerous escalation in tension around the Russian-Ukrainian border, and could have irreversible 
consequences, the responsibility for which rests with the Ukrainian side.”1308. Ukraine dismissed the claim 
from Russia as “nonsense” and blamed the separatists for the incident1309. A Ukraine transport plane is shot 
down which Ukraine states was “probably” done so from Russian territory1310. Separatists however claimed 
responsibility for the incident1311. 
 
July 15, 2014: Ukraine accuses Russia of destroying an apartment building in Eastern Ukraine, which killed 
11 civilians. Separatists however claimed Ukraine was responsible for the attack1312. Russia’s support to 
the separatists have emerged over the past days with the separatists complaining over the low quality of the 
weapons provided by Russia and a lack of more proactive assistance from Russia1313. 
 
July 17, 2014: Malaysian airline passenger plane is shot down over Eastern Ukraine1314.  
 
July 18, 2014: Obama holds a press conference on the Malaysian plane and states that “Evidence indicates 
that the plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile that was launched from an area that is controlled 
by Russian-backed separatists inside of Ukraine.”1315. International observers are prevented from inspecting 
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the site1316. The UNSC calls for a “full, thorough and independent international investigation” into the 
downing of the plane and “appropriate accountability” for those responsible1317. Ukraine and Russia blamed 
each other1318.  
 
July 19, 2014: Ukraine accuses Russia and the separatists of destroying evidence which proves their guilt 
in the downing of the Malaysian Airline1319. Armed men have prevented OSCE from inspecting the site1320. 
Separatist leader Aleksander Borodai stated that they had not touched the site although videos have emerged 
of men going through the wreckage and moving bodies1321. Putin has urged the separatists to cooperate and 
insisted that a U.N.-mandated investigation must not leap to conclusions1322. Russia blames Ukraine for the 
incident1323. Germany pointed to the incident and stated it was Russia’s last change to cooperate1324. Russia 
said it would retaliate the US sanctions1325. Lavrov and Kerry also agreed to try to get both sides of the 
conflict to reach a consensus1326. 
 
July 21, 2014: Ukraine steps up its operations against the separatists and they clash in Donetsk1327. A leader 
from the separatist hands over the black box from the Malaysian Airline1328. The UNSC unanimously passes 
a resolution condemning the attack on the Malaysian Airline1329. The resolution also called for an 
international investigation with the United Nations civil aviation agency and demanded that armed groups 
at the crash site allow unfettered access1330. Putin spoke with the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, with 
both giving a “high assessment of the resolution passed by the U.N. Security Council on the investigation 
into the catastrophe.”1331. Obama states that Russia has a direct responsibility to compel separatists to 
cooperate with the investigation and states “What are they trying to hide?”1332. 
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July 23, 2014: Alexander Khodakovsky, commander of the Vostok Battalion, acknowledges that the 
separatists do possess a BUK missile system, which is capable of shooting down airlines at cruising height, 
and that they received it from Russia1333. Khodakovsky also stated that “The question is this: Ukraine 
received timely evidence that the volunteers have this technology, through the fault of Russia. It not only 
did nothing to protect security, but provoked the use of this type of weapon against a plane that was flying 
with peaceful civilians”1334. Khodakovsky however later claimed that he was misquoted1335. Other separatist 
leaders continue to deny that they possess such a system1336. 
 
July 25, 2014: The US accuses Russia of firing artillery from its border into Ukraine in order to target 
Ukrainian military positions1337. The US also claims Russia is “planning to boost military shipments to 
separatists in a "clear escalation" of hostilities there”1338. Ukraine Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk resigns 
over frustration of the parliament to pass laws1339. The decision follows the failure of the parliament to pass 
a law on lessening Ukraine’s dependence on Russia gas1340. The Ukraine Defense Ministry warns the 
parliament that the military is running out of money to pay for its operations in Eastern Ukraine1341. The 
EU agrees to expand sanctions on Russia1342.  
 
July 26, 2014: Ukraine launches offensive to retake Donetsk and Russia accuses the US of conducting “an 
unrelenting campaign of slander against Russia, ever more relying on open lies."1343. Investigations into the 
Malaysian Airline crash is stalled by the ongoing battles in the area and the advancement of the Ukraine 
forces towards Donetsk1344. 
 
July 27, 2014: The US released satellite images which it claims backs up its accusations of Russia firing 
artillery into Ukraine1345. Kerry and Lavrov talk over the phone and agree on the need for an immediate 
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ceasefire1346. The US State Department further stated that Kerry urged Lavrov “to stop the flow of heavy 
weapons and rocket and artillery fire from Russia into Ukraine, and to begin to contribute to deescalating 
the conflict. He did not accept Foreign Minister Lavrov’s denial that heavy weapons from Russia were 
contributing to the conflict.”1347.  
 
July 28, 2014: Arseniy Yatsenyuk proposes to parliament the imposing of a war tax of 1,5% in order to 
pay for the military operations1348. 
 
July 30, 2014: Ukraine accuses separatists of mining the roads which lead to the crash site of the Malaysian 
Airline1349. Belarus announces that it will host talks between Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE1350. There were 
no indications that the separatists would be represented but Belarus states that “all interested sides” were 
invited1351. NATO military commander General Philip Breedlove also stated that the number of Russian 
troops and military equipment was increasing along the Ukraine border1352. Russia announced a ban on the 
import of most fruit and vegetables from Poland and stated that the ban could extend to the entire EU1353. 
 
July 31, 2014: Ukraine imposes a one-day ceasefire in order to allow the Dutch-led team to conduct its 
investigations at the Malaysian crash site1354. Clashes however continued with Ukraine stating that it was 
only firing in self-defense1355. The parliament votes not to accept the resignation of the Ukraine Prime 
Minister and agrees to impose the war tax1356. 
 
August 3, 2014: Ukraine advances on Donetsk and the separatists renew their calls for Russia to send in 
troops1357. Pavel Gubarev, the self-proclaimed governor of the separatist Donetsk region, said they would 
ensure a quick victory if Russia sent troops1358. As he stated: "Of course it would be great to see Russian 
peacekeepers here: strong artillery units, tank brigades[…]This war would be over in a day, maybe two."1359 
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August 4, 2014: 300 Ukraine troops cross into Russia1360. Ukraine states that they were forced to cross the 
border due to clashes with the separatists, whereas Russia claims they came to Russia to seek asylum1361. 
There are also disagreements over the exact number of troops1362. Lavrov stated: “I expect Ukrainian 
authorities to understand that it is absolutely unacceptable, when Ukrainians[…]are forced to fight with 
their own people, to treat those who refuse to do so as traitors to the motherland,”1363. According to the 
Ukrainian National Security and Defense council “the troops asked Russian border guards to open a 
humanitarian corridor and found themselves on Russian territory”1364.  
 
August 5, 2014: According to NATO, US and Ukraine, Russia continues to increase its military presence 
at the border which raises the “specter of a cross-border attack with little or no warning”1365. Western 
officials also worry that Russia will deploy the troops as peacekeepers in Eastern Ukraine, should the anti-
terrorist operations succeed in removing the separatists in Donetsk1366. Russia states that the situation in the 
Donetsk regions is on the brink of a humanitarian catastrophe and that the Ukraine government refuses to 
admit it1367.  
 
 
August 7, 2014: Alexander Borodai, the prime minister of the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic, 
resigns amid signs of deepening divisions within the movement1368. He is replaced by Alexander 
Zakharchenko1369. Borodai stated at the handover: “I am a Muscovite. Donbass should be led by a genuine 
Donetsk native”1370. Demonstrations erupt in Kiev as attempts are made to clear the independence 
square1371. Canada announces that it will send military equipment to Ukraine which includes helmets, 
ballistic eyewear, protective vests, first-aid kits, tents and sleeping bags1372. 
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August 8, 2014: The Prime Minister office in Ukraine and 10 other embassies in the country have been 
under cyberattack1373. Russia calls an emergency meeting at the UNSC on the humanitarian situation in 
eastern Ukraine1374. 
 
August 9, 2014: Donetsk is surrounded at the separatists ask for a ceasefire in order to prevent a 
humanitarian catastrophe1375. A Ukrainian spokesman stated that a ceasefire would only be possible if the 
separatists surrender1376. Poroshenko stated that Ukraine was ready to agree on humanitarian assistance, but 
it must come in without military accompaniment, it must pass through border checkpoints under Ukrainian 
control and the mission must be international in character1377. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated: 
"there was no attempt by Russian soldiers at penetration," and again called for humanitarian action, saying 
"this catastrophe now is the No. 1 theme for discussion."1378.  
 
August 11, 2014: Ukraine and Russia agree on a humanitarian mission led by the Red Cross1379. Russia 
stated it was sending an aid convoy to eastern Ukraine in collaboration with the Red Cross despite Western 
warnings not to use humanitarian help as a pretext for an invasion1380. The Red Cross sent a document to 
Ukraine and Russia which stipulated that “prior to the beginning of the operation, the ICRC should receive 
without undue delay from the authorities of the Russian Federation all necessary details concerning the aid, 
including the volume and type of items, and requirements for transport and storage.”1381. NATO stated that 
there was a “high probability” that Russia could launch an invasion of Ukraine1382.  
 
August 12, 2014: The US supports Ukraine in its decision to support the Russian convoy of aid only if it 
goes through customs check and hands over the aid to the Red Cross1383. Mr. Lavrov stated that the delivery 
was agreed with the Red Cross and that he expected that the Ukrainian government would guarantee the 
column’s security1384. He also stated that the separatists would do the same: “We have already signaled to 
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them[…]I am certain there will be no disruptions on their part. They are on the territory whose residents 
need humanitarian aid.”1385. 
 
August 14, 2014: The Russian aid convoy changes course1386. Ukrainian accuses Russia of repainting 
military vehicles white to disguise their efforts1387. Ukrainian officials also claim to have stopped a 
purported aid convoy accompanied by Russian troops and hence vowed to stop any "uncertified" aid convoy 
from Russia1388. Another leader of the separatists, Igor Strelkov, resigns1389. Ukraine accuses him of being 
the direct link between Russia and the separatists1390.  
 
August 15, 2014: Ukraine claims it has destroyed part of a Russian armored column inside Ukraine1391. 
Russia denied the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine and stated that the Ukrainian report was “some 
kind of fantasy”1392. Russia also accuses Ukraine of sabotaging aid delivery to the country1393. Russian 
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated Russia was “seriously concerned” by the increased NATO activity 
and called for a ceasefire to get aid into Ukraine1394. In an attempt to diffuse tensions, the Kremlin stated 
that the Ukrainian and Russian chiefs of presidential staff met in Russia on Friday1395. The foreign minister 
of Ukraine also stated that he would meet his Russian counterpart in Berlin on Sunday1396. 
 
August 16, 2014: Separatists in Ukraine claim that a Russian military convoy with military hardware is on 
the way to the separatists1397. NATO and Western journalists claim they saw Russian armour crossing the 
border1398. France also prepares for talks under the Normandy format, or the four-way talk, with France, 
Germany, Russia and Ukraine1399. 
 
August 17, 2014: Ukraine says it has made gains against the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk1400. 
Ukraine also acknowledges that the Russian convoy does contain humanitarian aid1401. Russia stated that 
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the convoy contained grain, sugar, baby food, medical supplies and sleeping bags1402. The elected governor 
in Luhansk stated that she did not want to receive aid from Russia1403. Lavrov meets with his Ukraine, 
French and German counterparts1404. Germany's foreign minister said the talks were aimed at "restarting 
the political process", seeking options for a cease-fire and finding a "framework for effective border 
controls"1405. The crisis risked entering an "intensified spiral of escalation" without such action.”1406. 
 
August 18, 2014: Rockets hit a convoy carrying refugees1407. Ukraine and the separatists disagree over who 
fired the rocket1408. 
 
August 19, 2014: Ukraine and Russia announce that Putin and Poroshenko will meet during a Customs 
Union-Ukraine-EU meeting in Minsk1409.  
 
August 20, 2014: Four people are detained in Moscow after a Soviet star on one of the city’s Seven Sisters 
high-rises was painted blue and yellow1410. In a statement to the incident Poroshenko stated: “On the eve of 
Independence Day we are starting an initiative called ‘Our Colours,’ which is devoted to the Ukrainian 
flag[…]And it is symbolic that, on this day, our colours have been painted on what is perhaps the greatest 
skyscraper in Moscow. I urge Ukrainians throughout the world, wherever they are, on the eve of the 
anniversary of our independence, to decorate their homes, offices, and cars in our national colours.”1411. 
 
August 21, 2014: Poroshenko states that he will tell Putin to rein in the separatists, when they meet on the 
26th1412. Poroshenko also stated: “In order to have solid positions in peace negotiations, we have to be strong, 
to have the unity of the people, a strong country, a strong army[…]We are capable of defending our 
sovereignty, our independence and our territorial integrity. Today we are fighting for the independence of 
Ukraine. Together we will win for sure,”1413. He also stated that he would soon announce the dissolution of 
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lives on both sides1415. A Ukraine journalist releases photos of a Russian armored vehicle and documents 
captured in Luhansk1416. Russia stated that the documents were fabricated1417. 
 
August 22, 2014: NATO claims Russia has moved military artillery units into Ukraine and was using them 
to fire at Ukrainian soldiers1418. A 200-aid convoy from Russia entered separatist held areas in Eastern 
Ukraine1419. The convoy entered without consent from Ukrainian authorities and escort from the Red 
Cross1420. The Russian foreign ministry stated “All the excuses to delay the delivery of aid to people in the 
area of a humanitarian catastrophe are exhausted[…]The Russian side has made a decision to act. Our 
column with humanitarian cargo starts moving toward Luhansk.”1421. Poroshenko stated that Ukraine forces 
would not attack the trucks1422. The People’s Republic of Donetsk stated that it would cease fire on parts of 
the roads where the Russian convoy passed1423.  
 
August 23, 2014: OSCE states that the Russian aid convoy has returned to Russia1424. Obama states that 
Russia’s decision to send in the convoy marked a “dangerous escalation” in the conflict1425. The Russian 
foreign ministry stated "The Russian convoy has left Ukrainian territory and is in the territory of the Russian 
Federation[…]We are receiving numerous messages from the people of Luhansk grateful for such a kind 
attitude on the part of Russia,"1426. The Red Cross, which was intended to escort the convoy, stated it had 
backed out due to security concerns in the area1427. An honorary consul representing Lithuania was 
reportedly kidnapped and killed by separatists in Luhansk1428. In a phone call with Poroshenko, Biden 
“commended Ukraine’s restraint in the face of Russia’s blatant provocation and disregard of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty,”1429.  
 
August 24, 2014: Ukraine celebrates Independence Day1430. In the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s 
Republic, separatists marched captured Ukrainian soldiers at gunpoint through the streets with a resident 
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stating: “This is no independence day. This is a plague on our land, the fascists who have taken control of 
Kiev who are now shooting at hospitals and morgues”1431. 
 
August 25, 2014: Poroshenko dissolves parliament and calls for elections in October1432. In his speech, 
Poroshenko stated that the current composition did not only “approve dictatorship laws that took away lives 
of the Heavenly Hundred,” (reference to those who died during Maidan), but also that “many of the deputies 
who sit or are listed in the Rada – if not direct sponsors and comrades, then sympathizers of militant 
separatists”1433. 
 
August 26, 2014: Putin and Poroshenko hold bilateral meetings in Minsk1434. Poroshenko stated: “A 
roadmap will be prepared in order to achieve, as soon as possible, a ceasefire regime which absolutely must 
be bilateral in character,"1435. Putin stated: “Russia, for its part, will do everything to support this peace 
process if it starts"1436. But he also added that it was up to the Ukraine government and the separatists to 
work out conditions for a truce1437. Ukraine states that it has captured 10 Russian paratroopers near the 
border1438. Russia stated that they had crossed the border “by accident”1439. Russia also stated that 500 
Ukraine servicemen had crossed the Russian border and that "We did not give much publicity to that. We 
just returned all those willing to return to Ukrainian territory at safe places.".1440. Ukraine Security Service 
releases videos of a group of Russian soldiers captured in Ukraine1441. One of the soldiers stated: “My 
vehicle was hit at and blown up[…]Then I understood it was not just a military exercise and I got scared.  
Now I understand we were sent to fight people we shouldn’t have been fighting[…]They sent us here 
without informing us or explaining why just as if we were cannon fodder,”1442. Lavrov denied any illegal 
crossing of Russian soldiers and said this was part of the information war1443. According to a statement 
from a source in the Russian defense ministry:  "The soldiers really did participate in a patrol of a section 
of the Russian-Ukrainian border, crossed it by accident on an unmarked section, and as far as we understand 
showed no resistance to the armed forces of Ukraine when they were detained,”1444.  
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August 27, 2014: No agreement is reached in Minsk and fighting continues1445. Ukraine accuses Russia of 
deepening its presence in Ukraine and sending new troops to Crimea1446. Ukraine states that another 
armored column had entered Ukraine from Russia1447. In another event Lavrov stated about the Ukraine 
Government and the separatists: “We are now convinced that everything possible must be done to ensure 
that they sit down at the negotiating table and start moving from an urgent ceasefire to trying to hear each 
other. Until they sit down we won't be able to understand whether they will be able to live together or 
not[…]Unless a political dialogue is launched with the participation of all regions, we will never be able to 
understand whether it is realistic or unrealistic for the Ukrainians to reach an agreement. And when the 
current Kyiv authorities say, 'We will start a dialogue but not before Donetsk and Luhansk lay down their 
arms, and if they don't we'll try to achieve our goals in a military way,' it is an absolutely irresponsible 
attitude because when one says to people, 'Surrender first, and then we'll see what to do with you,' it sparks 
a chain reaction,"1448. 
 
August 28, 2014: Poroshenko declares that Russian forces have invaded country1449. According to a 
Ukraine official two columns of Russian tanks and military vehicles fired Grad missiles at a border post in 
southeastern Ukraine and then entered the country1450. NATO states at least 1000 Russian troops had entered 
Ukraine1451. Ukraine announces that it will call for an emergency meeting at the UNSC and the European 
Commission1452. In an interview with Russian media Alexander Zakharchenko, prime minister of the self-
declared Donetsk Peoples Republic, claimed that thousands of Russian citizens were fighting alongside the 
separatists in southeast Ukraine as volunteers1453. He said many of the Russians who had joined the 
separatists' ranks were retired military personnel or soldiers on leave and that "They are fighting with us, 
understanding that it is their duty,"1454. He also stated that between 3,000 and 4,000 Russian citizens had 
fought as volunteers alongside the separatists in southeast Ukraine1455.  
 
August 29, 2014: The UNSC holds emergency meeting with US ambassador Samantha Power stating "It 
has manipulated. It has obfuscated. It has outright lied. So we have learned to measure Russia by its actions 
and not by its words,"1456. Churkin stated: "The Kiev authorities have torpedoed all political agreements on 
resolving the crisis[…]The only thing we're seeing is a fight against dissent."1457. Leonid Slutsky, head of 
the Russian State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, stated: “I think that very soon the international 
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community will make an objective assessment of the Kiev junta’s actions, and many countries, members 
of the European Council, the representatives of which we are constantly in touch with, are beginning to 
realize that Kiev is leaking lies,”1458. 
 
August 29, 2014: Ukraine announces that it will seek NATO membership in response to Russia’s 
actions1459. NATO stated that it respected Ukraine’s decision and that “Despite Moscow’s hollow denials, 
it is now clear that Russian troops and equipment have illegally crossed the border into eastern and south-
eastern Ukraine[…]This is not an isolated action, but part of a dangerous pattern over many months to 
destabilise Ukraine as a sovereign nation”1460.  
 
August 30, 2014: Putin has stated that those Russians supporting the separatists are volunteers he also 
stated that the separatists were “insurgents” battling an army that he likened to Nazi invaders during World 
War II, and he praised them for “suppressing the power operation of Kiev” in Donbas1461. 
 
August 31, 2014: Ukraine and Russia exchange captured soldiers including the 10 paratroopers from 
Russia1462. Putin stated that he believed that the troopers had gotten lost stating: “In fact, this is the case, 
I’m talking seriously. I believe that they had just gotten lost because there are no boundary markers 
there,”1463. 
 
September 1, 2014: Poroshenko accuses Russia of “direct and undisguised aggression” in Ukraine which 
had changed the battlefield balance1464. Putin calls for negotiations on the “statehood” of southern and 
eastern Ukraine and blames Ukraine for not going into dialogue with the separatists1465. Putin’s spokesman 
however said that Putin’s call for talks on the statehood did not mean Russia endorsed the separatists calls 
for independence1466. In Minsk separatists sit down with Ukraine for preliminary peace talks1467. The 
separatists said they were willing to stay a part of Ukraine if they were granted “special status” 1468. A key 
condition was however that Kiev would end its military campaign1469. US senators call for the sending of 
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lethal weaponry to Ukraine in order to fight the “Russian invasion”1470. A statement from the Donetsk and 
Luhansk People’s republic stated that they wished “to preserve Ukraine's common economic, cultural and 
political space and the space of the entire Ukraine-Russian civilization."1471. 
 
September 2, 2014: In a conversation with Barroso, Putin states that he could “take Kiev in two weeks” if 
he wanted to1472. Russia did not deny the statement but condemned the EU official for disclosing statements 
from what was presumably a private phone call1473. NATO stated that it would create “a very high-readiness 
task force” in order to respond to Russia’s actions in Ukraine1474. In a response to the NATO decision, 
Mikhail Popov, deputy secretary of Russia’s Security Council, states that Russia will revise its military 
doctrine to account for “changing military dangers and military threats,” including NATO expansion1475. 
He furthermore called the expansion of NATO “one of the leading military dangers for the Russian 
Federation.”1476. Mogherini states that Russia is no longer a strategic partner of the EU1477.  
 
September 3, 2014: Putin outlines a seven-point peace plan1478. Poroshenko’s office states that Putin and 
Poroshenko had discussed the need for a ceasefire1479. In his plan, Putin called for Ukrainian artillery to 
pull back and out of range of the eastern separatists’ strongholds; an end to airstrikes; an exchange of all 
detainees; opening up humanitarian corridors for residents of the separatist areas; repairing damaged 
infrastructure; and deploying international observers to monitor the cease-fire1480. Ukraine Prime Minister 
Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk called Mr. Putin’s proposal “an attempt to confuse the international community” and 
that “Putin’s real plan is the destruction of Ukraine and the resumption of the U.S.S.R.”1481. He also stated 
that peace would only happen once Russia had withdrawn its troops and proxy forces1482. The leader of the 
Donetsk Peoples Republic stated that they are ready to cease fire if Ukraine does the same1483. In a speech 
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September 4, 2014: NATO holds its summit1485. Ukraine attended and met with US and EU leaders1486. 
Lavrov stated in a statement: "It is precisely at such a moment when a chance has emerged to start solving 
specific problems between Kiev and the militias that some sections of the Kiev authorities make demands 
for Ukraine to drop its non-aligned status and start joining NATO[…]It's a blatant attempt to derail all 
efforts aimed at initiating a dialogue on ensuring national reconciliation[…]Some of our Western partners, 
including unfortunately the most influential players - the United States - want victory for NATO and a 
situation where America dictates its will to everyone[…]This concept of exclusivity, which President 
(Barack) Obama has repeatedly declared, can lead to no good and has so far led to no good,"1487. Poroshenko 
states that he will establish a bilateral ceasefire, which could lay the foundation for a “stage-by-stage peace 
plan”1488. Putin stated that Russia could not enforce an agreement because it was not a party to the 
conflict1489. 
 
September 5, 2014 (Minsk I): Following a meeting with separatist representatives in Minsk, Poroshenko 
announces a bilateral ceasefire1490. Putin’s spokesman Peskov issued a statement which applauded the 
agreement1491. The agreement includes amnesty for those who disarm and who did not commit serious 
crimes; exchange of all prisoners; Militias will be disbanded; a 10-kilometer buffer zone — about six miles 
— will be established along the Russian-Ukrainian border with the area subject to joint patrols1492. The 
separatists have also agreed to leave the administrative buildings they control and to allow broadcasts from 
Ukraine to resume on local television1493. The agreement also states that power will be decentralized, and 
the Russian language protected1494. Ukraine Prime Minister Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk stated that the 
transformation of the cease-fire into a lasting peace was dependent on a long-term cease-fire, the withdrawal 
of the Russian Army and a wall along the border1495. Leonid Kuchma, former Ukraine president and the 
Ukraine representative in the trilateral group said that a working group would be established to follow the 
implementation of the agreements as he stated “A working group will be set up by Monday, whose mission 
will be to bring all the issues to their ultimate solution. And there are plenty of issues,"1496. The 7-point 
peace roadmap includes: 1) Ensure an immediate bilateral ceasefire. 2) Carry out decentralisation of power, 
allowing temporary local self-government in areas of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine under a 
"special status" law 3) Immediately free all hostages and illegally detained persons 4) Ensure monitoring 
on the Ukrainian-Russian border and a security zone 5) Ensure the holding of snap local elections in 
Donetsk and Luhansk 6) Remove illegal armed groups, military hardware, and all fighters and mercenaries 
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from Ukrainian territory 7) Pass a law against the prosecution and punishment of people over certain events 
in Donetsk and Luhansk region1497. 
 
September 6, 2014: The ceasefire is violated with clashes in the city of Mariupol1498. Putin and Poroshenko 
agree to continue the dialogue1499 and also agree that the ceasefire is holding fairly well1500. A report from 
Amnesty claims that both sides have committed war crimes1501. 
 
September 8, 2014: Clashes continue although more sporadic1502. Separatist leader Andrei Purgin tells 
Russian media: "Despite the provocations of Ukrainian forces, the militias[…]will keep firmly to the Minsk 
agreement. The militias are not resorting and will not resort to arms."1503. Poroshenko arrives in Mariupol 
and stated: “Just arrived in Mariupol[…]This is our Ukrainian land. We will never give it up to anyone.”1504.  
 
September 9, 2014: The Dutch group investigating the downing of the Malaysian Airline points to findings 
which could indicate that the plane was shot down by separatists1505.  
 
September 10, 2014: Ukraine states that most of the Russian forces have now left Ukraine1506. Poroshenko 
also stated that he would move ahead with a law which would seek to consolidate the ceasefire1507. He also 
stated that he would introduce a law that would grant parts of the breakaway regions of Donetsk and 
Luhansk temporary self-rule1508. As he stated “Based on the latest information I have received from our 
intelligence services, 70 percent of the Russian troops have moved back across the border[…]This bolsters 
our hope that the peace initiatives enjoy good prospects.”1509. Putin states that the conflict is used to revive 
NATO as he states: "The crisis in Ukraine, which was basically provoked and created by some of our 
Western partners, is now being used to revive this military bloc”1510. Putin also stated that Russia was being 
"absolutely forced to take appropriate measures in response" and warned the West against "any hysterics" 
towards Russia's strengthening of its security1511. 
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September 11, 2014: EU imposes new sanctions on Russia1512. These are the sanctions which were stalled 
earlier1513. The sanctions may be lifted if Russia abides by the ceasefire1514. The US also announced new 
sanctions which are currently under way1515. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated in a statement: “Today, 
Brussels and the leaders of the EU nations need to give a clear answer to EU citizens as to why they are 
putting them under the risks of confrontation, economic stagnation and unemployment,” 1516. Ukraine calls 
on EU to check up on Russian gas supplies which allegedly had been decreasing to countries such as Poland 
and Slovakia1517. Russia denied that this was the case1518. 
 
September 12, 2014: Another Russian aid convoy enters Ukraine without being checked by the Ukraine 
border guards, customs officers or the Red Cross1519. According to the OSCE a Russian official stated that 
the process "would not involve Ukrainian customs and border guard officers" whereas a spokesperson from 
the Russia's Federal Security Service stated that "Ukrainian border guards and customs officers were invited 
to run checks on the convoy at the 'Donetsk' checkpoint, but the Ukrainian side rejected the offer"1520. 
Ukraine accused the FSS of having prevented the Ukrainian border guards from approaching the trucks1521. 
The convoy reentered Russia after having unloaded the cargo in Donetsk1522. The trucks allegedly carried 
1,800 tons of food, medicine, water purification equipment and power generators1523. 
 
September 14, 2014: Yanukovych’s former party, the Party of Regions, announces that it does not intend 
to take part in the upcoming election and rather forms an opposition government1524. As stated by Secretary 
of the Party’s Presidium and MP Boris Kolesnikov: “Our party will not take part in the upcoming elections 
because a fourth of the country or almost 7 million electors will not be able to vote,”1525.  
 
September 15, 2014: The US and NATO allies hold peacekeeping exercises in western Ukraine under the 
name of “Rapid Trident”1526. It is a 12-day exercise and will involve 1,800 personnel1527. The US stated that 
the purpose was to increase interoperability among the United States, Ukraine and other participating 
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nations1528. Also, the foreign ministers of Russia, Germany and France met in Paris to discuss the situation 
in Ukraine1529. Prime minister of the self-declared Donetsk People's Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, 
accused the Ukrainian government of violating the cease-fire and said further talks with Kyiv would make 
no sense1530. 
 
September 16, 2014: Ukraine and the EP ratify the Association Agreement1531. EP President Martin Schulz 
stated: "This is an historic moment[…]The two parliaments freely determined to vote today at the same 
time on this agreement. This is free democracy, the opposite of directed democracy. The European 
Parliament has always defended the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and will continue to do 
so"1532. Ukraine also approved a bill which gives the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk limited self-
rule, grants amnesty to many pro-Russian separatists and call for local elections1533. The limited autonomy 
granted to the separatists will be in place for three years, as Poroshenko stated: "During this time we will 
be able to introduce the issue of profound decentralization which must also provide for respective 
amendments to the Constitution”1534. Russia applauded the legislation1535. 
 
September 17, 2014: The Ukraine parliament passes a lustration law in order to root out corrupt 
practices1536. All those who worked under Yanukovych as well as former senior Communist and KGB 
members will be affected1537. As stated: "About one million civil servants of different kinds will come under 
this law, including the whole cabinet of ministers, the interior ministry, the intelligence services, the 
prosecutor's office,"1538. 
 
September 19, 2014: Russia, Ukraine representatives of the separatists and OSCE (Trilateral Contact 
Group) meet in Minsk for new talks1539. The group will consider a memorandum which first point is how 
to stop hostilities in Ukraine’s embattled southeast1540. The memorandum was developed by the group to 
include nine provisions implementing the ceasefire1541. 
 
September 20, 2014: The Trilateral Contact Group agree to create a 30 km buffer zone and move artillery 
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September 21, 2014: Thousands march in Moscow and other Russian cities in protest against the conflict 
in Ukraine1544. A protester in Moscow, said the Russian authorities should "stop this outrageous covert war 
that they don't admit" waging and banners said: "Putin, I'm sick of your lies," "Don't shoot our brothers," 
and "I don't want a war with Ukraine."1545. Another protester held portraits of killed Russian paratroopers 
in Ukraine and stated that she was "not only against us sending our troops to Ukraine, but also against us 
interfering whatsoever in the matters of other sovereign states." 1546. “The protests coincided with the United 
Nations' annual International Peace Day” 1547.  
 
September 22, 2014: Ukraine and separatist troops begin their withdrawal from front line positions1548.  
 
September 23, 2014: The separatists announce that they will hold elections on November 2, five weeks 
earlier in defiance of the “special status” law approved by the Ukraine parliament1549. Both the Luhansk 
and Donetsk regions plan to elect a Supreme Soviet and their own leaders1550. 
 
September 24, 2014: NATO observes a significant withdrawal of Russian troops from inside Ukraine as 
stated: "There has been a significant pullback of Russian conventional forces from inside Ukraine, but many 
thousands are still deployed in the vicinity of the border"1551.  
 
September 25, 2014: Poroshenko outlines a strategy called “strategy 2020” which includes an ambitious 
reform plan targeting among other corruption1552. He also stated that Ukraine would never surrender the 
eastern regions and it plans to move as quickly as possible towards European integration1553. The Ukraine 
government also planned to push legislation that would repeal a 2010 law barring Ukraine from membership 
in any military or political alliance, a step viewed as a prelude to an application to join NATO1554. 
 
September 27, 2014: In a speech at the UNGA, Lavrov stated that the NATO alliance “made obvious the 
inability of the alliance to change the genetic code it embedded during the Cold War era.”1555. He also 
stated: “The attempts to distort the truth and to hide the facts behind blanket accusations have been 
undertaken at all stages of the Ukrainian crisis”1556. 
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September 28, 2014: Vigil held in Moscow for those who had lost their lives in the Ukraine conflict1557. 
 
September 29, 2014: Fighting continues, straining the cease fire1558. In the Ukraine city of Kharkiv, a Lenin 
statue is removed by anti-Russian protesters1559. Ukrainian Interior Minister Arsen Avakov stated: “Lenin? 
Let him fall down. As long as nobody suffers under his weight. As long as this bloody Communist idol 
does not take more victims with it when it goes[…]I ordered the police to protect the people and not the 
idol”1560.  
 
September 30, 2014: Ukraine's Prime Minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, told UNGA that Russian troops were 
still operating in eastern Ukraine and he urged the West not to lift the sanctions until Ukraine until Ukraine 
as regained control of its territory1561. 
 
October 3, 2014: A red cross worker is killed when shelling occurred close to the Red Cross office in 
Donetsk1562. Ukraine signs a deal with Norwegian Statoil on supply of gas1563. Fighting continues over the 
Donetsk airport and Lavrov and Kerry called for the ceasefire to be maintained1564.  
 
October 4, 2014: Germany considers sending soldiers to protect the OSCE mission in Ukraine1565. The 
consideration comes after a Franco-German fact-finding mission of the border region in mid-September 
which found that the ceasefire could only be monitored if armed soldiers protected the monitoring staff1566. 
Germany also announced that it would send a 100-aid convoy to Ukraine1567. 
 
October 5, 2014: A Ukraine military spokesman states that the ceasefire is being violated and stated: "The 
terrorists are violating the terms of the ceasefire."1568.  
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October 6, 2014: The OSCE receives drones to support their monitoring work1569. Putin stated that the 
work of the OSCE should be expanded1570. 
 
October 7, 2014: Ukraine calls for the expansion of the OSCE mission1571. 
 
October 8, 2014: The Russian Duma adopts a law that would allow for foreign assets inside the country to 
be seized and for the state to pay compensation for the loss of property due to Western sanctions1572. The 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights releases a report on the human rights 
situation in Ukraine1573. In states that at least 331 were killed after the ceasefire1574. The UN also pointed to 
the alleged presence of mass graves, which the UN was told by the separatists1575.  
 
October 9, 2014: Poroshenko signs the lustration law titled “On the purification of Government”1576. The 
law among other prevents "Yanukovych-era officials from working in public administration for ten years 
and others for five years."1577. 
 
October 10, 2014: “A Reuters examination of Ukraine’s probes into the Maidan shootings - based on 
interviews with prosecutors, defence attorneys, protesters, police officers and legal experts – has uncovered 
serious flaws in the case against Sadovnyk and the other two Berkut officers.”1578. The three are accused of 
killing 39 unarmed protesters during Maidain1579.  
 
October 11, 2014: Putin and Poroshenko announce that they will meet in Italy to discuss the ceasefire and 
the issue of gas supplies1580. A Ukraine military spokesman stated: "We are ready to abide by the agreement 
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October 12, 2014: Ukraine defense minister Valery Heletey resigns1582. Heletey was appointed in July1583. 
Putin orders troops to withdraw from the Ukraine border1584. The decision comes ahead of the meeting 
between Poroshenko and Putin in Italy1585. Russia states that the withdrawal happens because the period of 
training for the troops was complete1586.  
 
October 13, 2014: Ukraine reports that they are witnessing a withdrawal of Russian troops1587.  
 
October 14, 2014: A legislation on recognizing the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, a controversial group that 
collaborated with Nazi Germany, as national heroes led to clashes outside of the parliament between 
nationalists and riot police1588.  
 
October 15, 2014: Putin warns that the Ukraine crisis threatens global security and stated on the sanctions: 
“We hope that our partners will realise the recklessness of attempts to blackmail Russia, will remember the 
risks that a spat between major nuclear powers incurs for strategic stability[…]For our part, we are ready 
to develop constructive cooperation on the principles of equality and real consideration of mutual 
interests[…]How can one talk about striving for de-escalation in Ukraine if new sets of sanctions are being 
introduced almost at the same time as agreements to promote the peace process are reached?”1589. 
 
October 16, 2014: Putin warns that Russia will reduce Europe’s gas supplies if Ukraine steals gas from 
Russia1590.  
 
October 17, 2014: Putin and Poroshenko meet in Italy1591. Progress is made on the gas issue however no 
further progress is made on Ukraine1592. Putin’s spokesman stated: "Unfortunately, some participants of 
[the Milan] breakfast demonstrated complete unwillingness to understand the reality in south-eastern 
Ukraine," 1593.  
 
October 19, 2014: Germany’s foreign intelligence agency states that the separatists are to blame for the 
downing of the Malaysian Airline1594. 
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October 20, 2014: Amnesty releases a report which states that their: “investigation into allegations of 
execution-style and other deliberate killings by pro-Russian separatists and pro-Kyiv forces has found 
evidence of isolated incidents attributable to both sides, but not on the scale reported by Russian media and 
authorities”1595. The report also stated that a propaganda war is going on too, which has led to exaggerations 
about the number of executions, and a culture where deaths and injuries sustained in battle are kept off the 
books in hospitals and other official tallies1596. 
 
October 22, 2014: The US claims that Russia has refused to increase international monitoring of the border 
with Ukraine1597. A senior US official stated at the OSCE: "We are concerned that[…]the mission will be 
unable to monitor the extent to which Russia is participating in or facilitating the flow of illegal arms, 
funding, and personnel to support the separatists in eastern Ukraine”1598. Russia also stated that it would 
not agree to expand the OSCE monitoring work at the Russian-Ukraine border1599. 
 
October 23, 2014: Separatists in Donetsk states that they will end the ceasefire with the prime minister of 
the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, stating "The truce has been 
observed by us alone. But the day before yesterday we started to respond as well. It has been quieter since 
yesterday."1600. The Ukraine Prime Minister stated: “"It is clear that attempts to destabilise the situation will 
continue and be provoked by the Russian side. They did not succeed during the presidential election [in 
May] but their plans have remained[…]We need full mobilisation of the whole law-enforcement system to 
prevent violations of the election process and any attempts at terrorist acts during the elections."1601. 
 
October 24, 2014: Putin at the Valdai Club states: “Statements that Russia is trying to reinstate some sort 
of empire, that it is encroaching on the sovereignty of its neighbors, are groundless,"1602. According to 
NATO, Russia has withdrawn but is also still has troops inside Ukraine stating: “But the force that remains 
and shows no indications of leaving is still a very, very capable force,”1603. 
 
October 26, 2014: Elections are held and Poroshenko’s party took 23% of the vote1604. Poroshenko stated: 
“I asked you to vote for a democratic, reformist, pro-Ukrainian and pro-European majority[…]Thank you 
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for having heard and supported this appeal.”1605. Lavrov stated that Russia would recognize the results and 
as he stated: "I think we will recognize this election because it is very important for us that Ukraine will 
finally have authorities that do not fight one another, do not drag Ukraine to the West or to the East, but 
that will deal with the real problems facing the country[…]We hope that the election[…]will allow for the 
swift creation of a government that will be constructive, will not seek to continue escalating confrontational 
tendencies in society, [in ties] with Russia," 1606. 
 
October 28, 2014: Russia announces that it will recognize the election taking place in the separatist 
areas1607. As Lavrov stated: "We expect the elections to be held as arranged and of course we will recognize 
their results''1608. Ukraine’s foreign minister stated that Lavrov’s comments were "absolutely destructive 
and provocative statements" that "will be interpreted by the terrorists as encouragement by Russia to hold 
the illegal November 2 elections."1609. The US also condemned the election which takes place 5 weeks prior 
to agreed time1610.  
 
October 30, 2014: NATO reports an “unusual level” of Russian air activity as it tracked Russian strategic 
bombers over the Atlantic and Black Sea and sorties of fighters over the Baltic1611. 
 
November 2, 2014: The separatists hold elections1612. Separatist election officials said about half a million 
people had voted and the Ukrainian military said Russia had in recent days bolstered equipment supplies to 
separatists1613. The EU stated that the election was "a new obstacle on the path towards peace"1614. 
 
November 4, 2014: As a response to the elections in the separatist areas, Poroshenko states that Ukraine 
would re-examine its commitments to the ceasefire including the granting of more autonomy to the 
separatist areas1615. The Ukraine Security Service said it was opening a criminal investigation into the 
elections1616. Separatist leaders are sworn in and Ukraine states that newly formed units will be sent to 
defend a number of cities in eastern Ukraine1617. NATO said conditions were now in place to create a 
“frozen conflict”1618. Russia stated that the election of Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky as 
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leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” means that Kiev should now negotiate with them 
directly1619. The Russian foreign ministry also stated: "The elected representatives received a mandate to 
solve practical issues to restore normal life in the regions," and it also stressed that it considered Donetsk 
and Luhansk to remain parts of Ukraine1620. An official from South Ossetia, spoke at Zakharchenko’s 
inauguration1621. 
 
November 5, 2014: The ceasefire falls apart and the Ukraine government announces that it will not pay 
pensions1622 and other funds to eastern Ukraine until "terrorists clear out of there."1623. 
 
November 7, 2014: Ukraine states that Russia has sent 32 tanks, 16 howitzers and 30 trucks hauling 
ammunition and fighters into the Luhansk region in order to support the separatists1624. Neither NATO nor 
the OSCE could confirm this although NATO did state “We can confirm a recent increase in Russian troops 
and equipment along the eastern border of Ukraine[…]Russia continues to demonstrate its lack of regard 
for international agreements and its determination to further destabilize Ukraine.”1625. 
 
November 8, 2014: Gorbachev warns that the world is at a brink of a new cold war over Ukraine1626. 
Gorbachev also accused the west – particularly the US – of “triumphalism” after the collapse of the 
communist bloc and he called for new trust to be built through dialogue and the lifting of sanctions1627.  
 
November 9, 2014: OSCE reports heavy shelling and large columns of unmarked tanks and artillery 
moving in territory held by pro-Russian separatists1628. 
 
November 13, 2014: According to the OSCE, a vehicle marked "Cargo 200" - Russia's military code for 
soldiers killed in action –crossed from Russia into Ukraine and later returned1629. Ukraine states that it has 
no intention of abandoning the Minsk agreement1630. As stated by National Security and Defense Council 
spokesman Andriy Lysenko: “There is no intention of abandoning [the ceasefire] despite all[…]attempts to 
break these agreements by the Russian side,”1631. Medvedev stated: "In order to overcome existing 
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problems, sanctions need to be simply abandoned, relations should be returned into a [level] playing field; 
normal, peaceful, productive negotiations should be restarted, then everything will stabilize,"1632.  
 
November 14, 2014: According to Ukraine Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk, Ukraine’s top priority is to 
build an army strong enough to stop Russian military aggression1633.  
 
November 15, 2014: Leaders meet at G20 where Cameron tells Russia that the relations between Russia 
and the West has reached a crossroad and other leaders condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine1634. Putin 
stated that he was still interested in the principle of Ukraine remaining a single political space1635. In an 
interview to ARD, Putin stated: "The most important thing is that one does not have a one-sided view of 
the problem[…]Today there is fighting taking place in the east of Ukraine, the Ukrainian government has 
deployed troops there[…]There have even been missiles fired, but is that mentioned? There's not been a 
word on that[…]That means, that you (Western media) want the Ukrainian government to destroy 
everything there, including all their political opponents and adversaries. Is that what you want? That's not 
what we want and we won't allow that to happen."1636. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko issues several 
decrees to shut state institutions and banking services in pro-Russian eastern regions1637. A decree posted 
on the president’s website said all state companies, institutions and organizations should end their work 
within a week and “evacuate workers, with their permission, (and) where possible remove property and 
documents”1638. A Russian TV channel issues photo which allegedly show how a Ukraine fighter jet is 
responsible for the downing of the Malaysian Airline1639. Bellingcat, a British investigative journalism 
website, described the photographs as “a crude fabrication”, highlighting what it said were several 
inconsistencies, which included signs that the photos had been partly compiled from historical Google Earth 
imagery dating from 20121640. The U.S. State Department dismissed the Russian TV reports as yet another 
"preposterous" attempt by Moscow to "obfuscate the truth and ignore ultimate responsibility for the tragic 
downing of MH17."1641. 
 
November 16, 2014: Putin leaves the G20 early before which he stated: "Today the situation in my view 
has good chances for resolution, no matter how strange it may sound, but certain structures had been 
established on both sides that could handle the tasks they are facing better,"1642. He also pointed to Ukraine’s 
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decision to cut ties with eastern Ukraine stating: “Why are the authorities in Kiev now cutting off these 
regions with their own hands? I do not understand this,”1643. 
 
November 17, 2014: EU imposes sanctions on separatists, not Russia1644. Poroshenko states that Ukraine 
is ready for a total war with Russia1645.  
 
November 19, 2014: Russia urges Ukraine to talk directly to separatists to end the conflict in the east, but 
Ukraine rejected the call and told Moscow to stop “playing games” aimed at legitimizing “terrorists”1646. 
Lavrov stated “We are calling for the establishment of stable contacts between Kiev and Donbass 
representatives with the aim of reaching mutually acceptable agreements,”1647. Ukraine Prime Minister 
stated in response “We will not hold direct talks with your mercenaries.” 1648. Igor Plotnitsky, head of the 
self-proclaimed LNR stated “Let’s follow the example of the ancient Slav and Cossack chieftains and face 
each other in a duel[…]Whoever is declared winner dictates the rules the loser’s country has to follow,”1649. 
In an interview with BBC, Putins spokesperson stated: "We would like to hear that NATO would stop stop 
approaching the Russian borders and that NATO would stop trying to ruin the balance, the balance of 
power[…]But we, unfortunately, are not hearing these words, and that makes us nervous, as NATO is 
gradually coming closer to our borders,"1650.  
 
November 20, 2014: The US plans to increase non-lethal aid to Ukraine and Obama’s deputy national 
security adviser and nominee for deputy secretary of state, Tony Blinken, stated that lethal assistance 
“remains on the table. It’s something that we’re looking at,”1651. In a response to the possibility of US 
sending lethal aid Russia responded that it sent a “very serious signal”, cautioned against “a major change 
in policy of the (U.S.) administration in regard to the conflict” in Ukraine and stated that: “That (would be) 
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November 21, 2014: Ukraine agrees on a five-party ruling coalition and puts NATO membership as its 
major goal1653. Biden and Poroshenko were met with heckling from protesters during a commemoration of 
the Maidan1654.  
 
November 22, 2014: Ukraine states that 7500 Russian troops are present in Ukraine and a Colonel General 
stated “Unfortunately, stabilization of the situation in the East of Ukraine does not depend just on us. The 
external factor and the presence of 7,500 representatives of Russian armed forces in Ukraine destabilize the 
situation and prevent us [from stabilizing] it,”1655. Referring to uprisings in former Soviet states including 
Ukraine and Georgia, Mr Putin said the world could see "what tragic consequences the wave of the so-
called colour revolutions has led to[…]We have to do all that is needed to ensure that similar things never 
happen in Russia," Putin said1656. Lavrov also stated: "As for the concept behind to the use of coercive 
measures, the West is making clear it does not want to force Russia to change policy but wants to secure 
regime change[…]Public figures in Western countries say there is a need to impose sanctions that will 
destroy the economy and cause public protests,"1657. Lavrov also stated: “Our western partners played ‘all-
or-nothing’ in Ukraine, they have stepped on their own principles of democratic change of power, have 
supported the extremists. As the hooligans say, they wanted to ‘bluff us’, I cannot say it in other words, to 
make us swallow humiliation – Russians and Russian-speaking people in Ukraine[…]Always when 
sanctions were used before – I worked in New-York at that time — our western partners, in regard to North 
Korea or Iran, or any other countries, they framed sanctions in such a way so that they wouldn’t negatively 
affect the social sphere, the economy, so that they would affect only the elite, selectively[…]Now 
everything is different. Western leaders publicly say that sanctions should be framed in a way to ruin the 
economy and raise national protests[…]this “shows that their point is not to change the Russian Federation’s 
policy, which is illusory in itself, but they want to change the regime,”1658. 
 
November 24, 2014: Lithuania is to supply Ukraine with lethal aid1659. Ukraine also announced that it will 
hold a referendum on NATO membership once the criteria for membership are met1660. Russia suspends 
coal supplies to Ukraine1661.  
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November 27, 2014: An OSCE patrol was fired upon by separatists1662. Ukraine’s parliament approves 
Arseny Yatseniuk for a new term as prime minister1663. Poroshenko stated that 100 percent of Ukrainians 
favored a unitary state without federalization and stated sarcastically: “These are our warm wishes to those 
in the East or West who advise federalization”1664. 
 
November 29, 2014: The EU imposes sanctions on those separatists responsible for organizing the 
elections1665. Russia urged the EU to lift the sanctions in return which Russia would lift the food 
embargo1666. This was rejected by the EU1667. 
 
November 30, 2014: Ukraine accuses Russia of sending a convoy of 106 trucks into Ukraine without 
authorization and according to Ukrainian military spokesman Andriy Lysenko: “The lion’s share of 
humanitarian supplies find their way to the rebels partly in the form of food, but mostly it is ammunition, 
equipment and other things for combat operations,”1668.  
 
December 1, 2014: NATO accuses Russia of sending weapons to the separatists and stepping up its military 
activities in Europe and the world1669. NATO also stated that Russia and the separatists were not respecting 
the cease fire1670. Russia accused NATO of destabilizing the northern Europe by holding military exercises 
transferring aircraft which are capable of carrying nuclear weapons1671.   
 
December 2, 2014: Ukraine’s parliament votes in a new government1672. Ukraine and the separatists agree 
“in principle” on a new ceasefire to take place on December 51673. The ceasefire is however violated on the 
same day with shelling at the Donetsk airport1674. 
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December 4, 2014: Putin addresses the Federal Assembly where he praises the “Crimean Spring”1675. Kerry 
states that Russian soldiers have been fighting and dying in Ukraine and that “The result is damage to its 
credibility, and its own citizens wind up paying a steep economic and human price, including the price of 
hundreds of Russian soldiers who fight and die in a country where they had and have no right to be”1676.  
 
December 5, 2014: Fighting continues at the Donetsk airport with Poroshenko stating that the whole of 
Ukraine will be within reach of the “enemy” if the airport falls to the wrong side1677. Both sides agree to 
enforce a day of silence on December 9, which is intended to prepare for creation of a non-militarized buffer 
zone, from which the two sides will withdraw artillery and other heavy military equipment1678. 
 
December 6, 2014: Poroshenko announces that talks will be held on December 9 on implementing the 
September ceasefire. Vice-speaker of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) Denis Pushilin 
suggested that a next meeting on peace settlement should be held in Minsk on December 121679. 
 
December 7, 2014: Ukraine expects Russian gas supply to resume1680. Gazprom’s CEO Alexey Miller 
stated in an interview that the new pipeline between Russia and Turkey is to, in the long run, meant to 
bypass Ukraine1681.  
 
December 9, 2014: Ukraine accuses the separatists of violating the day of silence and stated: “Not having 
any idea of observing the agreements, the rebels employed light weapons, mortars and artillery, armored 
tanks in residential areas,”1682. Leaders in Donetsk however argued that the ceasefire was observed1683. 
 
December 10, 2014: The ceasefire is violated again, and the talks set for Minsk are postponed1684. Russia 
on Thursday said it was eager to convene another round of talks, but Kyiv has said it will not meet 
representatives of either Moscow or the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk until the ceasefire is fully 
observed1685. The separatists in Donetsk state that: “The militia have started pulling back artillery units with 
a caliber greater than 100 millimeters in the south of the republic,”1686. A Russian general states that a small 
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Russian military mission is presence in eastern Ukraine on the invitation of Kiev and that it is assisting the 
OSCE security group1687. 
 
December 12, 2014: The first day where the ceasefire has not been violated with no deaths or injuries on 
either side1688. According to Ukraine, Russia has removed several separatist leaders who were 
insubordinate1689. Ukraine also stated that some separatist groups had gone rogue stealing coal and fighting 
with their Russian backers in the separatist areas1690. 
 
December 13, 2014: The US senate passes a bill on further sanctions and the supply of lethal aid to 
Ukraine1691. Russia condemned the act and stated "Undoubtedly, we will not be able to leave this without a 
response,". Alexander Lukashevich, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman also stated: "The openly 
confrontational nature of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act approved by both houses of the US Congress 
without debate and proper voting cannot cause anything but deep regret" 1692. Ukraine welcomed the bill 
and hailed it as a historic decision1693. 
 
December 15, 2014: The Ukraine Freedom Support Act lands on Obamas desk who is to decide on whether 
to sign or veto it1694. Medvedev stated "We are not going to support Ukraine's economy anymore. It is a 
burden for us. And to be honest, we are tired of it"1695. Lavrov states that Poroshenko is a key player in 
ensuring peace and states “His peace plan and the corresponding initiatives of President Putin have provided 
the foundation for the Minsk accords, whose strict observance is the key to a viable solution of the current 
crisis"1696. Lavrov also stated that Russia expected real constitutional reform in Ukraine, which should result 
in the adoption of a “a well-thought-out and renewed social contract that would be perceived by an entire 
polyethnic Ukrainian society as a solid long-term document, the foundation of a rule-of-law state that 
guarantees the equal rights of regions and nationalities.”1697. 
 
December 16, 2014: President Obama states that he will sign the Ukraine Freedom Support Act which 
amongst other includes further sanctions and would provide Ukraine with $350 million in arms and military 
equipment1698. In response Lavrov stated: “Russia will not only survive but will come out much 
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stronger[…]We have been in much worse situations in our history, and every time we have got out of our 
fix much stronger.” 1699.  He also said there were “very serious reasons to believe” that the United States 
was pursuing a strategy of regime change, designed to topple Mr. Putin’s government1700. 
 
December 17, 2014: In a phone call between Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany, Merkel stated the need 
for a meeting with the contact group1701. The official statement from Merkel’s office stated: "The pre-
requisites for progress in the implementation of this agreement is, according to common perception, a 
speedy meeting of the contact group consisting of Russia, the Ukraine as well as the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, which has been repeatedly calling for talks," 1702. All leaders welcomed 
the latest ceasefire in Ukraine1703. In connection to the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister, Sergei Ryabkov stated: "In recent weeks discussing providing[…]lethal arms to Ukraine 
intensified in a worrisome way,"1704. He also stated that those seeking a solution to the crisis should not 
supply weapons "that will be used to kill the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Donbass" but rather they 
should seek to put pressure on Kiev to hold talks with the separatists1705. 
 
December 18, 2014: In a news conference Putin replied, when asked about the current economic 
developments being the price Russia has to pay for Crimea: “No. This is not the price we have to pay for 
Crimea… This is actually the price we have to pay for our natural aspiration to preserve ourselves as a 
nation, as a civilisation, as a state.”1706. On Ukraine he amongst other stated: “Russian public opinion holds 
that what is now happening in southeast Ukraine is actually a punitive operation, but it is conducted by the 
Kiev authorities and not the other way around. The self-defence fighters of the southeast were not the ones 
who sent troops to Kiev. On the contrary, the Kiev authorities amassed their military forces in the southeast 
of Ukraine, and are using multiple rocket launchers, artillery and fighter jets. What is the problem here and 
how it can be solved? I’ll try to answer this question as well. The problem is that after the government coup 
(and no matter how others call it and what is being said in this respect, a government coup was carried out 
in Kiev by military means) part of the country did not agree with these developments. Instead of at least 
trying to engage in dialogue with them, Kiev started by sending law enforcers, the police force, but when 
that didn’t work out, they sent in the army, and since that didn’t work out either, they are now trying to 
settle the issue by using other forceful methods, the economic blockade. I believe that this path has 
absolutely no future whatsoever and is detrimental to Ukraine’s statehood and its people. I hope that by 
engaging in dialogue – and we are ready to assume the role of intermediaries in this respect – we will 
succeed in establishing a direct, political dialogue, and by employing such methods and political 
instruments we will reach a settlement and restore a single political space.” 1707. 
 
December 20, 2014: Russia states that it will not cave in to the latest sanctions imposed on it by the West 
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crisis in south-east Ukraine1708. Russia's foreign ministry spokesman Aleksandr Lukashevich also stated 
that: "The US and Canada still cannot come to terms with the results of the free expression of will that the 
residents of Crimea and Sevastopol made in March[…]The residents of Crimea today are together with the 
whole Russian people, who have never caved in and will not cave in to external pressure." 1709. Russia also 
announced that it would send another convoy with humanitarian aid to eastern Ukraine1710. Ukraine also 
announces that it will reintroduce compulsory military service with the secretary of the National Security 
and Defence Council, Oleksander Turchynov, “Victory is the only option,”1711. Poroshenko also stated: 
“The war made us stronger, but has crushed the economy[…]There’s one article of spending that we won’t 
save on and that’s security. Our financial plan should cover force majeure. Our enemy can start a full-scale 
offensive any minute.”1712. 
 
December 22, 2014: New peace talks (Trilateral group) involving Russia, Ukraine, the separatists, and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will take place on December 24 and 261713. Donetsk's 
Denis Pushilin stated that "It's important to find compromises at the negotiating table and not through 
weapons,"1714.  
 
December 23, 2014: Ukraine scraps its non-alignment status with the aim of eventually joining NATO1715. 
In response Lavrov stated: “It will only escalate the confrontation and creates the illusion that it is possible 
to resolve Ukraine’s deep internal crisis by passing such laws,” 1716. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo 
Klimkin said “This will lead to integration in the European and the Euro-Atlantic space,” 1717. 
 
December 24, 2014: The peace talks in the Trilateral Group end on the first day with no results1718. 
Separatist mediator Denis Pushilin stated: "We had a difficult preliminary meeting[…]The date and time 
of the next meeting is still up in the air. It is under discussion." 1719 . Whilst Ukraine stated: "The work 
begins today, and by some point around Friday [December 26] we should be able to achieve concrete 
results," 1720. . Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantin Dolgov stated that the talks were a “real chance” 
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for peace1721. Separatist leaders in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk have declared their 
own republics and have said they will settle for no less than Ukraine becoming a loose federation in which 
they manage most of their own affairs. 1722. 
 
December 26, 2014: The peace talks leads to no results, but the sides do agree on a prisoner swap1723. 
Ukraine announces that it will cut passenger and cargo rail services to Crimea due to “passenger safety.”1724  
 
December 27, 2014: Russia agrees on a new deal to supply coal and electricity to Ukraine1725.  
 
December 29, 2014: Poroshenko states: "There's no military solution in Donbas[…]If someone wants to 
play that way, taking up weapons and fighting the Russian military machine -- the strongest on the continent 
-- we'll see how that ends."1726.  
 





January 2, 2015: Nationalists march in Kiev in honor of Bandera who Putin previously has called “Hitler’s 
accomplice”1728. Marchers carried the flags of Svoboda and the Right Sector - both movements that helped 
to topple ex-President Viktor Yanukovych1729. Bandera is a controversial figure in Ukraine and his "hero" 
status was revoked by Mr Yanukovych1730. Despite leading anti-Soviet resistance fighters, Bandera was 
arrested and jailed by the Nazis during the war1731. He was assassinated by a Soviet KGB agent in Munich 
in 19591732. The Russian Foreign Ministry's human rights envoy, Konstantin Dolgov, stated that "the torch 
marches in Ukraine are a demonstration of the continuation of movement along the path of the Nazis!"1733. 
Ukraine's biggest television channel is under fire after broadcasting a New Year's Eve concert featuring 
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January 3, 2015: The Normandy format is to be resumed1735. The representatives of the Donetsk People's 
Republic (DPR) and Ukrainian Armed Forces could meet after the talks1736.  
 
January 12, 2015: The Normandy peace talks in Berlin do not lead to anything1737. Representatives from 
the ministries would meet again and as Steinmeier stated: "If there is progress made at that level in the 
coming days, then we are prepared to meet again next week and resume this discussion we began today,"1738. 
Latvia’s Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics stated that "the key point everyone agrees upon is that we ought 
to support the efforts to renew the territorial integrity of Ukraine."1739. Lavrov stated that the main sticking 
point remains Ukraine's lack of progress in implementing constitutional reform1740. 
 
January 13, 2015: A passenger bus comes under attack in Eastern Ukraine killing 111741. Poroshenko 
stated: “These deaths are on the conscience of the DNR and LNR gangs and on those who stand behind 
them,” and he also said that he promised to sign a decree to send more troops for the front1742. Military 
spokesman Andriy Lysenko stated: “The Russian military and the terrorists have deliberately chosen the 
tactic of escalation of tension,”1743.  
 
January 15, 2015: Separatists state that they have captured the Donetsk airport and that they plan to take 
more territory1744. Rebel leader in Donetsk, Alexander Zakharchenko, stated “Let our countrymen hear this: 
We will not just give up our land. We will either take it back peacefully, or like that,” 1745. Advancing further 
would undermine the peace agreement, which has been backed by Russia1746. The separatist leaders have 
also declined to attend talks with Ukraine and Russia in Minsk, they have instead sent envoys and stated 
that they will refuse to take part in talks unless specific results are achieved1747. Oleksander Turchynov, 
secretary of the national defense council stated “Russian aggression is continuing. There has been a 
significant surge in the intensity of firing”1748.  
 
 
1735 “French Foreign Ministry: Talks on Ukraine in Normandy format to be resumed at ministerial level soon” Kyiv 
Post, January 3, 2015, https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/french-foreign-ministry-talks-on-
ukraine-in-normandy-format-to-be-resumed-at-ministerial-level-soon-376618.html  
1736 “Ukrainian Reconciliation Talks Can Be Held on January 16: DPR Envoy” Sputniknews, January 2, 2015, 
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201501021016478155/  




















January 16, 2015: Ukraine accuses Russia’s LUKoil of financing the separatists stating that it smuggled 
oil products worth $2 billion into Ukraine between 2013 and 20141749.  
 
January 18, 2015: Ukraine announces new offensive in order to retake the Donetsk airport1750. Poroshenko 
stated that he would not "give up an inch" of Ukrainian territory to separatists1751. Russian president’s press 
secretary Dmitry Peskov stated: “Naturally, the Russian side will express its position which is obviously a 
grave concern over the resumption of large-scale operations in Donetsk, over shelling of residential quarters 
of the city and other settlements[…]Evidently, such situation in no way promotes the implementation of 
the Minsk agreements and further searches for ways to settle the conflict.”1752. 
 
January 19, 2015: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin stated in response to Ukraine’s new 
military offense that: “It’s the biggest, even strategic mistake of the Ukrainian authorities to bank on a 
military solution to the crisis in Ukrainian society and to all of south-east Ukraine’s problems[…]This can 
lead to irreversible consequences for the Ukrainian statehood.”1753. Ukraine claims that hundreds of Russian 
troops have crossed the border in order to assist the separatists1754.   
 
January 20, 2015: New peace talks in the Normandy format is to be held in Berlin1755. Steinmeier stated: 
“We now need to prevent military confrontations from intensifying any more and avoid further political 
escalation between Kiev and Moscow. That’s worth every effort,”1756 
 
January 21, 2015: The Ukraine Prime Minister suggests that Ukraine increases its number of troops as he 
stated: “The Ukrainian government is submitting a bill to the parliament on increasing the overall strength 
of the Ukrainian armed forces. We propose that the Ukrainian armed forces’ strength be set at 250,000 
people, which implies its increase by 66,000 people,”1757. Poroshenko claims that Russia has 9000 troops 
in Ukraine as he stated: “I promise you, we will have an absolutely clear and stable situation in Ukraine if 
Russia fulfills point number four (of the Minsk plan): close the border and withdraw all the foreign troops 
from my territory[…]Because now, and the dates of our intelligence confirmed by independent sources, we 
have more than 9,000 troops of Russian Federation on my territory.”1758. “The solution is very simple -- 
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stop supplying weapons[…]withdraw the troops and close the border,” he said. “If you want to discuss 
something different, it means you are not for peace, you are for war.”1759. Lavrov responded: “I say every 
time: if you allege this so confidently, present the facts. But nobody can present the facts, or doesn’t want 
to,” “So before demanding from us that we stop doing something, please present proof that we have done 
it.”.1760 Russia also stated it had received assurances from the separatists that they would retreat to the 
separation lines agreed last September1761. NATO stated it had seen an increase in the number of tanks and 
other heavy artillery being used by Russian troops in eastern Ukraine in recent months1762. 
 
January 22, 2015: Ukraine acknowledges that they have lost the Donetsk airport to the separatists and 
privately, some rebels in Donetsk admit they have received help from Moscow but deny that the number of 
Russian soldiers present is in the thousands1763. Lavrov states that under the Minsk accords, the Donetsk 
airport should be handed over to the separatists with Serhiy Halushko of the Ukrainian defence ministry 
responding: “It’s not for Sergei Lavrov to decide which parts of Ukrainian territory should be under whose 
control,”1764.  
 
January 23, 2015: According to insiders in the Kremlin, Putin has alienated “all but a handful of 
hardliners” over the conflict in Ukraine1765. Particularly oligarchs oppose as they are set to lose money1766. 
Leader of Donetsk Alexander Zakharchenko, states that the separatists "will not make any attempts at 
ceasefire talks any more[…]we'll attack right up to the borders of Donetsk region, but if I see a threat from 
other directions we'll neutralise it[…]Kiev doesn't understand now that we can attack in three directions 
simultaneously”1767. Putin states "The Kiev authorities have given an official order to start large-scale 
military operations practically throughout the whole line of contact. The result is tens of killed and 
wounded, not only among the military on both sides but[…]among civilians[…]Those who give these 
criminal orders are responsible."1768. 
 
January 24, 2015: Separatists announce major offensive against Mariupol1769. Oleksandr Turchynov, 
secretary of Ukraine’s national defence council, described the incident where 30 people were killed by 
missiles, as “another bloody crime against humanity committed by the Russian military and the bands of 
terrorists under their complete control”1770. Poroshenko stated on twitter that if the rebels failed to abide by 
the ceasefire, Kiev’s supporters would “give it to them in the teeth” 1771. 
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January 25, 2015: Poroshenko states that de-escalating the conflict with the separatists was the priority of 
the government1772. As he stated: “Beginning a political process of de-escalation and regulation remains 
our priority. We don’t see an alternative to the Minsk agreement,”1773. Russia urged for “comprehensive 
political dialogue”1774. Poroshenko also stated that the rocket attacks in Mariupol, which led to 30 killed, 
were conducted by the separatists, as he noted: "This attack, unfortunately, was made by terrorists supported 
by Russia"1775. Russia responded to this saying "The situation is a result of Ukrainian troops crudely 
violating the Minsk agreements by constantly shelling residential settlements"1776. Russia vetoes a UNSC 
statement which condemned the shelling of Mariupol1777. Russia said that they vetoed the statement because 
Britain had insisted on inserting condemnation of separatist “self-defence forces” backed by Russia and 
added that Western council members have never condemned the actions or statements of Ukraine’s 
government.1778. 
 
January 26, 2015: Ukraine orders a state of emergency in Donetsk and Luhansk and places all Ukraine 
territory on high alert1779. Putin states that the Ukraine army is a NATO legion that is not pursuing the 
national interests of Ukraine but aiming to reach its geopolitical goals of constraining Russia, as he states: 
"We often say: Ukrainian army, Ukrainian army. But who is really fighting there? There are indeed some 
official military units, but they are largely so-called volunteer nationalist battalions[…]Essentially, it's not 
an army, it's a foreign legion, which, of course, does not pursue the national interests of Ukraine. It has 
totally different aims and they are connected to achieving the geopolitical goals of constraining Russia, 
which is absolutely against the national interests of the people of Ukraine,".1780. The OSCE states that the 
shelling in Mariupol came from separatist area1781.  
 
The National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine adopts a new package of resolutions stating: Based 
on the results of the discussion of emergency measures to counteract the Russian threat and manifestations 
of terrorism supported by the Russian Federation, a package of resolutions has been adopted to boost the 
country's defense capability and counter-terrorist measures, to create military-civilian administrations in 
the anti-terrorist operation zone to ensure the security and living of people in these territories,"1782. The 
Council also stated that Ukraine should join in on the sanctions and stated: "In order to increase pressure 
on Russia, the National Security and Defense Council has passed a resolution requiring that the sanctions 
introduced against Russia by the European Union, Switzerland, the United States and the G7, become 
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mandatory for application in Ukraine and be expanded[…]The NSDC has instructed the Cabinet to start a 
procedure of filing lawsuits with the Hague Tribunal regarding the crimes against humanity, committed by 
the terrorists against Ukrainian citizens in 2014-15, and concerning recognition of the 'DPR' and 'LPR' as 
terrorist organizations,"1783.  
 
January 28, 2015: Russia states that “The latest military actions provoked by Kiev will lead to the 
inevitable further escalation of the conflict (and) undermine efforts taken by the international community 
to end the bloodshed,”1784. Eduard Basurin, deputy commander of the rebels in Donetsk, stated: “The form 
in which the Minsk agreement was signed doesn’t work anymore, but we’re prepared to continue talks,” 
1785. Prime Minister Arseny Yatseniuk stated: “Russia is on a path of isolation and it is driving the whole 
world into a state of cold war with hot conflicts,” 1786. Ukraine puts in new border restrictions to the 
separatist areas in an attempt to cut down on smuggling and prevent terrorists from entering1787.  
 
January 29, 2015: Belarus states that the next trilateral contact group talks will take place on January 
301788.  
 
January 30, 2015: The Minsk talks are called off and fighting continues1789. Separatist envoy Denis 
Pushilin stated: "The foreign ministry of Belarus confirmed today that Kyiv (representatives) won't come, 
the talks have been cancelled[…]We are leaving Minsk today,"1790. The separatists’ main negotiator also 
stated: "Should the negotiations collapse[…]the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics reserve the right 
to pursue their offensive until the entire Donetsk and Lugansk regions are freed"1791. Ukraine blamed the 
rebels for an attack near the community center, describing it as a "cynical terrorist act" aimed at 
undermining the planned meeting in Minsk of the so-called 'contact group,'1792. 
 
February 4, 2015: The separatists appear to be in control of the town of Vuhlehirsk, signaling a set-back 
to the Ukraine forces1793.  
 
 
1783 “Ukraine's Security and Defense Council wants Kyiv to join anti-Russian sanctions” Interfax Ukraine, January 
26, 2015, https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/246769.html  





1787 Lyman, Rick “Ukraine clamps down on travel to and from rebel areas” The New York Times, January 28, 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/world/europe/ukraine-clamps-down-on-travel-to-and-from-rebel-areas.html  
1788 “Belarus says next round of Ukraine talks on Jan. 30 in Minsk: TASS” Reuters, January 29, 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-talks/belarus-says-next-round-of-ukraine-talks-on-jan-30-in-
minsk-tass-idUSKBN0L21PZ20150129  
1789 “Fighting rages in eastern Ukraine as Minsk peace talks are called off” DW, January 30, 2015, 
https://www.dw.com/en/fighting-rages-in-eastern-ukraine-as-minsk-peace-talks-are-called-off/a-18226574  
1790 Ibid 
1791 Onians, Charles and Yulia Silina “Ukraine rebels vow to push offensive if talks fail” Yahoo News, January 30, 
2015, https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-peace-talks-due-eu-hits-russia-more-043830786.html  
1792 “Fighting rages in eastern Ukraine as Minsk peace talks are called off” DW 





February 5, 2015: France and Germany make surprise visits to Russia where they presented a new peace 
plan1794. Hollande stated “Together with Angela Merkel we have decided to take a new initiative[…]We 
will make a new proposal to solve the conflict which will be based on Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”1795. 
Poroshenko stated that the talks: ”gave hope that there will be a result in a ceasefire” 1796. NATO agrees to 
set up a network of command centres in eastern Europe and more than double the size of its rapid reaction 
force1797. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich responded “This is very 
worrying[…]This is about creating additional operational capabilities that would allow the alliance to react 
near the Russian borders[…]Such decisions will naturally be taken into account in our military 
planning,”1798. 
 
February 6, 2015: Talks between Germany, France and Russia yields little results1799. Ukrainian Prime 
Minister Arseny Yatseniuk stated: “Peace in Europe depends on peace in Ukraine and for us to achieve that 
peace Ukraine must have the means to defend itself. Not in offensive operations, but in defense 
operations,”1800. Mr. Putin, in letters this week to Mr. Hollande, and the Ms. Merkel, put forward a proposal 
that apparently included shifts in the cease-fire boundaries based on recent gains by pro-Russian separatist 
fighters1801. The proposal also included a plan to grant political autonomy to the embattled regions of 
Donetsk and Luhansk1802. In response to Russian military presence in Ukraine Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk stated: 
“If they need, I can give them my glasses[…]We are not fighting with rebels or guerrillas[…]We are 
fighting with the regular Russian military.”1803 
 
February 7, 2015: In a plea for political, economic and military assistance Poroshenko stated: “We are an 
independent nation and we have a right to defend our people,”1804. Calling himself a “president of peace”, 
he made clear that Kiev only wanted defensive weaponry1805. Lavrov accused Europe and the United States 
of supporting a “coup d‘etat” against Yanukovich, and turning a blind eye to nationalists he said were intent 
on ethnic cleansing in eastern Ukraine1806. 
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February 10, 2015: Participants in the contact group agree on a ceasefire scheme including the withdrawal 
of heavy weaponry1807. As stated: "The Minsk talks have squared a scheme of withdrawal of heavy 
weapons. The parties have also agree a ceasefire regime and control over its observance. The sides also 
discussed local elections and Donbass’ state structure, its form of government,"1808. Representatives of the 
self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR) also handed over their proposals 
on peace settlement and as stated: "We handed over to the members of the Tripartite Contact Group a draft 
protocol which provided for a set of measures on military and political settlement. The sides in the Contact 
Group took this draft protocol and promised to give an answer after a break,"1809. 
 
February 11, 2015: Germany, France, Ukraine and Russian leaders meet for talks in Minsk1810. Poroshenko 
stated that he, French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel would speak 
"with one voice" to Russian President Vladimir Putin1811. Expected sticking points at the talks include 1) 
drawing a line of division 2) withdrawing Russian troops and equipment from eastern Ukraine 3) securing 
the Ukraine-Russian border and 4) giving the rebels more autonomy1812. Poroshenko also stated that the 
conflict would go “out of control” if a ceasefire was not agreed upon and he also said he would not rule out 
introducing martial law throughout Ukraine if diplomacy failed to produce results1813. The talks were based 
on the 12-point peace plane agreed to in September also called the Minsk protocol1814. Poroshenko state 
that he endorsed decentralization but not federalization and noted that the separatist regions could be 
granted rights similar to those in autonomous communities in Russia1815. The separatists want to exist 
separately from the rest of Ukraine and to keep their weapons1816. They are also demanding amnesty for 
their leaders, they want Ukraine to resume pension payments and other forms of financial support, and they 
are pushing for a buffer zone wide enough that the main cities cannot be shelled by Ukrainian forces1817. 
Russia has stated that Ukraine should create a federal system that would allow separatist areas to have their 
own foreign and economic policies, and this would also protect the Russian language and culture1818. Russia 
also plans to keep Crimea and has called on the Ukrainian Army to withdraw from the southeast1819. 
 
February 12, 2015 (Minsk II): France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine agree on a ceasefire which is to 
begin on February 151820. The agreement includes1821: 1) Heavy weapons to be withdrawn, beginning on 16 
February and completed in two weeks 2) All prisoners to be released 3) amnesty for those involved in 
fighting 4) Withdrawal of all foreign troops and weapons from Ukrainian territory. 5) Disarmament of all 
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illegal groups 6) Ukraine to allow resumption of normal life in rebel areas, by lifting restrictions 7) 
Constitutional reform to enable decentralisation for rebel regions by the end of 2015. 8) Ukraine to control 
border with Russia if conditions met by the end of 20151822. Still unresolved issues include the status of 
Debaltseve, a government-held town surrounded by rebels, where fighting is still going on, and further talks 
will also be held on self-rule in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk separatist regions1823. In Luhansk, leader Igor 
Plotnitskiy said: "We hope that thanks to our efforts today, Ukraine will change and stop firing at civilians, 
hospitals and socially important facilities." And in Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko 
stated that Kiev would be to blame if the ceasefire collapsed and warned that there would "be no meetings 
and no new agreements".1824 
 
February 13, 2015: Fighting erupts in Eastern Ukraine the day after the ceasefire with the fiercest battles 
being over the city of Debaltseve1825. The ceasefire however is not meant to start before the 15th.1826 OSCE 
stated: "We feel that the Minsk agreements are really the only available roadmap to a sustainable ceasefire. 
But now unfortunately[…]there's quite serious live fire in areas like Luhansk, Debaltseve,"1827. OSCE also 
stated that they had monitored "significant movements" of unmarked military vehicles and convoys1828. The 
West and Ukraine continue to accuse Russia of supplying weapons and personnel to the separatists which 
Russia denied and  Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia could only be a "guarantor" 
because it played no direct role in the conflict, as he stated: "[Russia] is not a party that has to take action 
in this matter. We simply cannot do that physically, because Russia is not a participant in this conflict,"1829. 
EU accuses Russia of initially wanting to postpone the ceasefire in order to ensure that the separatists could 
take Debaltseve1830. Poroshenko stated: “I don’t want anyone to have any illusions and so I am not seen as 
a naive person: we are still a very long way from peace[…]Nobody has a strong belief that the peace 
conditions which were signed in Minsk will be implemented strictly.”1831. Separatists at a checkpoint stated: 
“What sort of ceasefire? Don’t make me laugh. This is already the second or third ceasefire,”1832. 
 
February 14, 2015: Poroshenko orders the ceasefire but also states that if Ukraine was slapped once, it 
would not offer the other cheek1833. He also stated: “I very much hope that the last chance to begin the long 
and difficult peaceful process for a political settlement will not be wasted.” 1834. Alexander Zakharchenko 
stated that separatist forces planned to cease hostilities everywhere “except Debaltseve” and that he ordered 
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pro-Russian forces to “block all attempts to break out”1835. A Ukraine soldier stated: “It is so much worse 
than what they show on television,” and he complained that most of the information about the conflict is 
“Ukrainian propaganda or Russian propaganda”1836. “If they say seven or eight are dead, it’s really 70 or 
80[…]They’re sending people into the field with no protection and no place to hide.”1837. Alexander 
Zakharchenko also stated that, if it was not satisfied with Kiev on holding its commitment about autonomy: 
“If our demands about de facto independence are not fulfilled, we will declare that the whole territory of 
Donetsk region is ours[…]It doesn’t matter by what means it is seized. If it doesn’t work by political means, 
we have shown that it is possible in another way.”1838 
 
February 15, 2015: In most parts of Eastern Ukraine the ceasefire holds, except for the city of Debaltseve, 
where separatist attacks reportedly increased1839. As stated by separatist commander Eduard Basurin: “Of 
course we can open fire (on Debaltseve). It is our territory[…]The territory is internal: ours. And internal 
is internal. But along the line of confrontation there is no shooting.”1840. The separatists also denied access 
to the OSCE at Debaltseve1841. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the deal including the truce 
must be implemented “unconditionally”1842. As he stated: “All the sequences of actions have been 
mentioned in the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreement. All those terms have 
to be observed unconditionally,”1843. According to journalists in the area, armored columns of troops 
without insignia arriving in the area in recent days1844. 
 
February 17, 2015: The separatists state that the town of Debaltseve has fallen into their hands1845. Ukraine 
denies this1846. In connection to the ceasefire and the fighting in Debaltseve, Putin stated: “I hope that the 
responsible figures in the Ukrainian leadership will not hinder soldiers in the Ukrainian army from putting 
down their weapons[…]If they aren’t capable of taking that decision themselves and giving that order, then 
(I hope) that they won’t prosecute people who want to save their lives and the lives of others.” 1847. Putin 
also added that the fighting in Debaltseve was "understandable and predictable"1848. Ukraine and NATO 
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accuse Russia of reinforcing the assault on Debaltseve with Russian tanks, artillery and soldiers1849. UNSC 
adopt a resolution calling on all sides to respect the Minsk agreements1850. 
 
February 18, 2015: Ukraine retreat from Debaltseve and suffer heavy losses1851. Nato stated that the 
separatist offensive had put the wider peace agreement at risk and urged Russia to "use all its influence on 
the separatists to make them respect the ceasefire"1852. Lavrov stated that he hoped that the situation in the 
town would "not be used to find a pretext to actually undermine [the agreement]"1853. Poroshenko stated 
"Debaltseve was under our control, there was no encirclement, and our troops left the area in a planned and 
organised manner.”1854. He also called for "a firm reaction from the world to Russia's brutal violation of the 
Minsk agreements, the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of heavy weaponry"1855. 
 
February 19, 2015: Poroshenko calls for the deployment of international peacekeepers in order to monitor 
the ceasefire1856. As he stated: “The best format for us is a police mission of the EU[…]It will be the most 
efficient guarantor of security in the situation when the word of peace is not observed either by Russia or 
by those who are supported by it.”1857. Denis Pushilin, a senior separatist figure, stated: “This is an actual 
violation of the package of measures to implement the Minsk agreement,” 1858. Vitaly Churkin, Russia's 
ambassador to the United Nations stated: "When someone starts to propose some schemes instead of doing 
what had been agreed, it primarily arouses suspicion that they want to undermine the Minsk 
agreements,"1859. Shelling resumes in Donetsk and Mariupol1860. Gazprom announces that it has started 
supplying gas directly to the separatist held areas in Ukraine1861. The Normandy format meet over the 
phone1862. 
 
February 20, 2015: Commemorations are held at Maidan in the one-year anniversary of its escalation1863. 
In a speech Poroshenko stated: "Now, it is finally clear that we struggled on Maidan not against 
Yanukovych. He was just a cruel and obedient marionette[…]Moscow was preparing to the liquidation and 
tearing Ukraine apart long before the victory of Maidan. They were expecting the fall of Yanukovych and 
accelerated the course of events,"1864. Ukraine stated that there had been reports of 300 violations of the 
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ceasefire1865. A separatist stated: “Donetsk and Luhansk regions are our home. We will take back our 
land[…]Every ceasefire they move up their armour and start killing us again. There won’t be a ceasefire, 
there will be war.”1866.  
 
February 22, 2015: A bomb explodes in Ukraine’s second largest city, Kharkiv, during a march marking 
the first anniversary of the ousting of Yanukovych1867. Four Ukraine citizens were detained with the Ukraine 
Security Service stating: “They are Ukrainian citizens, who underwent instruction and received weapons in 
the Russian Federation, in Belgorod,” 1868. Poroshenko stated: “Today is memorial Sunday, but on this day 
terrorist scum revealed its predatory nature,” 1869. A counterterrorism operation was launched in the city1870. 
On Sunday, Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, the leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s 
republics, approved a plan with a representative of Moscow to pull back heavy weapons beginning on 
Monday1871. Ukraine claimed that two Russian military reconnaissance planes flew over Mariupol1872. 
 
February 23, 2015: Ukraine delays the pullback of heavy weapons blaming attacks from the separatists1873. 
Military spokesman Lt. Col. Anatoliy Stelmakh stated "as long as firing on Ukrainian military positions 
continues, it's not possible to talk about a pullback."1874. The US considers arming the Ukraine forces or 
imposing further sanctions on Russia1875. To this prospect, Peskov stated: "An obsessive idea to force 
someone to pay the cost[…]is not conducive to the resolution of the situation in southeast Ukraine"1876.  
 
February 24, 2015: The Normandy four meet in Paris with France stating: “We ask for the reinforcement 
of the OSCE special monitoring mission. We ask all sides involved to completely cooperate with the OSCE 
to allow this organisation to fulfil its mandate, especially with regard to the surveillance and verification of 
the withdrawal of heavy weapons,”1877. Following the talks, Ukraine foreign minister Pavlo Klimkin stated: 
"We are extremely concerned by recent attacks in the vicinity of Mariupol. We are concerned by a possible 
relocation of forces from Debaltseve in the direction of Mariupol."1878. Britain announces that it will send 
military personnel to Ukraine to provide advice and training for the Ukraine troops1879. In a television 
 
1865 Ibid 
1866 Alec Luhn “Pro-Russia victors vow to ignore deal for ceasefire in Ukraine” The Guardian, February 20, 2015, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/20/pro-russian-victors-vow-to-ignore-deal-for-ceasefire-in-ukraine  




1870“Kharkiv On Security Alert Following Deadly Blast At Peace March” RadioFreeEurope, February 23, 2015, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/kharkiv-bomb-peace-march/26862841.html  
1871 Alec Luhn “Ukraine truce rocked by Kharkiv blast” The Guardian 
1872 Ibid 
1873 Jim Heintz “Ukraine says weapons pullback not yet possible because rebel attacks are continuing” USA Today, 
February 23, 2015, https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/02/23/ukraine-rebel-attacks-prevent-
weapons-pullback  
1874 Ibid 




1877 “Foreign ministers call for more OSCE monitors in Ukraine” Euronews, February 24, 2015, 
https://www.euronews.com/2015/02/24/foreign-ministers-call-for-more-osce-monitors-in-ukraine  





interview, Putin states that Russia would not go to war with Ukraine1880. He also stated that "if the Minsk 
agreement to resolve the conflict in eastern Ukraine is fulfilled, I am convinced that the situation will 
gradually return to normal."1881. In regards to returning Crimea to Ukraine, Putin stated: "Regarding the 
return of any territories, such things are of revengeful nature, and it is not about return of some territories 
somewhere[…]Crimea will remain Russian, Ukrainian, Tatar, Greek, and German -- it will be a home to 
all these nations. With regard to its nationality, Crimean people made their choice, which we must 
respect."1882. Poroshenko has accused Putin of ordering snipers to fire on protestors in Maidan back in the 
day1883. 
 
February 25, 2015: The Ukraine army reports for the first time in weeks of no fatalities as the ceasefire 
takes it hold1884. Separatists withdrew heavy weapons from the front1885. Ukraine reduces gas supplies to 
the eastern part of the country with Putin stating: "Imagine these people finding themselves without gas 
supplies in the winter period[…]What do you call that? This already smacks of genocide."1886.  
 
February 28, 2015: Russian opposition politician and former Deputy Prime Minister, Boris Nemtsov, is 
shot dead in Moscow1887. He had appealed for a march protesting the conflict in Ukraine and Poroshenko 
stated that Nemtsov was a bridge between Ukraine and Russia1888. Two are killed in eastern Ukraine, 
shaking the ceasefire1889. The leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic, Alexander 
Zacharchenko, stated that the separatists had withdrawn 90% of their heavy weapons and warned that they 
reserved the right to return the weapons to the front line if authorities in Kiev did not keep their end of the 
bargain1890. President Petro Poroshenko, who says a military threat from the east would remain even if a 
peace deal holds, stated that he would submit a bill to parliament to make a formal request for the 
deployment of United Nations peacekeepers to monitor the ceasefire1891. 
 
March 3. 2015: Ukraine’s foreign minister states that ties between Russia and Ukraine will only improve 
if Crimea is returned to Ukraine1892. He also stated that the border between Ukraine and Russia needed to 
be completely closed in order to reach a settlement in the conflict stating: “Because everything that has 
been destabilizing the situation in (the Ukrainian cities of) Donetsk and Lugansk - mercenaries, money, 
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weapons, heavy weaponry, and of course Russian rebel troops - came through the Russian-Ukrainian 
border.”1893.  
 
March 5, 2015: Russia denounces the arrival of US military trainers in Ukraine and Russia’s foreign 
ministry spokesman Alexander Lukashevich stated: "U.S.-Ukrainian military drills in the western 
Ukrainian Lviv region threaten Russia's security[…]It is evident that they are not trying to bring peace to 
the country[…]Kiev authorities and all the Ukrainian people should think about the possible consequences 
of such steps." 1894 To the presence of NATO warships engaged in an exercise in the Black Sea he also 
stated: "Talking about the ships that entered [the Black Sea], I would call it a very worrisome signal, a 
provocative idea which does not add up to stability and confidence that the peace process in Ukraine will 
be stepped up[…]Any military presence in the proximity of a regional conflict is always a very dangerous 
maneuver which can lead to different unpleasant consequences." 1895. In another incident, Ukraine votes to 
increase the size of the armed forces by a third1896. Alexander Zaharchenko, leader of the separatists in 
Dontesk, announced a 100,000-strong mobilisation plan to reinforce his troops1897. 
 
March 6, 2015: Russia and Germany call on the OSCE to double the number of observers1898. Both Ukraine 
and the separatists have reported the withdrawal of heavy weaponry although fighting continues1899. Russia 
announces military exercises in Crimea as well as the break-away regions of Georgia1900. 
 
March 7, 2015: Alexander Zakharchenko states that the separatists have fully removed heavy weapons 
from the front line as agreed in the ceasefire1901. He also stated that Ukraine had not done the same1902. 
Ukraine told BBC that it believed Russian troops were still entering Ukraine1903. 
 
March 8, 2015: Ukraine accuses the separatists of using the ceasefire to regroup and rearm for further 
offenses with Ukraine military spokesman stating: “Illegal armed groups are actively involved in combat 
training, gathering resources and rebuilding technical readiness,”1904 
 
March 9, 2015: In a Russian documentary, Putin talks about the plans to annex Crimea and stated: “We 
ended at about seven in the morning[…]When we were parting, I said to my colleagues: we must start 
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working on returning Crimea to Russia.”1905. He also admits that the plan to annex Crimea was ordered 
weeks before the referendum1906. 
 
March 12, 2015: OSCE states it will extend its observation mission another year and double the number 
of observers1907.  
 
March 16, 2015: As an apparent response to the military exercise taking place in Norway, Putin orders 
military exercise with the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stating: “The main task of the [combat 
readiness drill] is to assess the armed forces from the Northern Fleet’s capabilities in fulfilling tasks in 
providing military security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region,”1908.  
 
March 17, 2015: Peskov states that the issue of Crimea is not up for discussion and an unidentified official 
from the defense ministry stated that long-range Iskander ballistic missiles were being sent to the 
Kaliningrad exclave bordering NATO members Lithuania and Poland for the war games1909. 
 
March 18, 2015: Ukraine changes the conditions for the special status of the separatist held areas in Eastern 
Ukraine which states that the status will only come into force after local elections monitored by international 
observers are held in the areas according to Ukrainian law1910. Russia and the separatists state that the new 
law threatens the ceasefire1911. The Russian foreign ministry stated that Ukraine had “totally ignored” the 
Minsk provisions and it called for dialogue with the separatists1912.  Donetsk rebel leader, Denis Pushilin, 
stated that the new conditions "breach the spirit and letter of the Minsk accords" and that "the Minsk process 
is in fact interrupted" because Mr Poroshenko "does not respect the Donbas [Donetsk and Luhansk] people, 
he does not want peace"1913. Russia marks the anniversary of the Crimean annexation with Putin stating: 
“We understood that in terms of Crimea it was not a matter of just some territory, however strategically 
important it is[…]It was a matter of millions of Russian people, our compatriots, who needed our help and 
support.”1914,1915. Also, South Ossetia signed an “alliance and integration” treaty with Russian which 
integrates the security services, the military, the economy and border guards of South Ossetia with those of 
Russia1916. 
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March 20, 2015: In a piece in the wall street journal, Poroshenko states that “Crimea is still is Ukraine” 
and that Crimea is not merely a Ukraine issue1917. In an interview Poroshenko states: “We are now, together 
with our European, American and the world partners (committed) to defending freedom, democracy and 
the independence of my state – and we do not allow anybody to blackmail us.”1918 
 
March 21, 2015: Lavrov states that Russia has a fear that Ukraine may stage provocations in order to sway 
the US: "Provocateurs in Kyiv[…]could try to 'whip something up' in the expectation that this will influence 
the world public and weapons will flow into Ukraine[…]I am convinced that Berlin and Paris, as the most 
important players[…]should prevent such a turn of events."1919. Lavrov also voiced Russia’s opposition to 
the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Ukraine1920.  
 
March 25, 2015: The Ukraine far-right Azov battalion prepares to defend the port city of Mariupol in 
southeastern Ukraine against a widely expected attack by pro-Russian separatists1921. Azov commander 
Andriy Biletsky stated: “We don’t like the ceasefire at all. As with the previous ones, it’ll only lead to 
another offensive by the enemy[…]Appeasing the aggressor will only lead to more aggression. This war 
will inevitably continue - either until our complete defeat or until our full victory and return to our land in 
all east Ukraine and Crimea. We believe in the second scenario,”1922. Azov originates from Biletsky’s 
paramilitary national socialist group called “Patriot of Ukraine”, which propagated slogans of white 
supremacy, racial purity, the need for authoritarian power and a centralized national economy. 1923 It became 
enrolled in the Ukraine national guard in September where it received an increased supplies of heavy 
weaponry1924.  
 
March 26, 2015: Ukraine receives Humvees from the US with Poroshenko stating: 'And I as the president 
of Ukraine, as commander-in-chief, on behalf of the Ukrainian people, would like to thank to the United 
States of America for its comprehensive and firm position regarding the resolution of the conflict in the 
Donbass, for recognising Russia as an aggressor which annexed Crimea and which launched direct military 
aggression in particular areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.'1925. 
 
March 29, 2015: Poroshenko states that a summit will be held with the EU under the Association 
Agreement which will focus on an EU monitoring mission in Ukraine, the state of the Minsk II agreement 
and Ukraine’s economic situation1926.  
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March 31, 2015: Friends of Boris Nemtsov state that a report that provides evidence of Russian soldier 
presence in Ukraine will be released in April1927.  Igor Strelkov, a former commander of the separatists in 
eastern Ukraine, stated that heavily armed "vacationers" from Russia began arriving en masse in eastern 
Ukraine last August but that this year they were discharged before deployment1928. The report is based on 
statements from Russian soldiers and their families1929. 
 
April 1, 2015: Russia shuts down a television station which served the Crimean Tartars which Tartar 
members stated where an example of the continued discrimination they faced due to their opposition against 
the Russian annexation of Crimea1930. Poroshenko posted a picture of himself on social media with Tatar 
leaders whom Russia had expelled from Crimea stating: “You can turn off the TV, but you cannot stop the 
Crimean people’s pursuit of freedom and the truth.” 1931. Vladimir A. Konstantinov, speaker of Crimea’s 
Parliament, stated: “The West, through Ukraine, tried to tear off Crimea from Russia through the Crimean 
Tatars[…]They were used as a fifth column.” 1932. Tartar schools, mosques and political organizations have 
repeatedly been raided by law enforcement officers1933. Crimea's leader Sergei Aksyonov stated: "The 
channel is whipping up tensions and creating a sense of insecurity in the public by raising hopes that Crimea 
will return to Ukraine[…]It has been explained to ATR's management that such channels cannot operate in 
our republic in this time of semi-war."1934  
 
April 2, 2015: Russia, the separatists and Ukraine discuss in the contact group format the extension of the 
pull back of weapons to include tanks and smaller weapons systems1935.  
 
April 6, 2015: Poroshenko endorses a referendum on the federalization of Ukraine stating to a commission: 
“I’m ready to hold a referendum about the structure of the government, if you think it’s necessary,”1936. He 
however also stated that federalization was an “infection” that was forced upon Ukraine by Russia1937. He 
also stated that 90% of the Ukrainians supported a unitary government and stated: “When Ukraine united, 
they came at us with aggression, with war, trying to establish federalisation with iron and blood. I won’t let 
that happen; the Ukrainian people won’t let that happen,” 1938. The peace plan includes constitutional reform 
in the form of decentralization, the format of decentralization is however not yet established1939.  
Poroshenko also stated that Ukrainian would remain the only official state language as three-quarters of the 
population was in favor of this although the separatists are seeking greater official recognition of the 
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Russian language1940. Ukraine’s defence ministry also announced that ultranationalist MP Dmytro Yarosh 
was to become an aide to military chief Viktor Muzhenko and that his Right Sector fighting group would 
be integrated into the armed forces1941. An official of the separatists, Andrei Purgin stated that none of their 
representatives were invited to sit on the constitutional commission to start with, "which already says a 
lot[…]Everything that Kyiv does shows that they have to decide to find agreement but dictate their terms 
to us, which contradicts the Minsk accords,"1942. He also stated that "Poroshenko's statement does not mean 
anything" because there are no details of the referendum — if it happens at all1943. In relation to 
Poroshenko’s statement on the Russian language, Purgin stated: "he doesn't listen to the voice of the east: 
we speak Russian here." 1944. 
 
April 10, 2015: According to Amnesty International separatists have executed at least 4 Ukrainian 
servicemen1945. In another event, both Ukraine and the separatists accuse each other of violating the 
ceasefire agreement by firing at each other1946.  
 
April 12, 2015: Ahead of a trilateral group meeting in berlin, Germany’s foreign minister urges Ukraine 
and Russia to continue to work with the implementation of the Minsk agreement and its next phase which 
was "the preparation of local elections in the areas occupied by the separatists, but also humanitarian aid 
access and reconstruction in eastern Ukraine," 1947.  
 
April 14, 2015: Ukraine accuses the separatists of using heavy weaponry which is meant to be withdrawn 
and the separatists accused Ukraine of firing tank and artillery rounds at rebel positions1948. 
April 16, 2015: Putin holds his annual “Direct Line” press conference where he amongst other states: “I 
can tell you outright and unequivocally that there are no Russian troops in Ukraine[…]What does it matter 
where ethnic Russians live, here or in a neighbouring state, over a state border, if they can freely visit their 
relatives, if their living standards are improving, if their rights are not infringed upon, if they can speak 
their native tongue, and so on. It doesn’t matter where they live if all of these requirements are honoured. 
If we see that people have a decent life there and are treated accordingly[…]Because after World War II, 
we tried to impose our own development model on many Eastern European countries, and we did so by 
force. This has to be admitted. There is nothing good about this and we are feeling the consequences now. 
Incidentally, this is more or less what the Americans are doing today, as they try to impose their model on 
practically the entire world, and they will fail as well[…]To sum up, there are grounds to say that the current 
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April 17, 2015: 300 US troops arrive in Ukraine for a training rotation of the Ukraine National Guard. 
Russia warned that the arrival of the troops could “destabilize the situation” with Peskov stating: “The 
participation of instructors or specialists from third countries on Ukrainian territory, where the domestic 
Ukrainian conflict is unresolved, could destabilize the situation,”1950. He also stated that the presence of US 
military personnel in Ukraine: "is a long way from helping towards a settlement of the conflict"1951. 
 
April 20, 2015: As US troops begin training Ukraine troops, Poroshenko states that it will give a new face 
to the Ukraine conscript army and: “This is the first Ukrainian-American programme at this level, and it 
shows the transition of bilateral military cooperation into a fundamentally new dimension,”1952. 
 
April 22, 2015: Lavrov states that “it is in our interests to not tear Ukraine apart, but to make it neutral in 
military-political terms.” And that any division within Ukraine would result in attempts by NATO to “make 
Ukraine anti-Russian.”1953. 
 
April 24, 2015: US and Ukraine officials report that Russia is building up its troops presence at the border 
and in Crimea prompting fears that Russia planning a new offensive with former US ambassador to Ukraine 
stating: “Like most observers, I believe that there will be a new Kremlin-directed offensive; but I suspect it 
will be like the offensive in January”1954.  
 
April 26, 2015: In a documentary, Putin states that the Crimean annexation was justified and righted a 
historical wrong1955.  
 
April 27, 2015: Ukraine meets with EU officials for talks of deepening trade links and efforts to end the 
conflict1956. The EU announced that it will not send armed peacekeepers to Ukraine and that they would 
only have talks about a civilian mission1957. Tusk also announced that the EU would send a civilian 
"assessment" mission to Kiev, to explore ways to further boost security assistance for Ukraine and also that 
"We are concerned about reports of weapons still entering eastern Ukraine"1958. The EU also agreed to delay 
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April 28, 2015: Poroshenko warns that a war with the separatists could still break out again1960. Ukrainian 
military spokesman Oleksander Motuzyanyk also stated: “In the past 24 hours the resistance (from 
separatists) has significantly increased. The geographical area of ceasefire violations by the separatists has 
widened[…]The increase in the quantity of armed attacks[…]demonstrate the unwillingness of the 
separatists to settle the conflict by peaceful means,” 1961.  
 
April 30, 2015: Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine speak on the phone where Russia, according to 
Ukraine, stated that: “In the context of the discussion of ways towards a peaceful resolution (of the conflict), 
President Putin has accepted the possibility of deploying a peacekeeping contingent to the Donbass 
region,"1962. Russia did not mention this in its own statement1963. 
 
May 1, 2015: Russia denies that Putin has agreed to deploy peacekeepers in Ukraine1964. Peskov stated that 
it was "absolutely wrong" to raise the issue of peacekeepers until all provisions of the cease-fire had been 
fulfilled1965. Peskov however also state that Russia had never disputed the notion of deploying 
peacekeepers1966.     
 
May 4, 2015: Fighting increases in Eastern Ukraine with the worst clashes since the Minsk Agreements 
came into force1967. There were violations from both sides. Linked to the previous discussion on deploying 
a peacekeeping mission to Ukraine, the Kremlin Spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov stated:  "Before the text of 
the Minsk agreement and its concrete points are implemented we believe that it would be absolutely wrong 
to raise any other issues including that about peacekeepers," 1968. He also noted that Russia was not in a 
place to decide on a peacekeeping deployment as it is not a party to the conflict1969. Representatives from 
OSCE, Russia and Ukraine are to meet in Minsk as preparation for a meeting between the separatists and 
Ukraine1970.  
 
May 5, 2015: The EU announces that it will implement a free trade agreement with Ukraine despite 
pressures from Russia1971. Despite the EU being willing to discuss Russia’s concerns, it stated that the 
implementation of the agreement: "will be a top priority of the EU and the partners concerned for the 
coming years" 1972. Meanwhile, Lavrov stated at a news conference in Moscow: "Judging by certain signs, 
someone in the European Union wants the EU to allow the Ukrainian government not to implement the 
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Minsk agreements,"1973. Lavrov also accused Ukraine of increasing its military activities 1974. Ukraine on 
the other hand accused the separatists of preparing themselves for more attacks1975. 
 
May 6, 2015: Ukraine erects fences at its borders, including digging trenches, in order to deter a Russian 
invasion1976. The project is called “Project Wall” and will cost $520 million and take approx. 4 years to 
complete1977. Quote from news article: “In earlier times, lines separating the republics of the Soviet Union 
were viewed as little more than a formality, so families and communities straddled inconspicuously across 
borders. On paper, that changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. But scant security along the 
2,300-kilometer (1,400-mile) demarcation between Russia and Ukraine has for two decades ensured a 
smuggler's dream. Farmers and their livestock blithely crisscrossed in areas where it has never quite been 
entirely clear which country one was in. Separatist fighters in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions have 
exploited the porous borders, moving about with ease.” 1978. Other measures have been taken in order to 
protect the border such as tightening entry for Russian citizens (who previously could travel to Ukraine 
with merely their national ID) and trenches, shelters and parking space for armored vehicles has been 
created along highways 1979. Poroshenko noted that during a security and defense council meeting: “The 
threat of large-scale military action from Russian terrorist groups not only remains but is growing,”1980. He 
also stated that there were more than 40,000 separatist fighters in the rebel-controlled territories and a 
further 50,000 Russian troops across the border1981.  
 
May 7, 2015: NATO stages air, land and sea exercises across Russia’s northern borders as a response to 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine1982.   
 
May 8, 2015: Ukraine joins most of Europe in marking of WW2 a day ahead of Russia and Poroshenko 
also ditched the “great patriotic war” (used in Russia) in favor of the WW2 and as he stated: “For practically 
the first time[…]we’re at last looking at our own Ukrainian history, looking with our own eyes and not 
through Moscow’s glasses,”1983. The legacy of WW2 is contentious in Ukraine as a minority of men joined 
a militia that was prepared to ally itself with the Nazi invaders to fight Soviet Communist rule, leaving 
Ukrainian nationalism forever vulnerable to accusations of fascist sympathies1984.  
 









1980 Makhovsky, Andrei and Natalia Zinets “Ukraine leader warns of worsening conflict, peace envoys more 
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May 9, 2015: Russia celebrates victory day with the annual military parade on the Red Square1985. Several 
western leaders stayed away although 30 other leaders, including China and UNSG was present1986. In a 
speech, Putin warned about the rise of fascism and stated: "The basic principles of international cooperation 
have been ignored more often in the last decades. The principles which were hard won by humankind 
following the global hardships of the war[…]We've seen attempts to create a unipolar world"1987. 
Poroshenko rebuked Russia for accusing Ukraine of fascists method and stated: "It is the utmost cynicism 
to depict our country as a supposedly fascist state. It is done with the aim of justifying to the Russian people 
its own criminal action — Russia's aggression against Ukraine," 1988. Two US aid workers were released in 
Eastern Ukraine after having been captured and accused of spying by the separatists1989. The aid workers 
were part of a group from the IRC whose offices were raided by the separatists1990. The IRC stopped its 
operations in the area following the raid1991.  
May 14, 2015: NATO and the EU agree on collaboration on countering hybrid warfare (blend of 
unidentified troops, propaganda and economic pressure) which NATO has accused Russia of using against 
Ukraine1992. NATO stated that NATO and EU would work together to "ensure that the strategies we are 
developing are complementary so that we can work together quickly and effectively in case of a hybrid 
threat against any of our members,"1993 
May 16, 2015: Ukraine passes law which bans the use of communist and Soviet symbols, including the 
tearing down of thousands of monuments1994. The bill was declared as a “giant step forward for Ukraine”1995.     
May 18, 2015: Ukraine announces that it will prosecute captured Russian soldiers for terrorist acts1996. 
Peskov reiterated that there were no servicemen although the Russian defense ministry did acknowledge 
that the two captured had served under the Russian army but that they were no longer part of the army when 
they were captured1997.  
May 21, 2015: Ukraine parliament voted to suspend 5 military cooperation agreements with Russia with 
one of the agreements scrapped being giving the Russian military transit rights to reach Moldova and its 
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separatist area of Transnistria1998. Another agreement included to protect each other’s state secrets1999. 
Alexander Hug from the OSCE stated that the geographical scope of the conflict seemed to be spreading2000. 
Aleksandr Zakharchenko, the self-declared leader of the Donetsk People's Republic, state that the 
separatists intended to all of Donbass stating: "I consider and will consider the territory of the Donetsk 
region, which is currently under Kyiv authorities, illegally occupied and a subject to liberation[…]By what 
means it will happen – time will tell."2001.  
May 25, 2015: Separatist leader of Luhansk, Alexei Mozgovoi, is killed in an attack by a pro-Ukrainian 
guerilla group called “Shadow”2002. Also, the project of Novorossiya is put on hold by the separatists2003. 
Leader of the parliament which united the separatist entities, Oleg Tsarev, stated that the reason was because 
the project was not compatible with the Minsk Agreements2004. Alexander Kofman, foreign minister of the 
self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic also stated that: "The Novorossia project is frozen until a new 
political elite emerges in all these regions that will be able to head the movement. We don't have the right 
to impose our opinion on [the Ukrainian cities of] Kharkiv, Zaporizhia and Odess2005. Lavrov also stated 
that the separatist areas should remain a part of Ukraine: "At all levels, including the presidential one and 
in other formats, we say that we want [these republics] to become part of Ukraine[..]They have unveiled 
their own constitution project in which they talk about their status as envisaged by the Minsk agreements: 
The republics will become part of Ukraine, followed by constitutional reform that will solidify this status 
into a permanent one,"2006  
May 26, 2015: According to a Bloomberg report, the Russian military uses mobile crematories in order to 
get rid of the bodies of Russian servicemen killed in Ukraine2007.  
May 27, 2015: According to a Reuter reporter, Russia is massing troops and weaponry at a makeshift base 
near the Ukraine border2008. Many of the vehicles have their number plates and other insignia removed and 
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the same goes for the servicemen2009. Russia did not comment on this and several of the servicemen said 
they had been sent there for an exercise2010.  
May 28, 2015: Putin signs a decree that classifies the death of special operations soldiers during peacetime 
a state secret2011. Peskov states that the decree is merely an upgrade of state privacy laws that “has nothing 
to do with Ukraine” 2012. Amnesty international denounced the move as an infringement on the freedom of 
speech and stated: "Not only is this decree a blatant attack on freedom of expression, it also has sinister 
undertones that will intensify speculation President Putin has something to hide – specifically losses 
incurred by Russia's military in Ukraine,"2013 Despite this Putin continues to enjoy a 86% approval rating 
at home2014. Meanwhile Ukraine’s defense minister, Stepan Poltorak, stated that Russia had moved forces 
into eastern Ukraine as he stated: “A large number of tanks and artillery systems have been moved into the 
territory, and in the territory of Luhansk and Donetsk there are units of Russian armed forces[…]That is 
why we see a risk fighting will restart.”2015. Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia sign a memorandum of 
understanding on considering a joint procurement of medium-range air defense systems2016.   
May 31, 2015: Poroshenko announces the appointment of former Georgian president, Saakashvili, the 
governor of Odessa in Southern Ukraine2017. Saakashvili was granted citizenship at the same time2018. In 
response Medvedev tweeted: “Saakashvili – head of Odessa region. The Chapiteau show goes on. Sad 
Ukraine”2019. Saakashvili stated that the governorship was important because Odessa was a "frontline" both 
against local corruption and against perceived Russian aggression in the region and that: "If Odessa ever 
falls, God forbid, then Georgia might be wiped out from the map,"2020. 
June 1, 2015: An independent report finds that the Russian defense ministry had faked two satellite images 
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June 2, 2015: The firm which makes the Buk systems used in the downing of the Malaysian airline offers 
to recreate the event as a way of disproving that the system was used by the separatists, but rather by 
Ukraine2022.   
June 3, 2015: Fighting erupts outside of Donetsk with Ukraine accusing the separatists of violating the 
truce by launching a full-scale offensive2023. This is denied by the separatists2024.  
June 4, 2015: Poroshenko warns of a Russian invasion and that 9000 Russian troops were deployed stating: 
"Ukraine's military should be ready for a new offensive by the enemy, as well as a full-scale invasion along 
the entire border with the Russian Federation[…]We must be really prepared for this." 2025. Poroshenko also 
added that Kremlin's "plan to sow separatism in south-eastern Ukraine" had failed and only persisted in 
areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions because of "Russian bayonets"2026. Russia denied the impending 
threat with Lavrov accusing Ukraine of jeopardizing the Minsk agreement, by placing it "under the constant 
threat of disruption" and by refusing to engage in direct dialogue with separatist leaders2027. In his speech 
to the parliament, Poroshenko also stated that the eastern part of the country would be cut further off by 
fortification of the front and ending food supplies, until Russia abides by the Minsk agreements2028.  
June 5, 2015: The OSCE notes an increase in ceasefire violations and in another occasion Poroshenko held 
several interviews and meetings with foreign media and leaders and in an interview stated: “We will defend 
our country, our territorial integrity and our independence by ourselves[…]We have weapons for that. But 
unfortunately we are fighting with the weapons from the 20th century, from the time of the Soviet Union, 
against the Russian — most modern — weapons of the 21st century[…]Here we are defending freedom, 
we are defending democracy, we are defending European values, and the actual reason of this war is the 
right of the Ukrainian people to live under European standards, with European values, in the European 
Union.”2029. Poroshenko also stated that Ukraine had informed the OSCE that it would move heavy weapons 
back to defend the town, reversing a previous agreed withdrawal2030. Alexander Hug from the OSCE stated 
that the fighting in Maryinka (outside Donetsk): “constitutes a new, worrying development in the conflict 
in eastern Ukraine.” 2031. Poroshenko also noted that Ukraine cannot make any political concessions until 
weapons and fighters are removed from the east and the border with Russia is brought back fully under 
Ukrainian control2032. 
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June 6, 2015: In a comment to an Italian newspaper, Putin states: "I would like to say — there's no need to 
be afraid of Russia[…]Only a sick person — and even then only in his sleep — can imagine that Russia 
would suddenly attack NATO."2033. 
June 11, 2015: A faction in the US congress presses Obama to send lethal aid to Ukraine2034. On lethal aid 
from the US, Poroshenko stated: “We have an effective form of cooperation, but not with lethal weapons, 
with the United States, Canada, U.K.[…]We are very satisfied with the current level of cooperation but we 
would be happy if the level of this cooperation would be increased.”2035. 
June 12, 2015: Ukraine’s prime minister announces that Ukraine may halt its debt repayments in order to 
fund the war against the Russian-backed separatists in Ukraine2036.   
June 14, 2015: Russia responds to the US proposal of storing heavy weaponry in Ukraine by stating that if 
the US is to store weapons in Ukraine then Russia would boost its forces on the Western flank2037. Russian 
General Yury Yakubov, stated that such a move would be "the most aggressive step by the Pentagon and 
NATO" since the Cold War and that "Russia would be left with no other option but to boost its troops and 
forces on the western flank,"2038.  
June 15, 2015: Residents of two areas in eastern Ukraine which have been frequently shelled staged a 
protest chanting “stop the war” and “out with everybody”2039. The protesters were however not unified in 
their message as some wanted the rebels to attack the Ukrainian Army, to push the front farther from their 
neighborhoods, others demanded that the separatists remove artillery pieces from backyards and city streets, 
so as not to invite retaliatory strikes whilst others again demanded pension payments (which Ukraine has 
suspended as part of the economic blockade on the separatist area)2040.  
June 16, 2015: Kerry and Lavrov discuss how to ensure the ceasefire with Kerry urging: “Russia to seize 
the opportunity of upcoming meetings of the Trilateral Contact Group and its Working Groups to accelerate 
progress on implementing the Minsk agreements,"2041. Lavrov on the other hand stressed the importance of 
"establishing a direct dialogue between the [Kyiv] government and the self-proclaimed unrecognized 
Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics"2042. 
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June 19, 2015: Putin states that Russia was "not the first" to start the crisis in Ukraine and rather he blamed 
the US for "igniting it."2043.  
June 20, 2015: An OSCE report states that there are ceasefire violations on both sides with a majority of 
the incidents coming from the separatist side2044.  
June 22, 2015: The secretary of Russia's security council said it is impossible to stop Russians from going 
to fight in Ukraine because they are guided by "emotions."2045.  
June 24, 2015: The Normandy format meet in Paris to discuss the situation in Ukraine where they agreed 
to continue their engagement under this format2046. NATO warns of the risk that heavy fighting may resume 
in Ukraine and added that Russia continued to support the separatists with weapons, soldiers and 
training2047. In other related events, the Ukraine military accused the separatists of conducting long-range 
artillery attacks on villages in the east2048.  
June 26, 2015: The Ukraine defense minister urged the west not to retreat from Ukraine as Russia build-
up of forces showed that its intention was to seize control of Ukraine2049. As he stated: “One should not be 
naive and think that Putin has given up his plans to seize Ukraine, to destabilize the situation in Ukraine. 
He’s just changing his tactics and strategies, but his goal remains the same: to seize Ukraine.2050”.  
July 1, 2015: The Russian prosecutor-general’s office stated that it would review the decision by the Soviet 
Union’s State Council to recognize the independence of the Baltic states but also added that this was a 
request from two members of the United Russia party adding that it would have no legal implications and 
that: “We are required by law to consider all requests we receive, regardless of their content. Some of them 
lack common sense”2051. It caused outrage among the Baltic states with Estonia stating: “It serves as yet 
another example of the resurgent imperialistic mood that unfortunately exists in Russia.” 2052. 
July 2, 2015: A dossier provided by the Ukraine security service, sent to the US, states that five Russian 
generals are playing a key role in organizing and commanding the separatists2053. The US stated that the 
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information generally conforms with the US intelligence assessment of Russia’s activity in Ukraine2054. 
Russia on the other hand denounces a new US military strategy which states that Russia is failing to respect 
the sovereignty of its neighbors, that “Russia’s military actions are undermining regional security directly 
and through proxy forces,” and that Russia is among the “revisionist-minded” states2055. Kremlins 
spokesman responded saying that “The use of such language in this document points, shall we say, to what 
is probably a confrontational attitude devoid of any objectivity towards our country” 2056.  
July 3, 2015: The separatists withdraw from Shyrokyne with the separatist leader Denis Pushilin warning 
that the "unilateral demilitarisation" by their side may not be enough to establish a lasting peace and that 
"We are waiting for a similar step (from Ukraine),"2057. Ukraine however stated that "This is just a pullback 
of one infantry unit -- no more[…]It has absolutely no effect on the situation. The threat is still there because 
their tank and artillery forces remain very close to Shyrokyne and could always attack again," 2058. Russia 
on the other hand expressed "deep concern" over Ukraine's plans to decentralize power as part of a peace 
deal with separatist rebels2059. Poroshenko presented a blueprint to give Ukraine's regions more powers and 
control over their budgets and said that the moves would amount to a "vaccination" against 
federalization2060. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov however stated: "The preparation of such laws 
without taking into consideration the opinions of the representatives of the Donbass can hardly be seen as 
the fulfillment of the Minsk agreements."2061. Alexander Zakharchenko, self-appointed head of the Donetsk 
region, however stated that "Neither I, nor my colleague Plotnitsky, gave agreement to Poroshenko's 
proposed conception of constitutional reform"2062. Donetsk has also called for local election on October 18, 
a week before the rest of Ukraine, which Poroshenko stated would be "destructive"2063. 
July 4, 2015: 1,000 Ukrainian pro-government fighters and far-right supporters marched through Kiev 
calling on the government to end the Minsk ceasefire accord and declare war on pro-Russian rebels in the 
east2064. The march was called by the ultra-nationalist Right Sector group2065. 
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July 7, 2015: According to the New York Times, Chechens assist Ukrainians in the fight against “the 
Russians”2066. Meanwhile, Russia has cut off the power to the separatist areas2067.  
July 10, 2015: According to Poroshenko, the threat of criminal violence in Ukraine has “significantly risen” 
stating: “The level of guerrilla and terrorist threats in the regions outside the zone (of conflict) has 
significantly risen,”2068. This, Poroshenko argues, is the result of the trafficking of weapons from Eastern 
Ukraine2069. Meanwhile, 2000 recruits of a newly formed police force in Ukraine entered duty with 
Poroshenko stating that their job was not just to uphold the law but “also to make people believe that reforms 
are inevitable”2070. 
July 11, 2015: Clash between Right Sector and Ukrainian police force leaves two Right Sector members 
dead2071. According to a lawyer representing Russian soldiers, dozens of Russian soldiers have fled their 
unit in fear of being deployed to Ukraine and they now face trial2072. The soldiers allegedly were offered 
money and benefits from people in uniforms without insignia to join the war in Ukraine2073. The Russian 
defense ministry denied that a dozen soldiers were involved and stated that it only involved four soldiers 
who had committed disciplinary offenses2074. 
July 12, 2015: A standoff between Right Sector members and Ukrainian police continue, with fighting 
breaking out in the town of Mukachevo, near the borders with Poland and Slovakia2075. A disagreement 
over cigarette smuggling between Right Sector and another group apparently led to the confrontation2076. 
July 14, 2015: A booby-trap, allegedly placed by the Right Sector injures two police officers in Western 
Ukraine2077. Poroshenko orders the security services and police to disarm “illegal groups” and root out 
corruption and smuggling2078. 
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July 15, 2015: Violence escalates between Ukraine and the separatists with shelling leading to deaths on 
both sides2079. Ukraine’s security council stated that the previous 24 hours saw "some of the most intense 
bombardments of Ukrainian territory since the signing of the Minsk (truce) agreement" and continued to 
state: "The latest events are proof of yet another attempt by Russia and its puppet to wreck the Minsk 
agreement and restart active military hostilities," 2080. 
July 16, 2015: In connection to the Minsk agreements, Ukraine's parliament approves a draft law to grant 
greater autonomy to the separatist-held areas in the country’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions2081.  
July 20, 2015: NATO and Ukraine launch joint military drills near the Polish border with Russia 
condemning the war game and stating that NATO "should understand that such actions[…]may threaten to 
disrupt the visible progress (made) in the peace process concerning the deep internal crisis in Ukraine,"2082. 
July 21, 2015: Poroshenko announces a plan of introducing a 30 km buffer zone in Luhansk2083. The plan 
was agreed to between Ukraine's warring factions under mediation of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and Russia, and it requires all tanks and artillery to be withdrawn from the 
region and aims to bring an end to the "permanent shelling." 2084. 
July 22, 2015: Right Sector announces that it will start a campaign “to conduct a national referendum on 
whether President Petro Porshenko and his government should be impeached and an “absolute blockade” 
set up against territory in eastern Ukraine under the control of pro-Russian separatists.“2085. The leader also 
said the referendum was to “ask whether Ukrainians support the legal recognition of volunteer militia units 
and their right to carry arms as well as the introduction of martial law -- which he said would help defeat 
the rebels in the east.” 2086. 
July 25, 2015: The pentagon announces that it will train Ukrainian regular troops by the end of 20152087. 
July 26, 2015: Ukraine detains Russian officer who was driving a military truck carrying ammunition to 
Eastern Ukraine2088. Another man was also detained, and both carried military uniforms without insignia2089. 
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July 27, 2015: According to the OSCE, there has been a record increase in the number of ceasefire 
violations2090.    
July 29, 2015: Russia vetoes a UN resolution meant to create a tribunal to prosecute those responsible for 
the downing of the Malaysian airline2091.  
July 31, 2015: Ukraine court approves the constitutional changes which allows limited self-rule to the the 
areas under separatist control in Luhansk and Donetsk2092.    
August 1, 2015: Ukraine’s foreign minister demands that Russia begins new negotiations on a cease-fire 
deal in eastern Ukraine and he stated that the Russian military and security services were in “full command” 
of the separatists2093.  
August 3, 2015: Ukraine’s former Prime Minister (under Yanukovych) announces the creation of the 
“Ukrainian Salvation Committee” which calls for regime change and early elections in Ukraine2094. 
Kremlins spokesman stated that Russia had nothing to do with the initiative2095. 
August 6, 2015: Amid speculations that the separatists have the capability to create a dirty bomb, Ukraine 
announces that it has prevented a suspected uranium sale2096.  
August 8, 2015: Per request of the Ukraine Security Service, Ukraine’s ministry of culture blacklists 14 
Russian artists over their public support for the annexation of Crimea2097.  
August 9, 2015: OSCE vehicles used for the monitoring are set on fire with the OSCE deputy head of the 
mission, Alexander Hug, stating: "It seems that this sort of intimidation is aimed at stopping the OSCE 
from reporting what is going on in the area,"2098. The separatist and the government blamed the other2099.  
August 10, 2015: Violence escalates in Eastern Ukraine with worst shelling since February2100. The 
government accused the separatists and the separatists denied it, with Ukrainian military spokesman Andriy 
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Lysenko stating “This brazen attack by the occupiers took place against a background of an escalating 
situation in east Ukraine,”2101  
August 11, 2015: The team investigating the downing of the Malaysian airline state that they have 
recovered debris which may be fragments from a Russian-made missile system2102.  
August 14, 2015: Separatist leader of the Donetsk Peoples Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, claims that 
the troops under his command have been reinforced with 1200 troops trained in Russia2103.  
August 17, 2015: Violence continues, and Ukraine blames the separatists for shelling civilians whilst 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov blamed Kiev for the violence, giving no detail but saying he 
suspected Ukraine was preparing a new offensive2104. Poroshenko on the other hand accused Putin of 
whipping up tensions in eastern Ukraine by visiting Crimea and as he stated: "This is a challenge to the 
civilized world and a continuation of the plan to escalate the situation which is being carried out by Russian 
troops and their mercenaries in the Donbass (east Ukraine),"2105.  
August 18, 2015: While visiting Crimea, Putin takes a dive in a research submarine which is used for 
researching Crimea’s ancient trade route2106. Putin stated that such research was important “in order to 
understand the development of ancient Rus’s relations with its neighbours, as well as the development of 
Russian statehood,”2107. Putin responded to Poroshenko’s comment about the annexation that: “I won’t 
comment on that because the future of Crimea was decided by people who live here. They voted for 
unification with Russia. Full stop” 2108 
August 19, 2015: In a meeting with Crimean leaders, Putin expressed his concern “over continued threat 
that external forces” which could destabilize the region2109.  
August 22, 2015: In a statement by Poroshenko, he states that military pressure from Russia and the 
separatists is likely to last decades and that future generations will have to undergo military training: “The 
military threat from the east is a tangible reality for decades to come. This threat will not go away in the 
near future and every generation of Ukrainians must have army experience,”2110. Germany, France and 
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Ukraine will meet, and no invitation is extended to Russia2111. Poroshenko stated: "The key goal of the 
Ukrainian authorities is to create a powerful international community that forms a coalition and stops the 
aggressor,"2112 
August 24, 2015: Ukraine marks its Independence Day with Poroshenko stating that bandits, mercenaries 
and Russian militaries keep on killing Ukrainians every day2113. Poroshenko also stated: “We must 
remember that we defend not only Ukraine, but also civilizational values of the entire democratic world. I 
am sure that the developments in Ukraine are the continuation of the creation of Europe" and he was 
confident that "in joint solidarity with the entire world, Ukraine can stop impudent and cynical mockery of 
the international law, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the whole international security 
architecture" and he also urged foreign leader "to uphold Ukraine and join its struggle for values, security, 
truth and peace! This is what it is all about in Donbas and Crimea today".2114. He also stated that  “The war 
for Ukrainian independence is continuing,” and that the threat of a “full-scale military invasion” remains, 
although Russia “also has an alternative strategy - to undermine the situation in the middle of our country 
and to put the country at loggerheads with key (foreign) partners, isolating it with the aggressor,”2115. Lavrov 
stated that Poroshenko’s words were “unfounded and disgraceful”, adding: “Their goal is to break the 
‘genetic code’ ensuring the unity of our nations. I think he won’t succeed in that.”2116. Lavrov also restated 
that Russia wanted Germany and France to put pressure on Poroshenko to comply with its commitments 
under the Minsk agreement and to grant the rebel regions greater autonomy as Russia thinks the changes to 
the Ukrainian constitution fall short of what had been agreed. 2117 
August 26, 2015: A report leaked alleges that Russia has paid compensation to families of 2000 soldiers 
killed in Ukraine2118. Meanwhile the separatists and Ukraine agree to strive for a full ceasefire 
implementation by September 1 alongside a political process, including plans for local elections and 
establishment of a special self-management status for separatist-minded regions2119. 
August 29, 2015: France, Germany and Russia back the new ceasefire2120.  
August 31, 2015: Clashes erupt between nationalists and riot police erupt outside the Ukraine parliament 
as MPs agree to give initial backing to reforms which would allow more autonomy to the separatist areas2121. 
Some MPs voted against the reform with Victoria Voytsitska stating that “This provision was made to 
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ensure an aggressor could not influence our constitution[…]And although we do not have an officially 
declared war, if you look at what is happening in the east, at the president’s rhetoric, then it is clear that we 
have a de facto war.”2122. Poroshenko stated that if parliament had not passed the draft, in line with Kiev’s 
commitments at the peace talks in Minsk, Belarus, Ukraine would have been in danger of losing the support 
of its Western allies: “There would have been a real possibility of us being left alone with the aggressor,”2123.  
September 1, 2015: The agreed to “school” ceasefire holds with both signs showing compliance2124. As 
Ukraine spokesman Oleksander Motuzyanyk stated: "As of 12 p.m. there were no reports of violations by 
the illegal armed groups. Now the situation is calm,"2125. The naval vessel exercise involving among other 
Ukraine and US begin in the black sea and is meant to strengthen security in the Black Sea region with 
Ukraine’s Prime Minister stating: "After Crimea was annexed, the Black Sea region is no longer stable and 
secure,"2126. Meanwhile Ukraine’s “Radical Party” leaves the coalition government in protest over the 
decentralization bill with right-wing party opposing a constitutional amendment which aims to give more 
autonomy to areas controlled by pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine2127.   
September 2, 2015: The ceasefire ends with a deadly ambush against a Ukrainian army vehicle in 
Luhansk2128.  
September 3, 2015: Ukraine’s National Security Council approve a new military doctrine which declares 
Russia to be a military opponent and states that Ukraine must strive for NATO membership in 2020, with 
Poroshenko stating that the doctrine: "not only officially establishes the Russian Federation as Ukraine's 
military opponent, but states the task of relocating military units and creating the necessary military 
infrastructure in the eastern and southern regions."2129. NATO opens a command post in Lithuania and 
Russia responds saying it is an aggressive action2130. 
September 5, 2015: Despite the ambush on September 2, Poroshenko lauds the ceasefire stating that no 
Ukraine soldier has died since the implementation of the ceasefire2131.  
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September 8, 2015: The level of violence is at its lowest since the beginning of the conflict2132. Kremlin 
also noted the drop, in violence however the spokesman also stated: "A relative stabilisation has indeed 
taken place from 1 September and there is practically no shelling by the Ukrainian armed forces of civilian 
populated areas in Donbass[…]But if you look at other conceptual points of the Minsk 
agreements[…]unfortunately you cannot note progress, it is impossible." 2133.  Ukraine accepts the 
jurisdiction of the ICC over any war crimes committed on Ukraine territory since February 20142134. 
Poroshenko also states that despite the ceasefire, Ukraine still faces a potential military attack from Russia 
and stated that, as a response to Russia’s ban on Ukraine food import and the failures in the gas imports, 
Russia’s aim is to “strangle our state economically and destabilise it”2135. A UN report finds that there is an 
increase in civilian casualties and widespread human rights violations with Gianni Magazzeni, chief of 
global operations for the U.N. Human Rights Office, stating that “ongoing hostilities in some areas of 
eastern Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk regions reportedly are being fueled by the presence and continuing 
influx of foreign fighters and sophisticated weapons and ammunition from Russia.”2136. 
September 9, 2015: According to Reuters, Russia is building a military base to house several thousand 
soldiers near Ukraine’s border2137.  
September 11, 2015: In a speech Poroshenko states: "A full withdrawal of all occupation forces from 
Ukrainian territory and closing the Ukrainian-Russian border: these are the two main preconditions for 
peace and stability in the Donbass[…]We don't have any civil war. We don't have any internal conflict. It 
very simple. We have aggression against Ukraine and occupation of independent Ukraine. It's absolutely 
clear that the aggressor is Russia,"2138 
September 13. 2015: Germany’s foreign minister says that the sides are very close to agreeing on the 
removal of heavy weapons from the front lines, Lavrov however stated: "90 percent ready[…]the devil is 
in the details."2139. 
September 15, 2015: Ukraine announces that if the Minsk agreements fail, then Ukraine will renew its call 
for lethal aid from western allies2140. Ukraine’s ambassador to NATO, Yehor Bozhok, stated: “If heavy 
weapons are withdrawn on our eastern border under the Minsk deal, then fine. But if the situation escalates, 
then we will again raise the issue of sophisticated defensive weaponry with our western partners[…]We are 
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not going to attack anybody, but we would like to protect ourselves,” he said, listing anti-artillery, anti-
mortar and anti-tank weapons as those most needed and saying the request “had already been on the table 
for some time”.2141 
September 16, 2015: Separatists announce that they will hold elections on a separate date to that of the rest 
of Ukraine2142. Ukraine stated that the holding of elections on separate dates would be perceived as a 
violation of the Minsk agreements2143. Denis Pushilin, the separatist Donetsk region's envoy to the so-called 
Contact Group however stated that the Minsk agreement calls on Kyiv to coordinate with separatist leaders 
about elections in eastern Ukraine and that the separatists decided on "yet another unilateral implementation 
of the Complex of Measures [for Fulfilment of the Minsk agreement]" because Kyiv has never coordinated 
on the issue2144. Poroshenko stated that "I want to stress on the great danger posed by the decision to hold 
fake elections on 18 October and 1 November," and also mentioned that this decision from the separatists 
required a “firm” response and hence sanctions for one year was imposed on 400 individuals and 90 
companies2145. The sanction list includes Russian government officials and separatist leaders but also 
journalists from the BBC2146. 
September 22, 2015: Ukraine presses NATO for the delivery of weapons to defend themselves against 
Russia2147. Stoltenberg however stated that NATO did not provide weapons2148. Other agreements were 
signed between Ukraine and NATO2149. Poroshenko also noted about Ukraine-NATO relations that “De 
jure we are not allies, but de facto we are much more than partners. Ukraine is the most eastern outpost of 
the Euro-Atlantic area,” 2150. Poroshenko also stated that "The decision on the non-alliance policy which 
was announced by the previous government is criminal in terms of the security and strategic interests of 
our state,"2151. Meanwhile the separatists stated that they would go ahead with their scheduled elections2152.  
September 23, 2015: Protesters lay siege to the house of pro-Russian politician Mikhail Dobkin in Kharkiv, 
with the protests allegedly being organized by the nationalist group Azov Battalion and calling on their 
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members to get rid of the accomplices to occupiers2153. According to Reuters, Russia is planning a second 
military base near Ukraine borders2154.  
September 25, 2015: Separatists in Luhansk ban 10 humanitarian aid groups for “grave violations of local 
laws”2155. Several international NGO’s have equally been told to leave Luhansk with the UN stating that it 
is a breach of international humanitarian law2156.  
September 28, 2015: Putin addresses the UNGA stating amongst other “Ukraine's territorial integrity 
cannot be secured through the use of threats or military force, but it must be secured. The people of Donbas 
should have their rights and interests genuinely considered, and their choice respected; they should be 
engaged in devising the key elements of the country's political system, in line with the provisions of the 
Minsk agreements. Such steps would guarantee that Ukraine will develop as a civilized state, and a vital 
link in creating a common space of security and economic cooperation, both in Europe and in Eurasia”2157.   
September 30, 2015: Ukraine and the separatists agree to withdraw their entire arsenal of smaller weapons 
from the buffer zone2158. Both sides hailed the agreement with Ukraine stating: "We view this is as a 
diplomatic victory[…]We are certain that this is another step toward establishing peace in the conflict 
zone."2159. Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko state that the "People's Republic of Donetsk 
will unequivocally implement its part of the agreement[…]However, the length of this negotiating process 
gives us reason to doubt the sincerity of the Ukrainian side,"2160. Separatist representative Denis Pushilin 
however stated that: “This could mean the end of the war,”2161. 
October 2, 2015: A new kind of Russian weapons system has been spotted by the OSCE in eastern 
Ukraine2162. Alexander Hug from the OSCE stated: “Both sides agreed a year ago to withdraw heavy 
weaponry from the line of contact. Having them near the line of contact is of course a concern as this 
weapon should be in storage and not be used.”2163.  
October 3, 2015: The two sides announce the beginning of the withdrawal of small arms from the buffer 
zone2164.  
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October 5, 2015: Poroshenko states that Ukraine must gain full control over its borders by the end of 
December even if the implementation of the Minsk agreements are delayed as he stated: "The border is a 
key component of our sovereignty and we are not going to compromise over it."2165.  
October 6, 2015: The separatists announce that they will postpose their elections until February2166. In 
return the separatists stated that Ukraine should fulfil its responsibilities in accordance with the Minsk 
agreements, which included special status to the separatist areas, amnesty and constitutional changes2167.  
October 7, 2015: Ukraine reports that the separatists had violated the truce by attacking 4 Ukraine soldiers 
with Poroshenko stating: “It is somewhat a new reality, but you should stay on your guard, victory is still 
far away. We must not only return the Donbass (east Ukraine) but also defend the whole of Ukraine,”2168. 
Separatists equally reported Ukrainian violations of the ceasefire2169. 
October 8, 2015: According to OSCE relative calm has prevailed as the two sides have begun to pull light 
weapons and tanks from the buffer zone2170 .  
October 10, 2015: Russia announces that it wishes to see a bigger European monitoring mission in Ukraine 
as part of assisting with the light weapon withdrawal2171. A statement from the Russian ministry said: 
“Russia is in favor of increasing the number of observers to the maximum permitted 1000[…]This is 
especially current in view of the new tasks of fulfilling the agreements of Sept. 29 on withdrawing mortars, 
tanks and light artillery.” 2172. 
October 11, 2015: Poroshenko stressed the need for elections in the separatist areas as "without elections 
in these occupied territories, a political solution will be in a deadlock"2173. Poroshenko spoke of the 
importance of re-integrating the separatist areas as he noted: "If you lose the chance to regain the regions 
of Donetsk and Lugansk, who in the world will speak of returning Crimea to a Ukraine that abandons its 
territories?" 2174. 
October 13, 2015: The dutch team investigating the downing of the Malaysian airline concludes that the 
airline was shut down by a Russian-made Buk missile, but does not state who fired the missile2175. 
According to the report both the Russians and the Ukrainians possess such a missile2176. In response Ukraine 
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Prime minister stated that he had "no doubt" that the crash was "a planned operation of the Russian special 
services", whilst Russia’s foreign minister stated that the investigation "biased in nature" and said Russia 
was "ready to present its own information"2177. 
October 15, 2015: Russia refuses to join a debt swap with Ukraine and Ukraine states it is “ready to fight 
Russia in court” over the debt repayment2178. Meanwhile Ukraine is voted to, alongside Egypt, Senegal, and 
Uruguay, join the UNSC, with Ukraine stating that it will use the opportunity to draw greater international 
attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine2179.  
October 20, 2015: Separatists bar pro-Kiev candidates from running in the upcoming elections2180. In a 
response to Ukraine’s demand for the elections to be held under Ukrainian law and overseen by foreign 
observers, Donetsk separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko stated that this is "a sign that they have 
absolutely no idea how the people here really live[…]How can we allow (pro-Kiev) parties take part in the 
vote when they provided the political cover for the[…]effective genocide of our people,"2181 
October 22, 2015: During a meeting at the Valdai International Discussion Club, Vladimir Putin pointed 
to the ousting of Yanukovych and stated: “Russia’s position is not that we oppose the Ukrainian people’s 
choice. We are ready to accept any choice. Ukraine genuinely is a brotherly country in our eyes, a brotherly 
people. I don’t make any distinction between Russians and Ukrainians. But we oppose this method of 
changing the government. It is not a good method anywhere in the world, but it is completely unacceptable 
in the post-Soviet region, where, to be frank, many former Soviet republics do not yet have traditions of 
statehood and have not yet developed stable political systems.”2182 
October 26, 2015: Ukraine holds elections with early polls showing the east/west divide in the country2183. 
Poroshenko retained his support in western and central part of the country, whilst the Opposition Bloc 
gained votes in the south and the east2184. “The Opposition Bloc is composed of members from the former 
Party of Regions, which supported President Viktor Yanukovych2185.” Poll stations never opened in 
Mariupol due to dispute over ballots2186.  
October 27, 2015: There is a mortar exchange between the two sides in Donetsk meanwhile Poroshenko 
addresses the scheduled separatist elections stating that those "fake" polls would be addressed in Minsk 
later Tuesday and that Moscow’s failure in pressuring the separatists to call of the vote meant that "The 
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Russian side is basically sabotaging the implementation of the Minsk agreements[…]The illegal elections 
have not been cancelled but only postponed."2187. 
October 29, 2015: Ukraine and separatists swap prisoners as part of goodwill gesture meant to re-track the 
peace talks with Poroshenko announcing: "Dear friends, I have good news,"…"Nine Ukrainian heroes have 
been recovered. Glory to Ukraine!"2188 
November 4, 2015: Ukraine announces that it will suspend its withdrawal of arms if provocations from the 
separatists continue, as stated: "If the Russian invaders continue their provocative actions, which threaten 
the lives and security of the Ukrainian military [personnel] and civilians, then [Ukrainian] armaments and 
military hardware will be immediately brought back to their previous location, and the Ukrainian 
servicemen will act in line with the existing challenges of the Russian invaders,"2189. Donald Tusk states 
that Russia does not fully abide by the terms set in the Minsk agreements and that this will be taken into 
consideration in terms of the EU sanctions review2190.  
November 5, 2015: OSCE reports an increase in ceasefire violations2191.  
November 6, 2015: The Normandy Format meets with Lavrov stating that the deadlines on political 
reforms in Ukraine under the Minsk agreements need to be extended into 20162192.  
November 7, 2015: Ukraine announces that it has completed the first withdrawal of arms stating: "The fact 
that we are withdrawing weapons of up to 100mm is evidence that we are in compliance with the Minsk 
agreement,"2193. Meanwhile the separatists accuse Ukrainian volunteer battalions of firing rockets towards 
Donetsk with a separatist spokesman stating: "Ukrainian volunteer battalions are bombing Donetsk in order 
to derail the Minsk (peace) agreement and to provoke a response from us,"2194. 
November 9, 2015: The two sides engage in direct combat, for the first time in months2195. Poroshenko has 
a meeting with the EU’s High Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy where Mogherini 
states that the EU’s position on sanctions is linked to the Minsk Agreements and the de-occupation of 
Donbas with Poroshenko stating:  "I was very pleased to hear the firm position of Mrs. Vice President on 
the sanctions that are clearly linked to the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the end of the 
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occupation of Donbas. I am grateful to her for her advocating the need for the full implementation of the 
Minsk agreements,"2196. 
November 10, 2015: The failed local elections in Mariupol and Krasnoarmeysk are rescheduled till 
November 29.2197 . 
November 11, 2015: The level of violence increases with continued violations of the ceasefire2198.  
November 15, 2015: Ukraine receives two counter battery stations from the US, which is part of a US-
Ukraine agreement on military and technical cooperation2199. 
November 16, 2015: Ukraine announces that it may return its artillery to the frontline if the fighting 
escalates further2200. 
November 17, 2015: The EU announces that an EU-Ukraine free trade zone will be launched on January 
12201. 
November 18, 2015: Russia decides to impose a food embargo on Ukraine from January 1 with Russia’s 
Economic Development Minister Alexey Ulyukayev stating: "Since Ukraine joined anti-Russia sanctions - 
economic, financial - we’ve decided to impose[…]protective measures in the form of food embargo," he 
said, adding that the decision is "postponed till January 1."2202.  
November 21, 2015: All EU members ratify the Association Agreement with Ukraine, which will come 
into effect on January 12203. 
November 28, 2015: Ukraine commemorates Holomodor with Poroshenko describing it as the darkest 
pages in the country's history and "a manifestation of a centuries-old hybrid war waged by Russia against 
Ukraine" as part of a bid "to destroy the Ukrainian nation."2204. He also stated that for "21 months Ukraine 
fights against Russian aggression. Russia's hate towards Ukraine and its desire to destroy Ukrainian people 
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remain unchanged[…]I am convinced that the famine would not have occurred if we had not lost our 
independent state in the 1920s." 2205. 
November 29, 2015: Mariupol hold the delayed election with members of the ultra-nationalist movement 
"Pravyi Sector" (Right Sector) observing the election and stating that "We are here to make sure that 
elections will be held fairly[…]It is no secret that the majority here support separatists. The reason is that 
our people are still nostalgic for the Soviet Union and are trying to get it back by voting for pro-Russian 
forces."2206. 
December 3, 2015: Putin holds his “State of the Nation” address in which there was no mention of 
Ukraine2207.  
December 6, 2015: The OSCE SMM is threatened in Eastern Ukraine as they tried to approach heavy 
artillery located in Luhansk2208.  
December 10, 2015: Ukraine announces that its security service has detained members of an insurgency 
group in Kiev who were planning terrorist attacks2209. They detained three Russians and four Ukrainians, 
with Ukraine believing that the Russians could be members of the Russian SBU, stating: “Russian 
intelligence agencies are increasing their activities in peaceful (Ukrainian) cities,”2210. 
December 11, 2015: Fighting erupts inside Ukraine’s parliament between Ukraine’s ruling coalition and 
Poroshenko’s bloc2211.  
December 17, 2015: Putin states that Russia does have personnel in eastern Ukraine who are carrying out 
certain military tasks, but he denies that Moscow has deployed regular troops there2212. As he stated: “We 
never said there were no people there who were carrying out certain tasks including in the military 
sphere[…]But that does not mean there are Russian (regular) troops there, feel the difference.”2213. He also 
stated that Russia was ready to help persuade the separatists to agree on a compromise in order to reach a 
political settlement2214. 
December 20, 2015: In a documentary titled “World Order”, Putin states that Russia’s strategy in Ukraine 
is based on the single premise that “we cannot just abandon the people who live in the southeast of the 
country to nationalists to eat them up.”2215. He also stated that Russia was not trying to restore the Soviet 
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Union, but that “nobody wants to believe it” and rather that "With Ukraine and other areas of the former 
U.S.S.R., I'm sure our Western partners aren't working in the interests of Ukraine, they are working to 
prevent the recreation of the U.S.S.R.,"2216  
December 22, 2015: Putin states that Russia will continue to seek a settlement over the disputes that exist 
within its trade relations with Ukraine and the EU2217. Ukraine and the separatists agree on a “holiday 
ceasefire” during Christmas and New Years2218. 
December 23, 2015: Ukraine and the separatists accuse each other of violating the holiday ceasefire2219. 
December 25, 2015: Ukraine announces that it will impose a tit-for-tat food embargo on Russia2220.  
December 27, 2015: Deadly clashes erupts and the ceasefire faulters as also OSCE comes under fire2221. 
Meanwhile Poroshenko announces that he has signed a decree allowing joint NATO, US and Ukrainian 
military exercises in Ukraine the following year2222. 
December 28, 2015: Russia calls on the US to reconsider storing military hardware and troops across 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic States with Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova stating: “The 
current large-scale military preparations by the United States under a completely fabricated precursor of 
protecting its allies from a nonexistent ‘Russian threat’ does not only not correspond to the interests of 
peace and security in Europe, it simply once again confirms Washington’s goal of escalating tension and 
disrupting stability on the continent,”2223. 
November 30, 2015: France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine agree that the Minsk peace agreement must be 
fully implemented in 20162224.  
December 31, 2015: Ukraine’s SBU blames Russia for a cyber-attack on its power grid with Russia on the 
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January 1, 2016: Russia publishes new national security strategy which states NATO’s expansion as a 
threat to the country2226.  
January 5, 2015: Ukraine calls for the UN to consider sending a UN peacekeeping mission to Ukraine2227. 
Vladimir Yelchenko, Ukraine’s permanent representative to the U.N. also presented several other proposals 
on how the international community may assist the peace efforts in Ukraine, including opening a UN office 
in Kiev2228. 
January 8, 2016: Officials in Crimea state that Crimea will experience power shortage until May due to 
the incident in November where individuals knocked out power lines supplying the Peninsula with energy 
from Ukraine2229.  
January 11, 2016: Putin discusses Ukraine with the Germany newspaper “Bild” in which he blames the 
current geopolitical crisis on NATO’s expansion and justified the annexation by pointing to “undemocratic 
coup” in Kiev which threatened the constitutional rights of Crimea’s inhabitants2230.  
January 13, 2016: The Trilateral Contact Group meet in Minsk and Lavrov states that the main threat the 
peace process are Ukraine’s attempts to revise the Minsk Agreements: "We are told that Ukrainian President 
Pyotr Poroshenko faced internal political difficulties, that is why he cannot implement everything in full. 
They propose not to interpret the ‘Minsk language’ too literally,"2231. He also stated that the Minsk 
Agreements clearly state "that the constitution should include decentralization on a permanent 
basis[…]This means the right to speak the Russian language on the territory of Donbass, the right for special 
economic ties with Russia, the right to take part in appointing prosecutors, judges, have their own law 
enforcement agencies, including people’s militia, and many more things that were personally signed by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel together with French President Francois Hollande[…]Instead of this, 
the (Ukrainian) constitution states that these territories may have some special rules in the sphere of self-
governing," 2232. Russia also stated that Ukraine’s proposition of deploying UN peacekeepers was "another 
attempt to divert attention from non-implementation of several key points of the Minsk Agreements from 
12 February 2015." 2233. 
January 19, 2016: Ukraine raises the cost of gas transportation for Russian gas2234. 
January 23, 2016: Poroshenko states that he will not allow the conflict in Donbass to “freeze”2235.  
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January 24, 2016: Poroshenko states that Ukraine will not give greater autonomy to the eastern regions 
before a lasting ceasefire is in place2236. He stated that he would not allow lawmakers to cancel the vote on 
the decentralization reform, but that a series of conditions must be met before the voting could happen2237. 
This included: "ceasefire and a long period of a full silence. This is what Russia has to ensure, and the world 
needs to see that it happens," and giving international monitors unfettered access to the border between 
Ukraine and Russia to monitor the flow of troops and arms into eastern Ukraine2238. 
January 27, 2016: Nikolai Patrushev, executive secretary of the presidential Security Council of Russia, 
states that the Minsk agreements obliges Kiev to coordinate with rebel leaders to "conduct a constitutional 
reform, amnesty, ensure the approval of permanent legislation on a special status of certain areas of the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions, work out the issue of local elections and take steps to improve the 
humanitarian situation in southeastern Ukraine[…]Instead of a direct dialogue with representatives of 
Donetsk and Luhansk, the Ukrainian side has introduced a total blockade of the region[…]They are forcing 
people, who, by the way, have Ukrainian passports, to starve"2239. 
February 8, 2016: Russia’s defense ministry announces the mobilization of troops on its southern borders 
in order to check military preparedness to rebuff a foreign attack or natural disasters2240. 
February 12, 2016: A new ceasefire is agreed to which is to begin on February 152241. 
February 13, 2016: Violence intensifies in Eastern Ukraine with the separatists having moved heavy 
artillery back to the front line and Russia accusing NATO of being hostile and closed and dragging the 
world back into a Cold War2242.   
February 16, 2016: Internal divisions within Ukraine continues now with the Parliament proposing a no 
confidence vote as an address to the dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister and his cabinet2243. President 
Petro Poroshenko also calls on the Prime Minister to resign "in order to restore trust" in the government2244. 
February 18, 2016: The ruling coalition in Ukraine’s parliament breaks up with the Prime Minister stating 
that he will not step down2245. 
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February 20, 2016: On the second anniversary of Maidan, protestors attack two Russian banks in Kiev 
and the office of Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov2246. The protesters blame Akhmetov for supporting 
corruption and the separatists2247. Meanwhile, Ukraine and the separatists exchange prisoners2248  
February 22, 2016: Attacks on Russian banks in Ukraine continue, with some of them set on fire2249. 
Meanwhile, France and Germany call on Ukraine to push on with reforms in order to battle corruption2250.  
February 23, 2016:  In order to battle corruption, the Ukraine government announces that political parties 
will be funded exclusively from the state budget, with the Prime Minister stating: "It is unacceptable that 
the political parties or deputies are funded by businessmen or the so called oligarchs. We've decided that 
the financing of political parties exclusively from the national budget will start this year,"2251. 
February 27, 2016: Ukraine’s Interior Minister announced that the ministry is preparing new military units 
which will be able to take back Crimea stating that "We need a new army, a new national guard, new police. 
That's what the government of Ukraine is doing right now. And you have to understand that. We should 
rebuild them and then, when we want, Crimea will be with us. I have no doubts about that,"2252. The unit 
includes the Crimean Tartars with the interior minister further noting: "Together with Mustafa Cemilov and 
Refat Chubarov [Crimean Tatar politcal leaders] we're preparing guys as special separate units of the 
national guard. The project is being prepared in order to be ready to return Crimea to us. I'm sure that it will 
happen when we're strong, and when we're ready." 2253.  
March 4, 2016: The Normandy Format meet in Paris but do not reach a consensus regarding the elections 
in eastern Ukraine2254. Lavrov stated that Russia was prepared to push the separatists to abide by the 
ceasefire and participate in the polls but Ukraine’s refusal to set a hard deadline for elections made it 
impossible to reach a consensus2255. Germany’s foreign minister stated that he was "not satisfied with the 
way Kyiv and Moscow are operating the negotiations here[…]I'm afraid the situation in eastern Ukraine 
really isn't being viewed seriously enough... It can escalate again at any time." 2256. The actors did however 
agree to a "release and exchange of all prisoners and people held in illegal detention between now and April 
30," and to establish by April 30 a mechanism to "prevent and settle incidents connected with cease-fire 
violations," as well as ensure access to the conflict zone by truce monitors." 2257 
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March 12, 2016: Violence continues with Ukraine stating that there has been an increase in attacks and 
provocations2258. Meanwhile, the Donetsk Peoples Republic claim that the Ukraine military has used heavy 
artillery against the separatists2259.  
April 10, 2016: Ukraine’s Prime Minster resigns2260. 
April 14, 2016: Volodymyr Groysman is approved as new Prime Minister2261. 
April 18, 2016: Ukraine convicts two Russian men, alleged special forces captured in Donbas, of waging 
an “aggressive war” against Ukraine, committing terrorism, and using weapons to provoke conflict2262. The 
men deny the charges and Russia states that it will do what it can to bring them home2263. The lawyer of 
one of the men was the one found dead outside Kiev2264. Poroshenko has proposed swapping the two 
prisoners in exchange for the Ukraine pilot, Nadiya Savchenko2265. 
April 20, 2016: The Russia-NATO summit ends in disagreement with Stoltenberg stating that there are 
profound disagreements over Ukraine stating: "In the meeting, it was reconfirmed that we disagree on the 
facts, on the narrative, and the responsibilities in and around Ukraine[…]Many allies disagree when Russia 
tries to portray this as a civil war[…]This is Russia destabilizing eastern Ukraine, providing support for the 
separatists, munitions, funding, equipment, and also command-and-control."2266.  
April 22, 2016: NATO considers bigger presence in the Black Sea as part of a strategy to deter Russia and 
counter its military build-up in Crimea2267. NATO already patrols the black sea but as stated: “We need to 
consider a more persistent NATO military presence in the region, with a particular focus on our maritime 
capabilities,”2268. Russia however responded that NATO’s plans are a threat to Russia’s security and Russia 
warned there will be no improvement in the worst East-West tensions since the Cold War until NATO 
withdraws its forces2269. 
April 29, 2016: In an address to the UNSC, Ukraine states that the ceasefire must be strengthened before a 
political solution can be reached. Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko suggested that the 
Easter holiday may be an opening for this and stated: "If we can start with that, we can then proceed to 
withdrawal of forces and resolving of all the problems -- demining, humanitarian problems -- all the way 
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down to a political resolution,"2270. He also stated: "Russia has organized and deployed in Donbas a 34,000-
strong hybrid military force consisting of regular Russian troops as well as of foreign and local 
militants[…]Russian generals and military officers provide direct command-and-control of this illegal 
military entity [which is] impressively heavily armed," 2271. He also denied the accusations that the 
separatists had bought their firearms in local hardware stores stating: "Last time I checked, you will hardly 
be able to buy a decent knife in Ukrainian hardware stores, not to mention the multiple-launch rocket 
systems and jet flamethrowers"2272. Russia on the other hand, represented by UN Ambassador Vitaly 
Churkin, stated that the Ukrainian crisis was provoked by a "coup d'etat with external support," and rejected 
claims that the source of conflict was "Crimea's union with Russia." 2273. He also stated that Ukraine's case 
before the council was "very disappointing," as "Over the entire crisis, the UN has been used as a 
propaganda platform[…]There is a lot of rhetoric but no specific plan about how to implement the Minsk 
agreement"2274. He however also noted that he hoped the ceasefire would hold for the Easter holiday as 
"Easter is one thing that continues to unite us, Russia and Ukraine,"2275. 
April 29, 2016: The Minsk Contact Group reaches an agreement on a ceasefire in Donbas as soon as the 
Easter holiday begins, presenting a statement saying: "The Trilateral Contact Group and the representatives 
of certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine are welcoming the determination of all the 
participants in the Minsk process aiming to secure a full observation of the ceasefire regime with the start 
of the Easter and May Holidays, as effective from Saturday, April 30, 2016, at 12:00 midnight,"2276. 
May 1, 2016: Ukraine accuses the separatists of breaking the ceasefire as one Ukraine soldier is killed and 
several troops are wounded2277. The separatists equally accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire2278.  
May 11, 2016: Russia and Ukraine agree to the creation of demilitarize zones, greater information-sharing 
and a halt to military exercises along the dividing line between the separatist territories and Ukraine 
proper2279. They however continued to disagree over the local elections in the separatist areas 2280.  
May 30, 2016: Violence continues in eastern Ukraine with 5 servicemen and 2 separatists killed near 
Donetsk2281. 
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June 1, 2016: The separatists accuse Ukraine of fresh offensives with heavy weaponry which according to 
the ceasefire agreement is to be withdrawn from the frontline2282.  
June 2, 2016: Denis Pushilin, the chairman of the People's Soviet of the self-proclaimed People’s Republic 
of Donetsk states that if Ukraine launches a full-blow attack on the DNR, then the separatists are able and 
ready to advance further into Ukraine territory2283. Igor Plotnitsky, leader of the self-proclaimed People’s 
Republic of Luhansk (LNR) also accused Ukraine of sabotaging the Minsk Agreement and stated "we are 
not going to wait. We are initiating the offensive. At first – on the diplomatic front."2284. 
June 9, 2016: Nadja Savchenko calls for direct dialogue with the separatists stating: “We should establish 
direct internal communication without third or fourth parties,” and added that she was ready to negotiate 
with Alexander Zakharchenko, the leader of the Donetsk People’s Republic, directly2285. Her idea was 
rejected by Andriy Parubiy, speaker of the Ukrainian parliament who stated that “These are terrorist 
organisations who are acting on our territory under full control of the Russian aggressor[…]I don’t think 
we can carry out any negotiations with these people.” 2286. 
June 16, 2016:  Ukraine is outraged over comments by UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon who stated 
that as a permanent member of the UNSC, Russia has a critical role to play in resolving global issues such 
as Ukraine and Syria. Ukraine responded stating that Ban Ki-Moon’s statement makes him unfit to further 
comment on the conflict and that he has lost all moral authority on the issue2287. 
June 19, 2016: Germany’s foreign minister accuses NATO of warmongering and calls for the phasing out 
of the Russian sanctions, stating: "What we should avoid today is inflaming the situation by warmongering 
and stomping boots," and that it is a mistake to think "you can increase security in the alliance with symbolic 
parades of tanks near the eastern borders."2288. On June 17, Putin had reiterated the argument that the United 
States and its allies have used the Ukrainian crisis to "justify the existence of the North Atlantic bloc." And 
that "They need an external adversary, an external enemy, otherwise what's the purpose of this 
organization?[…]There is no Warsaw Pact, no Soviet Union, so whom is it directed against?" 2289. 
June 28, 2016: Poroshenko proposes constitutional declaration of Crimean Tartars right to self-
determination within Ukraine stating: "We should start the process of modification and additions to Section 
10 of the Ukrainian Constitution titled 'Autonomous Republic of Crimea' [...]These adjustments fully derive 
from the inalienable right of the Crimean Tatar people to self-determination within the sovereign and 
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independent Ukrainian state,"2290. He also stated that the rights of ethnic Ukrainians and Russians and other 
ethnic groups should be guaranteed in Crimea2291. 
June 24, 2016: Ukraine arrests former riot police for their use of violent force in dispersing protestors 
during Maidan2292.    
July 14, 2016: The UN accuses both sides of indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas and summary 
executions2293.  
July 20, 2016: Pavel G. Sheremet, a journalist critical of the Russian government is killed by a car bomb 
in Kiev. Poroshenko hints that Russia was behind the assassination stating: “It seems this was an act done 
with the intention of destabilizing the situation in the country[…]In the conditions of war and aggression, I 
am not excluding the possibility of some foreign interest here.”2294. Russia denied the allegation but rather 
stated: The incumbent Ukrainian government, supported by its Euro-Atlantic patrons for its purportedly 
successful democratic reforms, did not manage to protect him,”2295. 
August 4, 2016: The Speaker of the Parliament of the self-proclaimed DNR Denis Pushilin stated that the 
Minsk agreements must be complied with or the conflict could resume: "No progress was made after the 
last negotiations on the political settlement. The situation remains tense, and it can flare up at any moment 
and escalate into a full-fledged military clash. Ukraine is not fulfilling its obligations in military and 
political spheres. Not only we see that, but also our citizens who signed the petition to the UN SC about 
Kyiv’s failure to fulfill the agreement. There are more than 320 thousand such signers in the DNR. In the 
last 5-6 days the situation has completely deteriorated. If Ukraine will not comply with at least the first 
three points of the Minsk-2 Agreements, open firefights will soon resume in Donbass."2296 
August 12, 2016: Ukraine troops are put on high alert around the de facto border of Crimea because of "the 
escalation at the administrative border with Crimea" and in the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk2297. 
Meanwhile Russia accuses Ukraine of carrying armed incursions into Crimea whilst Crimean leader states 
that the US is behind the alleged armed incursions, saying "Ukrainian officials wouldn't have had the 
courage for such actions" 2298. Russian President Vladimir Putin accused the Ukrainian government in Kiev 
of "practising terror" and vowed to "not let such things slide by" whilst Ukrainian President Petro 
Poroshenko described the accusations as "preposterous", calling them a "pretext" from more threats2299. 
August 24, 2016: Ukraine celebrates its independence day with Poroshenko stating: “Independence has 
given us democracy and freedom, the feeling of civic dignity and national unity[…]Our main guarantor is 
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the Ukrainian armed forces[…]This parade will signal to our international partners that Ukraine is capable 
of defending itself but requires further support.”2300. He also spoke about Vladimir Putin’s “imperial 
appetite” and warned that Ukraine would need “years and tens of billions of hryvnias” until it can “sleep 
soundly.”2301 
August 25, 2016: Russia orders wide-ranging snap military exercises in Russia with the exercises being 
designed “to defend the interests of the Russian Federation amid increasing threats to its security,”2302. 
September 1, 2016: The two sides agree on a new ceasefire marking the beginning of the new school year 
with no violence being reported the first 24 hours of the ceasefire2303.  
September 13, 2016: Alexander Zakharchenko, rebel leader in Donetsk, announces a unilateral ceasefire 
and orders his troops to cease fire, urging Ukraine to do the same2304. He also stated that the separatists are 
"fully committed to the Minsk agreements" and see them as "the only solution."2305. 
September 28, 2016: The investigations into the downing of the Malaysian airline concludes that the 
missile system was trucked in from Russia, by request from the separatists, and returned to Russia the same 
night2306.  
October 3, 2016: Internal power struggles between the separatists leads to purging of internal opposition 
figures2307.   
October 5, 2016: Ukraine warns its citizens against travelling to Russia stating that there is an increase in 
harassment and detention of Ukraine citizens, with the foreign ministry stating: “On the territory of the 
aggressor-state, the number of unjustified detentions of our citizens has increased[…]Russian law 
enforcement bodies treat Ukrainians roughly, using unacceptable methods of physical and psychological 
pressure, torture and other acts,”2308. Former separatist minister Alexander Khodakovsky states that Russia 
directly finances pensions and public sector salaries in eastern Ukraine stating: “Without outside help, it’s 
impossible to sustain the territory even if you have the most effective tax-raising system. The level of help 
from Russia exceeds the amounts that we collect within the territory,”2309. 
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October 20, 2016: The Normandy Format meet leading to a road map based on the Minsk Agreements, 
which will be further discussed in the upcoming weeks2310.  
October 26, 2016: Ukrainian hackers claimed to have hacked two email accounts belonging to the Kremlin 
official, Vladislav Surkov, which shows Russia’s involvement with the separatists in 20142311.   
November 15, 2016: The lead prosecutor for the International Criminal Court states that the conflict in 
Ukraine should be considered an international armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine2312. In a report 
released by the court, it was stated: "According to information received, the situation in the Crimea and 
Sevastopol is equivalent to the international armed conflict between Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation[…]This international armed conflict started not later than February 26, when the Russian 
Federation employed members of its armed forces to gain control over parts of the territory of Ukraine 
without the consent of the government of Ukraine."2313.  




January 12, 2017: The Russian TV channel Dozdh is suspended in Ukraine as it was announced that the 
channel’s broadcast broke Ukraine law2315. 
January 18, 2017: Nadiya Savchenko suggests that Ukraine should give up its territorial claim on Crimea 
in exchange for Russia leaving Donbass2316. Savchenko compared Crimea to Transnistria2317.  
January 31, 2017: Violence surges again in Eastern Ukraine with the UN calling for a full implementation 
of the ceasefire2318. 
February 1, 2017: Poroshenko announces the plan of a referendum on NATO membership2319.  
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February 2, 2017: NATO calls off a meeting with Ukraine amid fears of escalating tensions with Russia2320 
February 18, 2017: Putin orders Russia to temporarily recognize civil registration documents issued in 
separatist-held areas of eastern Ukraine2321. The recognition allows people from eastern Ukraine to travel, 
work or study in Russia and will be in place until a political settlement has been reached2322. Ukraine stated 
that the recognition destroyed the Minsk agreements and that "By signing this decree, Putin legally 
recognized quasi-terrorist groups that have this as a fig leaf covering the Russian occupation of 
Donbass,"2323 
February 20, 2017: The two sides agree on another ceasefire2324.  
February 21, 2017: It is reported that Russian officials have started to hand out Russian passports in 
Donbas2325. In connection to Russia now accepting documents from “Donetsk Peoples Republic” and the 
“Luhansk Peoples Republic,” this means that people from these areas may apply for Russian citizenship on 
the basis of documents provided from the areas and not from Ukraine2326.  
February 27, 2017: The Luhansk Republic announces that it will adopt the Russian ruble as its official 
currency from March 12327. 
March 3, 3017: The former Ukraine Prime Minster states that Russia should get out of Ukraine: "We are 
on the different side of the aisle, we cannot have any kind of compromise over the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of my country. "The only solution which is on the table is that Russia is to get out of Ukraine. 
"It was Russia who started the war, who waged the war against an independent country, who tries to redraw 
the lines after the Second World War and who posed the threat to Ukraine, to you, to Nato and to everyone 
who stands by the values of democracy and freedom,"2328 
March 7, 2017: The International Court of Justice begin hearings for Ukraine’s lawsuit against Russia2329. 
Ukraine is requesting the court to demand that Russia exerts greater control over the border to prevent 
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“money, weapons, vehicles, instructors or armed groups” from entering Ukrainian territory and that Russia 
stops the discrimination against Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians in Crimea2330. 
March 15, 2017: Ukraine halts the movement of all goods into separatist areas stating that the decision was 
made due to "sharp escalation of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the seizure of Ukrainian 
businesses" by the separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions2331. Ukraine stated that the halt would be 
in place until the separatists hand back the businesses and comply with the Minsk agreements2332. “War 
veterans, activists and some lawmakers had for weeks demanded that all transport links with the rebels be 
cut, describing any business activity with the east as "trade in blood"2333. Meanwhile separatists announce 
that they have started shipping coal to Russia2334. 
April 6, 2017: The EU approves visa waiver for Ukraine citizens2335. 
April 24, 2017: A US ceasefire monitor for the OSCE dies in Luhansk following an explosion with Russia’s 
foreign ministry calling it a “provocation” designed to derail the peace process2336  
April 25, 2017: The death of the OSCE monitor makes Ukraine assume its call for UN peacekeeping troops 
in Ukraine with Russia continuing to oppose this2337.  
May 16, 2017: Ukraine orders new sanctions against Russia including the blocking of several Russian 
websites and social networks2338. 
July 18, 2017: DPR announces the creation of a new state called “Malorossiya”2339. As stated by the head 
of the Donetsk People’s Republic Aleksandr Zakharchenko: “The situation has reached a dead end. We 
propose the plan of the reintegration of the country in order to stop civil war, we discussed the situation and 
came to the conclusion that Ukraine has shown itself to be failed state”2340. Donetsk has amongst other 
created a constitution in which it states: “We, the representatives of former Ukraine, declare the 
establishment of a new state, Malorossiya, which is a successor state to Ukraine. We agree that the new 
state’s name will be Malorossiya because the very name of Ukraine has discredited itself,”2341. 
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July 19, 2017: Alexander Zakharchenko announced the creation of Malorossiya as a new "state" in 
Donetsk, saying it will replace Ukraine2342. Russia states that the decision for the creation of Malorossiya 
by DPR was a personal initiative made by the leaders in Donetsk and that Russia remains “committed to 
the Minsk accords"2343. The separatists in Luhansk also dismissed the initiative2344.  
August 23, 2017: The two sides declare a new ceasefire amid the beginning of the new school year2345. 
September 5, 2017: Russia proposes a draft resolution to the UNSC regarding the creation of a UN 
peacekeeping mission which is meant to provide security for the OSCE SMM with Putin stating: “I consider 
the presence of peacekeepers, or rather people who would provide security for the OSCE mission, 
absolutely appropriate, and see nothing wrong with it,”2346. The draft resolution states that the mission is 
only meant to provide security for the SMM and that it should operate on the contact line2347. Ukraine on 
the other hand states that the mission should be deployed across the entire territory of the separatists and 
up until the Russian border2348. And Ukraine is asking for personnel from NATO countries, while Russia 
asks for a multinational constellation of personnel2349. Russia furthermore stated that a decision on 
peacekeepers could not be made without direct consultation with the separatists, with Ukraine rejecting this 
is: “Putin’s statement concerning the necessity of coordinating the issue of UN peacekeepers’ deployment 
to Donbas with the [self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk] would de facto mean 
legalization of their network” in eastern Ukraine2350 
September 7, 2017: Poroshenko states that he fears Russia would use the joint Russia-Belarus Zapad 
military exercise as "a smokescreen to create new Russian army assault groups to invade Ukrainian 
territory"2351. He also stated: "There are no signs that Moscow is ready to pull out of Donbas or 
Crimea[…]But unfortunately there is more and more proof of its preparations for an offensive war on a 
continental scale."2352. 
September 26, 2017: Ukraine announces that it will also submit a draft resolution to the UNSC regarding 
UN peacekeeping mission to Ukraine with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin stating: "As for the 
Russian resolution, nothing has started, except for very formal consultations, one round, so that there would 
be a response. We will not take the bait. First comes an agreed upon position with the so-called G7, the EU, 
China[…]Only then will we move forward with a resolution[…]Ours will be an agreed-upon position, not 
just our resolution[…]We will introduce it when we have an agreed-upon position with our friends and all 
 




2345 “Ukraine forces declare truce for new school year” BBC News, August 23, 2017, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41027663  
2346 “Russia drafts UN Security Council resolution to send peacekeepers to Ukraine” RT, September 5, 2017, 
https://www.rt.com/news/402094-russia-resolution-peacekeepers-ukraine/  
2347 Ibid  
2348 Alex Gorka “Russia Proposes UN Peacekeeping Mission in Ukraine” Strategic Culture, September 21, 2017, 
https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2017/09/21/russia-proposes-un-peacekeeping-mission-ukraine/  
2349 Ibid 
2350 “Russia drafts UN Security Council resolution to send peacekeepers to Ukraine” RT 





the main players. Russia will not be able to start playing its game, like it always does, to create conditions 
to weaken the mandate of the mission,"2353.  
October 1, 2017: The first deputy head of the Verkhovna Rada states that Russia’s proposal of the UN 
peacekeeping mission to Donbass was made for delaying time, as she states: "In fact, the Russian 
Federation, the Russian president dropped such a hybrid, surrogate proposal for peacekeepers that 
supposedly should be located only on the line of contact and guard the OSCE mission - it is absolute 
nonsense. There is not a single peacekeeping mission which mandate would be to guard another mission, 
"2354. 
October 3, 2017: Ukraine condemns Russia’s intention of conducting military draft in Crimea, stating: 
‘We decisively protest against Russia’s plan to hold the draft in the temporarily occupied Crimea and 
Sevastopol. We once again reiterate that the UN General Assembly on the human rights in Crimea and 
Sevastopol confirmed that the peninsula was illegally occupied by Russia”2355. 
October 4, 2017: Poroshenko suggests in two draft bills - “On re-integration of Donbas’ and ‘On extension 
of special order of local government in the occupied areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions’2356 - that the 
Parliament recognize the territories of Donbass as occupied by Russia. The bill states that the occupation is 
unlawful and that it does not give Russia territorial rights: “The actions of the armed forces and other 
military groups of Russian Federation and occupational administration of Russian Federation contradict the 
norms of international humanitarian law, is unlawful, and any act issued by such activity is invalid, and 
doesn’t cause legal consequences,”2357. The draft bill also stated that Ukraine was not responsible for the 
Russian aggression or the actions of the separatists in Donbass, with the bill stating: "The state of Ukraine 
is not responsible for the unlawful actions of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state, its armed forces, 
other military formations and the occupation administration in the temporarily occupied territories in 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions,"2358. 
October 5, 2017: Russia states that the draft laws proposed by Ukraine may be seen as a defiant act against 
Europe and an act which contradicts the Minsk Agreements2359. The Vice Speaker of the Russian Parliament 
stated: ‘Abiding by Minsk agreements is Poroshenko’s obligation before Europe. But the president of 
Ukraine is not going to fulfill these commitments. He is about to commit crimes, impudently grinning to 
Europe,’ 2360. She also stated that by approving the bill, Ukraine will ‘legalize military operations against 
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peaceful civilians of Donbas.’ 2361.  The Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, 
Olexandr Turchynov, however stated that the draft bill on has strategic importance for Ukraine: ‘The 
provided draft law has the strategic importance for our country; it creates the rightful principles for the 
restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine, complete de-occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, 
provides strong and  firm legal position of Ukraine at the international judicial instances, blocks any 
attempts of Russia to continue aggression disguising  under the peacekeepers. The most important is that 
the project clearly and unambiguously defines Russia as the state-aggressor and Donbas as occupied 
territory’,2362. 
October 6, 2017: The Verkhovna Rada approves the so-called Donbas Reintegration draft bill and excludes 
any mentioning of the Minsk Agreements in the bill2363. Meanwhile Russia opens four criminal proceedings 
against the Ukraine military for “artillery attacks of the civilians in Donbas”2364.  
October 8, 2017: Ukraine and NATO announce that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly will be held for 
the first time in Ukraine in 20202365. NATO also agreed to assist Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova with 
strategic communication, which implies the development of special units meant to monitor fake news and 
propaganda2366. 
October 11, 2017:  Special Envoy of Russia to the Trilateral Contact Group on Donbas Boris Gryzlov 
states that Ukraine’s approach to the deployment of UN peacekeepers is unacceptable, stating: ‘Some 
politicians in Ukraine consider the contingent of UN mission as the advanced detachment that will lead the 
Ukrainian armed forces, so-called paramilitary troops and police force to Donbas. Naturally, such approach 
is unacceptable for Donbas. I think that it is unacceptable for the UN and for all those who really want 
peace at this territory’2367 
October 17, 2017: A statue commemorating the Russian volunteer fighters in Ukraine has been erected 
close to the Ukraine border2368. Mayor Vitaly Kushnaryov thanked a delegation of retired and active 
“volunteers” at the ceremony for “doing everything to save the Russian world.” 2369. The unveiling was 
attended by DNR leader Alexander Zakharchenko and Russian presidential aide Vladislav Surkov2370. 
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November 1, 2017: Russia shuts down three checkpoints into Crimea following sabotage which left the 
Peninsula without power and gas2371.  
November 13, 2017: US and Russia envoys are set to meet for a discussion regarding the deployment of 
UN peacekeepers to Ukraine2372.  
November 16, 2017: Putin talks with separatist leaders over the phone urging them to exchange prisoners 
with Ukraine2373. 
November 24, 2017: The leader of rebel-held Luhansk, Igor Plotnitsky's resigns with a statement saying: 
"due to health issues, emanating from his injuries sustained during the war and concussion 
consequences"2374. 
December 14, 2017: Ukraine plans to broadcast news to the Crimean Tartars in Crimea stating: "These 
people, who are facing persecution for their nationality, religion, and political views, will be able to listen 
to broadcasts in their own language" 2375. Dmitry Poklonsky, the local official in charge of communications 
in Crimea responded saying "only Russian TV and radio will be broadcast to Crimea - all states have to 
take certain measures to defend their territory and information space"2376. 
December 18, 2017: Russia withdraws its military officers from a joint Russia-Ukraine center monitoring 
the ceasefire stating that Ukraine prevented the monitors from doing their job2377. Ukraine called the move 
a provocation stating: "We consider this unprecedented step by Russia as a new provocation which 
considerably undermines the Minsk agreements"2378. The Ukraine military also warned that the decision 
could escalate the conflict2379. 
December 23, 2017: The US states that it will provide Ukraine with “enhanced defensive capabilities,” 
stating that “U.S. assistance is entirely defensive in nature, and as we have always said, Ukraine is a 
sovereign country and has a right to defend itself,”2380 
December 28, 2017: Ukraine swaps prisoners with the separatists with 74 entering Ukraine and 230 
entering separatist territory2381. 
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January 19, 2018: In a new law, Ukraine defines the areas seized by the separatists as temporarily occupied 
by Russia and referred to Russia as an aggressor state, stating: “The Russian Federation is committing a 
crime of aggression against Ukraine and is temporarily occupying parts of its territory,"2382. Russia 
condemned the act stating that it would be considered as preparation for a new war2383. 
March 2, 2018: Ukraine closes schools and universities in an effort to save gas as Russia’s energy company 
Gazprom refused to supply more gas2384.  
March 12, 2018: In a documentary, Putin states that he will never give Crimea back to Ukraine2385. 
Responding to a question regarding this he stated: "What, have you gone mad?[…]There are no such 
circumstances and never will be.”2386  
March 16, 2018: Ukraine plans to prevent Russians in Ukraine from voting in the Russian presidential 
elections since Russia decided that votes should be cast in Crimea2387. Russia responded saying: “This is a 
blatant violation of international obligations, international law and particularly a violation of the rights of 
our citizens,”2388 
March 18, 2018: Presidential elections are held in Russia on the date of the fourth anniversary of the 
annexation of Crimea2389.  
March 19, 2018: Putin secures his seat as President with 76.7% share of the votes2390. 
April 25, 2018: Russia rejects Ukraine’s attempt to conduct military inspections in Crimea stating: "The 
modern status of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as territorial entities of the Russian 
Federation cannot be reviewed. Respectively, Russia is free to deploy troops and military equipment on its 
territory, and all attempts to inspect the territory of Crimea as part of inspections in Ukraine are provocative 
and futile. Naturally, Russia is ready to accept inspectors, observers and the evaluation group in Crimea if 
it receives relevant requests under the Vienna document,"2391. 
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April 30, 2018: Ukraine receives U.S. Javelin missiles and launch units, which the US and Ukraine believe 
will assist Ukraine in building its long-term defense2392. Ukraine’s “antiterrorist operation” officially ends 
and in its place Poroshenko launches “joint forces operation”, which is based on the law on the reintegration 
of Donbas proposed earlier2393. Whereas the antiterrorist operation had a short-term outlook, meant to deal 
with unrest in Donbas, the new operation has a long-term trajectory of reintegrating Donbas and Crimea 
into Ukraine2394. The operations also switched hands from the security services to the armed forces2395.  
May 1, 2018: Russia’s envoy to the Contact Group for Ukraine Boris Gryzlov states that Ukraine has put 
its stakes on solving the conflict militarily, as he stated: "The issue is not about the declared formats of 
using the armed forces or other groupings by Ukraine’s authorities, but about their announced stake on a 
military solution to the conflict in the country’s southeast. The major problem is the lack of any steps by 
Ukraine towards a political settlement,"2396. He also stated: "It is vital to launch the process of providing 
Donbass with a special status under the Steinmeier formula and amnesty to the participants of the conflict 
on both sides[…]Russia, as a mediator in settling this conflict, also views this rhetoric as destructive and 
not encouraging peace[…]We hope that in fact this rhetoric won’t lead to the deterioration of the armed 
standoff and won’t affect the security of citizens in the conflict zone areas," 2397. 
May 4, 2018: Russia blocks the expansion of the OSCE mission on the border with Ukraine with Ukraine 
stating: "Discussions during the 1184th meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council on May 3, 2018, at which 
the said decision was endorsed, showed Russia's isolation in its reluctance to ensure effective international 
control at the border. These actions by the Russian Federation indicate its intention to continue the supply 
of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, regular troops, mercenaries in order to support terrorist 
activity on Ukrainian territory. In this regard, joining the consensus on the decision, Ukraine's delegation 
to the OSCE issued a respective interpretation statement,"2398 
May 7, 2018: Putin is sworn in as president for another six years, following his election win in March2399. 
May 8, 2018: According to Poroshenko there are still 50,000 Russians mobilized in Russia and sent to 
Ukraine2400. He also stated that Putin is trying to: "reconquer Ukraine[…]Yes, [Russia wants] to reconquer 
Ukraine and rebuild the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire, whatever you want,"2401. 
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May 9, 2018: In a speech Poroshenko states that Russia intended to split Ukraine in half in 2014, stating: 
"In the spring of 2014, Russia planned to split Ukraine into several pieces. We disrupted this insidious plan 
with the heroic will of the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian warriors. We caught hold of the ground, 
cemented into the map of Europe and the world. We took such strong roots that no force is able to unearth 
us from our legal and natural place. From the place we've been living in for thousands of years already,"2402. 
He also stated confidence that Ukraine would win: "We will definitely win this time as well. With different 
price, in a different way, by other means. Not only by military, not only by defensive ones, but also 
politically and diplomatically,"2403  
May 10, 2018: Separatists in Donetsk hold a Victory Day where they parade heavy weapons banned by the 
Minsk Agreements. Many of the weapons were painted with the red soviet star and “a black-and-orange-
striped St. George's ribbon, a hallmark of World War II victory celebrations that Ukraine banned after 
Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 as a symbol of what Kyiv sees as Russian aggression and 
expansionism”2404. In a speech Poroshenko stated: "Stalin's Soviet Union in the first two years of World 
War II was an ally of Hitler's Germany[…]and he also stated that Russia is ready to bring the world "to the 
brink of World War III[…]They are here, not far from us -- and this requires our special vigilance and 
responsibility,"2405. France, Germany and Ukraine sit down to discuss the conflict under the Normandy 
Format, without Russia2406.  
May 11, 2018: Russian Foreign Ministry's spokeswoman Maria Zakharova states that a recent attack in 
Ukraine against a Russian cultural center is but another attempt to destroy the common culture between 
Ukraine and Russia: "That is a part of the tendency. There are permanent attempts to set us against each 
other. Culture is also used to achieve that. In order to force Russia out of Ukraine, it is necessary to close 
all Russian language centers, all centers of Rossotrudnichestvo, simply ban teaching the Russian history 
and everything linked to our country — to destroy the common cultural space. Is it a need of the Ukrainian 
people? Of course, no. That is a political environment, ideology of current Kiev authorities,"2407. Meanwhile 
in Donetsk celebrations were held marking the fourth anniversary of the city’s proclaimed independence 
from Ukraine2408.  
 








2406 Tatiana Urbanskaya “Normandy format without Russia: Agenda of Poroshenko's talks with Merkel and Macron” 
Unian, May 10, 2018, https://www.unian.info/politics/10112183-normandy-format-without-russia-agenda-of-
poroshenko-s-talks-with-merkel-and-macron.html  
2407 “Russian FM: Increase in Neo-Fascism Sentiment in Ukraine Alarming” Sputniknews, May 11, 2018, 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/201805111064344908-russia-ukraine-culture-sentiment-fascism/  




May 15, 2018: Russia opens the Kerch Strait bridge, which links Russia's Krasnodar region with the 
Crimean Peninsula2409. Poroshenko proposes that EU countries prepare “a targeted program of patronage 
over certain cities of the Ukrainian Donbas to help them revive and restore infrastructure”2410. 
May 16, 2018: Poroshenko withdraws a bill meant to strip Ukrainians of their citizenship if they voted in 
Crimea2411.  
May 18, 2018: According to the U.S. Special Envoy to Ukraine Kurt Volker, ethnic Russians participate 
in the conflict on both sides2412. This could, according to Volker, be an area where Putin could “present 
himself in the best light” by working towards a settlement of the conflict by stopping the clashes between 
the ethnic Russians on both sides of the conflict2413. 
May 19, 2018: Poroshenko signs a decree which recalls Ukraine’s envoys to the CIS, stating:  "We have 
nothing more to do there[…]We are moving together to Europe."2414 
May 22, 2018: The OSCE reports that fighting has escalated in eastern Ukraine with Alexander Hug stating: 
"Last week was in many ways the worst we have seen so far this year[…]In total, we recorded 7,700 cease-
fire violations."2415.  
May 26, 2018: The Normandy Format has yet to be resumed, with Russia announcing that there are so far 
no talks scheduled for the future2416.  
May 28, 2018: According to the Russian Border Service there is still a threat that Ukraine radical groups 
will enter Crimea and the Rostov region of Russia with weapons and ammunition2417. Meanwhile, Ukraine 
claims that Russia has relocated approx. 1 million people from Russia to Crimea2418. According to the leader 
of the Crimean Tartars: "Russia is now roughly repeating the same strategy that was used during the first 
occupation [of Crimea] under [Empress] Catherine [the Great][…]At that time it wasn't possible to deport 
people since there were no railroads. So they simply created impossible living conditions for people in order 
to force them to migrate. As a result, Crimean Tatars very quickly became a minority people." 2419. 
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May 29, 2018: Ukraine and Russia clash at the UN during a meeting on the conflict in Ukraine2420. 
Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin stated the conflict “was invented by the Kremlin to punish 
Ukrainians for their aspiration towards freedom, democracy and European future[…]The conflict itself is 
not, as Russia pictures it, an ethnic conflict, a conflict between Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking population, 
or a civil war inside Ukraine[…]It is an external aggression designed to destroy Ukraine’s statehood only 
because we did not want to be a part of the so-called Russian world.”2421. Russia responded by saying that 
some Ukrainians did not want to solve the conflict because it would mean that millions of separatists would 
be able to vote at the presidential elections in 20192422. Russia also stated: “what you do want is a hotbed 
of instability on the borders of Russia, and drawing satisfaction that there is tension in the relations between 
two brotherly peoples and countries.”2423. Russia also stated that the people of Crimea did not want to be a 
part of Ukraine stating: “I’m very touched about the concern for Crimea and the suffering of the people 
there[…]Let me give you a piece of advice: Don’t worry about them. They’re quite happy[…]What we’re 






























May 26, 1989: Clashes erupt between Georgian civilians and civilians from Ossetia on the anniversary of 
the declaration of Georgia’s independence in 19182425. 
 
August 1989: The Supreme Soviet of Georgia creates a new language program in which the Georgian 
language is to be used in all public spheres2426. 
 
September 1989: Adamon Nykhas (South Ossetian movement) and a group of Ossetian workers appeal to 
the USSR Council of Ministers and other Soviet organs in a protest against the Georgian language program 
which they regard as “anti-democratic and unconstitutional” 2427. They ask that the prospect of South 
Ossetia’s unification with North Ossetia to be discussed2428. Later in September the Supreme Soviet of 
South Ossetia furthermore announces that Ossetian will be the official language of the area2429. 
 
October 1-15, 1989: Police units are reinforced in South Ossetia as the result of protests from Ossetians 
who demand an end to the official use of the Russian and Georgian language and the revision of Ossetia's 
status from an Autonomous Region to an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic2430.  
 
November 10, 1989: The Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia demands a change of status for South 
Ossetia2431. They demand it to be changed from autonomous oblast to autonomous republic2432. The 
Supreme Soviet of Georgia call the demands illegal and proposes a law on sovereignty, which states that 
the Supreme Soviet of Georgia has the right to veto any Soviet law which goes against Georgian 
interests2433. In addition, the First Party Secretary of the Oblast is fired2434. 
 
November 20, 1989: The Georgian Supreme Soviet states that its inclusion under the Soviet Union in 1921 
was the result of military force and hence it was involuntary and illegitimate2435. The Georgian Supreme 
Soviet also states that it has the right to secede from the USSR and to nullify laws and decrees emanating 
from the central government in Moscow2436. 
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November 23-26, 1989: Zviad Gamsakhurdia (later the first president of Georgia) organizes a so-called 
“peaceful meeting of reconciliation” in which he takes thousands of people to Tskhinvali2437. Ossetians 
however block the road and clashes erupt with several wounded2438. 
 





August 1990: Jaba Ioselani goes to South Ossetia in order to calm fears and assure the Ossetians that 
Georgia has no hostile intentions2440. Later in August the Supreme Soviet of Georgia passes an election law 
which bans the participation in upcoming parliamentary elections for any party whose activities are 
confined to specific areas of Georgia2441.  
 
September 20, 1990: South Ossetia declares independence from Georgia, and reinstates itself as South 
Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic, which Georgia declares as an illegal act2442. 
 
October 28, 1990: The Supreme Soviet of Georgia holds elections which are boycotted by South 
Ossetia2443. The election results in victory for the coalition headed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia2444.  
 
December 8, 1990: The Georgian Communist Party states that it is separating from the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and delegates from South Ossetia and Abkhazia denounce the secession 
move2445. 
 
December 9, 1990: Parliamentary elections are held in South Ossetia, with the results rejected by 
Georgia2446.  
 
December 11, 1990: The Supreme Council of the Republic of Georgia abolish the Autonomous Oblast of 
South Ossetia and the South Ossetian election results are cancelled2447. 
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December 12, 1990: Clashes erupt between Georgians and South Ossetians in the South Ossetian capital 
and a state of emergency is declared in the area2448. Russian and Georgian troops are dispatched, and 
Georgian militia begin to disarm South Ossetian militia2449. 
December 16, 1990: The South Ossetian Supreme Soviet confirms South Ossetia’s decision of seeking 
independence2450. Later in December, talks between Georgia, South Ossetia and Moscow lead to the 




January 1991: The Supreme Soviet of Georgia forms the National Guard2452. Several Georgian militiamen 
are killed in South Ossetia2453. 
 
January 5-6, 1991: Thousand Georgian troops enter South Ossetia and clashes erupt2454.  
 
January 7, 1991: President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union condemns the South Ossetian 
declaration of independence and the Georgian abolition of South Ossetian autonomy2455. He also calls for 
the withdrawal of the Georgian troops2456. Georgian parliament votes to refuse to comply2457. 
 
January 25, 1991: The two sides agree on a ceasefire, but new fighting breaks out within a couple of 
days2458. In the end of January, the Ossetians succeed in pushing the Georgian troops out of Tskhinvali to 
the hills surrounding the city2459. According to South Ossetia, Georgia starts shelling the city and according 
to Georgia Ossetia starts burning down the houses belonging to Georgians who live in Tskhinvali2460. The 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of South Ossetia is invited for talks in Tbilisi but is arrested once he arrives 
to the city2461. 
 
February 1991: Georgia cuts the electricity supplies to Tskhinvali and block roads from which the area 
receives food and other supplies2462. South Ossetia blocks the Georgian populated villages inside South 
Ossetia from the rest of Georgia2463. A ceasefire is reached, and Soviet troops start patrolling Tskhinvali2464. 
The ceasefire is however short lived2465. 
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February 27, 1991: Gamsakhurdia states to the Georgian Supreme Soviet that “Gorbachev is planning to 
detach South Ossetia and Abkhazia from the Republic and is using such measures as a tool for pressuring 
Georgia into singing the newly proposed Union Treaty”2466. 
 
March 1991: Russia and Georgia sign a protocol in which they agree to establish a joint commission 
between Russian and Georgian Ministries of Internal Affairs2467. The protocol agrees to joint assessment of 
the situation, disarmament of all illegal armed groups and the settling of the refugees2468.  
 
April 9, 1991: Georgia declares independence from the Soviet Union and clashes erupts between the central 
government and the separatists in South Ossetia who seek independence from Georgia2469. Georgian 
president Zviad Gamsakhurdia demands that Mr. Gorbachev withdraw Soviet troops dispatched to the 
region, in northern Georgia2470. 
 
May 1991: The Soviet of South Ossetia votes to abolish the South Ossetian Democratic Soviet Republic 
and restore its Oblast status under the Russian Federation and Georgia rejects this2471. On May 26, Georgia 
also holds its first presidential elections in which Gamsakhurdia wins 87 percent of the vote2472. Polling 
stations were closed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia due to the continued unrest2473.  
 
August 19, 1991: The government of Georgia neither supports nor denounces the takeover in Moscow 
however, South Ossetia and Abkhazia announce their support for the coup leaders2474. 
 
November 1991: South Ossetia declares the area a republic within the Russian Federation – a decision 
which is annulled by the Georgia Parliament2475.  
 





January 19, 1992: South Ossetia approves in a referendum, secessionism from Georgia and integration 
with Russia North Ossetian region2477.   
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June 15, 1992: The Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, described Georgia’s 
actions in South Ossetia as a genocide which he states could be a cause for Russia to consider the Ossetian 
request to join the Russian Federation2478.   
 
June 18, 1992: Three combat helicopters with Russian Air Force identification marks launch an attack on 
Georgian military units and villages2479. Attacks from Tskhinvali also occur2480. 
June 20, 1992: Shevardnadze condemns Russia’s participation in the conflict and their support of South 
Ossetia2481.  
 
June 21, 1992: Russia’s Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi accuses Georgia of practicing "genocide" 
against its Russian minority2482. 
 
June 24, 1992: A ceasefire agreement is signed between Russia and Georgia called the Sochi 
Agreement2483. The agreement establishes joint peacekeeping (Joint Control Commission) forces composed 
of Russia, Georgian and Ossetian units2484. 
 
July 15, 1992: A Russian-Georgian peacekeeping force wearing United Nations blue began operations 
today to stop the fighting in the South Ossetia region of Georgia2485. Russia reported the deployment of 500 
troops whilst Georgia reported deployment of 3002486. The troops will be joined by several hundred troops 
from South Ossetia2487  
 
July 25-30: 1992: The OSCE sends a fact-finding mission to Georgia2488.  
 
July 31, 1992: Georgia is internationally recognized and becomes a member of the UN and South Ossetia 
is considered to be a part of Georgia2489.  
 
November 6, 1992: The OSCE establishes the OSCE mission to Georgia in order to facilitate 
negotiations2490. The mandate of the mission is later expanded to monitor the JPKF and compliance with 
the ceasefire agreement2491. 
 
November 19, 1992: Georgian and Abkhaz forces reach a temporary ceasefire to allow Russian troops to 
depart from Sukhumi and the South Ossetian parliament votes to separate from Georgia and join Russia2492. 
 





2482 Minorities at risk project “Chronology for Ossetians (South) in Georgia” Refworld 
2483 Angelika Nußberger “South Ossetia” Oxford Public International Law, January 2013, 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2068  
2484 Ibid 





2488 University of Central Arkansas “38. Georgia/South Ossetia (1990-present) 
2489 Nußberger “South Ossetia” Oxford Public International Law  
2490 University of Central Arkansas “38. Georgia/South Ossetia (1990-present) 
2491 Ibid 






February 18, 1993: Georgia and Russia meet for talks and agree that the conflicts in the Caucasus cannot 
be separated from one another and must be settled in a comprehensive manner2493. Russia states that it will 
assist with the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia if Georgia assists in bringing a close to ethnic strife in 
South Ossetia2494. 
 
May 1, 1993: Russia states that ethnic Russians are being discriminated against in Georgia, an allegation 
which Georgia rejects2495. Georgia however offers to host UN and OSCE experts to investigate such 
claims2496. 
 
November 2, 1993: South Ossetia adopts its first constitution as part of its state building efforts with 




February 2, 1994: Chairman of the South Ossetian Parliament, Lyudvig Chibirov, accuses Russia of 
inconsistency for signing a military cooperation treaty with Georgia before the settlement of conflicts in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia2498. The treaty allows Russia to keep three military bases on Georgian soil past 
1995, whilst committing the Russian military to train and supply the Georgian Army2499. The treaty caused 
widespread protests inside Georgia with the detonation of a bomb which killed Georgia's Deputy Defense 
Minister in his apartment2500. There was also opposing views inside Russia who expressed concern that the 
Georgian Government could use Moscow's military backing to reassert control over Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia2501. Yeltsin stated that the treaty would not be submitted for ratification until the legal and political 
status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is settled under a new Georgian constitution2502. As he stated: "Russia 
is proceeding from the need to respect Georgia's territorial integrity while fully honoring the interests of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia,"2503.  
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October 31, 1994: Russia, Georgia, North Ossetia, and South Ossetia meet to negotiate a political 








February 17, 1995: Georgia allocates one million dollars in relief aid to refugees (Ossetians and 
Georgians) returning to South Ossetia2508. 
 
February 24, 1995: South Ossetia and Georgia announces the initiation of a joint restoration operation 
which will seek to improve infrastructure and economic conditions2509.  
 
March 1, 1995: Georgia, South and North Ossetia meet for talks arranged by the OSCE2510. The parties 
discussed a proposal on the status of South Ossetia, drawn up by OSCE on the initiative of Georgia’s 
president2511. The proposal was written by experts in international law who had also drawn up a proposal 
for the settlement of Transnistria2512. The proposal envisioned that South Ossetia should be granted the 
greatest possible degree of (political) autonomy within the Georgian state, i.e. a sort of “internal” self-
determination2513. The proposal envisaged the division of responsibilities in detail2514. According to this 
plan, South Ossetia, while not becoming an independent state, would gain a significantly stronger legal and 
political position than it had ever enjoyed in the Soviet Union or previously2515. In addition, a special border 
regime was to make the borders between South and North Ossetia as porous as possible, thus facilitating 
the ability of Ossetians on both sides of the Russian-Georgian border to share a common existence2516. The 
proposal was overall welcomed by Georgia but was rejected by South Ossetia. South Ossetia however 
expressed the wish for further talks2517.  
 
March 29, 1995: The South Ossetian parliament invites the OSCE to the area to discuss the issue with the 
parliamentarians. The meeting took place with Russian civilian and military observers2518.  
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November 1, 1995: Georgia's Central Electoral Commission suspends polling in Abkhazia and part of 
South Ossetia for the upcoming presidential election, and Shevardnadze states on Russian television that 
Russia should assist Georgia in restoring control over its breakaway regions2519. 
 




May 16, 1996: A “Memorandum on Measures to Provide Security and Strengthen Mutual Trust” (mediated 
by Russia) between Georgia and South Ossetia is signed by Georgia, Russia, South and North Ossetia and 
OSCE2521. The memorandum stipulates that the use of force is to be excluded as a means for conflict 
resolution, amnesty should be granted, and further dialogue and peacebuilding measures should be 
established2522.  
 
November 10, 1996: South Ossetia holds its first presidential elections in which Lyudvig Chibirov claimed 
the victory2523. The elections where not recognized outside of South Ossetia however Shevardnadze stated 




April 25, 1997: The OSCE opens an office in Tskhinvali2525. The office is linked to the OSCE mission in 
Georgia, established in 1992, which seeks to promote negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia and 




May 19, 1998: Talks between Shevardnadze and North Ossetian President Aleksandr Dzasokhov led to 
Dzasokhov rejecting the aspirations of some South Ossetian politicians to succeed South Ossetia from 
Georgia and join North Ossetia2527. Rather he endorses the concept of asymmetric federation proposed by 
Shevardnadze, which is to provide the separatists regions with maximum self-determination2528.  
 
June 23, 1998: CIS Executive Secretary Boris Berezovskii states that all conflicts within the former Soviet 
Union are interconnected and that all CIS presidents should "say no to separatism,"2529. Shevardnadze has 
allegedly proposed “that Georgia should be an "asymmetric federation" in which the Abkhazia, Adjaria and 
South Ossetia would enjoy varying degrees of autonomy” 2530. 
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February 4, 1999: The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe votes that Georgia becomes the 
Council’s 41st member and the first state from the South Caucasus to become so2531. However, in order to 
fulfil this, Georgia must for the next two years meet various criteria including guaranteeing autonomy to 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia2532.  
 
April 13, 1999: Russia and Georgia are to sign an agreement on join measures to rehabilitate the economy 
of South Ossetia2533. Meanwhile, the leadership in South Ossetia is planning parliamentary elections in May 
in which the Georgian minority is South Ossetia is being encouraged to vote in. Georgia however insists 
that the election is illegal since South Ossetia’s political status in connection to the central government in 
Georgia has not been determined2534. Both South Ossetia, Georgia and Russia have drafted proposals 
regarding the future relations between Georgia and South Ossetia2535. In this South Ossetia holds for 
recognition as an independent state, whilst Georgia is only willing to offer broad autonomy within a federal 
Georgian state2536. 
 
May 20, 1999: Parliamentary votes in South Ossetia result in a victory for the local communist party, whilst 
the Georgian minority of South Ossetia boycotted the election2537.  
 
November 18-19, 1999: The OSCE holds its sixth summit for Heads of State or Government in Istanbul2538. 
During the summit Russia committed to the withdrawal of its troops and military hardware from Moldova 
and Georgia by December 31, 20022539,2540. At the summit Russia’s president Yeltsin amongst other stated: 
“Russia, where hundreds of peoples are united by a common destiny, has always valued peace and harmony. 




March 9, 2000: Russia plans on creating an east-west transportation network across the Russian Federation 
as an alternative to the EU's TRACECA project2542. This includes creation of an extraterritorial international 
free economic zone on the territory of North Ossetia and South Ossetia2543. The latter however requires a 
resolution of the conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia2544. Reports in Izvestiya state that secret talks 
are under way in which Georgia and South Ossetia will discuss the “terms whereby the unrecognized 
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republic will abandon its struggle for recognition as an independent state and accept some unspecified status 
within Georgia”2545.  
 
April 7, 2000: Lyudvig Chibirov, president of South Ossetia states that he hopes Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze will be reelected on April 9, where Georgian presidential elections are held. Chibirov stated 
that Shevardnadze is: "a man who keeps his word, [and who is] sincerely interested in settling the Georgian-
Ossetian conflict by political means without military interference."2546. Chibirov also stated that he hoped 
negotiations would resume after the elections and that he would meet with “Russian President-elect 
Vladimir Putin, whom he will ask to intensify Russia's input in seeking a solution to the conflict”2547.  
 
April 18, 2000: The Georgian parliament approves a draft bill on the political status of the Republic of 
Adjaria which “envisages amending the Georgian Constitution to stipulate that Adjaria is a constituent part 
of Georgia and establishing a special parliamentary committee to draft a further bill on the division of power 
between the Adjar Autonomous Republic and the central Georgian government in Tbilisi”2548. In the 
Georgian constitution from 1995, it was decided to omit any references to the status of autonomous 
republics until the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was resolved2549.  
 
September 9, 2000: Russia announces that it intends to withdraw from the Bishkek Treaty which ensures 
visa-free travel for most CIS residents2550. The measure was explained as a way to control illegal 




March 6, 2002: The Russian Duma adopt a non-binding resolution on US’ military presence in Georgia, 
stating that the presence of U.S. troops "may complicate the already difficult situation in the region," and 
that it hoped U.S. military aid to Tbilisi "does not lead the Georgian leadership into seeking a military 
solution to armed conflicts In Abkhazia and South Ossetia."2552 
 
March 8, 2002: Russia denounces claims that it is willing to allow the accession of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia into the Russia federation with Igor Ivanov (FSB Director) stating: "Moscow respects the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, and is making no deals behind its back,"2553. 
 
March 25, 2002: Russia accuses Georgia of preparing military actions against South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
and members of the Russian state Duma demand the dispatching of 400 additional Russian peacekeepers 
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March 26, 2002: Russia’s Defense Ministry denies that army units in North Ossetia are preparing for 
military operations as a response to a possible attack from Georgia on South Ossetia2555. 
 
March 27, 2002: Georgia states that a large-scale provocation, which starts with the reporting of Georgia’s 
intention of attacking South Ossetia, is aimed at involving Georgia in a conflict in South Ossetia2556. 
 
April 3, 2002: Russia holds military exercises in North Ossetia2557. The exercise allegedly addresses the 
possibility of an enemy infiltrating Russia through Georgia2558. 
 
May 31, 2002: Kokoity states in a meeting in Moscow that the separatist entity fears Georgia will use force 
to solve the conflict2559. He also stated that the entity feared that Georgia would use US trained Georgian 
troops to do so2560.  
 
June 10, 2002: Georgia denounces the recent adopted citizenship law of Russia which states that persons 
living on the territory of the former Soviet Union and having no citizenship can apply and receive 
citizenship of the Russian Federation2561. Shevardnadze stated that the law was “a hidden annexation” and 
further stating: "This is not a friendly step from the Russian side. Each country has a right to consider its 
own migration policy, but this policy must not jeopardy other countries' sovereignty,"2562.  
 
November 22, 2002: Shevardnadze states that Georgia will officially bid for NATO accession stating that: 
"Membership of NATO means the final guarantee for security for Georgia"2563. He also stated that the 
conflict with South Ossetia and Abkhazia make relations between Georgia and Russia tense and stressed 





January 31, 2003: South Ossetia is allegedly mobilizing its armed forces and police in Tskhinvali2565. 
Georgia’s envoy to the president will allegedly visit South Ossetia to convince South Ossetia that Georgia 
supports peaceful resolution of the conflict2566.  
 
February 4, 2003: Georgia accuses Russia of sending weapons to South Ossetia stating:  
 
2555 “Russia Denies Military Alert on Its Border with Georgia” Old Civil, March 26, 2002, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=1643  
2556 “Large Scale Provocation is Prepared Against Georgia - Defense Minister Says” Old Civil, March 27, 2002, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=1657  
2557 “Russian Large-Scale Military Exercises at the Georgian Border” Old Civil, April 3, 2002, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=1709  
2558 Ibid 
2559 “Leader of Breakaway Region Fears Georgia's Increasing Military Capability” Old Civil, May 31, 2002, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=1970 
2560 Ibid 
2561 “Shevardnadze Slams Russian Citizenship Law” Old Civil, June 10, 2002, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=2059  
2562 Ibid 
2563 “Georgia Aspires NATO Accession” Old Civil, November 22, 2002, https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=2767  
2564 Ibid 





“Georgian side has requested Russia for several times to stop deployment of the weaponry in the conflict 
zone”2567. 
 
February 5, 2003: Georgia and the US delegation to the OSCE express concern regarding the appearance 
of military hardware in South Ossetia2568. Georgia alleges that Russia is moving military hardware to South 
Ossetia2569. Russia denies that military hardware is entering South Ossetia via Russia2570. 
 
February 7, 2003: Georgia’s Foreign Ministry states that 13 Russian T-62 battle tanks were deployed in 
Tskhinvali last December, a claim which is denied by Russia2571. The US delegation at the OSCE Permanent 
Council also stated the presence of: “the heavy weapons, including artillery, in a military depot in the 
Tskhinvali region that apparently belongs to the Ossetian battalion of the Joint Peacekeeping Force.”2572. 
 
April 4, 2003: Georgia’s Foreign Minister Irakli Menagharishvili stated that Georgia would give “an 
adequate response” in case the Russian Parliament’s lower chamber adopts a statement condemning US-
Georgian military agreement2573. A group of Russian MPs have proposed a draft decree which condemns 
the US-Georgia military agreement, which was ratified by Georgia in March2574. According to the 
agreement the US is allowed free access to mutually agreed military facilities in Georgia2575. The Russian 
MPs proposes that Russia revises its policies towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia as a response to the US-
Georgia military agreement2576. On the same day and in response to the group of Russian MPs, Georgia’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister stated that "It seems that the new wave of the anti-Georgian hysteria starts in 
Russia," and that "In case the draft of decree is adopted we will send a statement of protest to Moscow"2577. 
 
April 7, 2003: Georgia’s president Shevardnadze states that the US-Georgia military agreement poses no 
threat to Russia. He also stated that before Russia starts debating the agreement: “they’d better think over 
legality of the presence of the Russian military bases in Georgia, which were to be disbanded according to 
the OSCE 1999 treaty.”2578 
 
November 2, 2003: Georgia holds parliamentary elections2579. 
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November 23, 2003: A state of emergency is declared in Georgia following protests against 
Shevardnadze2580. Shevardnadze announced the state of emergency on TV stating that he would use the 
Defense ministry and Interior Ministry to restore order2581. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov arrives in 
Georgia in an attempt to resolve the situation2582. He stated Russia had no intention of interfering in the 
internal affairs of Georgia but also stated: "At the same we cannot remain indifferent to the fate of 
Georgia[…]It is critically important for us that everything proceeds according to the constitution and the 
law[…]There are no issues that cannot be resolved through dialogue and compromise on the basis of 
existing legislation and the constitution"2583. 
November 24, 2003: Georgian President Eduard A. Shevardnadze resigns following weeks of protests2584. 
Opposition leader Saakashvili states that new presidential and parliamentary elections where scheduled in 
and that there would be no retribution against Shevardnadze2585. Parliamentary speaker, Nino 




January 2004: Mikhail Saakashvili is elected president of Georgia2587.  
 
May 14, 2004: South Ossetia hosts Russian-mediated talks with Georgia2588. The talks were meant to 
diffuse South Ossetian concerns following Saakashvili’s news conference where he stated that once Georgia 
has taken control over Ajaria, the other breakaway entities would follow2589. Georgia assured that it would 
only resolve to a negotiated settlement of the conflict2590. South Ossetia nevertheless started implementing 
additional security measures with Eduard Kokoiti, president of South Ossetia, meeting with Teimuraz 
Mansurov, chairman of Russia’s Parliament of North Ossetia, to discuss joint steps to counter Tbilisi’s 
plans2591. Following the meeting, the North Ossetia chairman stated: “The current situation obliges North 
Ossetia to protect South Ossetia” 2592. South Ossetian officials also claim to possess intelligence about 
Georgia’s intentions to provoke political disorder in South Ossetia up to the schedule parliamentary 
elections in South Ossetia on May 232593. Stanislav Kochiev, chair of the South Ossetian de facto parliament 
stated that any forceful actions from Tbilisi would lead to bloodshed and secretary of South Ossetia’s de 
facto security council, Jemal Karkusov, stated that it would not be possible for Georgia to replicate the 
Ajarian scenario in South Ossetia, because unlike Ajarians, the Ossetians are not ethnic Georgians, with 
him stating: “Tbilisi must take this into account” 2594. The de facto leaders of South Ossetia also noted that 
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most of the South Ossetian inhabitants had Russian citizenship and an aspiration to join North Ossetia2595. 
A conflict with South Ossetia would involve a conflict with North Ossetia, a scenario in which Russia 
would not stay neutral2596. 
 
May 17, 2004: Secretary of the Russian Security Council Igor Ivanov travels to Georgia to negotiate with 
Saakashvili and other officials, the status of South Ossetia2597. 
 
May 22, 2004: The pro-Saakashvili youth movement Kmara (Enough), which played a key role in the 
protests in Tbilisi and Ajaria announces that it has started to work in South Ossetia with the aim of recruiting 
support2598.  
 
May 23, 2004: South Ossetia holds parliamentary elections with 40,000 registered electors expected to cast 
their votes2599. No polling stations were opened outside South Ossetia2600. Four seats were allotted to ethnic 
Georgians living in South Ossetia, however these seats remained empty as there is yet to be any record of 
ethnic Georgians living in the area having voted in these elections2601. This is however disputed by South 
Ossetia who claims the opposite2602. According to early polls, the pro-governmental Edinstvo (Unity) 
movement of South Ossetia President Eduard Kokoiti — which is an ally of the Russian political party of 
the same name – will most likely win the majority2603. The motto of the party is “Our Path is to Russia.” 
2604. The remaining seats will most likely be divided between the Communist Party led by Stanislav 
Kochiev, chair of the South Ossetian Parliament, and the nationalist People’s Party2605. In an interview with 
Georgian and Russia media, Kokoiti compared Saakashvili with Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia’s first 
president, who abolished the South Ossetian autonomous region2606. In earlier statements, he also pledged 
not to negotiate with Georgia until Georgia admitted the, as he stated: “genocide of the South Ossetian 
population in 1989-1990 and legally and politically assesses these events[…]Our integration with Russia is 
now closer than ever and no one will force either me or my nation to deviate from this path” 2607. 
 
May 26, 2004: Saakashvili states that he is ready to begin peace talks with South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
over any federal state model2608. Speaking in Ossetian and Abkhazian language, Saakashvili stated: "For 
the first time, I would like to address the issue of a special status, and to guarantee all rights for security to 
our brothers. We have to build new relations based on understanding and friendship."2609. He also stated: 
“We propose to our Abkhaz and South Ossetian brothers to start immediate talks on the restoration of a 
united state. We are prepared to consider any state model that takes into account their interests and ensures 
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Saakashvili also pointed to Georgian-Russia relations which were “completely different type of relations” 
2611. He also described his relations with Putin as “warm and normal,” and welcomed the prospect of Russian 
capital investment in Georgia stating: “It makes no difference where the capital comes from.” 2612. In 
response to Saakashvili’s speech, South Ossetia’s de factor Foreign Affairs Minister Murad Jioev stated 
that South Ossetia was a: “sovereign state, prepared to build good relations with Georgia.” 2613. He also 
stated that negotiations could only take the form of conflict-settlement2614.  
 
May 31, 2004: Georgia sends extra troops into South Ossetia following reports that Russian peacekeepers 
intended to dismantle Georgian checkpoints set up around villages inhabiting ethnic Georgians2615. The 
checkpoints were officially established to prevent smuggling2616. The leader of South Ossetia, Eduard 
Kokoity stated that he intended to order his troops to respond with force if the Georgian troops tried to 
invade South Ossetia2617. South Ossetia’s de facto government spokeswomen furthermore stated that the 
extra troops were “pure provocation” designed to involve Russian troops in a military conflict 2618. Georgian 
Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania on the other hand warned the Russian peacekeepers not to get involved in 
an internal dispute2619. Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry criticized Georgia’s “strong-arm actions (that) do 
nothing to help the development of Russia-Georgia relations” and urged Tbilisi to engage in “restoring 
trust” with Abkhazia and South Ossetia2620. The statement also referred to the “large number of Russian 
citizens residing in those areas”2621. Meanwhile, Georgian officials accuse the Russian military and South 
Ossetian leaders of sharing the profit from smuggling and that they both have an interest in its 
continuation2622. 
 
June 1, 2004: Saakashvili’s wife visits South Ossetia’s capital and several Georgian villages inside South 
Ossetia2623. She was interrupted by the South Ossetian KGB who escorted her to their building after which 
she was escorted out of South Ossetia2624. Meanwhile, a Georgian public radio inaugurated an Ossetian-
language news broadcast2625. Georgian Security Council Secretary Vano Merabishvili states that Georgia 
intends to increase the number of troops and arms in the joint South Ossetian peacekeeping contingent and 
that artillery and other equipment have already been moved into Georgian-controlled areas of the conflict 
zone: "According to the [peacekeeping] agreement, the Russian side has 500 peacekeepers, as well as the 
Ossetian side[…]Georgia should also have 500 peacekeepers, but because of the incapability of the previous 
authorities of Georgia [in the Shevardnadze administration], we have there only 100 soldiers."2626. In 

























republic of South Ossetia is violated" and stated that he "found no peaceful intentions" in Georgia's action 
to deploy "military hardware" near the South Ossetian administrative border2627. On June 1, Saakashvili 
also announced that "all Ossetians living in South Ossetia" would receive state "pensions" and he also stated 
that Georgia would extend agricultural aid to Ossetians and restore Tbilisi-Tskhinvali rail service as well 
as Georgian state television programming would be translated into Ossetian2628. In connection to this he 
stated: "I appeal to our fellow citizens of Ossetian origin for help[...]We must together force all sides to 
engage in dialogue" on Ossetia's status. He however also noted that this dialogue would only concern the 
reintegration of South Ossetia into Georgia as: "The disintegration of Georgia will not take place[…]This 
is the end of a fragmented Georgia."2629 
 
June 2, 2004: Saakashvili announces social programs for the inhabitants of South Ossetia including 
“disbursement of Georgian pensions to retirees in South Ossetia, including those who are already entitled 
to pensions from Russia (which many of them are); distribution of free mineral fertilizer; reopening the 
railway link to Tskhinvali, which had been dismantled during the 1992 fighting; and, deployment of medical 
personnel to provide free ambulatory treatment to local residents”2630. South Ossetia however declined the 
measures2631. 
 
June 4, 2004: Georgian police are replaced by Georgian army troops in the Georgian-South Ossetian 
conflict zone2632. The redeployment follows Georgia’s decision to make full use of its quota of 500 
peacekeeping troops and an undisclosed number of armored vehicles in the zone2633. Meanwhile, a Georgian 
convoy starts distributing nitrate fertilizer in South Ossetia2634. The convoy is however forced to leave with 
South Ossetian “authorities evidently recalled that fertilizer distribution in Ajaria in April — also with 
Shervashidze leading the first convoy — helped set in motion events that led to the toppling of Aslan 
Abashidze.”2635. On the same day, the Georgian parliament also launched an appeal to the South Ossetian 
population calling for political dialogue and personal contact2636. In an interview Saakashvili offered Eduard 
Kokoiti a choice between accepting Georgian sovereignty — in which case he could “play an important 
role in Georgia” and “give his people a chance to improve their lot.”2637 or, he could remain in his current 
“situation as a besieged chieftain in a small enclave.” 2638. Saakashvili also offered to go to Tskhinvali for 
negotiations2639. 
 
June 9, 2004: South Ossetia leader Eduard Kokoity is in Moscow for consultations with senior government 
officials2640. While in Moscow, “Kokoity announced complete cessation of South Ossetia’s contacts with 
the rest of Georgia, citing three conditions for resuming those contacts: a Georgian admission of culpability 
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which would be fixed by South Ossetia”2641. Kokoity brought a resolution by South Ossetia’s legislative 
assembly, requesting Russia’s bicameral Parliament and its president to recognize South Ossetia’s secession 
from Georgia and right of accession to the Russian Federation via North Ossetia2642. To this, Russia’s 
Federation Council’s International Affairs Committee Chairman Mikhail Margelov stated that Russia 
would rather have a “federative Georgian state on its border” 2643. 
 
June 11-12, 2004: A convoy of Russian army trucks carrying tarpaulin-covered cargoes, reportedly entered 
Georgia’s territory in South Ossetia via the Roki tunnel from Russian territory2644. The Russia military did 
not notify Georgia nor the OSCE as is otherwise stipulated in armistice agreement2645. The OSCE confirmed 
the entry of at least 60 Russian trucks and Georgia sent a protest note to the Russian foreign ministry, stating 
that it would report the incident to international organizations2646. Following this there were inconsistent 
statements from Russia with spokesmen for Russia’s North Caucasus Military District and the 58th Army 
Command (in North Ossetia) stating that the convoy only carried non-lethal supplies as well as some troops 
as part of a planned rotation of Russian “peacekeeping” troops2647. Leadership of the military command and 
a Defense Ministry spokesman in Moscow however stated that there had been “no movement.” And Dmitry 
Rogozin, the Rodina bloc’s leader in the Duma, stated that the move was a justified “response to Georgia’s 
provocations.”2648. Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov eventually denied any knowledge of the Russian 
military move2649. In a telephone conversation between Saakashvili and Putin, Putin allegedly stated that it 
was not done on his initiative2650.   
 
June 14, 2004: Following a meeting in Moscow, trans-dniester’s leaders offer military assistance to South 
Ossetia2651. Trans-Dniester leader Igor Smirnov amongst other cited a 1994 agreement, signed between 
Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which agreed to mutual assistance in the event of “aggression” 
against any of the signatories2652. Smirnov also stated: “Trans-Dniester is watching with concern the events 
unfolding in the friendly states Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We have constantly provided material 
assistance to South Ossetia, including foodstuffs, grain, and training. If necessary — and as the events show 
such a necessity becoming increasingly evident — we will also provide comprehensive military 
assistance.”2653. He also described the situation in South Ossetia as: “nothing but preparations for aggression 
by Tbilisi.” 2654. 
 
June 15, 2004: Georgian Conflict Resolutions Minister Giorgi Khaindrova demands that Russian 
peacekeepers leave South Ossetia since: "they do not wish to perform their functions." 2655. Russia rejected 
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South Ossetia2656. Russia further stated: "The Georgian authorities are intentionally vilifying the Russian 
peace-keepers deployed in the Georgia-South Ossetian conflict zone," 2657. Khaindrava stated that the 
peacekeepers should only be stationed in areas where Georgians and South Ossetian populations come into 
contact and should not be deployed in the neighboring Gori district, which is regarded as part of Georgia2658. 
He also stated that Georgia wants peacekeepers to monitor the Roki Pass, a route to Russia that Tbilisi 
states is used to shuttle contraband and weapons into South Ossetia2659. 
June 16, 2004: Attempts by Georgia to distribute humanitarian aid in South Ossetia meets resistance with 
Georgian Agriculture Minister Davit Shervashidze stating: "The majority of local residents are avoiding 
contact with our mission[...]They seem to have been brainwashed to such an extent that they are rejecting 
any assistance. In fact, they are being terrorized".2660 
 
June 18, 2004: Bilateral negotiations on Russia’s military bases in Georgia were cancelled by Russia2661. 
In the negotiations Russia is aiming at a draft treaty which would “determine the duration of the presence 
and conditions of the functioning of Russian military bases in Georgia.”2662 Russian officials, including 
Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov also sometimes add the term 
“procedures for continued functioning of Russian bases,” and suggest more explicitly that the bases should 
receive legal “status” in Georgia prior to any decision on withdrawal2663. 
 
June 21, 2004: South Ossetia announces that it intends to withdraw from the JCC2664. This comes after a 
meeting with the JCC was scheduled to take place in Tbilisi which South Ossetia demanded be changed to 
a more neutral site2665.  
 
June 22, 2004: 2000 South Ossetian police forces take part in a training exercise aimed at combating 
terrorism, however the training also kept Georgia in mind with the interior minister stating: "We have to do 
it," … "Georgia still maintains illegal police posts in the conflict zone and keeps troops on the border with 
South Ossetia. Moreover, reconnaissance flights of Georgian helicopters over the republic have become 
more frequent lately."2666. During the exercise a 70-year-old Georgian women sustained a head wound, 
which Georgia stated was the result of an exploding shell and South Ossetia stated was the result of a stray 
bullet which grazed her2667. Georgia demanded the extradition of the lady with Interior Minister Irakly 
Okruashvili stating: "[W]e are not going to put up with the brazen steps the authorities of South Ossetia 
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July 1, 2004: Peace talks between South Ossetia and Georgia hit a stalemate as Georgian president 
Saakashvili refuses to attend the talks until South Ossetia releases three officers detained in the area, whom 
South Ossetia accuses of being spies2669.  
 
July 3, 2004: Saakashvili meets with Putin in Moscow during a CIS summit2670. Following the meeting 
Saakashvili stated: “During the visit I was convinced that the South Ossetians cannot hope for Russian 
help2671. Just as Georgia does not interfere in Russian affairs, Russia would not interfere in Georgian” 
domestic issues2672. He also stated that that a special operation is planned in one of the Georgian regions in 
the immediate future2673. 
 
July 7, 2004: South Ossetian leaders reopen the main routes in and out of Tskhinvali, which were closed 
down earlier by South Ossetian paramilitary groups2674. The Ossetian called it a “gesture of good will”, the 
Ossetian authorities however continue to block the delivery of humanitarian goods from Georgia2675. On 
July 7, Georgian peacekeepers in South Ossetia seized nine trucks carrying Russian peacekeepers, weapons, 
ammunition, and uniforms2676. The convoy was allegedly on route from Russia to Tskhinvali and Georgian 
Interior Minister Irakli Okruashvili stated: “Such a large number of arms could not be the peacekeeping 
purposes.”2677. 
 
July 8, 2004: South Ossetia moves 300 armed militants and armored vehicles into ethnic-Georgian villages 
and in the Vanati village they disarmed and captured 50 Georgian servicemen, who were taken to 
Tskhinvali2678. South Ossetia is allegedly importing weapons from Russia and distributing them to the local 
population and preventing civilians from fleeing2679. South Ossetia furthermore publicly appealed to 
Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester, and to Russian Cossacks to send volunteers urgently2680. 
 
July 9, 2004: 50 Georgian police were captured in South Ossetia during a raid where armed separatists 
entered a Georgian village in South Ossetia and disarmed Georgian police stationed there2681. Georgia stated 
that the police where part of the peacekeeping mission, whilst South Ossetia described them as “fighters” 
2682. The policemen were later released but not before they were forced to kneel on TV, a move which 
angered Georgia with Prosecutor-General Irakly Okruashvili stating: "We'll force [South Ossetian leader 
Eduard] Kokoity to regret that he put our servicemen on their knees before the eyes of the entire Georgian 
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people" 2683. Earlier that week Georgia intercepted a Russian convoy near the Kurta village in South 
Ossetia2684. Two of the trucks carried military equipment which was impounded2685.   
 
July 10, 2004: Clashes erupt in South Ossetia with shootings at a checkpoint with injuries and casualties 
on both sides2686. At a news briefing, Saakashvili states that: "South Ossetia will be reintegrated into 
Georgia within a year at the latest, without any shots being fired."2687 
 
July 11, 2004: South Ossetia and Georgia meets for talks on the escalating situation where they agree to 
"cease shooting and other provocative actions."2688. Meanwhile during a rally, Saakashvili states that the: 
"[c]urrent crisis in South Ossetia is not a problem between Georgians and Ossetians. This is a problem 
between Georgia and Russia."2689. He also stated that "certain forces in Russia" are preparing for 
"aggression against Georgia," and he called on Putin to "restrain these forces," 2690. He also warned that a 
conflict in South Ossetia would not be a fight between Georgians and Ossetians but would become "a 
serious problem between the two countries, Georgia and Russia." 2691. He also stated that Georgia had 
prevented a full-scale conflict in the area, stating: "Due to coordinated activities by the Georgian 
government, international support and because of frequent contact with Russia and the United States, 
Georgia has avoided the bloody conflict which [South Ossetian leader Eduard] Kokoev and his backers in 
Russia wanted to launch," 2692. Russia’s foreign minister on the other hand stated that Georgia was to blame 
for the flare up and that Georgia had "illegally brought into the conflict zone hundreds and thousands of 
armed forces who do not come under the peacekeepers' control," and he also stated that Russia would be 
justified in breaking up "illegal formations" in South Ossetia2693 
 
July 12, 2004: Saakashvili states that forces in Russia want to duplicate the events of 1992, when the 
opposition overthrew President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and drew him into exile, as Saakashvili stated: 
“However, this time they will confront not a fragmented but a highly consolidated Georgia,”2694. Saakashvili 
also noted however that Georgia had managed to avert a conflict with the “Ossetian separatists”2695. He also 
noted that Russia had a key role to play in resolving conflict2696. He even pointed out that it is “a Russian-
Georgian issue.” Further stating: “We tried hard to avoid the Georgia-Ossetian question. But it didn’t work. 
This is an issue between Tbilisi and Moscow[…]We are ready for a constructive dialogue with Moscow, 
but if there are people from the Duma or elsewhere who will try to put pressure on us — it won’t work. We 
are not afraid. We are ready to solve all the issues with Russia.”2697. Saakashvili also stated that Kokoiti: 
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understood that this could end badly for them[…]It’s clear that with energetic actions over the past few 
days we have managed to overcome a serious conflict.” 2698. Meanwhile, three Georgian policemen remain 
in custody in South Ossetia albeit Kokoiti later ordered them to be handed over to Russian peacekeepers 
who are expected to hand them over to Georgia2699. Moscow at the same time demands that Georgia returns 
169 unguided missiles which were meant for the Russian peacekeepers, but which were seized on July 72700. 
Georgy Khaindrava, Georgia’s minister for separatist conflicts, however stated that Georgia: “does not 
intend to trade missiles for people,” and added that the missiles should be destroyed2701. Russia’s Defense 
Minister, Sergei Ivanov, demanded the return of the missiles stating: “This Russian military property must 
be returned where it was stolen, that is, in South Ossetia” 2702. 
Eventually Saakashvili accuses Russian peacekeepers of a pro-Ossetian bias and stated that the Russian 
peacekeeping mission “needs to be revised.”2703. He also accused Russia of sending weapons to the area 
stating:  
Our intelligence did a very good job. We know exactly how many shells, bullets, and pieces of hardware 
have been brought from Russia not only to South Ossetia but also to Abkhazia. We know exactly which 
groups in Moscow provided this; we know exactly how much money has been sent by these groups to 
various separatists; we know exactly how many criminals have crossed [into Georgia] from Russia — 
about 190 men that are in a hotel in Java. They are true criminal-type elements2704. 
According to head of the print and information committee of South Ossetia, Irina Gagloyeva, however 
approx 1,000 people have been involved in the latest incident2705. These are not ethnic Ossetians, but 
individuals from Abkhazia, Cossacks from Kuban and Perm, North Ossetia, the Trans-Dniester region, and 
Cherkassia, as she stated: “They have come to Ossetia of their own free will and are not mercenaries. Yet, 
they are ready, if necessary, to support their South Ossetian friends”2706. Meanwhile, Abkhazia also stated 
its assistance to South Ossetia with Valery Arshba, the vice-president of Abkhazia, stating: “We are not 
going to remain indifferent towards our South Ossetian brothers. We will help them as we can,” 2707. 
Vyacheslav Eshba, Abkhazia’s defense minister, furthermore stated: “Georgia is using Ossetia to rehearse 
attack on us” 2708.   
 
July 13, 2004: South Ossetian forces hold military exercises2709 and skirmishes continue to occur between 
the two sides2710. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania reaffirmed the presence of Russian and North 
Caucasian mercenaries stating: “They pose no threat to us, but we do not want to use force[…]We keep the 
situation under control and are ready for any type of scenario.”2711 He also restated the hope of resolving 
the conflict peacefully2712. Meanwhile, Russia and South Ossetia state that approx. 3000 Georgian troops 
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humanitarian aid to the area2714. A humanitarian convoy with signs reading “President Putin’s gift to South 
Ossetia.” Were however halted by Georgia and the convoy was not allowed to reach its destination2715.  
 
July 14, 2004: During a meeting with the Joint Control Commission, Georgia and Russia agrees to 
demilitarize the entire region2716. Georgia referred to South Ossetia as "an enclave of bandit groups, stuffed 
with weaponry" which poses a threat to Russia and Georgia2717. Russia stated that demilitarization must 
equally apply to South Ossetian and Georgian illegal armed groups2718. This comes following allegations 
from South Ossetia that Georgia in the previous weeks had deployed to South Ossetia, members of a guerilla 
organization previously deployed in Abkhazia2719. Georgia responded to the allegations by stating that 
Abkhazia had sent fighters to South Ossetia in order to reinforce the South Ossetian army2720. Russia on the 
other hand accused Georgia of sending 3000 armed men to South Ossetia rather than the 500 peacekeepers 
it is entitled to deploy in the area2721. All sides agreed to inspections in the conflict zone as an attempt to 
prevent further arrival of armed groups2722. 
 
July 15, 2004: Following the day where the sides agreed to demilitarization, South Ossetia accuses Georgia 
of sending between 200-800 Interior Ministry troops into the area2723. This claim was dismissed as 
disinformation by Georgia2724. 
 
July 18, 2004: South Ossetia announces that the volunteers, which arrive son July 12, have returned home 
following a joint exercise with South Ossetian forces2725. South Ossetia’s foreign affairs minister, Murad 
Jioev however stated that South Ossetia remained: “in permanent contact with Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester, 
and Karabakh[…]to gain military support if necessary. Nearly all volunteers who had arrived in South 
Ossetia have left, but would return as need be”2726. 
 
July 28, 2004: Georgian government troops clash with South Ossetian forces2727.  
 
July 29, 2004: Georgia’s proposes to widen the mandate of the OSCE in South Ossetia the proposal was 
however rejected by Russia2728. Georgia proposed to expand the mission to include the entire South Ossetia 
territory and not just the “Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone”2729. Russia however stated that the OSCE 
Mission’s mandate precludes enlargement of its area of responsibility and that the Mission’s personnel is 
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August 4, 2004: An unidentified group shoots at the motorcade of Andrei Kokoshin, chair of Russian 
Parliaments Committee on CIS Affairs, during his trip in South Ossetia2732. 
 
August 9, 2004: Givi Targamadze, chair of the Georgian parliament’s Committee on Defense and Security, 
states that the “Ossetian forces plan to assassinate South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoiti and use the incident 
to justify a new round of attacks to cleanse ethnic-Georgian villages”2733. He also “warned that the Georgian 
government’s retaliation to this expected move would be “very tough.””2734 
 
August 10, 2004: Clashes occur in South Ossetia2735. 
 
August 12, 2004: Both sides accuse each other of firing at villages in the conflict zone. South Ossetian 
forces amongst other shelled an ethnic-Georgian village and moved their heavy armored vehicles close to 
the villages2736. Georgia reported civilian and troop casualties2737. South Ossetia nevertheless blamed 
Georgia for the attacks with Irina Gagloeva, spokeswoman for the South Ossetian authorities, stating that 
fighting in several Ossetian villages had continued despite promises from Georgian Prime Minister Zurab 
Zhvania of a ceasefire2738. She also delivered an ultimatum stating that if shelling continued, then South 
Ossetian forces would purge the ethnic-Georgian villages of any paramilitary squads2739. Following an 
emergency meeting in Georgia, Saakashvili stated that Georgia would no longer leave South Ossetian 
attacks unanswered2740.  In connection to the attacks, Georgian Ministries of Security the Interior also 
accused the Russian peacekeeping troops of cooperating with the South Ossetian militias and even 
participating in the attacks on the Georgian villages, stating: “For the first time the Russian peacekeepers 
openly fixed their position in the South Ossetian conflict. During last night’ overnight shelling they 
provided the South Ossetian militias with information regarding the movements of Georgian 
peacekeepers,”2741. Saakashvili announces three government priorities in defusing the situation namely: 
Ensuring the safety of the population in South Ossetia, prevent the resumption of smuggling in the 
breakaway region, and avoid Georgia’s involvement in armed clashes2742. As Saakashvili stated: “We do 
not need this conflict; we intend to reintegrate the country peacefully[…]All these tasks are decisive at the 
moment[…]We need to coordinate efforts to avoid further provocations and to settle the existing problems 
through peaceful means” 2743. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania also stated that Georgia: “Urge 
immediate talks with the South Ossetian separatists, as well as with top Russian officials, since Russia is 
actively involved in the recent developments in the conflict area. We also demand the complete 
demilitarization of the conflict area; that foresees the withdrawal of all extra troops from the South Ossetian 
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conflict zone that are not part of the designated peacekeeping force there” 2744. South Ossetia also 
acknowledges the need for talks2745. 
 
August 13, 2004: The Georgian parliament vote for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from South 
Ossetia2746. Meanwhile a Russian mediated ceasefire was signed between the two sides2747. Despite this, 
violence continues2748. 
 
August 17, 2004: Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov states that Russia has a legitimate interest in 
South Ossetia as he stated: "One should not forget that most residents of South Ossetia are citizens of 
Russia, and we [the Russian government] should care about them,"2749 
 
August 18, 2004: Putin states that Saakashvili is making the same "foolish" mistakes committed by former 
Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia, whose equally was engulfed in the separatist conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia2750. Putin further stated that the current tension in South Ossetia is "a repetition 
of what happened in the 1990s,"2751. He also called on Georgia to pursue negotiations rather than use force 
to resolve the conflict2752. Meanwhile three Georgian soldiers were killed and five wounded following 
clashes in South Ossetia2753. Both sides accused each other of trying to storm their positions. Georgia's 
Defence Minister Georgi Baramidze stated: "After this night's shooting and attacks, there can be no question 
of any withdrawal of Georgian forces from the zone of conflict[…]There is a well-prepared armed group 
of about 15-20 people in the conflict zone - the South Ossetian side agrees with this. During the night they 
shoot at positions of both sides, trying to provoke all-out war"2754. Meanwhile, Georgia’s Foreign Minister 
Salome Zourabichvili, called for an international conference on the Georgian-Ossetian conflict stating: 
"The situation is complex, tense and paradoxical[…]On one hand, we have an escalation of violence, but 
at the same time, we have an escalation of peace initiatives."2755. The OSCE noted the request but stated 
that the main priority at the time would be to reach a lasting ceasefire2756. 
August 20, 2004: Georgia sends extra troops into South Ossetia following reports that Russian 
peacekeepers intended to dismantle checkpoints that Georgia has set up outside ethnic Georgian villages2757. 
Georgia later withdraw its troops following guarantees from the Russian peacekeepers2758. In response to 
Putin’s comment on August 18, the Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze stated that it was hypocritical of 
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renegade region, Chechnya2759. He also stated: "When he [Putin] tells us that we [Georgia] should learn to 
negotiate[…]why is he not holding talks with the Chechens?" 2760. 
 
August 24, 2004:  Givi Targamadze, chairman of the Georgian parliament's Defense and Security 
Committee, states that Russian troops was ready to launch a strike into Georgian territory on August 19, 
but that it was preempted by Saakashvili's decision to withdraw Georgian units from strategic positions in 
South Ossetia2761. He further stated that Georgia possessed secretly taped video of Russian military 
preparations along the Georgian-Russian frontier, stating: "From now on, our whole strategy will be built 
on the notion that the army, the Georgian armed forces, should get ready to repel Russian aggression,”2762. 
Saakashvili furthermore echoed this stating that "the [Georgian] population must be prepared" for the 
possibility of war2763. 
 
August 25, 2004: Russia releases a statement which condemns the “militaristic rhetoric” from Georgia 
stating that the: "latest utterances show a complete absence of any sense of restraint[…]Against a backdrop 
of the failure of the military adventure in South Ossetia, acute social and economic problems in Georgia 
stand out in even bolder relief[…]All [the Georgian government's] energy ought to be focused on tackling 
these problems, instead of directing it in a search for a non-existent ‘external enemy."2764 
 
September 8, 2004: Russian and Georgian point to each other and South Ossetia as party to the terrorist 
attacks in Beslan, North Ossetia2765. Whereas a number of Russian lawmakers have been looking for traces 
of Georgian involvement in the attack, Georgia on the other hand have pointed to South Ossetia’s 
involvement with Georgian special serviced investigating the possibility2766.  
 
October 6, 2004: The JCC meets in Moscow and agrees to measures aimed at increasing the security 
situation in South Ossetia2767. All sides signed a protocol in which they agreed to: commit all parties to 
make only make changes in peacekeeping troops deployment with mutual prior notification and to create a 
scheme of mined fields and work over the supply of power to the region during the winter period2768. The 
sides also agreed to organize talks between Georgia’s Prime Minister and South Ossetia’s de facto 
president2769. Talks including foreign ministers of all sides were also agreed to2770. 
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November 1, 2004: Russia suggests that South Ossetia’s leader, Eduard Kokoiti, should be invited to the 
end-of-year conference and the OSCE2771 . Russia also continues to reject the settlement of the conflict 
outside of the Joint Control Commission2772. The JCC is five-sided including, Russia, South Ossetia, 
Georgia, North Ossetia and the OSCE2773. Meanwhile shoot outs occur on a nightly basis in South 
Ossetia2774. Guram Vakhtangashvili, who represents South Ossetia’s Georgian-populated Didi Liakhvi 
electoral district in parliament warned that: “As a result of pressure from the Ossetian separatists, the 
number of internally displaced persons from South Ossetia may increase by 25,000”2775. He also stated that 
there was an urgent need to protect Georgian residents and that Ossetian miltias groups had retaken strategic 
positions around Tskhinvali and the Georgian villages2776. Georgia also claims that South Ossetia has 
violated the ceasefire over 30 times with shelling of Georgian villages2777. South Ossetia claim that shelling 
originates from Georgia2778.   
 
November 2, 2004: Georgia’s parliamentary speaker Nino Burdjanadze meets with Russian officials in 
Moscow2779. Following the meeting, Burdjanadze stated: "Today, I made repeated offers that we should 
agree on a joint action plan that would help us build a good, normal relationship[...]I also suggested that we 
should issue a joint statement in which Russia would not only say it recognizes Georgia's territorial 
integrity, but would also commit itself to help Georgia restore its territorial integrity."2780. Russian Foreign 
Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated in response: "The risk exists that either side may try at any time to forcibly 
decide developments. We believe it would be disastrous for the resolution of both the Georgian-Abkhaz 
conflict and the Georgian-[South] Ossetian conflict"2781.  
 
November 3-4, 2004: Ossetians kidnap two Georgian villagers and later detain 50 Georgians passing 
through Tskhinvali2782. In response, Georgian villagers in South Ossetia blocked the road connecting 
Tskhinvali with the northern city of Java and also captured a number of South Ossetians2783. The sides later 
exchanged prisoners and the road was reopened2784.  
 
November 4, 2004: Joint Peacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia claim that Georgia has increased its 
number of police forces in the area with over 100 forces deployed to Georgian villages2785.  
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November 5, 2004: Talks are held between Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and South Ossetian 
President Eduard Kokoity which Zhvania’s office describe as tense2786. Prior to the meeting Zhvania stated 
on the issue of sovereignty: "This issue cannot remain indefinitely suspended in the air. This conflict has 
been going on for 14 years now, and it is still not settled. We simply cannot go on like that. This is why we 
are trying to make use of all possible ways to peacefully settle our dispute," 2787. Russia was also represented 
at the meeting 2788. 
 
November 9, 2004: Georgia and South Ossetian leaders meet in Sochi in where the agree to cease hostilities 
and demilitarize the South Ossetian conflict zone by November 202789. They also agreed to specifically 
remove all armed groups except the peacekeeping troops2790. They however failed to reach an agreement 
about joint control of the Roki tunnel2791. Following the meeting, South Ossetia stated that Georgia had: 
“acknowledged responsibility for the events of the summer of 2004, and the necessity for the Ossetians to 




January 26, 2005: Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili presents at the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe an offer to extend broad autonomy to the secessionist republic of South Ossetia in return 
for its recognition of Tbilisi's authority2794. South Ossetia refused the offer stating that it would remain 
independent2795. To the plan, Saakashvili stated:   
First and foremost, our vision for a peaceful and united Georgia is based on the respect for the desire for 
autonomy of the Tskhinvali region-South Ossetia. If during the Soviet period South Ossetia enjoyed all 
[possible] forms of Soviet autonomy, today, under this plan, it [would] enjoy a much [fairer] form [of 
autonomy] -- even broader than the autonomy [enjoyed by] North Ossetia in Russia[…]We want to have a 
strong Georgian state, and we want the [South Ossetian] conflict to be solved peacefully. The price we 
must pay for that is that we should give that territory certain political rights. But everything that concerns 
border control, defense, public order, human rights will be the prerogative of Georgia's central 
government2796. 
Speaking in Russia, Kokoity rejected any peace proposal from Georgia stating: "South Ossetia already 
determined its own status. South Ossetia is an independent state, and this status is not going to be 
discussed[…]All our history dictates that autonomy within Georgia does not guarantee the security of the 
South Ossetian people."2797. 
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February 2, 2005: A car explosion in Gori which led three policemen dead and several wounded is 
characterized by Georgia as a terrorist attack with “foreign forces” likely being responsible for it2798.  
 
March 18, 2005: The Joint Control Commission (JCC) with representatives from Georgian, South Ossetia, 
Russia and North Ossetian sign a protocol which envisages measures aimed at demilitarization of South 
Ossetian conflict zone2799. The sides agreed to sides agreed to carry out dismantling of military fortifications 
in the conflict zone with Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Goga Khaindrava stating 
that the withdrawal of unauthorized troops from the conflict zone would be the next step of 
demilitarization2800. Khaindrava stated that both sides will position these troops in one particular location, 
which should become accessible for joint -- Russian, Georgian, Ossetian -- peacekeeping troop stationed in 
the conflict zone, as well as for OSCE observers for carrying out regular monitoring there2801. 
 
May 2005: Shooting erupts in South Ossetia resulting in the death of a Georgian policeman and four South 
Ossetians2802.  
 
May 12, 2005:  Two OSCE monitoring staff are threatened at gun point and detained by a South Ossetian 
volunteer group2803. They were freed following an intervention by the JPF2804.  
 
June 29, 2005: The Russian Foreign Ministry releases a “Commentary Regarding Georgian Foreign 
Ministry Protest Over Humanitarian Aid to South Ossetia” where it responds to allegations that "a part of 
the cargo is of dual use and can be used for military purposes"2805. Here it states: “This entirely does not 
correspond to reality. We know that the Moscow mayor's office invited Georgian embassy officials to be 
present at the dispatch ceremony of the cargo so they could see for themselves its completely peaceful 
character. But the Georgian embassy in Moscow did not avail itself of this invitation.”2806 
 
July 5, 2005: South Ossetia staged military exercises with 500 troops in the Java district2807. 
 
July 9, 2005: Saakashvili states on TV: "The status quo cannot continue. I am not going to wait for the next 
100 years to resolve these problems[...]Therefore, we will be very aggressive in seeking peace." 2808. 
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July 10-11, 2005: Saakashvili holds a conference aimed at promoting the peace plan he proposed in 
January, which South Ossetia declined to attend2809. Saakashvili said the peace plan was a "dream list" for 
residents of South Ossetia and stated: "We understand it will take years[...]But we want action. Nothing 
ever happens on its own, so we need your assistance."2810 The plan's provisions would: 1) Ensure language 
rights and the preservation of cultural heritage. 2) Provide compensation for damages suffered during the 
1990-1992 conflict with Georgia. 3) Create a truth commission to investigate alleged crimes against 
civilians. 4) Establish "a simplified border regime" for South Ossetians residing along the border with 
Russia. 5) Guarantee South Ossetian representation in the central Georgian government.2811. In an interview 
Saakashvili stated:"[i]f the de-facto leaders of Ossetia love Ossetians even a tenth as much as we do, they 
will certainly engage in negotiations." Which Dmitri Medoyev, South Ossetia's representative to Russia 
responded to saying: "Our train left Georgia 15 years ago[…]And [it] is now heading towards Russia."2812. 
 
July 18, 2005: While recognizing that "peace initiatives are being pursued quite actively", Georgia’s 
Minister of Defense Irakli Okruashvili states: "We have enough equipment, and people trained[...]to ward 
off any internal threat that may face Georgia. Naturally, this concerns the two lost territories [Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia]."2813 
 
July 26, 2005: South Ossetia and Abkhazia sign a mutual assistance agreement and Eduard Kokoiti, states 
that Georgia and international organizations "want to impose on us peaceful initiatives of an aggressive 
nature”. 2814 
 
July 27, 2005: Anatoly Barankevich, the head of the South Ossetian defense forces, states that Georgian 
troops are engaged in menacing activities not far from the separatist region's border with him stating: 
"Georgian troops are holding all kinds of exercises[...]that we view as purposeful preparations for combat 
operations"2815 
 
September 20, 2005: Georgia blames Russian troops for the shelling of the South Ossetian capital, which 
injured 10 people2816. Russia and South Ossetia denied the claims whilst Georgia called for the end to 
Russia’s role in the peacekeeping mission2817. The shelling coincided with celebrations commemorating the 
15th anniversary of the breakaway region's declaration of independence from Georgia in 19902818. 
Georgia’s State Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi Khaindrava stated in regard to the peace process: 
"I think the whole process as such has been wrecked,"2819. He also stated that the peacekeeping mission: 





















September 21, 2005: In a televised speech Saakashvili states: "In reality, Russia is ruling this small enclave 
[South Ossetia], not just through its officials, but with ethnic Russians sent there by Russia and appointed 
by Russia[…]"There is no place here for burying your head in the sand. We hope that Russia – this is not a 
Georgian-Ossetian problem, it is a Georgian-Russian issue – will play a constructive role so that once and 
for all we can put an end to all breaches of the peace."2821. Meanwhile Georgian State Minister for Conflict 
Resolution Giorgi Khaindrava stated regarding the presence of heavy weaponry in South Ossetia: "The next 
step is to start a war, as our opponents probably plan[…][How] could the newest military hardware get into 
the region? How did it get there? Obviously, we will put this question to our Russian colleagues because 
there is no other way than the Roki tunnel [on the Georgian-Russian border]. How can the peacekeeping 
forces led by Russia simply stay in the conflict zone, look at these outrageous incidents and do nothing?"2822. 
 
September 22, 2005: Georgia’s Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli states that, despite the shelling on 
September 20, he wanted to pursue plans for a meeting with South Ossetian separatist leader Eduard 
Kokoity, originally slotted for some time in late September: "Such a meeting would have been very 
important if it had been held earlier. I think it might have prevented the incidents yesterday and the day 
before[…]But it seems that the de-facto leadership in Tskhinvali has no interest in ruling out acts of 
provocation and calming down the situation. Nevertheless, we, for our part, will do our utmost for a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict. That is why it is essential that such a meeting takes place."2823.  
 
October 12, 2005: The Russian Foreign Ministry issues a statement regarding Georgia’s resolution on the 
situation in the zones of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts2824. Here they state that: 
“Apart from the obviously biased and partial assessments of the state of affairs in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, it contains some rude attacks against Russia. The resolution also charges that the conflicts still have 
not been settled because of Moscow's position and even that Russia harbors intentions to annex a part of 
Georgia. As the chief target are selected the peacekeeping forces stationed in accordance with the operative 
international agreements in the zones of the said conflicts. The Georgian parliamentarians have chosen a 
language of ultimatums: the deadlines are set, after which the government of Georgia is directed to take 
action for the soonest withdrawal from the country's territory of the peacekeeping forces and to denounce 
the relevant international agreements. The Russian side regards the resolution as a provocative move, aimed 
at whipping up tensions, breaking the existing negotiation formats and liquidating the juridical base of a 
peaceful settlement of the conflicts on the territory of Georgia. By accusing Russia of the unsettledness of 
the problem of the territorial integrity of Georgia, the parliament of that country is obviously trying to shift 
the blame on to somebody else”2825. 
 
October 24-25, 2005: An emergency session of the JCC is held in Moscow following the use of force by 
Ossetian troops on September 202826. Following the meeting Georgian State Minister for Conflict 
Resolution Issues Goga Khaindrava called for an overhaul of the JCC and the Russian dominated 
peacekeeping operation2827. Since 2004, 15 protocols on demilitarizing South Ossetia have been signed 
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ended up with unprecedented militarization” of South Ossetia by Russia and “everyone knows perfectly 
well that the arms come from Russia through the Roki tunnel.”2828. He also noted that the OSCE had a 
mandate to monitor the Roki tunnel but that this mandate remained largely unfulfilled2829. He also pointed 
to “JCC’s passivity and the indifference Russian “peacekeepers” showed toward the September 20 
demonstration of force in Tskhinvali, where “heavy armaments and illegal armed formations were brought 
in, smartly outfitted young men with assault rifles, submachine guns, and grenade launchers marching 
around, accompanied by armored vehicles, parading ostentatiously before the eyes of the whole world.” 
2830. As he further stated this is: “evidence that the [existing] peacekeeping operation is untenable.”2831. 
 
October 27, 2005: Georgia’s Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli presents “South Ossetia Conflict Resolution 
Plan” at the OSCE2832. Here he stated that the goals were: Effective conflict settlement strategy; Moving 
forward peace process; Ensure democratic development and economic revival of the region; Full-scale 
conflict settlement. The objectives: Create comprehensive state policy on conflict settlement; Create 
common strategy for international partners; Engage old and new partners in new framework talks; Ensure 
international support for conflict settlement plan2833 
 
November 1, 2005:  Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli presents to the OSCE the recent version 
of President Mikheil Saakashvili's proposals for resolving the South Ossetian conflict2834. The peace plan 
gives South Ossetia broad autonomy within Georgia, it calls for the inclusion on the US, EU and the OSCE 
as part of the peace process and it advocates the demilitarization of the conflict zone and the imposing of 
strict border controls at the Roki tunnel linking South Ossetia with the Russian Federation2835. The plan also 
envisages resolving the conflict by 20072836.  
 
December 5, 2005: Russia accuses Georgia of attacking and shooting against South Ossetian posts and 
refusing vehicles with Russian and South Ossetian plates to pass to different areas in South Ossetia2837. To 
this Russia further states: “The enumerated actions are accompanied by threats and accusations against 
South Ossetian leaders and Russian peacekeepers that they are supposedly involved in crime, including 
abductions of people, arms trade, contraband and the like. It got to the point where Vano Merabishvili, 
Georgia's minister of the interior and state security, in an interview with a Georgian TV company declared 
that the president of South Ossetia, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of South Ossetia, the South 
Ossetian minister of defense, and other leaders of the unrecognized republic "will either be punished for 
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December 13, 2005: South Ossetia proposes a peace plan which Georgian Prime Minister Zurab 
Noghaideli stated came as a “surprise” to him, but nevertheless saw it as a “step forward”2839. The South 
Ossetian peace plan calls for the creation of a working group within the “four-party Joint Control 
Commission (JCC) that is responsible for monitoring and implementing the 1992 Georgian-South Ossetian 
ceasefire.”2840. The purpose of this working group should be to focus on further demilitarization, confidence 
building and on ways to boost the regional economy2841. The plan is according to South Ossetia meant to 
be implemented in three stages, as stated: "The [first stage] includes the demilitarization of the conflict 
zone, the restoration of confidence, and the establishment of security guarantees[…]The second stage 
includes the social and economic rehabilitation [of the conflict zone] and the third stage includes the 
political settlement of the relations between Georgia and the republic of South Ossetia. This program should 
serve as a basis for talks that would involve the four sides' highest political leaders."2842. In response to the 
peace plan, Georgia stated: "[Georgia] has been often criticized for making unilateral proposals. And indeed 
those were unilateral proposals because our colleagues [in the JCC] did not want to take part in this process. 
Thank God, common sense has prevailed. Everyone understands -- and I, too, believe -- that this is an 
important step on Kokoity's part[…]We must now join forces so that the Ossetian and Georgian populations 
of the [conflict zone] can live together again. Were it not for these political tensions and these various forces 
that have been hindering the implementation of the peace process, there would have long been no problems. 




January 31, 2006: A traffic accident between a Georgian civilian's car and a truck belonging to the Russian 
peacekeeping force in the village of Tkviavi led to a confrontation between Georgian police and Russian 
officers when a Georgian police officer tried to confiscate the truck2844. The dispute was solved with 
negotiations between Gen. Kulakhmetov and a Georgian presidential representative2845. On the same day 
Vladimir Putin stated that Russia would recognize the South Ossetia and Abkhazia if Western nations 
decided to acknowledge the independence of Kosovo in the Balkans2846. He also critices Georgia’s handling 
of a gas crisis which took place in January where Saakashvili suggested that Russia had intentionally turned 
off the natural gas tap. To this Putin stated:"While workers were trying to fix the gas pipeline in freezing 
temperatures, in response we only saw Georgian authorities spitting at us,"2847  
 
February 8, 2006: Georgia detains three Russian troops for being in the conflict zone without passport or 
Georgian visas2848. Russia condemned the arrest as a “provocation” and stated that the arrest was pushing 
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both sides towards conflict2849. Both Georgia and Russia accuse each other of building up their troop 
presence in the area2850.  
 
February 9, 2006: Georgia’s parliament plans to vote on the presence of Russian peacekeeping troops in 
South Ossetia on February 152851. The US ambassador to the OSCE stated to a decision to dispel the Russian 
troops without a substitute in place would be destabilizing and urged Georgia to exercise caution2852. It is 
expected that the Georgian parliament will issue a statement calling for the prompt and unilateral 
withdrawal of Russian troops from the conflict zone as a destabilizing force2853. To this Russia, however, 
argues that Georgia does not have the legal right to secure a unilateral withdrawal of peacekeepers from 
South Ossetia and that this decision must be made by all members of JCC2854. Georgian Foreign Minister 
Gela Bezhuashvili proposed a joint Georgian-South Ossetian police force for the conflict zone once 
demilitarization is complete and also pressed for fulfillment of earlier agreements on allowing OSCE 
peacekeepers to act and move freely throughout South Ossetia and to establish permanent control over the 
Roki Tunnel that connects North and South Ossetia2855. 
 
February 10, 2006: Following negotiations with Russia, the three Russian men are handed over to the 
OSCE, who handed them over to Russia2856. At a news conference, Georgian Defense Minister Irakli 
Okruashvili stated that the current situation in South Ossetia "is not alarming." And that "[R]ecent 
developments in relations with Russia make us more cautious, more watchful than before[…]We will not 
compromise where observance of the law is concerned, but we will also do our best not to lose control over 
the situation in the region," 2857. 
 
February 15, 2006: The Georgian parliament adopts a resolution which calls for the replacement of 
Russian peacekeepers in the breakaway region of South Ossetia2858. The resolution criticized the Russian 
peacekeepers' performance, stating that they were abetting an attempt by Russia to annex South Ossetia and 
it also called on the Georgian government to work with the international community on an alternative 
peacekeeping plan2859. Russia criticized the move stating that Georgia has no right to amend the Sochi 
agreement unilaterally2860. Georgia however argues that it does in fact have the right to do so2861. Former 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze comments on the time he signed the agreement where he states 
the 1992 war was Georgia’s fault and that a revision of the agreement should be agreed upon with Russia: 
“Frankly speaking, it is our fault. We shouldn't have entered South Ossetia in the first place”2862. Russia 
responded stating that the resolution: “causes concern in Moscow because it is part of the anti-Russian 
campaign being mounted in Georgia in recent weeks and calls for a dismantling of the existing mechanisms 





















tensions in the conflict zone. The decision of the Georgian lawmakers is a clear indication that Georgia may 
embark on a road leading to destabilization of the entire region. It remains to hope that the executive branch 
in Georgia will treat this problem with all responsibility and restraint”2863.  
 
February 21, 2006: Russia, North and South Ossetia criticize that the Mixed Control Commission for the 
settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict cannot be held due to Georgia’s refusal to participate. To this 
Russia stated: “While the South Ossetian side demonstrates a striving to find compromise peaceful ways 
for settling the conflict and has put forward concrete proposals for joint work on a common action program 
to settle the conflict, the Georgian side actually ignores the peace initiatives and is building up arms and 
stepping up bellicose rhetoric. It seems that Tbilisi is making a choice in favor of a force-based scenario. 
No unilateral initiatives can substitute for the proposed joint work.”2864.  
March 9, 2006: Georgia removes visa requirements for EU and US citizens visiting the country2865. Gleb 
Pavlovsky, a Kremlin adviser, implied that the solution to the crisis was to assassinate a leading figure in 
the Georgian government stating: "The cost of a single bullet being lower than the cost of war,"2866.  South 
Ossetian defence minister Anatoly Barankevich stated: "If Russian peacekeepers are withdrawn, we will 
do everything we can to withstand the aggression of the Georgian armed forces.”2867 
 
March 2006: Russia initiates a number of import restrictions of goods from Georgia2868. 
 
June 2, 2006:  Lavrov states in an interview with Russian media that Russia recognizes the territorial 
integrity of Georgia but that the conflicts in Georgia means that Georgia cannot really control its territory: 
“we recognize the territorial integrity of Georgia. But in the conditions when a significant part of the 
territory of Georgia is internationally recognized conflict zones - both South Ossetia and Abkhazia - the 
Georgian authorities and Tbilisi really cannot control these territories. The classical definition of the notion 
Sovereignty is an ability to control a territory. This is international law. In order to solve this problem, it is 
necessary to return to the table of negotiations, which are being stalled in every way, even sabotaged by the 
Georgian side”2869. Regarding whether Russia is spurring separatist movements he states: “We are not 
spurring any tendencies. We state an objective given that the territorial integrity of Georgia cannot be 
ensured in full measure so long as the conflicts remain unsettled. Their settlement is being sabotaged by the 
Georgian side. The examples I have cited to you - the refusal to sign documents on a purely peaceful 
settlement, together with the facts of the purchases by Georgia of attack weapons and ammunition in 
quantities enormous for normal security purposes of that country - cannot but lead us to suspect that, indeed, 
a force-based option of the solution of this problem is being contemplated.”2870 
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July 2006: Georgian parliament demands that the Russian peacekeepers depart from South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia and asks for international troops to replace them2871.  
 
September 3, 2006: South Ossetians claim that they downed a Georgian government helicopter, which was 
violating their airspace2872. Irakly Okruashvili, the Georgian defence minister stated that: "This is yet 
another provocation out of the many already staged by the regime in Tskhinvali [South Ossetia's centre] 
and the military command of Russian peacekeepers deployed in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian 
conflict."2873 
 
September 8, 2006: Georgian police and South Ossetian police clash2874. 
 
September 29, 2006: Georgia arrests four Russian officers for espionage and Georgia later states that 
Russian troops have started to move close to the Georgian border2875. The commander of the Russian 
military forces in Georgia states that the military might reconsider its plans to withdraw its troops from 
Georgia by 2008 because of the arrests of four Russian officers stating: "if our servicemen are arrested and 
put in custody, there will be problems with the withdrawal since there will be no people left to prepare 
weapons for the pullout"2876. Meanwhile, Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defence minister, calls Georgia a 
"bandit" state and states that Georgia's actions were "to push Russian peacekeepers out by any means 
possible[…]and then to submit an application to join Nato[…]It is absolutely clear to us that Georgia has 
chosen the military path, the forceful path, for resolving the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,"2877.  
 
October 27, 2006: Georgia's Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli, calls for the implementation of the OSCE-
approved peace plan and suggests an increase in OSCE monitors: "I wish to reiterate my willingness and 
that of my government, to engage in a direct dialogue with members of the Russian Government as soon as 
possible[...]How do we bring new momentum to our efforts at building peace? I think the answer is staring 
us in the face. It is the very peace plan that this institution universally endorsed almost one year ago in 
Ljubljana. Only now we must implement its provisions and steps[…]Likewise, to reduce tension and 
counter the growing threats, it is high time that we establish a joint Georgian-Russian-OSCE permanent 
monitoring presence at the Roki Tunnel"2878. He also announced on behalf of Georgia's President Mikheil 
Saakashvili Georgia’s readiness to meet directly with the de-facto leader of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity: 
"This step, indeed this new initiative, is intended to create dialogue, build trust, and create a powerful signal 
that there is no alternative to peace"2879. 
 
October 31, 2006: Clashes erupt in the Dzhava District in South Ossetia2880. 
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November 12, 2006: The Tbilisi-backed Union for National Salvation of Ossetians (UNSO) conducts 
another referendum on independence and presidential elections in South Ossetia2881. The South Ossetians 
once again voted in favor of independence2882. Meanwhile the Georgian electorate in South Ossetia 
participated in a parallel ballot in which they elected their own de facto president, Dmitry Sanakoyev2883. 
South Ossetia votes for independence with allegedly 99% of the voters backing independence from 
Georgia2884. US and European countries state that they will not recognize the result2885. A separate 
presidential vote was held which was won by the current leader, Eduard Kokoity, who wants South Ossetia 
to join Russia2886. Kokoity stated afterwards: "It's not a symbolic referendum - it's an answer to those who 
won't recognise the will of the people of South Ossetia,"2887. Georgia accused Russia of encouraging the 
separatist movement2888. 
 
November 13, 2006: The OSCE states that it does not recognize nor acknowledge the outcome of the 
referendum in South Ossetia with the OSCE’s Chairman-in-Office, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De 
Gucht, stating: "The 'referendum on independence' and 'presidential election' in the South Ossetian region 
does not help to bring a peaceful solution of the conflict closer[…]The so-called elections increase tensions 
and divisions at a time when the sides to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict should be devoting all efforts to 
stabilizing the situation and moving forward the negotiating process[…]We have made it clear from the 
outset that we do not recognize such a unilateral referendum, and believe it to be counterproductive."2889 
 
December 8, 2006: The Russian state Duma adopts two non-binding resolutions on on South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia2890. On South Ossetia, the Duma urged the Kremlin to "build a policy" around Tskhinvali's 
"expression of free will" referring to the entities referendum2891. To this Georgia responded: "Through such 
biased approach the Russian State Duma not only puts under serious doubt the role of Russia as an impartial 
mediator and facilitator, but also undermines the moral and legal basis for the presence of Russian 




January 29, 2007: Police and gunmen in South Ossetia exchange gunfire in the border village of Ergneti 
with no injuries reported2893.  
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March 15, 2007: In his annual address to parliament, Saakashvili stated that Europe was Georgia's "chief 
political sector" and that the country was united in its desire to join NATO and the European Union2894. He 
also stated: "Georgia is returning to its historical family[…]We are not simply Europeans, but the most 
ancient Europeans. Europe is coming back to Georgia, and Georgia is returning into Europe's fold."2895. He 
also expressed a wish for a more active engagement of the EU and US in the settling of the conflicts in 
Georgia2896. 
 
March 25, 2007: Sporadic fighting erupts again with two Georgian police officers killed whilst patrolling 
the road between the villages of Nikozi and Avnevi2897.  
March 27, 2007: Georgia constructs a military base 20 km away from Tskhinvali, which South Ossetia 
claims is a sign that Georgia aims to use force in an attempt to reestablish its authority over the area2898. 
Irina Gagloyeva, the head of South Ossetia’s press service states that: "[T]he military buildup continues 
along the borders of Georgia[…][T]hey are preparing to solve our problem exclusively by strong-arm 
methods. Meanwhile, the trite statements on the part of Georgian politicians on a commitment to peace are 
only an ordinary verbal smokescreen." 2899. 
 
March 29, 2007: Georgia seeks international backing for the establishment of a pro-Georgian interim 
administration in South Ossetia which would be led by recently elected Dmitry Sanakoyev2900. Russia states 
to the Sanakoyev issue that it was “watching with concern the momentum-gathering massive propaganda 
campaign in Tbilisi around the so called Dmitry Sanakoyev movement.  Its objective is obvious - to produce 
in the eyes of a not quite experienced internal and external observer a semblance of respectability for this 
agent group, a creation of Georgian special services, that has landed itself in one of the Georgian enclaves 
on the territory of South Ossetia”2901.  
 
April 12, 2007: Saakashvili’s revised peace plan passes a second reading in the parliament2902. The plan 
seeks to create a new Georgian administrative entity inside South Ossetia with Dmitri Sanakoyev tapped as 
head of the entity2903. The entity should serve as a vehicle for the "peaceful resolution of the conflict; 
restoring constitutional order in the area; protecting the rights and interests of people and ethnic groups 
living there; and creating appropriate conditions for democratic elections."2904. Russia has called the 
proposal criminal and accused the Georgian government of attempting to sabotage the peace process2905. 
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The Russian ambassador in Tbilisi, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, also stated concern that the proposal would stir 
an already hostile environment and possibly cause a "new surge in hostilities,"2906.  
 
April 24, 2007: Georgia introduces Dmitiri Sanakoyev to NATO members during a NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly2907. South Ossetia and Abkhazia condemned the promotion of Sanakoyev call and the "puppet 
governments" that Tbilisi supports in both conflict zones2908. The statement also said: "The purpose of such 
moves is no secret to anyone[…]Georgian authorities are trying to create an illusion of settlement, making 
use of the surrogate authorities on the territories it temporarily controls[...]If the Georgian government 
intends to spark further tensions, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali will officially withdraw from [peace] talks."2909. 
They also stated that if Georgia achieved NATO membership then they would equally withdraw from 
talks2910.  
 
May 8, 2007: The Georgian parliament votes to set up a provisional administrative entity in South 
Ossetia2911. The vote is part of a larger chain of steps needed for the establishment of the entity2912. One of 
the controversies attached to the process was the name of the administration2913. Some inside the Georgian 
parliament are oppose to South Ossetia as a name and rather use the name Samachablo or Tskhinvali 
Region2914. South Ossetia stated that it was considering withdrawing from talks with Georgia if Georgia 
continued to undermine the negotiation process by promoting its “puppet government”, with Kokoity 
stating: “Georgia’s actions towards South Ossetia make us believe that [the Georgian side] is not willing to 
deal with the situation in a peaceful manner. Georgia continues to escalate tensions, provoking the Ossetian 
side and ignoring the negotiating process[…]Only civilized dialogue is acceptable for the South Ossetian 
side; otherwise we will have to consider whether to participate or not in negotiations in the future[…]There 
is no one with whom we can hold talks to resolve this issue” 2915 
 
May 9, 2007: A group of men identifying themselves as South Ossetians fired at the Joint Peacekeeping 
Force, which included OSCE observers2916.  
 
May 13, 2007: Violence erupts in South Ossetia at two Georgian villages leading to the injury of a 
policeman and a civilian2917. The violence follows the day after South Ossetia blockaded Georgian villages 
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July 1, 2007: Violence continues with several wounded2919. Georgia states that South Ossetia had fired 
mortars at villages and South Ossetia states that Georgian forces had launched grenade attacks on 
Tskhinvali2920. The day before villagers had poured paint and petrol on Russian vehicles and checkpoints 
in protest over attempts by Russian forces to prevent the building of a new road linking ethnic Georgian 
villages2921. 
 
July 24, 2007: Georgia holds its first state commission which seeks to define the status of South Ossetia2922. 
The meeting included several representatives from the Georgian side, including the provisional 
administration, however it did not include Kokoity from South Ossetia2923. Kokoity stated that Tibilis is 
pursuing a policy of disinformation aimed at destabilizing the situation2924. He pointed to the inclusion of 
Dmitri Sanakoyev, head of the "provisional administration" at meetings held at e.g. the EU and NATO and 
stated: [A]llowing Sanakoyev to speak at an EU meeting [in Brussels] confuses the international community 
about who, in fact, is the legitimate representative of South Ossetia and the person fulfilling the nation's 
will"2925. He also dismissed and invitation to the state commission stating that the status of South Ossetia 
was already decided in November 2006, where it voted for independence2926. As he further stated: "We 
wished dialogue was being conducted between legally elected representatives," said Kokoity. "It's proof 
that [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili is panicky and afraid of dialogue with representatives of the 
South Ossetian nation, according to law." 2927. 
 
July 3, 2007: Residents of Georgian villages in South Ossetia are blockading a road leading to Tskhinvali 
in a demand for the resumption of irrigation water supplies to their villages2928. South Ossetia cut off the 
water supply in early June as a response to Georgia’s move to cut off drinking water supplies to 
Tskhinvali2929. Georgia restored the water supply in June but stated that South Ossetia had failed to do the 
same2930.  
 
August 9, 2007: Georgia states that it has proof that an aircraft which entered Georgian airspace and 
dropped a guided missile near South Ossetia, was a Russian aircraft2931. Georgia asked the UNSC to hold 
an emergency session regarding the incident2932. Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff General 
Yuri Baluyevsky however stated: "I'm convinced that it was a provocation by Georgia[…]a provocation 
against the Russian peacekeepers and Russia as a whole"2933. The reporting of a military aircraft entering 
the airspace at the stated time was also confirmed by international groups2934.  
 
























November 7, 2007: Russia’s foreign ministry states that: “Georgian authorities undertook a hostile new 
attack against Russia. Speaking on national television, Mikhail Saakashvili delivered himself of a whole 
slew of accusations, mentioning both the old tired claims against our peacekeepers and the Russian spy 
scares. Something new also emerged: it turns out, the mass protests in Georgia are likewise the handiwork 
of Moscow. Thus the Georgian leadership continues carefully shaping an enemy image in the person of 
Russia. The reasons why they do so are clear. They must justify the obvious failures of the economic and 
social policy of the present government, the plight of the population, their unwillingness to constructively 
tackle the problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the authoritarianism of the country's leadership and, 
finally, the scorn for democratic freedoms, which found more than vivid expression in the latest events on 
the streets of Tbilisi.”2935 
 
November 8, 2007: Saakashvili declares a 15-day state of emergency following protests demanding his 
resignation2936. Security forces forcibly dispersed crowds in front of the parliament and took an opposition 
TV station off air2937. Saakashvili blamed Russia for the crisis stating that Russian security services had 
been behind the violent clashes, stating: "Georgia is facing a very serious threat of unrest. High-ranking 
officials in Russian special services are behind this[…]We cannot let our country become the stage for dirty 
geo-political escapades by other countries. Our democracy needs the firm hand of the authorities." 2938. As 
a result, Georgia recalled its ambassador to Moscow and expelled three Russian embassy staff members2939. 
Meanwhile the Prime Minister stated: "An attempt to conduct a coup was made, and we had to react to that" 
2940. Russia stated that the claims of its involvement was “hysterical” and an “irresponsible provocation” 
and that the expulsion of diplomats would be met with an adequate response2941. The opposition parties in 
Georgia denied Russia’s involvement stating that it was peaceful demonstrators from Georgia2942. The crisis 
was triggered following allegations by the former defense minister that Saakashvili was involved in 
corruption and had plotted the assassination of a prominent businessman2943. 
 
November 21, 2007: On the withdrawal of Russian bases from Georgia, Russia stated: “Expressing 
grievances of all kinds against Russia has, alas, become an integral part of the policy of the current Georgian 
leadership. With their groundless, but noisy statements they in Tbilisi hope to conceal their own lack of 
constructiveness in relations with our country. How many propaganda lances were broken in recent years 
around the withdrawal of the Russian military bases (RMB) from Georgia, and what sins was Russia not 
being accused of! But now the withdrawal is over. It will be useful to find out who and how treated their 
respective obligations[…]Russian peacekeepers continue to serve in the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-
Ossetian zones of conflict, protecting calm there. It is they who represent the chief obstacle for those who 
under cover of peaceable rhetoric continue preparing military adventures in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.”2944 
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February 18, 2008: Kosovo declares independence from Serbia and countries such as U.S, France and 
Germany recognize the declaration2945. Russia on the other hand demanded and emergency meeting at the 
UNSC and stated that the declaration was “null and void” 2946.  
 
March 5, 2008: Following the Kosovo declaration, South Ossetia and Abkhazia demand international 
recognition for their independence2947. The South Ossetian parliament issued a declaration stating that "the 
Kosovo precedent presents a convincing argument" for recognition of South Ossetia's independence2948. 
Kokoity further stated: "Considering the precedent created by the arguments that served as basis for the 
declaration of Kosovo's independence, which was virtually created by the European Union -- it says that 
Kosovo should be recognized due to the impossibility of coexistence between Kosovo and Serbia within 
the same state[…]so we also want to announce that future coexistence between South Ossetia and Georgia 
within the same state is impossible." 2949. Georgia dismissed South Ossetia’s demand stating that: "the so-
called South Ossetian parliament is not a legitimate body, and its declarations cannot have any 
consequences." 2950. When asked about unification with Russia, Kokoity further stated: "It is necessary first 
to achieve -- in strict accordance to the norms of international law and today's realities -- our independence. 
We will aspire to this, and we will fight for this. Afterward, it will be up to the people of South Ossetia. No 
one should forget that we represent a small group of people, split into two. In order to protect our language 
and culture, we are obliged to consolidate all our forces." 2951. 
 
March 11, 2008: Russia states that Abkhazia and South Ossetia will separate from Georgia if Georgia joins 
NATO: "This is why I think that if Nato accepts that Georgia takes part in the Membership Action Plan 
(Map), that this could provoke the secession of the two territories[…]This would be enough for the 
separatists to go through with secession[…]It is a very dangerous process because it could reheat the 
conflict. All this is of concern to us, because it's happening near our borders[…]Many citizens of the 
northern Caucasus have links with South Ossetia and Abkhazia."2952. Elene Khoshtaria, Georgia's deputy 
minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, stated about Russia’s statement that: "The 
statement[…]is nothing but an attempt to blackmail allied nations and Georgia. Georgia's Nato membership 
bid is not against Russia, it's about our dedication to the common values of democratic nations[…]I am 
confident that Nato member states will make a decision on Georgia's membership independently and that 
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March 18, 2008: Georgia suggests a change in the JCC peace format which it has called "2+2+2."2954. The 
format would pair Georgia and the Provisional Administration of South Ossetia and be counterbalanced by 
Russia and the South Ossetian separatist leadership2955. The third tandem would comprise the OSCE and 
the EU2956. During a parliamentary hearing the Georgia's State Minister for Reintegration Temur 
Iakobashvili stated: "If our proposal is not supported, we will no longer work under the JCC format,"2957. 
Both Russia and South Ossetia have rejected the proposed changes with Russia stating that Georgia cannot 
withdraw from the JCC without renouncing the Sochi agreement2958. 
April 3, 2008: At the summit in Bucharest, NATO welcomed Ukraine's and Georgia's aspirations for 
membership and agreed that they would eventually become members2959. NATO also agreed to engage in 
“intensive engagement” with the countries in order to address the outstanding matters regarding their 
membership action plan2960.  
 
April 11, 2008: Russia’s General Yuri Baluyevsky states that Russia will take military and other steps if 
Ukraine and Georgia join NATO: “Russia will take steps aimed at ensuring its interests along its 
borders[…]These will not only be military steps, but also steps of a different nature,”2961. Maka Gigauri, 
spokeswoman for Georgia’s foreign ministry, stated that Baluyevsky’s comment was: “a demonstration of 
open aggression against Georgia[…]This is why we, Ukraine and Georgia, want to become NATO 
members. Such attempts by Russia to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from becoming NATO members will 
prompt an appropriate reaction from the leaders of NATO member states.”2962. 
 
April 16, 2008: Putin orders the establishment of ties with the separatist administrations in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, which Georgia stated was a violation of international law2963. 
 
April 21, 2008: Georgia accuses Russia of shooting down a drone over Abkhazia2964 and Russia stated that 
Georgia had violated the cease-fire agreement by using drones to track developments in the separatist 
area2965. 
 
April 29, 2008: Russia increases its number of peacekeepers near Abkhazia stating: "Georgia is increasing 
its group of forces in close vicinity to the conflict zones," 2966. There have been "threats to use military force 
and provocations on behalf of Georgian authorities[…]Such developments of the situation prompted the 
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need to increase the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Armed Forces,"2967. It also states: “The 
Georgian side and some of our other partners claim that the Russian Federation President's April 16 
instructions to the Government regarding protection of the rights and interests of the people of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia run counter to the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and 
aim at "annexing" these regions. In this context we consider it necessary to give the following 
commentary[…]The measures announced by Russia for the protection of the interests of the residents of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are due to the special situation in these regions. It is characterized by the fact 
that in view of the unsettledness of the armed conflicts Georgia does not fully exercise its jurisdiction on 
their territories; control is exercised there by the de facto power entities. Furthermore, residents of these 
areas are essentially deprived of the possibility to realize the most elementary human rights at times. This 
situation has now been around for many years. Yet life goes on in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: people are 
born; enter into marriage; study; work; trade and so on. They have basic, fundamental rights without which 
a normal human life is impossible. In fact, the residents of the unrecognized republics have all these years 
been hostages to the inter-nationality conflicts, which – let us not forget it – broke out after the Tbilisi 
authorities abolished the autonomy of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Georgian State Council troops 
marched on Sukhumi.”2968.  
 
May 19, 2008: Russia accuses Georgia of provocation stating: “The Georgian side has undertaken yet 
another provocation against members of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Force (PKF). On May 18, on the 
outskirts of Zugdidi (the southern security zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict), about 20 masked 
Georgian security officers blocked the road and did not let an armed personnel carrier of peacekeepers 
through[…]It is abundantly clear that this was a preplanned hostile action of the Georgian authorities 
against PKF soldiers. Further, the participants of the Georgian "masks-show" behaved like real street 
bandits. Such precisely is the usual style of the provocative sallies regularly being organized by Tbilisi 
against peacekeepers in the conflict zones. Unfortunately, it has not changed throughout recent years[…]In 
a bid to discredit the Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia at all costs, the Georgian 
leadership stops at nothing”.2969 
 
July 4, 2008: Russia accuses Georgia of attacking Tskhinvali with a mortar attack and states: “The fire 
from Georgian positions was being directed at residential quarters of the city; there are civilian 
casualties.”2970. It also states that Georgia violated the conflict zones airspace stating: “The actions of Tbilisi 
show that an open act of aggression was committed against South Ossetia, an internationally recognized 
party in the conflict settlement efforts. It is also indicative that the Georgian side has refused to participate 
in a joint investigation of the incidents.”2971 
 
July 9, 2008: Georgia reports that a Russian military aircraft entered Georgian airspace and Russia 
responded stating that the aircraft was sent to prevent an attempt by Georgian forces from entering South 
Ossetia to free four Georgian servicemen who were arrested by separatist law enforcement agents on July 
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82972. Russia also stated the action was a way: "to cool off hot heads in Tbilisi and to prevent the situation 
from developing into a force scenario, the likelihood of which was more than realistic." 2973. 
 
July 11, 2008: Georgia recalls its ambassador to Russia for consultations after Russia announced that 
Russian military aircraft had flown over South Ossetia2974. Russia stated that it had received a warning from 
Russian peacekeeping forces that Georgia was considering sending in forces to rescue four of its servicemen 
held by separatists and stated that the flights were made to observe the situation and to send a message that 
“dampened the zeal of hotheads in Tbilisi.”2975 
 
July 26, 2008: An explosion occurs close to Tskhinvali with South Ossetia blaming it on a car bomb planted 
by Georgia, which Georgia denies2976.  
 
August 1, 2008: Georgian troops and South Ossetian forces clash leading to six deaths2977. 
 
August 2, 2008: South Ossetia accuses Georgia of opening fire on Tskhinvali with heavy weaponry killing 
three civilians2978. Kokoity stated to the alleged attack: "our response to Tbilisi's aggressive actions will be 
very tough and hard-hitting[…]We reserve the right to strike Georgian cities. We have something that can 
reach them."2979. Shota Utiashvili, the Georgian interior ministry spokesman, denied the accusation that 
Georgia had fired first, stating: "The Ossetians opened fire, including with grenade launchers, and the 
Georgian side only returned fire."2980. He also stated that it was Georgian police and not military forces 
which had been involved in the clashes and denied that there were any snipers present in South Ossetia2981.  
 
August 5, 2008: Special ambassador Yuri Popov states that Russia will intervene if conflict breaks out in 
South Ossetia in order to protect its citizens living there, as stated: "If events develop according to the 
worst-case violence scenario, Russia will not allow itself to remain indifferent, considering that Russian 
citizens live in South Ossetia, particularly in the conflict zone[…]I don't want to make any grim predictions, 
but if such events are repeated, the situation may spiral out of control and lead to sad consequences"2982. 
“South Ossetia's separatist government accused Georgia on Friday of killing six people and injuring seven 
in an attack on the outlying village of Satikari”2983. South Ossetian and Georgian Officials are expected to 
meet in the next days2984. 
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August 6, 2008: Georgia and Russia announce that the first bilateral talks will be held in South Ossetia, 
however South Ossetia rejects meeting with Georgia2985. Both sides accuse each other of opening fire in 
villages with South Ossetia stating that four Ossetian villages came under heavy fire throughout the day. 
Georgia stated that it had only returned fire after South Ossetia began shelling Georgian villages2986. Shota 
Utiashvili, a Georgian interior ministry spokesman stated: "The South Ossetian side is trying to create an 
illusion of serious escalation, an illusion of war, while in fact the situation is quite calm in the conflict 
zone,"2987. Meanwhile hundreds of women and children were evacuated from South Ossetia which South 
Ossetia states is a sign of preparation for a conflict2988. Georgia states that the children were being sent to 
summer camps2989.  
 
August 7, 2008: Georgia launches a military offensive against South Ossetia2990 Reports state that 
volunteers from North Ossetia and Abkhazia are on their way to South Ossetia to assist the Ossetians2991.   
 
August 8, 2008: Russian tanks enter South Ossetia, rolling towards the capital of South Ossetia and Russian 
fighters bomb Georgian air bases2992. A representative of the Russian force stated: "Now our peacekeepers 
are waging a fierce battle with regular forces from the Georgian army in the southern region of 
Tskhinvali,"2993. Putin declared: "War has started." And Georgia's ambassador to the OSCE stated: "If this 
is not war, then I wonder what it is." 2994. Russia and Georgia disagree on who started the conflict and 
Lavrov stated: “We are receiving reports that a policy of ethnic cleansing was being conducted in villages 
in South Ossetia, the number of refugees is climbing, the panic is growing, people are trying to save their 
lives,"2995. Georgia states that it will withdraw 1,000 soldiers from its military contingent of around 2,000 
troops in Iraq to help in the fighting against South Ossetian separatist rebels and Georgia has asked the US 
to provide military aircraft to transport its troops2996. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated: "The 
United States calls for an immediate ceasefire to the armed conflict in Georgia's region of South 
Ossetia[…]We call on Russia to cease attacks on Georgia by aircraft and missiles, respect Georgia's 
territorial integrity, and withdraw its ground combat forces from Georgian soil," 2997. 
 
August 9, 2008: A delegation of US, NATO and EU officials travel to Georgia in an effort to negotiate a 
ceasefire2998. Georgian states that it has fought off attacks by Abkhazian separatists, backed by Russian air 
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raids, and that Russian forces invaded the Georgian province of Abkhazia hours after taking control of most 
of South Ossetia2999. The Georgian parliament formalized the move to war footing and Saaskashvili stated 
that Russia had been planning the assault for months and compared the Russian act with Stalin's invasion 
of Finland in 1939 and said "the entire post-Cold War order of Europe and the world is at stake"3000. 
Saaskashvili also stated that Russia was conducting ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Ossetia and Abkhazia's 
Kodoro Gorge region3001. During the last two days the UNSC has failed in convening an emergency 
meeting3002. There are reports of high numbers of casualties on all sides with Sssetian separatists stating 
that Georgian shelling had killed more than 1,600 people and Georgia stating that Russian air raids had 
killed many civilians3003. As stated by Saakashvili: "Hours ago Russia's Black Sea fleet started to move to 
Gerogia's territory in Abkhazia[…]Russian troops and heavy equipment are in upper Abkhazia." 3004. 
Georgia also stated that it would offer an “immediate ceasefire and called for the disengagement of all 
forces and the demilitarisation of every area where there is friction”3005. Moscow announced that “it would 
send reinforcements into South Ossetia and President Dmitry Medvedev has pledged to "force the Georgian 
side to peace[…]Our peacekeepeers and reinforcement units are currently running an operation[…]They 
are also responsible for protecting the population. That's what we are doing now" 3006. A Russian infantry 
officer also said that “units of the 58th army had arrived in Tskhinvali overnight and would seek to 
"establish peace"” and that “"special units" would arrive "in the next few hours"”. 3007. 
 
Russia carries out bombing raids across Georgia with Putin stating: "The actions of the Georgian authorities 
in South Ossetia are of course a crime, and above all it's a crime against their own people[…]That's because 
a mortal blow has been dealt to the territorial integrity of Georgia itself. "Therefore huge damage has been 
inflicted on its statehood. It's hard to imagine how South Ossetia can be convinced to be a part of the 
Georgian state. "From a legal point of view our actions are absolutely justified and legitimate, moreover 
they are necessary in line with existing international agreements[…]Russia is not only carrying out 
peacekeeping tasks but is also obliged if one of the sides violates a cease-fire agreement, to protect the other 
side."3008. Russia also states that it wants Georgia to withdraw its forces to the position they had prior to the 
conflict3009.  Georgia declares the country to be in a state of war and approved martial law with Saakashvili 
stating: "We appeal to our friends and allies to call on Russia to cease hostilities immediately. Georgia is a 
peace-loving nation, but today we are being attacked north to south, east to west[…]Russian troops, Russian 
tanks that moved into South Ossetia, on their way expelled the whole ethnically Georgian population of 
South Ossetia[…]They've committed, as of this morning, ethnic cleansing in all areas they control in South 
Ossetia[…]Russian forces have been specifically targeting civilian quarters. They specifically attacked and 
blew up the whole civilian quarter in the town of Gori, far away from the place where the conflict area is 
and where direct friction between forces is[…]They attacked civilian installations in the western part of 
Georgia. They've attacked residential quarters all around the country. They've attacked civilian hospitals. 
And most of the casualties are among civilians."3010. At the UN the UNSC failed to issue a statement calling 
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targeting Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia and that Georgia was entirely to blame for the escalation 
and was continuing "its treacherous attacks" on South Ossetia "with the connivance of a number of Security 
Council members."3011. He also stated: "Russia will not pull out[…]In order for us to withdraw we have to 
make sure there won't be genocide there. This is a grave matter."3012 
 
August 10, 2008: Georgia states that it has ordered a ceasefire and offered peace talks with Russia but 
Russia states that the exchange of fire has yet to stop and Russia also continued to bomb targets near 
Tbilisi3013. Meanwhile in Abkhazia the separatist government announced that it had ordered a military 
operation to clear Georgian forces out of Abkhazia's Kodori Gorge3014.  
 
August 11, 2008: Abkhazian separatists and Russian air-force launch an attack against Georgian forces in 
Abkhazia and Russia allegedly lands 4000 troops in the area3015. Georgia stated that the operation was 
orchestrated by Russia with Georgia's parliamentary speaker, David Bakradze, stating that he has 
"irrefutable proof" that the Russian military was masterminding the "plan" and that "The enemy will be 
offered all resistance."3016. Russia stated that it did not wish to escalate the conflict and that: "We do not 
intend to take the initiative in escalating the conflict in this region. We are primarily interested in 
stabilisation there"3017. 
 
August 12, 2008: Georgia and Russia agree to a ceasefire agreement which requires the immediate 
withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgian territory3018. Meanwhile Russia calls on Georgia to agrees to 
“abjure all use of force in his country in any attempt to resolve the territorial disputes with the two 
breakaway pro-Russian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia; and that Georgian forces withdraw 
entirely from South Ossetia and are no longer part of the joint "peacekeeping" contingent there with Russian 
and local Ossetian forces”3019. Russia also “insisted that the populations of the two breakaway regions had 
to be allowed to vote on whether they wanted to join Russia” 3020. Russia also declared that Georgians would 
not return to South Ossetia as peacekeepers (which they have jointly been together with Russia for 15 years) 
with Dmitri Rogozin, Russia's ambassador to NATO in Brussels stating: "They shot their brother Russian 
peacekeepers, then they finished them off with bayonets, so we are not going to see them there any more," 
3021 . In a speech alongside the French President, Medvedev stated that Georgia had killed civilians and lied, 
stating: “You know, lunatics’ difference from other people is that when they smell blood it is very difficult 
to stop them[…]As for claims by the Georgian president that the ceasefire has been observed for two days, 
that’s a lie. Georgian forces continued to fire at peacekeeper[…]It’s strange when someone who’s killed 
thousands of people is characterised as a terrorist and bastard, while another is presented as legally elected 
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president of a sovereign state,”3022. Medvedev also stated at a meeting with defense officials: "I have taken 
the decision to end the operation to force Georgian authorities into peace[…]The purpose of the operation 
has been achieved[…]The security of our peacekeeping forces and the civilian population has been 
restored[…]The aggressor has been punished and suffered significant losses."3023. Temur Yakobashvili, 
Georgia's reintegration minister, stated: "The Russians have halted their advance. There is no movement of 
Russian forces, but they are staying at their occupied positions,"3024 
August 13, 2008: The EU announces a plan to send EU peacekeepers to South Ossetia in order to help 
enforce the ceasefire3025. The OSCE also announced that it would increase its numbers of monitors from 
200 to 300 to help with the monitoring of the ceasefire3026. Georgia reports continued Russian bombing and 
Medvedev described Saakashvili as a "lunatic": "You know, lunatics' difference from other people is that 
when they smell blood it is very difficult to stop them. So you have to use surgery"3027. A rally in Georgia 
in support of the war denounced Russia’s aggression and referred to Putin as a terrorist with Saakashvili 
stating to the crowd: "I promise you today, that I'll remind them of everything they have done and one day 
we will win"3028. Meanwhile, Kakha Lomaia, the secretary of Georgia's Security Council, states that: 
"Today, Georgian ambassador to the Netherlands filed a law suit to the International Court of 
Justice[…]because of ethnic cleansing conducted in Georgia by Russia in 1993 to 2008,"3029. Meanwhile, 
Human Rights Watch states that Russia is exaggerating the number of people killed in the conflict stating: 
"The figure of 2,000 people killed is very doubtful[…]Our findings so far do not in any way confirm the 
Russian statistics. On the contrary, they suggest the numbers are exaggerated."3030. HRW also stated that 
the burning and looting of Georgian villages was reported stating: "The torching of houses in these villages 
is in some ways a result of the massive Russia propaganda machine which constantly repeats claims of 
genocide and exaggerates the scale of casualties[…]That is then used to justify retribution." 3031 
 
August 14, 2008: The US and the EU demand that any settlement of the conflict to be based on the territorial 
integrity of Georgia3032. Russia however rejected those terms stating: "We recognise the sovereignty of 
Georgia[…]but territorial integrity, it's another matter[…]South Ossetia and Abkhazia never were part of 
Georgia as an independent country."3033. Meanwhile aid from the US arrived in Georgia and the EU foreign 
ministers held an emergency session on the crisis where France's foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, stated 
that the deal he and President Nicolas Sarkozy had mediated was "partially unsatisfactory"3034. 
 
August 15, 2008: Russia states in response to criticism against its actions: 'If someone continues to attack 
our citizens, our peacekeepers, then of course we will answer just as we did[…]Russia, as guarantor of 
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security in the Caucasus and the region, will make the decision which unambiguously supports the will of 
these two Caucasus peoples[…]Unfortunately after what has happened it is unlikely Ossetians and Abkhaz 
can live in one state with Georgians,'3035. Saakashvili however stated that NATO’s decision to admit 
Georgia as a member encouraged Russia to build up forces and attack Georgia, as he further stated: "Who 
invited the trouble here?" he asked. "Who invited this arrogance here? Who invited the innocent deaths 
here? Not only those people who perpetrated this are responsible, but also those people who failed to stop 
it."3036. The US announced that it and its allies were considering kicking Russia out from the Group of 8 
due to its actions in Georgia3037. 
 
August 16, 2008: Angela Merkel meets with President Medvedev close to Georgian borders where she 
stated that: "Some of Russia's actions were not proportionate," and that "It is rare that all the blame is on 
one side. In fact, both sides are probably to blame. That is very important to understand"3038. The 
Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state went to Georgia where she denounced Russian "bullying and 
intimidation" as "unacceptable" and further stated that the events would have: "profound implications for 
Russia[…]This calls into question what role Russia really plans to play in international politics[…]You 
can't be a responsible member of institutions which are democratic and underscore democratic values and 
on the other hand act in this way against one of your neighbours."3039. Meanwhile Russia announces that it 
is skeptical of an international peacekeeping mission with Medvedev stating: "We are not against 
international peacekeepers[…]But the problem is that the Abkhazians and the Ossetians do not trust anyone 
except Russian peacekeepers." 3040. 
 
August 18, 2008: More than 130 civilian Georgians are held captive in South Ossetia’s capital in the interior 
ministry’s headquarters3041. The civilians were taken from the streets in accordance to their nationality 
during the war3042. An Ossetian interior minister stated that the hope was to use the civilians as exchange 
for Ossetian civilians allegedly abducted by Georgia3043. Georgia stated about the situation and the hostages 
held in South Ossetia: "We know about them[…]They want to exchange them for our hostages. The 
problem is we don't have any hostages so we can't do any exchange." 3044. Ossetia responded: "We estimate 
500 Ossetian civilians were kidnapped and taken away by Georgian forces from the south of Tskhinvali," 
3045.  
 
August 19, 2008: The OSCE increases its number of Monitors in to 100 with an extra 20 unarmed military 
monitoring officers deployed to South Ossetia3046.  
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August 23, 2008: Russia states that it has withdrawn its troops from Georgia, which is denied by the 
Pentagon which states that Russian soldiers are digging trenches near Georgia's main Black Sea port of 
Poti3047. Russia states it has set up checkpoints in a "security zone"3048. Georgia accused Russia of lying 
with Shota Utiashvili, Georgia's interior ministry spokesman stating: "It is not true that the withdrawal is 
complete[…]They cannot stay in Senaki and Poti. Their presence there is illegal," 3049. Russia also 
announced that 500 peacekeepers would remain in a buffer zone around South Ossetia3050.  
 
August 25, 2008: Medvedev and Putin state that they see no problem in being locked out from NATO and 
the WTO with Putin stating: “We don't feel or see any advantages from membership, if they exist at all" 
3051. Meanwhile Georgia is urging the EU to commit to “fully fledged peace-keeping operations” with 
Salome Samadashvili, Georgia's Ambassador to the EU, stating: "So far the EU has been very fearful. We 
hope the meeting [on Monday][…]will end with real proposals for the EU to take a leading role in the peace 
process...The first thing is to get Russian troops off our soil. The second is a peace process lead by the 
EU."3052. Medvedev also issued a warning to the president of Moldova stating: "After the Georgian 
leadership lost their marbles, as they say, all the problems got worse and a military conflict erupted[…]This 
is a serious warning, a warning to all - and I believe we should handle other existing conflicts within this 
context." 3053. 
 
August 26, 2008: Russia announces that it recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states3054. 
Medvedev called on other countries to do the same and stated that it "was not an easy choice, but it is the 
only possibility to save the lives of the people." 3055. Medvedev also stated that Russia had been obliged to 
act because of Georgia's "genocide" of separatists and that Russia felt obliged to recognise South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia as other countries had done with Kosovo earlier this year3056. He also stated: "The most 
important thing was to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe to save the lives of people for whom we are 
responsible, because most of them they are Russian citizens," he said. "So we had to take a decision 
recognising the two states as independent."3057. Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili accused Russia of 
trying to: "break the Georgian state, undermine the fundamental values of Georgia, and to wipe Georgia 
from the map[…]Today's step by Russia is completely illegal and will have no legal basis, neither for 
Georgia nor for the rest of the world,"3058. Saakashvili also stated that the announcement was: "the first 
attempt in Europe after Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union to[…]change the borders of Europe 
by force" and "a blatant attempt to legalise the results of ethnic cleansing [which] Russian troops are 
continuing to commit, right now as we speak, and that have been committed during the last several years” 
3059. He also stated that Russia troops were "throwing out the remaining population, destroying the villages, 
killing and raping and looting people" in the areas and that: "This is 21st century brutal invasion, and 21st 
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century large-scale ethnic cleansing," he said. "How can the world allow them to get away with this? 3060. 
Meanwhile there were scenes of jubilation in South Ossetia where the announcement was welcomed and 
the South Ossetia leader stated that he would ask Russia to set up a military base in South Ossetia3061. The 
US condemned the act and stated: "We expect Russia to live up to its international commitments, reconsider 
this irresponsible decision, and follow the approach set out in the six-point [cease-fire] 
agreement[…]Russia's action only exacerbates tensions and complicates diplomatic negotiations. In 
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions that remain in force, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia are within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia, and they must remain so."3062. UK 
stated that Russia recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is “unjustifiable and unacceptable” and urges 
Russia to "abide by international law as the basis for resolving this crisis"3063. Meanwhile Georgia accuses 
Russia of moving its artillery closer to Tbilisi with Saakashvili stating: "They are trying to take the heights 
of Akhalgori[…]This is the most worrying thing at the moment. They would be within 20km of Tbilisi. 
"We are in a very precarious situation[…]Some people in the West have been in denial for a long 
time[…]Now there can be no more denial. "The West has to show that this will cost them - really cost them. 
You are dealing with bullies here and bullies do not understand the tender message."3064,3065.  
 
August 28, 2008: According to the HRW, recent satellite images confirm the widespread burning of 
Georgian villages inside South Ossetia3066. As stated by HRW: "Human Rights Watch researchers 
personally witnessed Ossetian militias looting and burning down ethnic Georgian villages during their 
research in the area[…]These satellite images indicate just how widespread the torching of these villages 
has been in the last two weeks." 3067. Meanwhile the EU meet at an emergency meeting where they amongst 
other discuss the possibility of economic sanctions against Russia3068.  
 
August 29, 2008: Georgia announces that it will break diplomatic ties with Russia3069. Russia responded 
saying: "The possible end of diplomatic relations with Georgia is not the choice of Moscow, and Tbilisi 
will have to bear the entire responsibility,"3070 
 
August 30, 2008: Georgia states that it will tighten visa requirements for Russian citizens, stating that they 
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September 1, 2008: Medvedev announces that Russia will send military aid to South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
and Georgia asked the EU to impose sanctions on those doing business with the breakaway regions and to 
send a civilian mission to monitor the buffer zone3072.  
 
September 4, 2008: Nicaragua recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, criticizing 
Georgia for attempting to regain control of the areas3073. 
 
September 8, 2008: France’s president negotiates another deal which envisions the deployment of EU 
observers to Georgia by October and the withdrawal of Russian troops inside Georgia3074. Medvedev state 
that Russia's “withdrawal of forces depended on Georgia's signing a "non-aggression pact" with South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Medvedev said Russia would continue to provide "military assistance" to the 
breakaway provinces”3075. The deal also states the need for international discussions3076. Medvedev stated 
that the international discussion would focus on:  • Stability and security in the region; • Return of refugees 
based on the internationally recognized principles and practice of post-conflict settlement; • Other issues 
for discussion should be mutually agreed between the sides3077 
 
September 9, 2008: Russia announces that its troops will stay in South Ossetia and Abkhazia for a long 
time to come as a necessity to avert Georgian attempts to regain control of the areas3078. Russia will sign 
formal agreement with the two areas3079. Yesterday Mikhail Saakashvili, reiterated Georgia claim to the 
areas stating that the Russians: "should get the hell out of the territories they control".3080 According to 
Russia media, Russia plans to establish diplomatic relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia3081.  
 
September 10, 2008: Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov accuses the US of encouraging Georgia to start 
a war in the South Caucasus in order to test Russian resolve3082. 
 
September 15, 2008: The EU establishes the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM-
Georgia) with the purpose of to ensuring that there is no return to hostilities; facilitating the resumption of 
a safe and normal life for the local communities living on both sides of the Administrative Boundary Lines 
(ABL) with; 
to build confidence among the conflict parties; to inform EU policy in Georgia and the wider region 3083.  
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September 23, 2008: Georgia shoots down a Russian drone in an area near South Ossetia, which is due to 
be patrolled by EU observers3084. Georgia states that the drone was spying on Georgian troops and the 
country’s oil pipeline3085. Russia dismissed the claim as a “provocation” 3086. 200 EU observers are to be 
deployed in the next week as part of the ceasefire agreement however Russia is refusing to allow the 
deployment of observers inside South Ossetia and Abkhazia and states that it intends to station 8000 troops 
in the two separatist areas3087. The EU states that Russia’s intention to station troops in the areas is a breach 
of the ceasefire agreement3088. The EU also stated: "Russia has to understand that its near-abroad policy is 
no longer in place. At the same time, we are saying to the Georgians that they have to be respectful to their 
neighbours." 3089. 
 
September 30, 2008: Human Rights Watch accuses South Ossetian troops of systematically destroying 
and burning down Georgian villages in South Ossetia3090. The secretary of Georgia's National Security 
Council states that South Ossetian separatists are trying to change the ethnic makeup of the area and stated: 
"We are dealing with classic case of ethnic cleansing. Not only is a specific ethnic group, in this case 
Georgians, being driven out from a specific territory, but their homes are being destroyed afterward in order 
to make it difficult, or even impossible, for them to return," 3091. According to refworld, South Ossetian 
leadership do not denying the occurrence of this but rather South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity has 
stated that Georgians will not be able to return to the area because their homes have been burnt down3092. 
He allegedly also stated that Ossetians were not allowed to return to Georgia in the beginning of 19903093. 
Human Rights Watch also accused South Ossetia of amongst other forced labor and torture stating: "We 
have learned that hundreds of civilians from Georgia were detained in holding cells in South Ossetia. These 
included women and the elderly[…]We know that these people were held in inhuman conditions, crammed 
together in one space. They were practically not fed. They were forced to work. They cleaned streets. The 
men were forced to bury the corpses of Georgian soldiers." 3094. Meanwhile, the EU prepares the deployment 
of 200 civilian monitors throughout Georgia3095. Russia stated that it would not allow the mission to work 
in the buffer zone. This was criticized by Georgia who stated: “We feel sad that we have a neighbor which 
doesn’t respect international law, doesn’t respect its neighbors’ sovereignty and doesn’t respect its own 
commitments,”3096. The OSCE earlier walked out on talks with Russia on the matter of access to the 
mission3097. Then Lavrov stated that the European negotiators had made an “absolutely unscrupulous 
attempt” to appease Georgia by suggesting that they would be able to patrol South Ossetia itself3098.  
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October 1, 2008: The EU mission begins with the spokesperson of the mission stating: "The teams are now 
patrolling the areas and making their first contacts. They will report back to headquarters throughout the 
day."3099. Javier Solana, the EU's head of foreign policy, stated that Russia was expected to adhere to the 
EU peace plan and evacuate its forces from Georgia by the October 10 deadline: "I am optimistic that all 
the parties will comply, as we have done, to the terms of the agreement[…]The objective of this mission is 
to allow Russian forces to withdraw."3100 
 
October 2, 2008: Merkel visits Russia in an attempt to ease tensions between Russia and the west following 
the war in Georgia3101. Meanwhile EU observes start patrolling in Georgia and inside the buffer-zone next 
to South Ossetia3102. The UNHCR states that the refugee situation would be resolved if Russian troops leave 
stating: "Ninety per cent are from the buffer zone. As soon as the Russians withdraw we expect the vast 
majority to go back[…]The mere presence of EU monitors helps. It gives the impression that the 
international community is here."3103. 
 
October 4, 2008: A car bomb kills seven Russian troops in South Ossetia3104. Russia states that Georgia 
"deliberately planned terrorist attack" that the incident was meant to derail the EU-brokered ceasefire 
deal3105. Georgia responded saying that “Russian intelligence agencies had plotted the attack outside the 
headquarters of Russian peacekeeping forces inside the breakaway republic as a pretext for Moscow to keep 
its troops inside the country” 3106. As Georgia stated: "If provocations and tensions are in the interest of 
anyone, it's the Russians[…]They are doing everything not to pull out troops within the set term." 3107. 
According to Russia, Russian troops detained two cars in the ethnic Georgian village of Ditsa and stated: 
"The cars and the detained people were escorted to Tskhinvali. During the search of one of the cars, an 
explosive device equivalent to some 20kg of TNT went off,"3108. Russia checks all vehicles entering the 
separatist area at a series of checkpoints3109. South Ossetia’s president stated: "The latest terrorist acts in 
South Ossetia prove that Georgia has not abandoned its policy of state terrorism[…]These actions 
undermine the efforts of the international community to stabilise the situation in the region and torpedo the 
Medvedev-Sarkozy peace plan." 3110. 
October 5, 2008: Shota Utiashvili, the spokesman for the Georgian interior ministry, confirmed the 
removal of the checkpoint, where 20 to 30 Russian soldiers had been deployed stating: "It looks like the 
start of the withdrawal[…]Georgian police are moving into the area immediately."3111.  
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October 6, 2008: The European Court of Human Rights has received nearly 2,000 applications from South 
Ossetians complaining of illegal treatment at the hands of Georgia3112. Russia has also filed complaints 
against Georgia and stated that it would assist any citizens of South Ossetia wanting to do the same3113. 
October 8, 2008: Russia begins the pull-out of its troops from Georgian buffer-zone with the EU observers 
due to take over security in the area3114. Russia is however refusing to leave territory seized during the 
conflict with Russian and South Ossetian forces staying in the strategic town of Akhalgori - which was 
under Georgian administration and which lies inside the old Soviet borders of South Ossetia3115. Inside 
Georgia, opposition members are calling for an enquiry into the war stating that Russia provoked the 
situation but that Saakashvili launched the attack, causing Russia to respond3116.  
October 15, 2008: The first Geneva talks are held in Geneva3117. The talks are a result of the six-point 
peace plan and the follow-up document created on September 83118, which amongst other asked for 
international discussions3119. The talks officially have representatives from the EU, the OSCE, the UN and 
the US, Georgia, and Russia and on Russian request, representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia3120. 
On the day, the conflict parties did however not meet, and the talks were suspended to November 18 due 
to procedural difficulties3121. Meanwhile, Saakashvili accused Russia of "walking out" of the talks stating: 
“[This] basically means that Russia has no interest whatsoever at this stage in any diplomatic process," 3122. 
Russia however stated that Saakashvili’s description of the event was "just a lie" and that: "The Georgian 
version just doesn't hold water[…]We deplore the absence of the Georgian delegation but we did not see it 
as tragic." 3123. OSCE mediator Heikki Talvitie stated: "Let's put it in a way that we have two 
meetings[…]One formal, one informal, and all participants were in one or the other meeting. We are not 
negotiating face to face we are discussing. We are not going to make decisions." 3124. 
October 17, 2008: The UNHCR reports that about 20,000 Georgians have returned home since Russian 
troops pulled out of the buffer zone around South Ossetia3125. The agency warned those who returned of 
watching out for mines and other unexploded weapons3126. 
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October 21, 2008: Russia announces that it will build permanent military bases in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia which are "aimed above all at defending our interests and those of these republics,"3127. The 
announcement follows the signing of an agreement with the breakaway regions3128.  
November 7, 2008: Thousands of anti-government protestors held a demonstration condemning 
Saakashvili’s handling of the conflict and blamed him for losing South Ossetia and Abkhazia3129. The 
protests also included accusations of electoral fraud and called for early elections3130. 
November 9, 2008: Georgia accuses South Ossetian security forces of occupying a Georgian village 
outside South Ossetia borders3131. South Ossetia stated that it had only entered part of the village, which 
was located in South Ossetia with Kokoity stating: "Unfortunately it seems the Georgian leadership is bad 
at geography and doesn't even know the borders of its own state,"3132.  
November 12, 2008: Russia asks the OSCE for an inquiry into the accounts that Georgia had attacked 
Tskhinvali on August 7 with indiscriminate artillery and rocket fire3133. Georgia contested the claim and 
Russia embraced it stating that Russia was “very much interested in finding the truth about what the 
O.S.C.E. observers say, what they reported and to whom those reports were presented[…]We are not trying 
to accuse anyone of anything. We are very far from this thought. However, taking into account continuous 
‘leaks’ to the media on this subject, we have raised a question in the permanent O.S.C.E. council in Vienna 
asking to clarify it”3134. Georgia meanwhile stated that Russia was sending out information out aimed at 
undermining the Georgian government with Temuri Yakobashvili, Georgia’s minister for reintegration, 
stating that Russia “has made large money available to launch information warfare against Georgia, using 
the K.G.B. arsenal of blackmail, bribes, recruitment and manipulation of information,” ... “The results of 
these activities get into the press.”3135 
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November 15, 2008: Ossetian militia fighters withdraw from Perevi, an ethnic Georgian village near the 
boundary with South Ossetia3136. The village, which the EU states is clearly outside South Ossetia was 
occupied by Russia in August3137. The Russian troops left the week before the Ossetians3138.  
November 17, 2008: Russia and Georgia clash in a row over a drone which allegedly crashed in Georgia, 
killing two policemen and wounding eight others3139. To the incident Georgia stated: "Georgia's sovereign 
airspace was violated by a Russian unpiloted reconnaissance drone," whilst Russia stated that: "These 
claims have nothing to do with the reality"3140.  
 
November 19, 2008: The negotiators for the conflict sides meet “informally” for the second round of talks 
in Geneva3141. They are meeting each other in an individual capacity, without identifying who they are 
representing3142.  Maxim Gvinjia, the deputy foreign minister of breakaway Abkhazia, stated that these were 
not talks, but “discussions”3143.  
 
November 23, 2008: Saakashvili and Poland’s president Lech Kaczynski of Poland stated that they were 
met with machine-gun fire when they visited a Russian checkpoint near the South Ossetian3144. South 
Ossetia and Russia denied any shooting had taken place and stated the two presidents intentionally provoked 
their forces and stated that the account of the shooting was “one more instance of wishful thinking on the 
part of Georgia.”3145. Saakashvili stated: “Frankly, I didn’t expect the Russians to open fire[…]The reality 
is you are dealing with unpredictable people. It seems they weren’t happy to see our guest and they weren’t 
happy to see me either.”3146 
 
November 26, 2008: Erosi Kitsmarishvili, a former Georgian envoy to Russia, stirs controversy by saying 
that the war was started by Georgia and not Russia3147. He also stated that Saakashvili had told him in March 
about plans to use force to retake Abkhazia3148. Georgia continues to maintain that its assault was the result 
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November 28, 2008: Opposition to Saakashvili accuses him of walking into a conflict he could not win to 
which he stated: "It was a difficult decision, but it was an inevitable one. Any democratic government would 
take the same decision, to protect its citizens[…]When we asked the Russians through the Americans what 
was the goal of their intervention, their answer was 'the complete destruction of Georgia'."3150 
 
December 2, 2008: The EU establishes a fact-finding mission to investigate the cause of the conflict3151. 
 
December 3, 2008: NATO agrees to a “conditional and graduated re-engagement” with Russia which does 
not imply a resuming of the NATO-Russia council but “lower level talks” would be held3152. During a 
meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels a reiteration was also made for the support of Georgian and 
Ukraine NATO membership, with minister encouraging Georgia and Ukraine to pursue reforms despite the 
lack of a timetable for membership3153. “Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili warned the "grave risks 
of returning to business as usual" with Russia without holding it to account for its actions in Georgia”  and 
further stated "If the international response is not firm, Moscow will make other moves to redraw the 
region's map by intimidation or force"3154. A South Ossetian separatist stated in response: "It is the 
opposite[…]There was a large Russian military presence here before but now there are just Russian 
peacekeepers." 3155. 
 
December 4, 2008: The annual Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ministerial 
meeting is held in Helsinki with Georgia’s Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili stating that talks to bring 
peace to Georgia could stall if Russia insisted on keeping the troops on what Tbilisi considers to be its 
territory: "There can be no confidence in the Geneva negotiations if there is no confidence in the compliance 
of the ceasefire[…]monitors have no access to the occupied areas of my country."3156.  
 
December 18, 2008: The conflict sides and mediators meet for a third round of Geneva talks where progress 
was made in terms of agreeing on mechanisms to tackle security-related incidents3157. Like the former talks, 
this talk also occurred in two informal working groups without any official plenary session3158. The two 
working groups focus on security issues and IDP’s and refugees and this working group format allows 
negotiators to meet without identifying who they are representing, which avoids differences on the status 
of negotiators mainly related with representatives of breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia3159. 
 
December 23, 2008: Russia once again accuses Georgia of genocide with the head of a Russian prosecutors' 
investigative committee stating that it had found evidence of this3160. The head of the Russian prosecutors' 
investigative committee Alexander Bastrykin stated that: "We can say that we have witnessed the genocide 
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of the Ossetian people,"… "What is important is that we have established that there was a conscious and 
planned action to destroy the Ossetians as an ethnic group,"3161. Alexander Lomaia, the former secretary of 
Georgia's National Security Council responded that this was a cynical lie, stating: "Russia was telling lies 
to the whole world that there were thousands of civilians killed by the Georgian army in South 
Ossetia[…]The Russian prosecutor's statements are yet another cynical lie. This is nothing but a Kremlin 
propaganda campaign," 3162. Despite verbal aggression between the two countries, there are reports that 
Russia and Georgia have had talks together regarding the restoring of flights between the two countries and 
the restoring of diplomatic ties3163. Meanwhile, Russia has stalled the renewal of the mandate of OSCE 
monitors3164.  
 
December 25, 2008: Medvedev states that Russia knew that Georgia was preparing for the conflict and 
hence Russia also prepared for the conflict in advance3165. As he stated: “We of course were assuming that 
not everything was OK with our neighbor’s [referring to Georgia] brains – though we did not expect it was 
to such degree[…]Taking into consideration that they [Georgians] were preparing for that [military actions] 
– I has once spoken about it – at some point I felt, that our Georgian counterpart [referring to President 
Saakashvili] simply stopped communicating with the Russian Federation. Before that he was requesting: 
let’s meet, discuss, have negotiations in Sochi; but then he just walked away from communication. At that 
point I started to suspect that he had decided to carry out forceful action[…]So, of course, we were preparing 
for that[…]And I think that as a result of those preparatory measures, which were carried out [by Russia], 
losses of the operation were minimal. The Russian army has destroyed the Georgian military infrastructure. 
At the same time [the Russian army] avoided actions, which could have been of inhuman nature.”3166. He 
also blamed “some senior leaders of Ukraine for taking decision to supply Georgia with arms and to send 
there people trained in firing at the Russian servicemen.” And stated it was “a crime committed against the 
Russian-Ukrainian relations.”3167. He also stated: “This is my deep conviction. First of all, [Russia will 
protect its interests] by international and legal tools[…]but, when necessary, by using an element of 
force[…]If there is a threat to life and dignity of the Russian citizens, the Russia’s positions, of course will 
be extremely simple and wisely firm. We will protect interests of our citizens anywhere no matter where 
they are. And there is no violation of the international law in this.”3168 
 
Saakashvili responded to Medvedevs statement saying that it was an acknowledgement of Russia’s 
aggression against Georgia, as he stated: “By these remarks of the Russian President – if somebody had 
any doubts in the world, in Russia or even in our country, if somebody had any questions about what has 
happened in August – this person [Medvedev] has given a clear-cut answer to it[…]I was thinking much 
what the reason of this open acknowledgment of their aggression was after four months from the war. I 
think that – and it troubles me as it concerns us – there is a serious economic crisis in Russia, there are 
serious social protests, serious internal tension and political struggle – and this acknowledgement and also 
new aggressive threats serve to distract attention from all of these [problems][…]What should we do in this 
situation?[…]We are sure that the way towards our unification and peace passes through Georgia’s internal 
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and in the rest of the world – to rescue and maintain Georgian economy, to preserve our economy, to 
maintain and develop Georgia’s stability and to become stronger and everything will be all right.”3169 
 
December 31, 2008: The OSCE mission to Georgia is terminated, although a number of monitors stayed 




January 16, 2009: A Georgian policeman is shot and killed near the border with South Ossetia3171. Gen. 
Gilles Janvier, an official with the European Union’s monitoring mission, called the attack “a totally 
unacceptable breach” of the cease-fire agreement,” and pressed for investigations in South Ossetia and 
Georgia3172. Meanwhile, Lavrov of Russia stated that he doubted the shooting had occurred: “Very many 
reports of this kind are not confirmed,”3173.  
 
January 25, 2009: The OSCE applauds the Georgian decision to resume gas supplies to South Ossetia3174. 
The supplies have been disrupted since August 8, 20083175. In its statement the OSCE stated that other 
urgent humanitarian issues now included the access to water in the conflict zone3176.  
 
January 28, 2009: Russia states that Georgia has captured a Russian soldier and pressured him into making 
statements against the Russian military. The Russian solider was shown on Georgian television asking for 
asylum, stating:  "I am asking the president of Georgia to grant me asylum. I cannot bear the hardship 
Russian soldiers are experiencing here anymore. I hope asylum will be granted,"3177.   
 
February 10, 2009: Two representatives of the OSCE are detained in South Ossetia on allegations that 
they had entered the area illegally with South Ossetia’s foreign ministry saying that the organization’s 
mandate “expired after the events of August 2008 and is null and void,”3178. Grigol Vashadze, Georgia’s 
foreign minister, stated the incident should be taken as a warning that South Ossetia is “a territory where 
no law exists, no human rights exists and where there is no respect for international agreements.” 3179. 
 
 
3169 “Saakashvili on Medvedev’s war acknowledgement” Old Civil, December 25, 2008, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20198  
3170 “Conflict resolution” OSCE 










3177 “Georgia 'captures Russian soldier'” Aljazeera, January 28, 2009, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2009/01/2009127144213480384.html  







February 19, 2009: The sides meet for the Geneva International Discussions in which they agree to the 
establishment of “proposals for joint incident prevention and response mechanisms”3180. The mechanism, 
later called Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM), would allow for regular weekly 
meetings “between structures responsible for security and public order in areas of tension and relevant 
international organizations.”, a 24-hour hotline would also be established and “agreed joint visits may be 
conducted” in the areas of concern3181. Georgia stated that the agreement was “a good step in the right 
direction,” but also added that “it is not a breakthrough[…]Now Russia’s political will is needed to 
implement reached agreements,” 3182. 
 
March 26, 2009: South Ossetia accuses Georgia of launching attacks against one of its border villages3183. 
They also claim that Georgian troops attacked Russian military strongholds in the village using gunfire and 
grenades3184. Georgia denied the allegations with Georgia’s Interior Minister stating that the allegations 
were made to: "mislead the international community and create an informational background for the 
resumption of Russia's aggression against Georgia." 3185. 
 
April 9, 2009: Thousands gather in street protests in Tbilisi to demonstrate demanding the immediate 
resignation of Saakashvili3186. They accuse him of authoritarianism and disapprove of his handling of the 
2008 conflict3187.  
 
April 10, 2009: The opposition party in Georgia announces a “civil disobedience campaign” due to the 
refusal of Saakashvili to step down3188. The campaign included rallies in front of the parliament and the 
blockade of some of the main streets in Tbilisi3189.  
 
April 30, 2009: Russia signs a border cooperation treaty with Abkhazia and South Ossetia3190. The treaty 
gives Russia control over the area’s borders3191. Saakashvili stated that the treaty was another attempt by 
Russia to legalize the areas stating: “But you cannot legalize something that is fundamentally illegal. It is 
very dangerous to everybody, including Russia itself,”3192.  
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May 2, 2009: Russian border guards begin taking up long-term positions along the borders of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia3193. The development follows the signing of security treaties with the areas which call for 
joint patrols3194.  Shota Utiashvili, a senior official in Georgia’s Interior Ministry, stated that he worried that 
F.S.B. units “might be more willing to stage operations” along the Georgian border3195. 
May 16, 2009: Ahead of the fifth round of Geneva talks, Russia states that it will focus on creating legally 
binding agreements regarding the non-use of force between Georgia and South Ossetia3196. Russia also 
stated: “An important element of security in the South Caucasus is imposing international embargo supplies 
of offensive armament to Georgia[…]Calls for restoring territorial integrity by force, which was lost as a 
result irresponsible policies of the Georgian leadership, are still made in Tbilisi,”3197. Russia also accused 
Georgia of installing “new fortifications and observation posts” and of increasing military presence in the 
areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia: “All it happens against the background of deep internal 
political crisis, to which the present leadership has led the country[…]It’s not a surprise that in these 
circumstances the Georgian leadership tries to distract public attention from pressing internal problems by 
artificially creating[…]dangerous external tricks.”3198 
 
May 18, 2009: The fifth Geneva talks are held in which Russia suspends its participation due to the 
Abkhazian decision of not attending and following the walk-out of South Ossetia3199. Abkhazia refused to 
take part following the wording in a UN report for the talks which stated “Abkhazia, Georgia” and hence, 
according to Abkhazia, failed to include the fact that Abkhazia was now independent3200.  
 
May 31, 2009: South Ossetia holds parliamentary elections with polling stations being arranged in Russia 
for expatriates and refugees who fled the area during the 2008 war3201. Four parties are competing, but the 
central election commission has barred the only two parties not loyal Kokoity and the opposition has also 
accused the president of embezzling funds allocated for restoration of infrastructure destroyed in the war3202. 
The president however denied the accusations stating that it was Georgian propaganda and that the election 
was a "maturity test for the small independent state"3203. 
 
July 1, 2009: The sixth round of Geneva talks is held in which it was agreed to hold the first IPRM meeting 
on July 143204.  
 
July 9, 2009: South Ossetia refuses to participate in the IPRM meetings due to disagreements over who 
should chair the talks3205. The meeting, which are facilitated by OSCE and EU Monitoring Mission in 
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Georgia, have already been held twice with representation from both Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia3206. 
In a statement, South Ossetia however noted: “We have offered two options: either the representatives of 
Russia and EU should be chairs of these meeting, as they have signed Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement, or 
each participating side based on rotation principle. None of these proposals were accepted[…]During the 
sixth round of Geneva discussions, we have offered a third option: the meetings to be chaired alternately 
by the Georgian and South Ossetian sides.”3207 
 
July 13, 2009: Medvedev visits Tskhinvali with the Kremlin later releasing a statement stating: “Joint 
implementation of projects for socio-economic rehabilitation of the [South Ossetian] republic was discussed 
during the Russian President’s working visit in South Ossetia,”3208. Medvedev also stated when in South 
Ossetia: “I would like to thank you for inviting me in the new state – South Ossetia, which has been created 
as a result of difficult dramatic events and which was supported by the Russian people in the difficult 
times,”3209. Georgia condemned the visit with Saakashvili stating that it was “shameful and immoral” and 
that South Ossetia’s de facto leader Kokoity was an “unwashed, murderer” and “corrupt criminal”3210. Davit 
Bakradze, the Georgian parliamentary chairperson, also noted: “This is not the way through which Russia 
would be able to adequately respond to the developments in the world. This visit once against confirms that 
there are people in the Russian leadership who made it part of their action plan to damage Georgia[…]This 
is a step directed against the Georgian statehood,” 3211. 
 
June 15, 2009: Medvedev states that Russia is ready to discuss security in the South Caucasus with western 
states but that it has two red lines with respect to Georgia3212. The first line is the recognition of the 
breakaway entities stating: “Our decision is irreversible; the decision we have taken was certainly 
painful,”3213. The second was Russia’s “attitude towards the current regime in Tbilisi” with Medvedev 
further stating: “It is our view that that this political regime has committed a crime and we will have nothing 
common with this [regime][…]At the same time, after elections, which will take place in Georgia sooner 
or later, we surely will be ready to return to discussions of various issues if the Georgian people elect a new 
leadership capable of maintaining a friendly dialogue with Russia and with close neighbors of the Georgian 
state - peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.”3214. He also stated that in regard to the conflict in 2008: 
“everything that happened was a result of irresponsible and delinquent policy pursued by the Georgian 
leadership.” 3215. 
 
July 20, 2009: Georgia hopes that the US will join the EU monitoring mission as they believe that this 
would deter aggression from Russia and the separatists. Eka Tkeshelashvili, the secretary of Georgia’s 
National Security Council, stated that the broadening of the monitoring mission to include the United States 
and other nonunion members would make it “politically very costly to Russia to do anything on the 
ground[…]It has the potential for reaching a very tangible impact,” she said. “It’s always very hard to think 















the red lines that we could have imagined.”3216. The EU stated that it had informal discussions on whether 
to invite the US3217. 
 
July 28, 2009:  Russia warns against the inclusion of the US in the EUMM as extremely harmful and states 
that: “The U.S. presence will sharply increase the likelihood of border provocations, given the United 
States’ role in last year’s events[…]As for U.S.-Russian relations, such a move will certainly not improve, 
but only worsen relations by adding a new issue.”3218 
 
June 30, 2009: UN monitors begin pulling out, alongside the last OSCE monitors, from Georgia3219. Russia 
rejected extending the mandate of the monitors3220. Russia rather demanded separate monitoring missions 
for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Georgia said was a violation of Georgian sovereignty3221. The only 
mission in the area is now the EU mission, which is set to expire on September 30, 20093222. The mandate 
of the EUMM does not extend to the breakaway regions and Russia has been barring access to areas which 
fell under separatist control in 20083223. States such as France have accessed for the EUMM to gain access 
to the entire conflict zone in order to assess the human rights situation, but this is denied by Russia3224. 
Russia denies that it has blocked negotiations on extending the mandate of the UN and OSCE missions and 
stated: "What happened with the OSCE mission to [Georgia] and the UN Security Council resolution on 
the UN mission in the region is a supreme act of diplomatic cynicism," … "Our impression is that Tbilisi – 
and perhaps some other capitals – have decided to seek a solution to the problem in the waters of instability." 
3225. 
 
July 13, 2009: Medvedev visits South Ossetia where he inspected a new Russian military base3226. 
 
July 14, 2009: Medvedev states that the Georgian people would one day rule a tough verdict on Saakashvili 
for attacking South Ossetia with him stating: “Of course full responsibility for what has happened [last 
August] lies on this regime, but it’s not our business to deal with it[…]One day the Georgian people itself 
will rule a heavy sentence to Saakashvili’s regime and to those who took part in those bloody 
actions[…]Our task is to help young state to stand on its feet, to overcome difficulties, simply to survive in 
difficult conditions, which exist in Caucasus[…]I can tell you frankly: they live there poorly and in difficult 
conditions. They were all grateful to Russia for those difficult decisions, which we had to take last August. 
Part of those people might not be alive now if we have not taken those decisions. They were thanking Russia 
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with tears on their eyes[…]It strengthens Russia’s reputation in Caucasus and in the world[…]We have a 
[military] base there[…]Decent conditions for the service are created there and this [military base] is a 
direct signal for them, who can’t settle-down and for them in whose minds idiotic plans emerge time after 
time.”3227 
 
July 28, 2009: South Ossetia’s Interior Minister states that a policeman who has been missing for several 
days is believed to be detained by Georgian security forces3228. Shota Utiashvili, the head of the Georgian 
Interior Ministry's Information Department, stated that Georgia could neither confirm nor deny the 
allegation3229.  
August 1, 2009: South Ossetia accuses Georgia of firing mortars towards a military observation post in the 
area3230. Russia warned Georgia by stating that it reserved the right to use force in order to protect the 
civilian population in the area, stating: "In the event of further acts of provocation threatening the population 
of the republic and the Russian military contingent based in the territory of South Ossetia, the Russian 
Defence Ministry reserves the right to use all available force and means to defend the citizens of the republic 
of South Ossetia and Russian servicemen," 3231. Georgia denied the shooting and stated that Russia’s 
comment showed Russia’s aggressive intent3232.  
 
August 3, 2009: Georgia states that Russia is trying to take more territory inside South Ossetia with them 
stating: "It's very alarming that as the first anniversary of the Russian aggression against Georgia comes 
close, Russia and its puppets are deliberately inciting tensions and behave defiantly"3233. Meanwhile Russia 
accused Georgian forces of firing mortars into South Ossetia and it also warned that Russia "reserves the 
right to use all available forces and means to protect the citizens of South Ossetia and Russian servicemen" 
in case of further "provocations"3234. 
 
August 5, 2009: Lavrov states that Saakashvili and his "masters of provocations" want to see the US join 
the EU mission in a bid to inflame tensions with Russia3235. 
 
August 6, 2009: South Ossetia approves a new Prime Minister, Vadim Brovtsev, a former director of a 
Russian construction company3236.   
 
August 7, 2009: Kokoity declares the border closed citing a potential threat from the H1N1 influenza which 
has emerged in Georgia3237. South Ossetia however also states that tensions remain and both sides accuse 
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each other of conducting cross-border attacks3238. David Sanakoyev, the human rights ombudsman to South 
Ossetia's president states: "People are very worried that there will be a new war[…]The only comforting 
fact is that Russia's ministry of defence has promised to defend the population from any possible attacks." 
3239. 
 
August 8, 2009: Medvedev states on the first anniversary of the 2008 conflict: "Last year's events have 
finally redrawn the political map of the Caucasus[…]The recognition of South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's 
independence was the only possible solution[…]Such decisions are made once and for all, and there is no 
way back."3240. At a candle-vigil in Tskhinvali, Kokoity stated: "The goal of the operation was the 
destruction and exile of the South Ossetian people[…]South Ossetian fighters courageously thwarted 
Tbilisi's plans for blitzkrieg. Russian troops came to the rescue of South Ossetia and pushed the bloodthirsty 
enemy back”3241 
 
August 9, 2009: Russia calls for an international embargo on arms supply to Georgia as Russia fears that 
Georgia may once again use force to reclaim the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia3242. Medvedev 
also stated that the recognition of the separatist areas was essential to ensure security in the Caucasus and 
would not be revoked3243. In other events, South Ossetia opened a “genocide museum” in South Ossetia to 
commemorate those who died during the war3244. 
 
August 14, 2009: South Ossetia is asking residents to turn in their weapons voluntarily however the process 
is slow3245. A local resident stated that for an Ossetian “a weapon is an essential part of daily life, his 
worldview, his accessory, if you will”. When asked how many private individuals owned a gun he stated: 
“As many as there are people in the population, that’s how many weapons there are.”3246 
 
August 25, 2009: Russia states that it has uncovered evidence that Ukrainian troops and volunteers fought 
on the Georgian side in the conflict in 20083247. They also stated that they had found Ukrainian built missile 
inside South Ossetia3248. Vladimir Markin, a spokesman for the Russian prosecutor-general’s office stated: 
“Servicemen from the regular divisions of the Ukrainian defence ministry and also no less than 200 
members of the Ukrainian nationalist organisation UNA-UNSO participated with Georgian forces in armed 
aggression against South Ossetia,”3249. He also claimed that investigators had found Ukrainian anti-aircraft 
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preparing for the conflict3250. Ukraine’s Yushchenko openly supported Saakashvili during the escalation of 
violence in 20083251. 
 
September 10, 2009: Venezuela acknowledges the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia3252. 
 
September 14, 2009: Saakashvili states that Georgia should be “equipped with knowledge” in order to 
prevail over “cruel enemy” and “occupant country,”3253. He also stated: “The President of our huge neighbor 
and of the occupant country, Russia, dedicated half of his hour-long congratulating speech about new school 
year [on September 1] speaking how bad Georgia is[…]I came here to speak how good we are and how 
good our country is,” ... “We are good and strong people because many other people, which experienced 
this tragedy [reference to the August war] would not have got back on their feet[…]Our land is still 
occupied, but although we have not yet won, they have already lost this struggle. To eventually win this 
struggle we need knowledge; we wont’ be able to prevail over them neither with weapons nor with number 
of people and nor with cruelty, because we are opposite to that; and in order to get rid of this cruel enemy 
we need to be equipped with knowledge.”3254 
 
September 17, 2009: The seventh Geneva talks takes place in which discussions continued in the two 
working groups3255. 
 
September 30, 2009: The EU fact-finding mission releases its report, which states that Georgia initiated 
the conflict but also that historical tensions and overreactions contributed to the conflict3256,3257. The report 
also stated that Russia used disproportionate force against Georgia to which Dmitry Ragozin, Russia's 
ambassador to Nato, stated: "If Russian troops had acted disproportionately, then why didn't they make it 
all the way to Tblisi?"3258.  
 
October 15, 2009: EU special representative for the crisis in Georgia and co-chair of Geneva discussions 
publishes an article in which he states: “A regular dialogue has been established on all important post-
conflict issues despite irreconcilable differences regarding the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia that took place on 26 August – two weeks after the end of hostilities. The work of the two groups 
has evolved despite these persistent disagreements – disagreements that led ultimately to the very 
regrettable closure of the OSCE’s mission in Georgia (22 December 2008) as well as of the UN Mission’s 
activities (15 June 2009)[…]The Geneva discussions are now entering a second phase, whose purpose is to 
attain a more developed security regime and humanitarian protection framework, designed to increase 
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framework agreement on the non-use of force” that will be examined during the 8th Session of the Geneva 
Discussions on 11 November 2009.”3259  
 
November 11, 2009: The eight Geneva talks are held in which talks were held on the agreement on the 
non-use of force and international security arrangements provided by the three Co-Chairs3260. 
 
December 5, 2009: Lavrov states that the continued armament of Georgia was “a serious problem” and 
stated following a NATO-Russia Council meeting: “We have paid special attention to those risks, which 
are related with continued supplies of arms to Georgia. We hope that the alliance-member states made 
necessary conclusions from last year’s August events[…]This is a serious problem. Weapons continue to 
be supplied in Georgia. According to some estimations Georgia’s pre-war military potential is already 
restored[…]And mainly offensive weapons are being delivered to Georgia. I hope everyone understands 
how risky it is to arm this regime. We have discussed it in details within the NATO-Russia Council.”3261. 
The day before Saakashvili stated that Georgian armed forces “should be permanently on high readiness.” 
And that: “The enemy is constantly considering new provocations and attacks. The Georgian state’s major 
goal should be liberation of our occupied territories. All of our actions should be directed towards achieving 
this goal through peaceful means. But we should also be ready to repel enemy’s new attacks,”3262.  
 
December 9, 2009: Medvedev states that he would not have any contact with Saakashvili and “with some 
others in leadership” stating: “I have numerously said that I am not going to have contacts with the current 
President and some others in [the Georgian] leadership; our ways have parted and our assessments of 
developments are absolutely different; I think that President Saakashvili bears direct legal responsibility for 
the committed crime, but it does not mean that we should postpone all other relations for a later time[…]The 
possibility of conducting direct flights, and opening the Upper Larsi checkpoint – it is a normal topic for 
discussion and solution. In general I cannot see any specific obstacles here, because it, first of all, concerns 
the interests of simple people, who always kept and are still keeping ties with each other despite[…]severe 
confrontation between our states over some issues on the international arena”3263. 
 
December 15, 2009: Saakashvili’s spokesperson states that there will be no “trade-off” with South Ossetia 
over the release of detained people with Manana Manjgaladze, the Georgian President’s spokesperson, 
stating: 
 “The President believes that any trade-off with the occupying regime is inadmissible. Mikheil Saakashvili 
is grateful to European officials for their efforts and calls on them to keep away from trading of human 
beings, which is pushed for by the occupying regime,”3264. South Ossetia calls for an “all for all exchange” 
of detainees3265. 
 
December 24, 2009:  Lavrov states that Georgia’s “current leadership represents threat for the regional 
peace and security.” And that the threat “has once already grown into war against South Ossetia, against 
the Russian peacekeepers, against the Russian Federation[…]So we are doing everything in order to prevent 
its [last year’s war] reoccurrence and we hope that those who continue rebuilding the Georgian army, 
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understand what they are doing and they will restrain Georgia from new adventures,”3266. He also stated 
that the security of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was “reliably protected” after Russia and the entities signed 
comprehensive agreements on friendship and cooperation3267.  
 
December 25, 2009: Georgia lays out a draft strategy paper for dealing with Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
which is against the “isolation of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali/South Ossetia” and aims at fostering ties 
between the communities “separated by dividing lines,”3268. The strategy states that its goals will be sought 
only by peaceful and diplomatic efforts and “rules out conflict resolution by military means.”3269 . The 
strategy has been discussed between academics and government officials but is yet to be endorsed by the 




January 1, 2010: In his new years address Saakashvili stated: “If we want free children of Georgia to be 
born on our soil – like it was for thousands of years – we should be ready for holding a hoe in one hand and 
a weapon in another[…]In one hand we should be holding hoe, computer, book and other tools, which are 
required for building of 21st and 22nd century, modern country[…]But, on the other hand, in order to 
protect the country’s future and to protect what we are building, we should always be ready for struggle 
and for protection of the country[…]These days we had a chance to again see on TV screens our enemy’s 
mad and at the same time very confused face. He can not understand why it was not possible to kneel down 
Georgia despite of so many tricks and provocations. He fails to understand that although it is possible to 
kneel down a separate Georgian, but it is impossible to ever kneel down the entire Georgian society[…]A 
secret, a recipe of our survival is very simple – our strength is in our unity[…]in the unity of all ethnic 
groups and all the citizens of Georgian, regardless of their origins and religious beliefs.”3271. 
 
January 6, 2010: The EUMM calls on the sides to address the issue of IDP’s following the arrest of a 
South Ossetian citizens and other cases of detentions at the administrative boundary line, which “raises 
wider issues concerning freedom of movement, security, and detainees.”3272.  
 
January 9, 2010: South Ossetia states that it will not take part in meetings with Georgian representatives 
under the IPRM framework as it stated: “The South Ossetian side has warned for multiple times during the 
Geneva discussions, that we would not participate in these meetings [in frames of IPRM] unless we receive 
information about the missing South Ossetian citizens,”3273. 
 
January 21, 2010: The ninth Geneva talks are held in which Russia continued to push for a non-use of 
force treaty3274. Russia also stated that another issues was the need “to resolve the problem related with 
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Georgia’s re-armament[…]Under conditions of continued bellicose rhetoric from Tbilisi, ongoing calls 
from the Georgian authorities for restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity at any price and build-up of 
Georgian armed presence and maneuvers in the vicinity of Abkhaz and South Ossetian borders, the issue 
of granting Sokhumi and Tskhinvali firm security guarantees gains more significance,”3275 
 
February 2, 2010: Lavrov states that the pace of international recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
is “normal” and stated that this process: “is faster than the pace of recognition of Soviet Russia was[…]I 
am sure, as the process of stabilization in Trans-Caucasus becomes free of ideology and momentum of the 
past and as the reality, which won’t disappear anywhere, are recognized by everyone and as the statehood 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are steadily strengthened, this process [of international recognition] will 
proceed faster”3276.  
 
February 4, 2010: South Ossetian locals warns the US of not supplying Georgia with weapons stating that 
these could be used against civilians3277. About 340 locals signed the petition which stated: “The citizens 
of South Ossetia fear that President Saakashvili, in light of his past recklessness and erratic behavior, will 
again use any military weapons and training against us.”3278.  
 
February 19, 2010: The leader of South Ossetia announces that the citizens of South Ossetia will soon be 
issued with new internal passports, travel documents, birth certificates, diplomas, and other documents, 
which are designed to replace the Georgian documents3279. In an announcement it was also stated that South 
Ossetians will be able to travel to Russia using only internal identification cards3280.  
 
March 30, 2010:  The tenth round of Geneva talk is held where the co-mediators, Antti Turunen of the UN, 
Pierre Morel of the EU and Bolat Nurgaliyev, the special envoy of the Kazakh OSCE chairmanship, stated: 
"Against the background of a relatively calm and stable general situation, it was noted that tensions continue 
to exist[…]It was highlighted that provocative actions and rhetorics are not helpful for the ongoing efforts 
to stabilize the situation on the ground and should therefore be avoided,"3281. Talks also continued on the 
different draft proposals related to the non-use of force and international security arrangements3282. 
 
May 26, 2010: Saakashvili states on the eve of Georgia’s Independence Day that he was in a "combative 
mood." Stating: "Of course I fully realize that 20% of our territory is occupied and that up to 500,000 
compatriots are not able to go back to thier homes[…]But I also know that Georgia has survived... but we 
still face huge struggle for unification, for making our achievements irreversible[…]Sooner or later Russia 
will follow the path of modernization and it will happen sooner than many can imagine - I am sure about 
it[…]We should keep following our path of development - economic development, strengthening of our 
state institutions and of democracy and we should wait for the time, when even more modernized and 
developed Georgia becomes a desired partner of modernized Russia[…]More concessions you make, more 
it [Russia] wants - that’s the principle based on which the leadership of this country acts[…]Show me at 
least one example when laying down before Russia turned out to be successful[…]I would have been the 
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first to follow that example[…]Putin once called a Prime Minister of one country and told: ’l will cut 
relations with you if you appoint that man as Finance Minister, because that’s friend of Saakashvili’. That 
person was appointed anyway. Putin also told a leader of one of the Arab countries not to meet me. Not 
only he met me, but also told me that he would visit Georgia ’because we do not obey such a dictate’"3283. 
 
June 4, 2010: Ukraine’s President Victor Yanukovych states that recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Kosovo as independent states is “a violation of international laws and norms,” and further stated: “I 
have never recognized Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Kosovo as independent states[…]There are 
international norms and laws which prohibit infringement of territorial integrity of any state. We have no 
right to welcome those processes in the world, where violation of territorial integrity of a country is taking 
place.”3284 
 
June 9, 2010: Putin states that there is no need to use French warships, which it plans to buy, against 
Georgia, with him stating: “I hope events will never again lead to military conflict between Russia and 
Georgia, never. We have been doing everything previously and are intending to do everything for 
preventing reoccurrence of this tragedy. Modern offensive systems make it possible to carry out any 
military operation deep into the entire territory of Georgia from the Russian territory and no Mistral is 
needed for that[…][Mistral] is an offensive weapon. Has France such helicopter carriers [Mistrals] in its 
armament? Yes, it has. Whom is France going to attack? No one. Why do people automatically assume that 
Russia will of course have to use this to attack someone? If you mean – and let’s put it bluntly – for example, 
our Georgian neighbors[…]Georgia has a huge land border with Russia. As a result of a criminal action, 
which was launched by President Saakashvili two years ago, people have died. And Russia had to defend 
the lives of its peacekeepers and citizens of South Ossetia. And, as it is known, Russia had, I want to stress 
it, to use its armed forces for defensive purposes[…]We have stopped [Russian army’s advance] 20-15 
kilometers from Tbilisi, and not because we could not enter Tbilisi, but because we did not want it. We did 
not want any hostilities at all. Just that is why our peacekeepers were staying there”3285. Meanwhile, the 11 
round of Geneva talks are held where Abkhazia and South Ossetia walked-out stating that their “opinions 
are ignored”3286. Disagreements particularly pertained to a draft document called “agreed undertakings” 
which deals with issues such as rehabilitation and damaged facilities3287. Georgia stated that: "due to the 
unconstructive position of the Russian Federation and its proxy regimes, participants were unable to finalize 
first reading of the 'Agreed Undertakings'[…]It is especially unfortunate that such a demarche happened on 
the issues, which are of direct relevance to the well-being and future of the victims of ethnic cleansing,"3288 
 
June 11, 2010:  Lavrov states that the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is irreversible. As he 
further stated: “When the purpose of the operation aimed at suppressing the aggression was fulfilled and 
the Russian President ordered to suspend a military operation, the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan was agreed, 
which laid the foundation for future actions. Its sixth point contained a provision on the need to launch 
international discussions over defining the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and ensuring their security. 
We have undersigned it. So, on August 12, 2008 the Russian President agreed that the status of these regions 
needed to be discussed on an international level[…]The document was agreed. French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy took it to Tbilisi. Then he called and said that Saakashvili was categorically against discussing the 
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status of these republics and that for him the status was in itself already obvious and this phrase should be 
removed [from the six-point agreement]. We agreed [to remove it][…]By the way, Saakashvili was also 
manipulating with other parts of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. Six points were preceded by a preamble, 
which said: the Presidents of Russian Federation and France approve the underwritten principles and call 
on the sides to fulfill them. In the document, which Saakashvili finally agreed to sign, he not only removed 
the phrase about the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but he also edited out the preamble and is now 
saying that the document calls, including on Russia, to stop doing various things. The preamble was 
unambiguously saying that the two Presidents were calling on the sides to do this and that. That is why it is 
called the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan[…]By that time discussions on the status have been thwarted and 
revanchist statements, like the war is not yet over, were heard from Tbilisi , so by the end of August [2008] 
it was decided that there was no other way to provide the security and survival of Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians, rather than to recognize their independence[…]Currently Russian troops are stationed in both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are stationed there based on agreements between Russia and two states 
recognized by it. Russia has fulfilled the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan in this part[…]By the way, those people, 
who say that we should return to the pre-August 8 line, forget that before August 8, 2008 our troops were 
stationed deep into the Georgia territory, because the peacekeepers were deployed not only in South Ossetia, 
which was then a part of Georgia, but also beyond its limits. The same situation was respect of Abkhazia. 
Therefore, if they call on us to move beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia and to locate on the line, where 
the security was provided by our peacekeepers before August 8, 2008, I would be glad if we were told about 
it directly,” 3289.  
 
June 29, 2010: Saakashvili again speaks of the importance of referring to Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
“occupied regions”3290. “You are well aware that the term ‘occupation’ has been used very rarely in the 
course of 20th century[…]This term means that occupation will end sooner or later. It means giving a 
temporary status to presence of [occupying force] on those territories; it means that those people [Russian 
forces] are there illegally; it means that property transactions are illegal[…]For example, I want tell some 
imprudent Russians: you are illegally buying houses [in Abkhazia] in illegally occupied territory of 
Georgia, as it is recognized by the international community and Russian forces there are occupants[…]The 
Russian people, which itself experienced Nazi occupation during the World War II, because of its 
leadership’s short-sighted and reckless policy now has to live in the country, which is occupant,”3291. He 
also stated that Georgia was “fully ready to hold comprehensive talks with Russia without any pre-
conditions on normalization of relations[…]This normalization means [talks] on return of 500,000 
displaced persons back to their homes and restoration of their property rights, as well as on other issues 
related with bilateral relations, including political, economic, diplomatic and humanitarian aspects[…]We 
have no interest in having confrontation with Russia; we are ready to talk with the Russian leadership, 
which unlike the Georgian one is elected through violation of all the international norms and that’s observed 
by international organizations; despite of that it is the Russian leadership and we recognize it as partner in 
negotiations and we want to have talks with them providing that Georgia should be recognized as united, 
sovereign, independent state,”3292.   
 
July 3, 2010:  Georgia approves an “Action plan for engagement” which lays out Georgia’s strategy for 
engagement with its “occupied territories”3293. The plan includes seven instruments: status-neutral liaison 
mechanism; neutral identification card and travel document; trust fund; joint investment fund; cooperation 
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agency; financial institution and integrated social-economic zone3294 (see the reference for further 
elaboration of the steps). 
 
July 5, 2010: Putin states, in connection to Clintons visit to Georgia that Georgia should negotiate directly 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia instead of "seeking solution on the side" from the third parties3295. He 
also stated. "While some think that it [South Ossetia] is occupied, others think it is liberated,"3296 . Georgia 
responded to Putin’s remarks stating: “This kind of cynical remarks that Russia has nothing to do with it 
and that other players should resolve the situation between each other is simply a cheap attempt to avoid 
responsibility[…]The Georgian government and large part of the Georgian society is willing and is ready 
to cooperate with Russia, but the cooperation means mutual respect. As soon as Russia lives up to Georgia’s 
free choice and Georgia’s sovereignty, it will become very easy to establish civilized relations with 
Russia.”3297. On US engagement Georgia also stated: “We should not have an illusion that it will bring 
immediate results; there is no reason to expect any fundamental change in Russia’s stance towards its 
neighbors and towards the European security. But in the process, which should lead us step-by-step to this 
result, engagement of the United States is very important,”3298.  
 
July 7, 2010:  Russia criticizes Hillary Clinton for using the word “occupation” when referring to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia3299. Russia stated that its military was invited to deploy troops in the areas, which are 
considers sovereign countries: “Therefore, Secretary Clinton’s use of the term ‘occupation’ has no 
basis[…]There is not a single Russian serviceman on Georgian territory.”3300. 
 
July 27, 2010: The 12 Geneva talks are held with Georgia stating: “We do not expect that substantial steps 
forward will be made during this round of talks, especially against the negative and unconstructive 
background created by Russia and its proxies – Tskhinvali and Sokhumi,”3301. Russia stated that the “major 
task of Geneva discussions remains elaboration of a legally binding agreement on non-use of force” 3302. 
Russia allegedly refuses to be a part of the agreement as it claims it is not a conflict party3303. Georgia on 
the other hand states that no additional treaty is required, as non-use of force commitment is already part of 
August 12, 2008 six-point ceasefire agreement3304. It is however ready to sign a new agreement but only 
with Russia and not with Russia’s “puppet regimes” 3305. 
 
August 5, 2010: Medvedev states that normal relations with Georgia is impossible as long as Saakashvili 
remains in power3306. As he stated: “But it does not mean that such [normal] relations cannot be restored if 
other people come to power in Georgia. I am sure that it will happen – sooner or later, Georgian people will 
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make their choice and those friendly, century-old relations, which link Russian and Georgian peoples, will 
be restored completely and we will be able to develop contacts between our countries in the spheres of 
economy, cultural-humanitarian cooperation and other fields[…]We have a good interaction with the EU 
countries and other states[…]We have differences over certain issues, but to say it bluntly, during private 
conversations, practically all those people, with whom I have discussed this issue, recognize both the fact 
of aggression and the rightfulness of such response [by Russia],”3307.  
 
August 7, 2010: Saakashvili states that Georgia’s struggle for complete liberation continues and stated that 
Russia’s aggression against Georgia started much earlier than in 2008 and that: “And this aggression has 
not slowed down till now and it is not over yet. Our struggle will continue unless last occupant leaves the 
Georgian land, unless justice is restored towards hundreds of thousands of our citizens of various ethnicities, 
who were forced to leave their homes,”3308. He also stated that in 2008, Georgians had to defend “dignity, 
freedom and its future” with arms in their hands and that “Each of us is obliged to carry out this struggle 
on daily basis to honor memory of those fallen [in the August war]; to carry out this struggle within the 
country to further develop it and throughout the world to defend our positions everywhere[…]It is a historic 
task of our generation to accomplish this struggle and to liberate Georgia; we will accomplish this struggle 
and completely liberate our country,”3309.  Meanwhile, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration, Temur 
Iakobashvili, stated that the most important achievement on diplomatic front since the August war had been 
international community’s refusal to follow Russia’s suit in recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia: “It 
is obvious now that [Tbilisi’s] counter efforts turned out to be more effective: if previously it was about 
recognition of these territories as independent states, now it is about recognition of these [regions] as 
occupied territories[…]I think it’s a complete failure of the Russian diplomacy and a real chance for us to 
return back these territories, to reintegrate them into the Georgian jurisdiction and to return those people 
back to Georgia[…]The war has demonstrated something that was not clearly evident before – our main 
problem is not relations with Abkhazians and Ossetians[…]Our major problem is Georgian-Russian 
relations. Russia is using separatists and separatism against the Georgian statehood,”3310. 
 
August 13, 2010: Medvedev meets with Eduard Kokoity in Sochi where he states: “Last two years have 
showed that Russia's decision to protect population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to recognize these 
states' independence were necessary. This [decision] gave possibility to these people to develop instead of 
being exterminated as a result of genocide,”3311. 
 
August 25, 2010: Georgia’s Foreign Minister, Grigol Vashadze, states that Russia has also enhanced its 
air-defense system in South Ossetia: “Russia has deployed S-300 in occupied Abkhazia and Russia has 
stuffed its military base in Gyumri [Armenia] with S-300 systems. Though it [Russia] has not announced it 
publicly yet, be sure that Russia has definitely deployed S-300 in the Tskhinvali region as well[…]Russia 
has actually created a triangle over South Caucasus and its bordering regions, which, as they think, will be 
needed for them for confrontation with NATO or Turkey”3312 Russia denied the allegation on South Ossetia 
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September 4, 2010: Saakashvili states that Georgia has "an ideological confrontation" with Russia, as 
Georgia represents "a major competitor" to Russia in terms of model of development stating: "It is an 
objective reality, that Georgia has become Russia's major competitor in the post-Soviet space in terms of 
model of development; the major competitor in the sphere of ideology. [It happened] not because we wanted 
that - we are not obsessed by megalomania - it just happened so. We only had a very humble task - to do 
something in Georgia, that would have been different from what we had previously and to have a normal 
live[…]But as it turned out, it came into direct conflict with what is a well-rooted way of life in the entire 
post-Soviet space and which, first of all, is a heritage of Russia's imperial space."3314. He also stated that 
Russia was "in the mode of imitating" Georgia: "But their attempt to imitate [Georgia] will fail, because 
when they speak about modernization[…]it is impossible to build modern, 21st century society in the feudal 
country"3315.  
 
September 8, 2010: The UNGA passes a Georgia sponsored resolution which reiterates the right of all 
displaced people to return to Abkhazia and South Ossetia3316. Grigol Vashadze, the Georgian foreign 
minister, stated: “This trend will continue because of a simple reason – the international community has 
ruled a verdict on the occupying power’s actions in the occupied territories, including in respect of ethnic 
cleansing; there is a good wording in the resolution ‘forced demographic changes’, which is a synonym of 
ethnic cleansing” 3317. Russia stated that the resolution had no humanitarian aims and its motivations were 
exclusively political and based on short-term calculations by Georgia3318. To the resolution, Saakashvili 
stated that Russia “waged diplomatic war” against it to the extent that “Putin made Medvedev to call twice 
to several countries’ leaders” to lobby against the resolution3319. As he further stated: “There was 
blackmailing of various countries and there were attempts to bribe some countries – they [Russia] may even 
bribed some countries, I do not know that and I can’t claim that, but the result [of voting] is that Russia has 
lost support of several important states and Georgia has gained several new supporters. Actually it is 
struggle between good and evil. Russia is against of the resolution, which says that people should return to 
their houses, where they were born[…]Russia is on the side of evil. Just look through the list of those 
countries, which support Russia and everything will become clear. The good has won a little, but important 
victory[…]We will continue our struggle, it was a small diplomatic victory and the eventual victory will be 
when occupying force leaves our territory; but before that eventual victory, we face many small diplomatic 
battles” 3320. Russia’s foreign ministry stated that the resolution was “counterproductive” and that it “is 
fraught with complicating situation in the region and may hit Geneva discussions, which are already 
ongoing in an uneasy” conditions3321. The ministry also stated: “Against the background of Georgia’s 
persistent refusal to sign with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides legally binding agreement on non-use 
of force, it looks like a pure demagogy [the resolution’s] call on participants of Geneva discussions ‘to 
intensify their efforts to establish a durable peace, to commit to enhanced confidence-building 
measures’,”3322.  
 
September 29, 2010: Georgia states that Russian troops in South Ossetia are conducting “border 
demarcation” stating: “Russian occupational forces started to seize additional territory and move forward 
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the line of occupation in Shida Kartli region[…]Russian FSB [Federal Security Service] troops are 
conducting illegal ‘border demarcation works’ by putting steel poles in villages [of] Kvemo Nikozi, Zemo 
Nikozi, Ditsi, Arbo and Kordi.”3323. According to Georgia’s Interior Ministry 25 hectares of farmland is 
now occupied by the Russian troops in Kvemo Nikozi, south from Tskhinvali3324. Russia denied the 
allegation stating: "The Russian forces are not conducting any demarcation works on the South Ossetian 
border with Georgia,"3325.  
 
September 30, 2010: Georgia towns down its accusations of Russian land grabbing now only stating the 
issue of border demarcation3326.  
 
October 15, 2010: Russia announces that it will pull its troops out of Perevi, a small village outside 
breakaway South Ossetia's administrative borders3327. The announcement followed the thirteenth round of 
talks in Geneva3328. To the announcement, Russia stated: “This is an act of responsibility, an act of good 
will and at the same time a test for our Georgian partners in restraint[…]When our border guard troops pull 
back, the territory of South Ossetia will be fully defined and borders of the republic will be fully under the 
Russian border guard troops’ control on the basis of bilateral agreement [between Tskhinvali and Moscow] 
and at the same time no one will be able to reprove border guard troops for presence somewhere on the 
Georgian territory”3329. Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Giga Bokeria, stated that: “de-occupation of 
any territory or a village is a positive development,” but also stated: "They [Russia] will try to ‘sell’ this 
move as a constructive step, but I want to emphasis, that it is only a slightest part of those commitments, 
which they have undertaken" under the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement3330.  
 
October 18, 2010:  Russian troops withdraw from Perevi3331.  
 
October 20, 2010: Russia states that with the withdrawal of Russian troops from Perevi the issue of "alleged 
non-compliance" with EU-mediated ceasefire agreement by Moscow had been "definitively closed."3332. 
As further stated: “We hope that this move of the Russian side, aimed at reducing tensions on the borders 
of Georgia and South Ossetia, will receive adequate and constructive response from the Georgian side and 
the international community,”3333.  
 
October 21, 2010: South Ossetia states that the withdrawal of Russian troops from Perevi was “premature” 
as the construction of an alternative road linking nearby South Ossetian village with the rest of region is 
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not yet completed3334. South Ossetia stated: "Construction of the road, linking the South Ossetian village of 
Sinagur with Karzman, should have been completed in 2008. We have been assured that residents of 
Karzman would have been under the South Ossetian authorities' control, but the road is not yet built. I was 
categorically against of this move [removal of Russian checkpoint from Perevi]. Those structures are to be 
blamed, which were in charge of construction of the road. They have misinformed Moscow, as well as 
us"3335.  
 
November 20, 2010: Medvedev states that during the Lisbon NATO summit Russia sought to make “a 
significant step forward” towards boosting cooperation but also stated: “One of the most serious differences 
probably is about our assessment of 2008 events – attitude towards what has happened in August, 2008, 
towards those geopolitical changes, which occurred at that time; in particular emergence of two new states 
– South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But we [Russia and NATO] have noted that this issue should not become a 
stumbling stone[…]We have agreed that [differences] should not disrupt our relations,” he said. “On the 
contrary, we should work on finding ways out of these difficult situations. We should work on hearing each 
others’ arguments.”3336 
 
November 23, 2010: Georgia makes a unilateral pledge of non-use of force with Saakashvili stating that 
Georgia was ready to make a “unilateral initiative to declare that Georgia will never use force to roll back 
the Russian occupation and to restore its control over the occupied areas.”3337. To this Russia responded 
that the pledge would be “perceived seriously” only if it “is put on paper” and when “it becomes legally 
binding,”3338. Russia also stated: “Russia still believes that the road towards ensuring peace and security in 
Trans Caucasus lies through legally binding commitment on non-use of force between Tbilisi and 
Tskhinvali, as well as between Tbilisi and Sokhumi”3339. Russia also stated: “On the one hand, we would 
like to believe, that Saakashvili’s remarks[…]reflect Tbilisi’s realization of the fact – which has been 
persistently suggested for many years already by Russia and other members of the international community 
– that use of force is inadmissible and a crime[…]But the way in which this so called ‘unilateral solemn 
pledge’ is being delivered cannot but trigger our concern[…]Saakashvili still tries to convince the 
international community in the existence of some kind of conflict between Russia and Georgia, instead of 
speaking about many years of conflict between Tbilisi and peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which 
as a result of another Georgian forceful adventure in August 2008 ended up with eventual self-determination 
of these peoples[…]We all remember 'a peace-loving' televised address by Saakashvili on August 7, 2008, 
just couple of hours before barbarous overnight shelling of Tskhinvali,”3340.  
 
December 1, 2010: Sergey Lavrov states that Russia would not support the final declaration of the OSCE 
Astana summit if it contained a wording – “conflict in Georgia”, as it would amount to referring Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as parts of Georgia: “In the final declaration, we are ready to actively and in details 
support Geneva Discussions. But we can not agree with [the wording] that these Discussions are dedicated 
to ‘conflict in Georgia’, as it is offered by some of our western partners”3341 
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December 6, 2010: Abkhazia and South Ossetia state that they are ready to commit themselves not to use 
force with Kokoity stating: “I, as the head of the Republic of South Ossetia, officially announce: our state 
will not use force against Georgia, its population, territories, armed forces,”3342. Russia stated that: "an 
exceptionally important step has been taken towards sustainable peace and security in Transcaucasia." And 
that "We believe, that it opens up the prospect of solving the key issue of the Geneva Discussions on 
Stability and Security in Transcaucasia – full-fledged legal enshrinement of a regime of non-use of force 
between Tbilisi and Tskhinval and between Tbilisi and Sukhum”3343.  
 
December 17, 2010: The 14 round of Geneva talks are held where Russia states that Georgia’s 
“unconstructive” position made it impossible to make further progress on non-use of force issue: “Non-use 
of force in Transcaucasus was the central part of the discussions. The November 23 statement by the 
Georgian President, as well as the December 6 statements by Presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
about renouncing use of force created new atmosphere and had a real impact on strengthening stability in 
the region[…]Further progress on this very important direction for the security of all three states was 
hindered by unconstructive position of the Georgian representatives, who were actually ignoring statements 
made by their neighbors [reference made on Abkhazia and South Ossetia]. Reluctance of Tbilisi towards 
developing good neighborly relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia became obvious once again,”3344. 
During the talks Russia has refused to sign such an agreement as it states that it is not a conflict party, but 
rather it states it is a mediator – a statement Georgia calls cynical: "We've heard such a cynical statements 
[from Russian negotiators] like as if there is no conflict between Russia and Georgia whatsoever[…]We 
said that when we hear statements of this kind from the Russian Federation it is a matter of concern for 
everyone and reaction to this kind of statements should be firmer and more clear-cut, but unfortunately, we 




January 10, 2011:  The 16 round of Geneva talks are held in which Russia states that the talks clearly 
demonstrated “increasing aggressiveness of the Georgian delegation[…]They tried to write off all the 
failures of Tbilisi’s leadership in domestic and international affairs to Russia’s intrigues. The Georgian side 
has arbitrarily accused Russian special services of organizing some kind of ‘terrorist acts’ on the territory 
of Georgia” 3346. Georgia claims that it has prevented two terrorist attacks in June last year allegedly plotted 
by Russian security officers stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia3347. Georgia also stated that it would 
consider walking out of talks if “Russia continues state-sponsored terror campaign against Georgia3348. 
 
January 24, 2011: An unnamed source from Russia’s Southern Military District states that tactical-
operational missile unit with Tochka-U rockets have been deployed in the Russian military base in South 
Ossetia with the source stating: “the Georgian special services have been informed about the presence of 
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the rockets in South Ossetia, which are capable to effectively repel any aggression from Tbilisi.”3349. 
Georgia later responded that the deployment “points clearly to the Russian Federation's plans to launch 
open military aggression against Georgia[…]The deployment of the Tactical Operational Missile Complex 
"Tochka - U" and the artillery battalion equipped with Smerch multiple-launch rocket systems poses a direct 
and overt threat to the peaceful population and territory of Georgia. By taking such actions Russia follows 
through with its aggressive policy directed towards the destruction of the Georgian statehood and 
elimination of the peaceful population of Georgia, as well as towards causing large-scale instability in the 
Caucasus and throughout the Black Sea Region”3350.  
 
January 25, 2011: In televised interview Saakashvili states: “War is not yet over[…]If we are consolidated 
and[…]if we continue development we will definitely win this war.”3351. He also stated that it was an 
achievement that the term “occupation” in reference to Abkhazia and South Ossetia was establishing on the 
international arena futher stating that “Occupation always ends with de-occupation,”3352. South Ossetia 
responded stating: “The statements of this kind are an open call for the preparation of a new military 
aggression against Abkhazia and South Ossetia[…]However, insistent reiteration of a thesis about 'occupied 
territories' by the President of Georgia, his threats and insulting tone, actually, rule out an opportunity of 
resumption of a political dialogue with him,”3353. 
 
January 27, 2011: Saakashvili states to the Independent that Monday's suicide bombing at a Moscow 
airport was "payback" for Russia's policies in the North Caucasus further stating: "I discussed this 
personally with Vladimir Putin a while ago. I said to him that the payback for his country for supporting 
separatists would be that violence would come back to hit them as well[…]Putin said, 'No, if anyone tries 
anything against us, we shall crush them like cockroaches,' while jabbing and twisting his thumb on the 
table in front him."3354. Saakashvili also stated that "Russia has a political mentality which is on the level 
of a reptile, like a crocodile ready to swallow you up" 3355. 
 
February 2, 2011: Russia states that Saakashvili’s recent remarks about Russia cast doubt over his sincerity 
of non-use of force pledge and make it difficult to continue serious discussions on confidence-building 
measures3356. In a televised Q/A Saakashvili stated that he would use a term “enemy” while referring to 
Russia and added that he was looking forward to the time when he would no longer use this term in reference 
to Russia: “You know there is a principle of boomerang and you know a great tragedy happened yesterday 
in Moscow [terrorist act in Domodedovo airport]; there is no justification for terrorism” Saakashvili said. 
He also said that Russia had “a political mentality, which is on the level of reptile; like a crocodile ready to 
swallow you up.”3357. Russia responded: “It has been confirmed, that the Georgian authorities insistently 
continue line of further deterioration of relations with Russia. At the same time concerns of the Abkhaz and 
South Ossetian sides about their security in the face of direct threat from the Georgian side are 
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justified[…]After this kind of remarks by the Georgian President it is difficult to continue serious 
discussions on the issues related with confidence building and return of refugees, as it is envisaged by the 
agenda of the Geneva Discussions on Trans-Caucasus. Real stance of Tbilisi is not in line with the solemn 
pledge [on non-use of force] made before the international audience in Strasbourg [at the European 
Parliament] and in other Western cities. With the efforts of the Georgian leadership Geneva [discussions] 
are again being thrown back. With this in mind, it is clear that issue of providing firm security to Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia and providing them with guarantees of non-use of force from Georgia remain major 
priorities for the Geneva Discussions. We will take it into consideration in the process of preparation of 
15th round of [Geneva talks] scheduled for March 4. We hope that the international community and first 
and foremost UN, OSCE and EU, as co-chairs of the Geneva meetings, will give adequate assessment to 
the existing situation and will support the Russian Federation’s efforts directed towards strengthening still 
fragile security and stability in the region”3358.  
 
February 27, 2011: Alexander Torshin, deputy speaker of Russia's upper house of the Parliament, Federal 
Council, blamed Georgia for ordering the attack against the Domodedovo airport in Moscow stating: "I am 
sure the terrorist act was organized from outside[…]I will say from where, although I understand that my 
words may trigger wave of anger and misunderstanding, but I think, it was Georgia and its ruling regime 
[who ordered the attack][…]Saakashvili is not hiding his animosity towards us. He has long turned anti-
Russian attitudes into a competitive product, which he is selling.There is nothing else to sell; the Georgian 
wines are being sold poorly on the foreign markets[…]But there is a demand on Russophobia. The 
Saakashvili's regime had no need at all in Umarov to organize the terrorist act, because there is Ossetian 
traitor [Dimitri] Sanakoev [the head of Tbilisi-based provisional South Ossetian administration] and  his  
network of agents,"3359 
 
April 1, 2011: The International Court of Justice states that it cannot hear a complaint by Georgia that 
Russia committed human rights abuses in two breakaway provinces since it has no jurisdiction over the 
case3360. 
 
April 25, 2011: Lavrov arrives in South Ossetia for a meeting with Kokoity where he states: “We expect, 
that the Georgian leadership will implicitly confirm its commitment not to use force against South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia[…]We will provide any assistance to South Ossetia in this regard and we will strongly insist 
that international discussions consider this task as a priority[…]We don't rule out military provocations 
from Georgia, because anything can be expected from the current regime in Tbilisi; so we will spare no 
efforts to reliably protect the South Ossetian border and to be ready if someone will again wish to commit 
the crime of August, 2008,"3361.  
 
May 24, 2011: The EUMM states that Georgian police forces have increased their presence in the areas 
adjacent to the breakaway South Ossetian administrative border with Georgia responding that it was nothing 
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July 13, 2011: The Geneva talks have been, according to Georgia, brought to a “dead-end” because of 
Russia’s “terror campaign” against Georgia3363. Georgia however states that despite the few results, Georgia 
was in favor of the continuation of the talks3364.  
 
August 1, 2011: Russia opposed a US Senate resolution which used the word “occupation” to refer to South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia and stated: “The statement of the American senators about this testifies either to 
illiteracy of international law, or else complete disregard for the real facts[…]All this is convincing 
evidence that the given resolution is no less than an exercise in P.R., taken in order to return attention to 
the ‘Georgian question.’”3365 
 
August 2, 2011: Putin states to a question about the unification of North and South Ossetia that the "Future 
will depend on the South Ossetian people themselves,”3366. He also stated: "In various periods of history 
the border between North Ossetia and South Ossetia was running differently. There was a period, when 
there was no border at all. The border emerged in frames of a uniform state, in frames of the Russian 
Empire. Simply it was easier to rule that way,”3367 
 
August 8, 2011: The Kremlin announces that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has sent two agreements 
(signed a year ago) for ratification at the state Duma on establishing military bases in the breakaway 
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia3368. The agreements would allow Russia to keep 3,800 soldiers in 
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia with heavy weapons for 49 years without paying any lease and the 
agreement may automatically be prolonged for an indefinite period3369. Russia stated that the move to send 
the agreement for ratification was done to mark the anniversary of the conflict in Georgia3370. Meanwhile, 
Medvedev hinted at US involvement in Georgia's decision to attack South Ossetia: "The moment of truth 
for me, as I realised later while analysing those events in hindsight, came with the visit by secretary of state 
Condoleezza Rice[…]Following that visit, my Georgian colleague simply dropped all communication with 
us.[…]It was apparent that he had new plans."3371. Georgia responded stating that Medvedev was using 
"Cold War rhetoric", and accused Russia of "unsuccessful attempts to resurrect the Soviet empire"3372. 
 
August 15, 2011: South Ossetia is to hold a referendum on whether to make Russian, alongside Ossetian, 
the official language3373.  
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August 23, 2011: Russia accuses Georgia of  preparing “a large-scale provocation” on South Ossetia’s 
administrative border stating that Georgian authorities had planned an event dubbed as “peace march” 
during which about 3,000 Georgians, residents of Tserovani settlement for IDPs, as well as Chechen 
refugees living in Akhmeta district in eastern Georgia would march from the village of Odzisi to a 
checkpoint at Akhalgori district on the South Ossetian administrative border3374. To this Russia stated:  
“Scenario of this event envisages an attempt of mass illegal penetration into the territory of South Ossetia 
under the slogan of return of refugees to their homes[…]This new irresponsible and provocative intention 
of Tbilisi is extremely dangerous[…]It is fraught with destabilization of already fragile situation in the 
region[…]We strongly warn the Georgian side against any attempts to carry out a new adventure in the 
region. We hope that the appropriate unambiguous signals towards Tbilisi will also come from other 
members of the international community”3375. To this Georgia responded: “We are already accustomed to 
hearing such outrageous and groundless accusations, and do not take them seriously. And neither does the 
international community, as the EUMM's [EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia] reaction to this allegation 
proves,”3376. Georgia also stated further: “It is extremely alarming that Russia invents such false pretexts 
for further provocations and for the worsening of the already dire situation near Georgia's occupied 
territories[…]Such Soviet-style propaganda aims at creating artificial tensions on the ground, and in doing 
so to prepare for possible future provocations[…]We will all keep a watchful eye on possible developments, 
as we can never be sure what aggressive intentions Russia may be hiding behind such statements” 3377. 
 
November 13, 2011: South Ossetia holds presidential election and language referendum3378 
 
November 21, 2011: Medvedev states that NATO would have expanded had Russia not defended South 
Ossetia: “If you[…]had faltered back in 2008, the geopolitical situation would be different now[…]And a 
number of countries which (NATO) tried to deliberately drag into the alliance, would have most likely 
already been part of it now[…]We abandoned direct competition (with NATO), but[…]we now have 
different visions of the solutions of a number of security issues,”3379. He also stated that Russia would soon 
announce new measures as a response towards the US plans of establishing a missile defense in Europe3380.   
 
November 28, 2011: Georgia states that South Ossetia’s presidential election was “an event planned by the 
Kremlin,” and further stating: “What is happening there is not considered as elections; that’s an event, 
which is planned by the Kremlin and which is led by the official Moscow and Moscow is responsible for 
its results[…]Events not agreed with Tbilisi are taking place in Georgia’s occupied territories. 
Unfortunately, human rights violations are also taking place and [Moscow], which is in charge of situation 
there, is responsible for that. We hope that the international community will react adequately. There was a 
very prompt and adequate reaction from the international community when the so called first round of 
[election on November 13] was condemned by the U.S., the European Union,”3381 
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November 29, 2011:  A court in South Ossetia annuls the outcome of the presidential election which saw 
victory to an opposition candidate3382. The ruling followed a complaint submitted by candidate Anatoly 
Bibilov3383.  
 
November 30, 2011: Russia states calls on political forces in South Ossetia “to respect” the ruling of the 
Supreme Court annulling Sunday’s presidential runoff results stating: “Moscow is closely following 
developments in friendly neighboring state[…]We are interested in calm and stable situation to be 
maintained in the young republic and in the political processes to develop exclusively in legal framework. 
For that to happen it is necessary for all the public-political forces respect decisions taken by the supreme 
bodies of the government.”3384. The court decision and Russian statement led to protests outside Russia’s 
embassy in South Ossetia3385.  
 
December 2, 2011:  Protests continue in South Ossetia with opposition to Bibilov3386. The protesters have 
equally stated an intention of boycotting the Russian state Duma elections which Kokoity called a 
provocation3387.  
 
December 5, 2011: Medvedev states to the situation in South Ossetia with the protests: “Situation in South 
Ossetia is developing in line with internal rules; I do not like it that they have quarreled there [in South 
Ossetia]. It, of course, happens, especially in small territorial entities. There are only several participants of 
this process, representing various clans, which periodically get into dispute[…]They should themselves 
agree on how to rule their state – we have recognized South Ossetia as international-legal entity. Of course 
we are ready to help them in a form of presence of our mediators. Of course we will be doing that, but let 
them themselves agree and assume responsibility for the fate of this small, but proud people,”3388. He also 
stated that instead of “pointing the finger at Moscow, the both sides themselves should be taking responsible 
decisions”, otherwise “they will have problems”3389.  
 
December 10, 2011: Kokoity quits as part of a deal with the opposition3390.  
 
December 23, 2011: Georgia adopts a new national security concept with the main changes referring to 
Russia3391. The strategy lists: Russian military “occupation of the Georgian territories” and “a risk of a new 
military aggression” by Russia, as well as “terrorist acts organized by Russia from the occupied territories” 
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January 21, 2012: Alla Jioyeva, whose victory in the South Ossetian presidential elections last year was 
annulled states that the repeat election set in March is illegal and that she would not run3393. 
 
January 25, 2012: Georgia accuses Russia of trying to “to kill” Geneva talks, stating: “Unfortunately 
Geneva talks are stalled in both working groups, because our Russian partners are explicitly refusing to 
discuss security arrangements in the first working group and they are explicitly refusing to discuss 
voluntary, dignified and safe return of IDPs and refugees in the second one,”3394.  
 
January 30, 2012: Alla Jioyeva, states that she will inaugurate herself as new leader of the region at a 
ceremony on February 103395. She also stated: “Mediators, who have arrived from Moscow, in particular 
Sergey Vinokurov, to put it bluntly, have bamboozled us[…]I have shown a very serious political 
shortsightedness and today I repent before those radical groups [within her supporters], who at the time 
claimed that we should have stood firm to the end[…]I am telling you with absolute sincerity, that I could 
have never imagined that such a senior level official [referring to Vinokurov], under whose mediation this 
agreement was signed, would have simply exploited our tiredness [after two weeks of street protest rallies] 
and would have made us sign an agreement which was disadvantageous for us. But even this 
disadvantageous agreement was not implemented,”3396 
 
February 6, 2012: Medvedev state that Saakashvili, whom he called “insane”, was well aware that the 
Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were capable of “inflicting incommensurable damage 
to any invader.” And that “[Military bases] are now in such a condition that they are capable to protect these 
two small states and correspondingly the Russian interests too in the most powerful way. The weaponry, 
which is in place [on those bases], is enough to inflict incommensurable damage to any invader and they 
understand it, even insane Saakashvili understands it,”3397 He also stated: “As far as militarization of 
Saakashvili’s regime is concerned, I have to say the following[…]To say the truth, this militarization has 
not been stropped even after the so called five-day war [in August, 2008]. Furthermore, we had information, 
that supply of various types of weapons continued through the U.S. administration and some other 
countries, by the way, including our close neighbors, immediately after [the war][…]That’s way we had to 
reinforce military bases, which are located on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They [the 
military bases] are now in such a condition that they are capable to protect these two small states.” 3398.  
Meanwhile, in South Ossetia, Anatoly Bibilov, states that he would not run in the repeat election on March 
25 either3399. 
 
February 9, 2012: Alla Jioyeva is hospitalized after law enforcement agencies raided her office in 
Tskhinvali. Law enforcement officers allegedly arrived at Jioyeva's office after she had refused to appear 
before investigators for "a questioning as a witness" into the case related to "unrests" outside government 
building in Tskhinvali3400. According to the chief prosecutor's office Jioyeva fell ill while "talking" with 
law enforcement officer3401. According to the same source she was immediately hospitalized and diagnosed 
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with "hypertensive crisis", a highly elevated blood pressure that may lead to a stroke3402. Acting leader in 
South Ossetia, Vadim Brovtsev, states that Jioyeva's intention to inaugurate herself on February 10 was 
"actually a call for forceful seizure of power" and that he "assume[s] full responsibility to prevent 
coup[…]Violation of laws will be eradicated in the most decisive way. Additional measures will be 
undertaken to protect law and order and constitutional rights of citizens,"3403. 
 
February 15, 2012: Russian military base in breakaway South Ossetia is creating a new battalion to recruit 
specifically local residents with the battalion called “Ossetian battalion”3404. Georgia stated that it was part 
of ongoing “militarization” of Georgia’s occupied territories by Russia: “Georgia’s occupied territories 
have actually turned into large military bases and and their inhabitants are either employed in the Russian 
military bases themselves or are serving with the Russian occupation troops[…]Additional financial and 
material resources are being allocated for the strengthening of the Russian occupation troops against a 
background of daily accidents in military (including nuclear) facilities [in Russia], which poses a real threat 
to the Russian population as well as to the population of neighbouring countries and indeed to the world as 
a whole"3405. 
 
March 3, 2012: Georgia proposes visa-free travel for Russian citizens which Russia pledged to reciprocate 
by removing the visa requirement for Georgians if Tbilisi can ensure "the safety of Russians visiting 
Georgia."3406. A statement by the Russian foreign ministry also stated that Russia is interested in 
"strengthening ties between the peoples of Russia and Georgia"3407. Saakashvili however stated that in order 
to restore diplomatic ties, Russia must first recognize that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are part of 
Georgia3408. 
 
March 4, 2012: Russia holds presidential elections in which the inhabitants of South Ossetia who have a 
Russian passport participated3409. Putin wins the election3410. 
 
March 5, 2012:  Following his election, Putin states that Russia will not reverse its policy on South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia3411. Saakashvili stated to the Russian presidential election that: “With their current course, 
with their current policy, whatever elections they hold or stage, in case of the present authorities, they have 
no future because they are building the past. They are building the past not only by having restored the 
Soviet anthem or by trying to create or restore a Soviet empire, or by having the slogans of the Eurasian 
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on an existing Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan]. They are mentally taking their country back 
to the past. We are building the future and it means that we will definitely achieve everything,”3412.  
 
March 25, 2012: South Ossetia holds presidential elections3413  
 
April 9, 2012: Leonid Tibilov, a former head of South Ossetia's KGB is declared the winner of the 
presidential election with just over 54 percent of the vote3414 
 
April 12, 2012:  Russia recommends its citizens “to refrain from traveling” to Georgia because of “absence 
of security” for the Russian citizens3415. This comes following the criminal persecution of three citizens of 
Russia for violating Georgia’s law on occupied territories3416. Russia has previously called on Georgia to 
lift the law3417.  
 
August 8, 2012: Putin states that Russia had worked out a plan in 2006 for dealing with a potential conflict 
in Georgia as he stated: "The plan [for potential armed conflict with Georgia] was prepared by the General 
Staff at the end of 2006 or at the beginning of 2007 and I approved it"3418. He also stated that part of the 
plan included training local groups in South Ossetia to help Russian troops in the event that open hostilities 
broke out with Georgia3419. 
 
August 15, 2012: Georgia accuses South Ossetia of intentionally tearing down Georgian villages in South 
Ossetia3420. According to Refworld, Leonid Tibilov allegedly stated that the villages would be stripped of 
their names as “the settlements will not exist."3421. Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kapanadze 
criticized South Ossetia and Russia for what he called a "continuation of the ethnic cleansing." 3422. 
 
April 26, 2012: Saakashvili states that he is ready to resign if Russia withdraws its troops from Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia and he also accused Russia of trying to replace the government in Tbilisi with one that 
would "legitimize" what he called the "occupation" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia3423. 
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June 19, 2012: Georgia's Ministry of Education states that it is ready to provide free university education 
to all residents of Georgia's two separatist regions who have obtained "status-neutral" documents3424. The 
status-neutral internal and travel documents for the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were 
announced earlier this year, in accordance with the state strategy on what it calls its "occupied 
territories."3425. Officials in South Ossetia and Abkhazia however condemned Georgia's new " status-neutral 
" documents after U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in Tbilisi recently that U.S. authorities would 
recognize the new documents3426. 
 
July 16, 2012: Georgia states that Russia is engaged in “intensive militarization” in the breakaway 
regions3427. Georgia amongst other points to a recent visit by the head of Russian ground forces General 
Vladimir Chirkin to the areas3428. In a statement, Georgia stated that Russia "has nothing to offer the 
Caucasus except criminal, mafia-style rule and militarization." 3429. 
 
August 26, 2012: Abkhazia and South Ossetia mark their Independence Day3430. It was the fourth year 
since Russia’s recognition of the entities3431. In South Ossetia, Tibilov handed out awards to "citizens who 
made contributions to the establishment and strengthening of sovereignty" and talked of the areas "unbroken 
spirit" and called its people citizens of a "heroic nation."3432.  
 
August 28, 2012: Gunfire is exchanged between Georgian security forces and Islamic group along the 
Russian border at the Georgia Lopota mountain gorge, close to Russia’s Dagestan3433. The Islamic group 
allegedly took hostages and the incident led to the death of three Georgian forces and 11 militants3434. To 
the incident, Saakashvili stated that "instability in a neighboring country will never affect[…]Another 
attempt to export a new wave of tension and instability into Georgia from our northern neighbor will be 
stopped at the very beginning."3435.  
 
September 18, 2012:  Russia holds a military exercise near the area where Russia entered into Georgia in 
20083436. To the soldiers, Putin stated: “You are all educated people, you see what is happening in the world. 
You see unfortunately that the use of force is increasing in international affairs[…]That all speaks to the 
fact that we should keep our powder dry and that Russia’s defenses must improve,”3437. The exercise will 
involve 8000 security personnel3438  
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September 22, 2012: During a Geneva talk on the security and human rights repercussions of the August 
2008 war, South Ossetian representatives accused Georgia of engaging in a new military buildup which 
they fear signaled a new attack against the entity3439. The EUMM stated that it had not observed such 
activity but that it had observed a concentration of Russian forces along the administrative line3440. Georgia 
expressed its concern about the Russian troops and asked for the international community to convey to 
Russia that such an “aggressive posture” was unacceptable3441. The EU’s special representative for Georgia, 
met with Leonid Tibilov who stated that he had: "very serious information about Georgia's current 
intentions. Specifically, the Georgian Defense Ministry is building fortifications on the territory that borders 
on [South Ossetia's] Leningori raion. Stores for firearms are being created in all Georgian border 
villages."3442. Georgia also referred to the Kavkaz-2012 war games which took place on its northern borders 
with Russia as an attempt by Russia to destabilize the situation in Georgia in the run up to the parliamentary 
elections in October3443. Russia stated that "in order to preclude additional tensions in relations with some 
of our neighbors," no units from the Russian military bases in Armenia, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia would 
participate in the maneuvers3444. 
 
October 2, 2012: Saakashvili admits defeat following parliamentary election stating that opposition leader 
Bidzina Ivanishvili will form a new government3445. Russia applauded the new government with Putin’s 
spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, stating: "We are definitely looking forward for a fresh, new non-hostile, sober 
leadership in Georgia[…]If they have more political wisdom under a new leadership, then lots and lots of 
new roads can be opened for the country." 3446. 
 
October 26, 2012: Georgia's new foreign minister, Maia Panjikidze, stated that the new government will 
continue the policy of refraining from formal diplomatic relations with Moscow until Russia ends its 
"occupation" of two breakaway Georgian regions3447. As she stated: "Twenty percent of Georgian territory 
is occupied by Russia, and Russia is the country that is occupying Georgia[…]It opened two embassies in 
Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, and as long as what I have said remains a fact, diplomatic relations with Russia 
will not be restored. Despite the fact that we don't have diplomatic relations, it's possible to have a dialogue, 
just as the former government was able to work with Russia in different spheres." 3448. 
 
October 31, 2012: The parliament of South Ossetia has adopted a law on Ossetian surnames3449. The law 
introduced a mechanism for creating traditional Ossetian surnames for those wishing to do so with 
traditional Ossetian surnames which end on "-ty," "-ti," and "-on." being able to now replace the Georgian 
endings "-shvili" and "-dze" and the Russian endings "-ov" and "-ova."3450.  
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November 2, 2012: The new Georgian prime minister's envoy to Russia says that talks with Moscow should 
be held in a new format stating that "a new, independent format for Moscow-Tbilisi talks" should be adopted 
"to discuss a broader range of issues: security, regional issues, the economy and trade ties."3451. The new 
prime minister stated that it was up to Russia to accept the new format, which could include talks on 
Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia3452.  
 
December 12, 2012: The 22 round of Geneva talks are held with a new team of negotiators from 




February 2, 2013: Georgia’s Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze states that Russia's occupation of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia is a threat to regional and European stability and also stated that Georgia attached "great 
importance to the return of the [OSCE] mission."3455.  
 
February 5, 2013: Georgia’s Prime Minister criticizes Saakashvili and states that he intends to establish 
relations with Russia3456. He amongst other noted: "We control the situation, and nobody in Georgia will 
be able to stir it up again. Believe me, Saakashvili's era is over in Georgia, the era of lies is over in 
Georgia[…]And I ask you very much to calm down and restore our mental balance[…]We have every 
opportunity to settle relations with our big neighbor. It will not happen quickly, I have to say it again. We 
are aware of it, as it was clear in the past as well, but we should try our utmost to do it as quickly as 
possible[…]Our hope is growing that we will be able to restore both our territorial integrity and friendly 
relations with Russia[…]As for those big steps forward, which you all expect regarding changes in the 
situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the change in the attitude of the Abkhaz and Ossetian 
population [toward us], this will take more time, but a good beginning makes a good ending"3457. 
 
February 25, 2013: A second meeting on the normalization of Russia-Georgia relations is expected to be 
held in Prague on March 1 which will focus on, according to Georgia, the restoration of "economic, 
transport, humanitarian, and cultural ties."3458 The first meeting was held in December3459.  
 
March 2, 2013: Georgian and Russian officials state that Russia is considering easing visa rule for Georgian 
citizens with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin stating: "Recently, we have expanded the 
possibilities for different categories of Georgian citizens to visit the Russian Federation[…]We shall try to 
figure out how else we can ease the regime."3460 
 
3451 “Georgian Envoy Wants New Format For Russia Talks” RadioFreeEurope, November 2, 2012, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/georgian-envoy-wants-new-format-for-russia-talks/24759183.html  
3452 Ibid 
3453 “Twenty Second Round of Geneva Talks” Old Civil, December 13, 2012, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25542  
3454 Ibid 
3455 Charles Recknagel “Georgia Calls Russia's Occupation A Threat To Stability” RadioFreeEurope, February 2, 
2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-russia-occupation-munich/24891359.html  
3456 “Georgian PM Criticizes Saakashvili, Pledges To Restore Russian Relations” RadioFreeEurope, February 5, 
2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-ivanishvili/24893497.html  
3457 Ibid 
3458 “Second Meeting On Georgia-Russia Relations To Be Held In Prague” RadioFreeEurope, February 25, 2013, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-russia-prague-meeting/24912115.html  
3459 Ibid 





March 8, 2013: The Georgian parliament adopts a resolution which reconfirms its European and Euro-
Atlantic course stating that Georgia should not have "diplomatic relations or be in a military, political, 
customs alliance" with a state that recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia3461. 
 
March 22, 2013: A 12-day joint Georgian-U.S. military exercises is undertaken at Georgia's Vaziani 
military base3462. Russia criticized the exercise stating that is was "actually a cause for concern." And also 
accused Georgia of "refusing to come to terms with the new political realities"3463. It also added that any 
foreign military support for Georgia "will further complicate the prospects for improving peace and security 
in the region."3464.  
 
April, 2013: Georgia's chief prosecutor sets up a working group to investigate the legal basis for the conflict 
with Russia with the Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili indicating that the investigation could lead to legal 
proceedings against Saakashvili: "I think that the cause of this war must be investigated[…]There are a lot 
of questions about it."3465. Ivanishvili accused Saakashvili and its government of "inadequate" actions 
before Russian troops ever entered South Ossetia and stated: "I think it was unjustified for military units to 
act and launch operations before the Russians crossed the border"3466. Saakashvili's government has insisted 
that the decision to send in troops was provoked by South Ossetian attacks and by the covert arrival of 
Russian forces3467. Saakashvili responded to the comment by the Prime Minister by warning him to not 
spread: "the lie that Georgia started the war"3468.   
 
April 1, 2013: Russia condemns Georgia’s statement in which it expressed “grave concern” over Russia’s 
snap military exercises in the Black Sea, stating: “Georgian side’s ‘grave concern’ about the exercises has 
a far-fetched nature. It is especially obvious against the background of a quite adequate reaction from rest 
of the international community[…]I think it is yet another unconvincing attempt to conceal actual state of 
affairs – Georgia, which launched military conflict in the Caucasus in 2008, continues evading entering 
into a binding agreement on security guarantees with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have been targets 
of Tbilisi’s threats and aggressive actions for many years[…]Inflating publicly Russian threat for the 
purpose of covering up its own confrontational policies is not a new trick employed by the Georgian side. 
It is quite enough to recall a months-long hype about last year’s scheduled Russian exercises [Kavkaz-
2012], which as if were posing ‘a deadly threat to Georgia’. The fact that Tbilisi continues applying such 
formulaic propaganda stunts, to say it directly, fits badly with the statements about having an aspiration to 
normalize ties with Russia,”3469. Georgia stated previously in the end of March that it was “alarmed by the 
unexpected, provocative activity of the Russian troops”, involving snap military drills in the Black Sea, and 
said that this action “runs contrary to the interests of stability and predictability in the European 
neighborhood.”3470 
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April 11, 2013: Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov welcomed the pragmatism of Georgian Prime 
Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili's government and said Moscow is ready to expand ties with Tbilisi3471. He 
however also stated that Russia will not revise the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia stating: 
"There will be no Russian politician to say we should go back to what it was[…]That can't be, no matter 
what you think about it."3472.  
 
April 27, 2013: Irakli Alasania, Georgian defense minister, states in an interview: “We don't have any 
illusion that Russia will change its policy toward Georgia on its territorial integrity or our aspirations to 
join NATO. But we want to get breathing space by calming the rhetoric so we can develop ourselves. We 
want to tone down the rhetoric so we can have a workable relationship on trade, so we can develop our 
institutions and our economy and give ourselves more space to deal with the Abkhaz and the Ossetians. 
This is the idea. We call it a realistic approach to Russia”3473.  
 
May 31, 2013: Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili states that a dispute about Georgia's administrative 
boundary with South Ossetia will be discussed at Russian-Georgian talks scheduled for June 53474. He also 
stated that a recent dispute over the installation of a fence was "misunderstanding rather than policy," and 
that "we have to be patient, everything will be clarified."3475. He also noted that there was no need "to go 
into hysteria" and that the breakaway regions "will be returned in several years."3476.  
 
June 5, 2013: Georgian PM’s special representative for relations with Russia, Zurab Abashidze, meets with 
Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Grigory Karasin for the third meeting trade, economy, humanitarian and 
cultural aspects of bilateral relations3477. To this Russia stated: “In overall the constructive and friendly 
atmosphere [in bilateral meetings] allowed to move forward on number of practical issues,” 3478 
 
August 8, 2013: Georgia marks the anniversary of conflict in 20083479. South Ossetia meanwhile urged 
Georgia to sign an agreement on the nonuse of force "to ease tensions in the border territories and create 
prerequisites for building trust between the two countries."3480. Medvedev in a speech stated: "I think our 
armed forces and our whole country did a noble deed[…][We] showed firmness defending the lives of our 
people, essentially saving a people from annihilation, and creating conditions for ensuring a peaceful path 
for the development of South Ossetia and Abkhazia."3481. Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Alasania, stated: 
"It's been five years since the conflict, but the wounds are still very sore for all of us -- for Georgians but I 
think for Ossetians too[…]In fact, it was certainly possible to avoid that conflict, which had been brewing 
for several years. However, considering the deployment of Russian troops in the North Caucasus in the 
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months prior [to the armed conflict] and the processes that had taken place in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali 
region [South Ossetia], I think it was already too late to influence those processes." 3482. 
 
In an interview, Saakashvili claims that Georgia was ready to trade NATO membership for Russian 
assistance with the breakaway regions3483. As he stated: "We told [Putin] that we were ready to say 'no' to 
NATO," but "Putin did not even think for a minute" about the proposal3484. As he further stated: "[Putin] 
smiled and said, 'We do not exchange your territories for your geopolitical orientation[…]And it meant 'we 
will chop off your territories anyway.'"3485. According to Saakashvili, from Russia's point of view, the war 
in 2008 could only have been prevented if Georgia had "become a failed state."3486. He also stated that 
reestablishing friendly relations with Russia was impossible as Georgia would never give up its territories, 
which he described as "occupied by Russia."3487. Dmitri Medvedev also appeared on television the day prior 
to Saakashvili stating that he stood by his decision to send troops to South Ossetia: "l tell you this: I made 
this decision, and I believe it was the only right thing to do in that particular situation[…]There are no 
conditions for reconsidering this decision. That would be a bad mistake[…]If there's a state which is a 
member of another military-political alliance whose nuclear missiles are aimed at targets located on Russian 
territory, we cannot welcome this," ..."This is our national approach[…]You [Georgia] have got yours. Our 
national approach is as follows: Russia is a very large country with a huge nuclear arsenal – we cannot 
ignore this." 3488. 
 
August 9, 2013: Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili states that Georgia is ready for "direct 
dialogue with our Ossetian and Abkhazian brothers" and that Georgia should have the strength "to forgive" 
but also to admit its "own mistakes."3489.  
 
September 13, 2013: Georgia's Foreign Ministry protests Russia's plan to sign a treaty delineating its 
border with Georgia's breakaway region of South Ossetia3490. 
 
September 17, 2013: Russian forces in South Ossetia allegedly renewed erecting fences and barbed wire 
in the Georgian village of Ditsi, which is located on the southern edge of the Russian-occupied Georgian 
region3491. The occupation line was allegedly moved hundreds of feet deeper into Georgian-controlled 
territories, cutting off the village residents' access to a local cemetery and an irrigation reservoir3492. The 
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September 24, 2013: Protestors have clashed in the Georgian capital of Tblisi. Whereas some of them 
argued for the re-establishment of ties with Russia others rejected this3494.  
 
October 1, 2013: Georgia seeks to rally international support against what they claim to be creeping 
borderization, where the territory of South Ossetia is expanding with the help of Russian troops3495. At the 
UNGA, Saakashvili stated: "The annexation of Georgian lands by Russian troops continues[…]Despite the 
friendly statements made by the new Georgian government in recent weeks and months, the Russian 
military keeps advancing its positions, dividing communities with new barbed wire and threatening our 
economy." 3496. The Georgian foreign ministry also condemned Russia stating: "The foreign ministry 
appeals to our partner countries and to international organisations to take effective and appropriate steps to 
end the illegal activities of the Russian occupying power."3497. The borderization issue has sparked concerns 
in Georgia that Russia and South Ossetia will take over land where the Baku-Supsa oil pipe runs, which 
serves as important revenue source for Georgia3498. To this Saakahsvili also noted: "The Russian military 
keeps[…]moving towards the vital Baku-Supsa pipeline, approaching ever closer to this important route 
and thus placing in question the very sustainability of our country"3499. 
 
October 14, 2013: Russia lifts restrictions on Georgian fruit import after a seven-year ban3500.  
 
October 27, 2013: Georgia holds presidential elections3501. Giorgi Margvelashvili, the candidate of the 
ruling Georgian Dream coalition, wins with 62% of the votes3502.  
 
November 6, 2013: Georgia accuses Russia of erected borders between South Ossetia and Georgia3503. The 
borders are allegedly positioned in accordance to a map from 1921 causing Russia to grab extra land3504. 
Russia however stated that South Ossetia was merely establishing its true borders by using Soviet maps3505. 
Georgia states that the border issue is used by Russia to pressure Georgia on an EU trade agreement and 
states that the fences are separating families and homes, as stated by Ketevan Tsikhlevashvili, Georgia’s 
deputy minister for reintegration: “The fences are separating people’s houses from their land, they’re 
separating family members, in some cases they’ve gone right through people’s homes,” 3506. 
 
 
3494 “Protesters clash over Russia in Tblisi, Georgia” Euronews, September 24, 2013, 
https://www.euronews.com/2013/09/24/protesters-clash-over-russia-in-tblisi-georgia  







3500 “Russian Imports Of Georgian Fruit Resume After Seven Years” RadioFreeEurope, October 14, 2013, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-georgia-fruit-imports/25136096.html  
3501 Associated Press “Georgia goes to the polls for presidential election” The Guardian, October 27, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/27/georgia-presidential-election-mikhail-saakashvili  
3502 “OSCE Praises Georgia Vote; Margvelashvili Declared Runaway Victor” RadioFreeEurope, October 28, 2013, 
https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-election-osce-margvelashvili/25150602.html  







November 17, 2013: Giorgi Margvelashvili is sworn in as the new president of Georgia3507. In his speech 
he stated: "Despite the difficult situation we are facing today and in parallel with integration into European 
and Euro-Atlantic structures, we reiterate our commitment to further dialogue with Russia and building 
confidence to solve the problems that exist today[…]This dialogue will be built upon unequivocal respect 
for Georgia’s national interests, i.e. respect for our internationally recognized borders and the principles of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty[…]Our offer to our compatriots living in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali 
region is as follows: let us build a successful democratic country together, a country that will guarantee the 
welfare of all citizens, preservation of their ethnic and cultural identity, and respect for their political 
rights[…]As president of Georgia, the ruling party and I assume responsibility for implementing this 
policy."3508.  
November 26, 2013: Russian troops install a boundary marker in Gogeti village near Georgia's border with 




January 8, 2014: A political party in South Ossetia “The Yedinaya Osetiya” (One Ossetia) not registered 
I the parliament and headed by Anatoly Bibilov, asks Tibilov to schedule a referendum, held alongside 
parliamentary elections in June, on the unification between North and South Ossetia inside Russia3510.  
 
January 16, 2014: Georgia’s Prime Minister states that he expects provocations from Russia ahead of 
Georgia’s signing of the EU’s Association Agreement3511. 
 
March 27, 2014: The 27 round of Geneva talks are held where discussions amongst other revolved around 
“the resumption of installation of fences and other obstacles along the administrative boundary lines, as 
well as alleged airspace violations”3512. Georgian chief negotiator, stated that Russia’s recent moves in 
Ukraine demonstrated once again the need for Moscow to reciprocate to Tbilisi’s unilateral non-use of force 
pledge made in 2010: “Today when we are witnessing growing assertiveness of Russia in its efforts to 
prevent neighboring countries from realizing their free foreign policy choice through violating their 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-use of force[…]commitment from the Russian side constitutes to 
a minimal mechanism preventing further aggression,”3513 
 
May 12, 2014: Five Georgian citizens where released from South Ossetia3514. They stated that they had to 
pay $60 as a fine for "illegally crossing the administrative boundary" with South Ossetia3515. According to 
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RFE/RL's Georgian Service, Russian troops patrolling the boundary have arrested 18 Georgians in the 
villages near to the boundary in the last two weeks and 13 Georgian nationals remain in custody3516.   
 
May 2014: Russian journalists report finding South Ossetians fighting in the separatist areas in Ukraine 
and in May a South Ossetian official allegedly announced a sign-up campaign in Tskhinvali for volunteers 
to go to Ukraine3517. South Ossetia however denied the presence of any South Ossetians in "any of the hot 
spots on the planet"3518. Tibilov later warned of the populist call for fighting in Ukraine which could be 
used by outsiders to accuse Russia of interfering in the internal affairs of Ukraine3519.   
June 3, 2014: South Ossetia’s president, Leonid Tibilov, states that South Ossetia will, when the 
"appropriate time" comes "the divided South Ossetian people should be united" with North Ossetia. He also 
stated that:  "integration is a serious preparatory stage in resolving the issue of accession to Russia."3520 
 
June 8, 2014: South Ossetia holds parliamentary elections which are declared illegal by Georgia3521. The 
vote was eventually won by the pro-Russian party Yedinaya Osetiya – or United Ossetia – with about 44% 
of the vote3522. The party has called for a referendum on unification with Russia3523. 
 
June 16, 2014: Georgia signs an Association Agreement with the EU3524.  
 
July 9, 2014: In an interview Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvilitalks about the signing of the EU 
association agreement and the breakaway regions. Asked whether Georgia would leave South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia behind he stated: “Of course we are not leaving them behind. In my speech to the European 
Council, I sent a clear message to our brothers and sisters, Abhkazians and Ossetians, that we offer them to 
share with us this process. We offer Abhkazians and Ossetians to share with us all the benefits that the 
European AA will bring. They will be able, for example, to travel with Georgian passports, without visa, 
very soon[…]Here is my vision: when our brothers and sisters, Ossetians and Abkhazians will see those 
big changes in our country, in Georgia; developing infrastructure, agriculture, educational programmes, 
improved healthcare and social conditions – they will also want to one day join and reconcile.”3525 
 
July 18, 2014: A court in South Ossetia has sentenced a Georgian national to 10 years and two months in 
jail for espionage and illegal weapons possession3526. The man allegedly provided information to the 
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November 4, 2014: South Ossetia allegedly tightens restrictions on freedom of movement for ethnic 
Georgians with South Ossetia announcing that as of January 1, 2015, the existing permits necessary for 
local Georgians to travel to Tbilisi-controlled proper will be replaced by South Ossetian "passports."3528. In 
order to obtain such passports Georgians must renounce their Georgian citizenship and refugee status3529. 
South Ossetia also warned that those who did not renounce their citizenship would have to abandon their 
homes in Akhalgori3530. The Akhalgori District is mainly populated by ethnic Georgians and it came under 
the full control of the separatist authorities after 20083531. 
November 5, 2014: The tunnel connecting South Ossetia and Russia is reopened following 
reconstruction3532. South Ossetia’s president, Leonid Tibilov stated that tunnel "will strengthen South 
Ossetia's relations with its strategic partner, Russia." And called it "a road of life."3533. The Russian 
Transport Ministry has said the reconstruction, which started in 2010, had cost Moscow more than $400 
million3534. 
November 15, 2014: Demonstrations in Tbilisi erupts with protesters protesting against Russia’s support 
for Abkhazia and South Ossetia3535. The protesters also showed support for Ukraine over the annexation of 
Crimea3536. The latest proposed treaty between Russia and Abkhazia, which would create a "common 
defense infrastructure" and combined armed forces is one of the issues being protested3537.  
December 11, 2014: Tibilov addresses the volunteers from South Ossetia who participated in the military 
actions in Donbass saying that it is time for them to return: “At present, our friends in the Donetsk People’s 
Republic (DPR) and Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) are shifting to formation of the state power 
institutions, a new stage of their development. Your mission is nearing completion[…]As the Supreme 
Commander I have not ordered to send you to Novorossiya. You left your peaceful life for justice by your 
own volition. But as the head of the state, I urge your today to return to your motherland”3538. Meanwhile 
the 30 round of Geneva talks are held in which the sides amongst other discussed a treaty on “alliance and 




January, 2015: In its first quarterly report on the human rights situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
Georgia states: “As a result of military aggression, creeping annexation and occupation policy, well-planned 
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and systematically implemented by the Russian Federation regarding the territory of Georgia, between 1991 
and 2015 several hundreds of thousands of persons were expelled from their homes to become IDPs and 
refugees and they have been deprived of their internationally recognized right to a voluntary, safe and 
dignified return to places of their permanent residence.1 Currently, the territories of two regions of Georgia 
– Abkhazia, Georgia and the Tskhinvali Region, Georgia are occupied by the Russian Federation. The 
Russian Federation as the occupying power, exercises effective control over these territories. The 
occupation of regions of Georgia by the Russian Federation has been recognized by the international 
community. It should be noted with particular emphasis, that recently the Russian Federation signed the so 
called “Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership" with its occupation regime in Sokhumi and the so 
called “Treaty on Alliance and Integration” with its occupation regime in Tskhinvali: thus going well 
beyond its military occupation and laying ground for annexation of Georgian territories”3540 
 
January 28, 2015: The Luhansk People’s Republic recognize the independence of South Ossetia with the 
head of the republic stating: “Ossetia has already recognized the independence of the LPR. We are making 
a return move and suggesting to recognize the Republic of South Ossetia as a sovereign country, as well as 
to establish diplomatic relations with it,” 3541. 
 
January 29, 2015: Georgian Foreign Minister Tamar Beruchashvili warns that Russia could annex the 
South Ossetia as it did with Crimea3542. In an interview she stated: "the next move is on [South] Ossetia; 
there are signals that the Crimea-like scenario could be repeated and South Ossetia could be annexed.". She 
also stated that South Ossetia could hold a similar referendum as in Crimea as a show of support from the 
local population, and stated: "That can be well organized, it's not a problem for Russia,"3543. South Ossetia’s 
president, Leonid Tibilov, has stated that Russia and South Ossetia would sign an agreement in the coming 
months aimed at strengthening ties3544. To this, Georgia’s Foreign Minister stated that the substance of that 
agreement would involve "more integration" with Russia and would provide, as she further stated: "a new 
opportunity of absorbing these territories in the military, economic, social orbit of Russia[…]There will be 
Russian pensions for the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia." 3545. She also stated that Russia’s support 
for South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Moldova's breakaway Transdniester region "are components of one big 
strategy of Russia” 3546 
 
January 30, 2015: The Georgian First Deputy Foreign Minister meets the EU Special Representative for 
the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia where it is stated: “The Georgian side once again expressed 
concern over the so called draft "treaty on alliance and integration" between the Russian Federation and the 
Tskhinvali occupation regime and underlined that this step, following the so called "treaty on alliance and 
strategic partnership singed with the Sokhumi regime, will be assessed as a factual annexation of Georgian 
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territories. It was also underscored that signing of the so-called "treaty" will hamper the progress on 
concrete issues within the Geneva International Discussions and will have a negative impact on the security 
situation in Georgia and the wider region, thus once again demonstrating the urgent necessity of 
international security arrangements on the ground.”3547 
February 18, 2015: Russia and South Ossetia sign an Agreement on the State Border between South 
Ossetia and Russia, which formalizes relations between the two3548. As a response to this the South Ossetian 
embassy in Russia stated: “The major goal of the document is to grant an international and legal status to 
the South Ossetia – Russia border as well as create conditions for enhancing the friendly and good-
neighbored relations between South Ossetia and Russia,”3549. In addition, Russia’s foreign minister stated 
that the agreement dismissed Georgia’s claims of Russian intentions of: "annexation" and "accession." 
"Such a document is of cornerstone importance in the inter-state relations between neighboring countries. 
We hope that this will dispel insinuations disseminated by the Georgian side that an alleged 'annexation', 
'merger', 'accession of South Ossetia ' is being prepared. The aim of such speculations is to discredit Russian 
policy in the South Caucasus and to distort the essence of its cooperation with young republics. Russia’s 
relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia will continue developing on an equitable and mutually respectful 
basis,"3550. Georgia criticized the agreement stating that it was: "yet another action directed against the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia."3551. The statement from Georgia also noted that Russia 
"vainly attempts to conceal the de facto annexation" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia3552. 
 
March 12, 2015:  Russia holds military exercises in Crimea, Abkhazia and South Ossetia3553. 
 
March 18, 2015: Russia and South Ossetia sign a “Treaty on Alliance and Integration” which will amongst 
other: “establish a common defense and security space, allow free movement across the Russia-South 
Ossetia border, integrate their customs services, develop cooperation between their interior ministries, and 
simplify the procedures for obtaining Russian citizenship”3554. Putin stated that the agreement would 
strengthen their partnership and the leader of South Ossetia stated: “We know that the Russian Federation 
is our people and republic’s only guarantor, and I am particularly happy that this event is taking place today, 
on what is such a symbolic date in the Russian people’s life. It was exactly a year ago that the agreement 
was signed by which the people of Crimea and Sevastopol, having expressed their free will, found their 
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Motherland. We welcomed that decision right from the first. South Ossetia welcomes all of Russia’s 
political decisions and we always stand at your side” 3555.  
 
March 19, 2015: The 31 round of Geneva talks are held in which the EU, UN and OSCE envoys states that 
the signing of an “integration” treaty between Russia and South Ossetia on the same day created “a difficult 
climate” in the discussions3556. Georgia expressed its concern over the Agreement of Alliance and 
Integration signed between South Ossetia and Russia with President of Georgia Giorgi Margvelashvili 
stating: “We are extremely outraged over signing the so-called ‘Treaty on the Alliance and Integration’ 
between the Russian Federation and the occupational regime of Tskhinvali. This step, taken against 
territorial integrity of the sovereign state, further aggravates the occurred situation after occupation and 
leads to the annexation,” 3557 Leonid Tibilov states it is "no secret" the idea of joining Russia "exists among 
our people," but added there are "many concerns" and he will not now "try to implement" the idea3558. He 
also stated that South Ossetia will "make steps appropriate not only for [itself] but also for Russia." 3559. 
 
May 12, 2015: The Donetsk People’s Republic recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia3560 
 
May 18, 2015: According to South Ossetia the development of state border infrastructure in the area has 
assisted in diffusing tensions and decreasing incidents3561. South Ossetia’s statement comes as a response 
to a statement of the Council of Europe, which states that the treaties between South Ossetia and Russia 
violates international law and the territorial integrity of Georgia3562. South Ossetia further stated: “To 
develop, the Republic of South like any other country needs reliable security. The agreement between South 
Ossetia and Russia pursued security goals. As threats from Georgia grow, the Republic of South Ossetia 
sees extensive cooperation and coordinated actions with the Russian Federation as the only way to develop 
its defense security[…]To contribute to the peace in the region, they should show Tbilisi the only right way 
– to accept the reality and sign a legally binding document on the non-use of force and launch a direct, 
constructive dialogue with the authorities of the South Ossetia”3563 . 
 
July 2, 2015: Geneva talks are held once again where Russia raised the issue of Georgia’s NATO 
integration stating that it posed “security threat to the South Caucasus” and hence is in conflict with the 
provisions of the August 2008 ceasefire agreement3564. Russia noted that “regular military exercises on the 
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Georgian territory with the recent one held with the participation of the American troops and military 
hardware in an immediate proximity from the South Ossetian border” is of “particular concern” 3565. 
 
July 22, 2015: Russian Foreign Ministry denies the Georgian accusations that it has violated Georgia’s 
territory by placing border markers on the edge of South Ossetia3566. Georgia’s Foreign Ministry stated 
previously that part of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline was now in territory occupied by Russia3567. 
 
August 19, 2015: Georgia’s President Giorgi Margvelashvili condemns Russia's military exercises in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia stating that: "it is unacceptable to carry out military maneuvers on occupied 
Georgian territory."3568 
 
August 25, 2015: Dr Evgenny Buzhinsky, former Russian ministry of defence’s liaison with Nato states 
that “Russian military planners believe Georgian leaders would take Nato membership as a green light to 
retake the Moscow-backed enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force, leading to a potentially more 
deadly re-run of that conflict”3569. As he stated: “If Georgia joined Nato tomorrow, in two days they would 
attack Abkhazia. We would respond, as we are obliged to by our agreements with Abkhazia. Then Nato 
would have to decide what to do[…]I hope someone is thinking about that.”3570. 
 
August 27, 2015: Vladislav Surkov congratulates President of South Ossetia Leonid Tibilov on the Day of 
Recognition of the State Independence of the South Ossetia Republic and states: “South Ossetia has passed 
a serious path of post-war restoration, social and economic development, and state building. I am sure that 
with implementation of the Alliance and Integration Treaty, the partnership relations of our countries will 
attain a new quality. The Russian Federation will keep supporting and assisting South Ossetia,”3571.  
 
October 20, 2015: The leader of South Ossetia has proposed a referendum on whether the separatist area 
should join Russia, with South Ossetia stating that “reunification” with Russia is an ancient dream3572. The 
leader of the area also stated: “The political reality is that we have to make a historic choice to be reunited 
with brotherly Russia[…]to ensure the security and prosperity of our country and our people” 3573. Russian 
state duma deputy Leonid Slutsky stated: “In principle we understand Mr Tibilov’s motivation, but I 
wouldn’t make any guesses before the referendum takes place[…]Next we must put our heads together to 
discuss whether this is necessary. We have to understand that the response from the international 
community will be absolutely explosive.” 3574. 
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December 10, 2015: Georgia states that Russia has violated its airspace with a military helicopter and that 
the violation threatens regional stability3575. Russia denies the allegation stating: “During recent days over 
the territory adjoining the Georgian border, Russian military helicopters haven’t made any flights,”3576.  
 
December 30, 2015: Tibilov states that the referendum should take place "long before" the presidential 
elections due in April 20173577. He also proposed renaming the region “The republic of South Ossetia – 





January 27, 2016: The ICC authorizes an investigation into possible war crimes committed in 2008, stating 
that it has "a reasonable basis to believe" that crimes against humanity and war crimes were committed3579. 
The prosecutor stated that there was evidence of the killing of peacekeepers on both sides as well as there 
were indications that South Ossetian forces had killed Georgian civilians3580. Georgia welcomed the 
investigation stating that it would give Georgia an opportunity to prove that Russia and its proxy separatist 
forces in South Ossetia "committed ethnic cleansing of Georgians" and were responsible for killing 
Georgian prisoners of war3581. 
 
March 21, 2016: Russia warns that the “sharply intensified anti-Russian” rhetoric by Georgia is damaging 
ongoing “normalization” of bilateral ties and is also having adverse effect on the Geneva international 
discussions3582. 
 
April 11, 2016: Leonid Tibilov states that South Ossetia is planning to hold a referendum about whether to 
join the Russian Federation3583. Whereas the first referendum in 1992 asked whether South Ossetia wanted 
to join Russia (allegedly 99% voted yes) the referendum in 2006 asked whether South Ossetia wanted 
independence from Georgia (again an overwhelming agreement) this referendum will ask whether South 
Ossetia should join Russia3584.  
 
April 15, 2016: South Ossetia’s leader Tibilov states that they did not expect Russia to respond to the South 
Ossetian request for unification due to the current geopolitical context, as he stated: “At the present time, 
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based on the situation in the world, we would not want to expose our Russian strategic partner to serious 
political risks[…]I am 100 percent sure that our people will say “yes”. And, of course, with our constitution 
amended, we can safely turn to Russia’s senior management. Let’s wait for the moment when “the stars 
align”, so we can begin to implement the referendum’s results”3585. During the “direct line with Vladimir 
Putin”, Putin stated that Russia could not interfere with the initiatives taken by South Ossetia: “We haven’t 
discussed this topic [on accession to the Russian Federation] with the president of South Ossetia in detail. 
He told me his thoughts on the issue, he said that the people of South Ossetia wanted to hold such a 
referendum and I think we can’t oppose it. We’re not being held back by anything, except the very interests 
of the South Ossetian people. However, we don’t know yet what will be used as a basis for the referendum 
or how the questions will be formulated. We will continue our considerations on this issue based on 
that”3586. He however also stated that South Ossetia – Russia relations were not based on unification talks, 
stating: “We’re not considering our relations with South Ossetia in such a context[…]I believe that it was 
a cardinal strategic error on behalf of the former president of Georgia, who initiated the famous armed 
action, which was fully unjustified, and as a result he lost this territory.” 3587 
 
May 6, 2016: A scheduled military exercise by Georgia and the US is condemned by Russia who states 
that it was a provocative step which could destabilize the region3588.  
 
May 12, 2016: Georgians living in regions adjoining the breakaway territory of South Ossetia are again 
unable to pay their traditional Easter visit to the graves of loved ones buried across the administrative 
border3589. South Ossetian residents can use their Russian passports to visit cemeteries in Georgia and access 
education or medical treatment across the administrative border3590. However, residents living on the other 
side of the border have to apply for access, which is usually denied3591. A local Georgian, who har repeatedly 
appalled to the Russian border guards but were turned away stated: "What kind of Christians are they? They 
could allow us to go at least for one day. After all, the cemetery is right here[…]My parents are buried 
there, our church is there, but they do not allow us [to go there]." 3592. Georgian citizens who cross the border 
on purpose or by accident is often seized by Russian border guards and charged with breaching the 
border3593. As stated by Ani Mirotadze, a lawmaker from the ruling Georgian Dream coalition: "It is part of 
their (Russian side) agenda to occupy Georgia[…]They are not satisfied with what is happening on our 
territory, and they want to have a certain influence in Georgia. We use all communications to avoid 
provocations and to not give Russia the opportunity again to draw us into a bloody conflict, which is most 
likely what they wish." 3594. 
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June 6, 2016: Georgia states that Russia’s creeping annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia goes 
unnoticed as focus is turned towards Ukraine3595. Georgia’s deputy foreign minister states: “They are doing 
it more smoothly [than in Crimea], and that makes it more difficult for us to alert the international 
community and to introduce preventative measures[…]What happened in Crimea was broadcast live. But 
the international press is not interested if there is no shooting, killing, bombing. Thankfully there is no open 
war but there is no peace either.”3596 





January 24, 2017: Zakharia Kutsnashvili, MP from the Georgian Dream-Democratic party (Georgia’s 
ruling party) suggests including a note in the constitution saying that Abkhazia and South Ossetia will have 
a special status as part of the united Georgia, as he stated: “Since it is important to restore the territorial 
integrity of Georgia through peaceful means, it would be right and timely to provide a special status to our 
Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers. If our friends accept the special status, which will take time, probably, 
we should define that special status at a negotiating table[…]We must make a brave step and get that 
message across Abkhazia and South Ossetia offering them a special status as part of the united Georgian 
state”3598. 
 
February 6, 2017: According to Georgia, South Ossetia has illegally sentenced a Georgian man to 20 years 
in prison for illegal border crossing and participation in the 2008 conflict3599.  
 
February 22, 2017: At the Munich Security Conference, Lavrov states that Russia “is pleased that relations 
have begun to normalize,” but added that the visa-free movement “is a quite difficult” issue: “It is associated 
not only with the absence of diplomatic relations[…]This is also connected with the necessity to ensure 
security in the circumstances, when not only Central Asia, but also the Trans Caucasus, regions of the South 
Caucasus are becoming routes, which insurgents, extremists, terrorists and drug traffickers are actively 
trying to use”3600. He also stated that Georgia and Russia “can talk about further facilitation of the visa 
requirements,” only when the Russian and Georgian law enforcement agencies “establish full cooperation” 
and when “all of these risks can be prevented on both sides as much as possible.”3601 
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March 15, 2017: Putin has ordered the Russian military to incorporate armed forces from South Ossetia 
into its structure3602. Georgia condemned the act stating: "Any agreement between the Russian Federation 
and de-facto leadership (of South Ossetia) is illegitimate.."Such steps are not aimed at protecting peace and 
are impeding peaceful process, which is necessary for the conflict resolution.”3603. 
 
March 24, 2017: South Ossetia announces that it will hold a referendum on the unification with Russia 
following its presidential elections on April 93604. As South Ossetia’s Parliamentary speaker stated: "The 
will of the people of South Ossetia to join Russia is not a secret. There is an agreement with the president 
of the republic [Leonid Tibilov] that the referendum must be held after the elections in 2017,"3605. 
 
March 25, 2017: Russia condemns Georgia for “the cascade of provocative statements and actions in the 
last few days” and accused Georgia of wanting to disrupt the upcoming round of the Geneva International 
Discussions3606. Russia stated “During the 34th regular session of the UN Human Rights Council, Georgia 
submitted a draft resolution, that was clearly politicized and aimed against Abkhazia, South Ossetia and 
Russia. Foreign envoys have made new “pilgrimages” to the state border with South Ossetia, which Georgia 
continues to call an administrative boundary line[…]The propaganda campaign[…]can be triggered by 
anything: Abkhazia’s lawful decision to revise the number of checkpoints on its border with Georgia, a 
bilateral agreement allowing the South Ossetian citizens to serve in the Russian army under individual 
contracts and a hoax on the alleged deployment of extra S-300 division in Abkhazia, as well as a totally 
fictional story on the Russian military convoy running through Georgia to Armenia.”3607. Russia added that 
Georgia’s “political show” serves to create “confrontational and hysterical atmosphere” ahead of the 
Geneva International Discussions and is designed to “sabotage” the event: “We would like to underline that 
the Russian delegation is going to Switzerland with the intention to hold a calm and productive discussion 
on the pressing issues of security and stability in the South Caucasus. We call on the Georgian partners, all 
other participants in the Geneva discussions, to follow suit,”3608.  
 
April 6, 2017: The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations took the initiative to discuss the situation in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and invited the members of the Security Council to express their countries' 
positions on the process of "absorption" of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian armed formations by the 
Russian army3609. As Volodymyr Yelchenko, the permanent representative of Ukraine to the UN stated: 
"Russia violates the Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008. We urge the Russian Federation to withdraw 
its troops from the occupied territories and to create conditions for the involvement of international security 
mechanisms and restoration of territorial integrity of Georgia,"3610 He also stated that “the history of the 
annexation of Crimea cannot be left without attention and adequate responses"3611. Russia blocked the 
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discussion put forward by Ukraine3612. Russia stated that Georgia: "was trying to take advantage of the fact, 
that Ukraine had the status of a temporary member of the UN Security Council." And the representative of 
the Russian Federation to the UN, Peter Ilichev, stated that compared to the situation in Syria: "it was not 
worth distracting the attention of the UNSC to the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia" as there was 
no conflict and Georgia should recognize the "new realities."3613 Russia’s acting permanent representative 
also stated: "If Georgia and its protectors try to discuss the issues of security without the participation of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Geneva talks may even be closed."3614 
 
April 12, 2017: South Ossetia holds presidential elections which sees the removal of Leonid Tibilov and 
the inauguration of Anatoly Bibilov3615. During his election campaign Bibilov supported the unification 
with Russia, stating that he had a 5-step plan aimed at this3616. Following his victory, Bibilov re-stated the 
need for unification with Russia’s North Ossetia: “This is a strategic goal after all[…]In just three years, it 
will be 100 years since the Ossetian people were split. This is very important and we will be doing so in 
contact with our counterparts in Russia.” 3617. On the same day of the election, voters also voted in a 
referendum on renaming South Ossetia “South Ossetia - Alania” a move which was previously done also 
in North Ossetia, which now refers to itself as North Ossetia – Alania3618. 
 
April 23, 2017: Bibilov is inaugurated with Putin’s adviser Vladislav Surkov attending and speaking at the 
ceremony3619. Surkov praised Bibilov for his: “firm position on the maximum possible integration with 
Russia”, and stated that both pursued the objective: “to establish a common economic, legal, cultural space 
that would unite our peoples.” 3620. Bibilov on the other hand confirmed that he was going to continue with 
the “course of integration into the Russian Federation.”3621. The leader of the Luhansk People’s Republic 
also attended the ceremony where he thanked South Ossetians for recognizing LNR independence and for 
sending “volunteers” to fight against Ukraine in the Donbass region3622. He also praised the volunteers 
saying they “fought honestly, risking their lives.” And added that the presence of volunteers from “all 
regions and republics of Russia” in Donbass confirmed the existence of the “strong and powerful Russia, 
the united Russian world.” 3623. Representatives from Donetsk, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh also 
attended3624.  
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June 8, 2017: Georgia and Ukraine’s defense ministers meet and spoke of military-political cooperation 
and joint participation in upcoming multilateral military exercises scheduled to be held in both countries3626.  
 
June 23, 2017: The 40th round of the Geneva talks is held where Georgia stated that it had brought up the 
“stage-by-stage integration” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in “Russia’s military, political, economic and 
humanitarian space,” including “the so-called referendum in Tskhinvali Region and signing of the so-called 
agreement on integration of the local armed groups into the military forces of the Russian Federation.”3627. 
During the talks, Georgia also accused Russia violating the 2008 “ceasefire agreement” in relation to the 
removal of the Russian troops from the two regions3628. South Ossetia and Abkhazia jointly condemned the 
UN General Assembly resolution on the refugees and demanded “legally binding agreement on non-use of 
force, and in due course – peace treaty between Georgia from the one side and republics of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia from the other.”3629 
 
July 10, 2017: The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Political Affairs and Security Committee resolution 
on peace and prosperity in the OSCE region voiced regret over “the lack of progress towards a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict in Georgia based on the norms and principles of international law,” and expressed 
concern “over the humanitarian and security situation in occupied Abkhazia, Georgia, and Tskhinvali 
region/South Ossetia, Georgia.”3630. A resolution from the OSCE PA called for “the full implementation” 
of the EU-brokered Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement of August 12, 2008, “which ended the conflicts in 
Abkhazia, Georgia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia,” as well as for “the free access of 
humanitarian aid” into the regions. It also stated: “Russia should implement the EU-brokered Six-Point 
Ceasefire Agreement of 12 August 2008 which ended the conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali 
region/South Ossetia and refrain from using and withdraw its military forces in order to create conditions 
for a peaceful resolution of the conflict,” and that “parliamentary diplomacy should enhance confidence-
building between both sides and create an atmosphere of co-operation and mutual trust[…]However, we 
reject the holding of parliamentary elections in Abkhazia and the approval of a military deal between South 
Ossetia and the Russian Federation. Unilateral decisions such as holding Presidential elections in South 
Ossetia and changing the name of the region, as well as the opening of a Russian Embassy in Abkhazia, 
undermine the peace process on the territory of Georgia,”3631. 
 
July 11, 2017: According to local media in Georgia, Russia has quietly moved one of its borders further 
into Georgian territory3632. Georgia called the move illegal and stated: "This is a continuation of the illegal 
process of the so-called borderisation, which not only violates the fundamental rights of local residents but 
directly damages the security situation,"3633. Georgia also stated that the act was an act of “creeping 
occupation” which has: "in progress since the Russia-Georgia 2008 war," 3634. 
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July 20, 2017: Ukraine and Georgia meet where they pledge strategic partnership3635. Poroshenko stated: 
“We have similar problems – Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia; Crimea and certain districts of 
Donbas in Ukraine: thus, we must intensify cooperation in the UN, first of all in the Security Council,”3636. 
Georgia replied: “Today you are on the battlefield and you can see well what we, the Georgians, have gone 
through in the 1990s and in 2008[…]These challenges are triggered by our neighbor, the Russian 
Federation’s policy of the spheres of privileged interests, which leads only to destabilization, human tragedy 
and parting of peoples”3637 
 
July 30, 2017: Georgia and troops from United States, Britain, Germany, Turkey, Ukraine, Slovenia and 
Armenia hold military exercises in Georgia with Georgia’s Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili stating that: 
“These exercises will help Georgia to get closer to NATO standards and to strengthen stability in the whole 
region,”3638.  
 
September 26, 2017: Russia states that NATO activities in Georgia pose “a serious threat” of 
destabilization in the South Caucasus and to the security of the Russian Federation3639. It stated: “The 
Alliance’s military infrastructure is expanding in Georgia, military exercises are held regularly, with their 
scale increasing every year, and NATO standards for the armed forces and their management are being 
introduced,” this posed “serious threat of destabilization in the South Caucasus and to the security of the 
Russian Federation, the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia.”3640. 
 
October 12, 2017: The 41st round of Geneva talks is held where according to Georgia the main subject of 
this round of GID was “the continuing ethnic cleansing towards the Georgians still remaining in the 
occupied regions of Georgia, and Russia’s destructive actions.”3641. Russia however pointed to its concern 
regarding “further deepening of the cooperation between Tbilisi and NATO,” saying it was seen as “a real 
threat for the regional security.”3642 
 
November 15, 2017: Putin meets with South Ossetian leader Anatoly Bibilov in Moscow where they 
discussed “the current state of bilateral cooperation,” including “the multifaceted efforts in implementing 
the Treaty of Alliance and Integration,”3643. Before the meeting Putin stated: “We are aware of what was 
happening ten years ago, back in 2008[…]The situation has undoubtedly stabilized since then. Russia is 
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November 26, 2017: Georgia and South Ossetia swap prisoners3645.  
 
December 14, 2017: The 42nd round of Geneva talks are held where Georgia pointed to the “the severe 
consequences of the ethnic discrimination against the Georgians remaining in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali 
regions, and the issue of non-use of force and establishment of the international security 
mechanisms[…]Russia’s non-compliance with the ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008,” and how 
Russian militarization of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions contributed to destabilization of the situation on 
the ground3646. Russia on the other hand stated that: “harmfulness of the U.S. State Department decision to 
allow the sale of the Javelin anti-armor missile systems to Georgia,” saying that “this largest military deal 
between Washington and Tbilisi since 2008 is, in fact, pushing Georgia into new dangerous adventures.” 
3647. 
 
December 27, 2017: Russia states that it is carefully monitoring the militarization of Georgia stating: “We 
are carefully observing the process of [Georgia’s militarization by western nations] and are adjusting the 
security assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia accordingly[…]We are not afraid of Tbilisi, but we are 





January 28, 2018: Customs points are opened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Georgia called: "an 
illegal step towards the actual annexation of these regions by the Russian Federation."3649. Georgia also 
stated that Russia intends to: "integrate Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia) into Russia’s 
single customs territory," 3650. The customs point in South Ossetia was agreed to at a government meeting 
in South Ossetia in December 20173651. 
 
February 26, 2018: Three Georgian men are detained in South Ossetia3652. One of the men dies while in 
detention. The EU states that the death is a “source of grave concern”. The EU also stated: “These latest 
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March 12, 2018: South Ossetia releases two Georgians who were detained on February 22 for participating 
in genocide in 20083654. They were initially three, but the third man allegedly fell down a flight of stairs and 
suffered heart failure3655. South Ossetia refused handing over the body3656.   
 
March 16, 2018: Georgia publicly appeals to Russia for the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with 
Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili stating the wish to embark on “sensible, if small” steps 
towards better relations3657. Russia welcomed the initiative but also stated that: “Russia[…]is ready to go 
as far as Tbilisi is.”3658 
 
March 18, 2018: Presidential elections are held in Russia in which Putin wins with 76%3659. According to 
local reports, he secured over 90% of the votes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia3660. Polls were opened for 
those holding Russian citizenship and the troops stationed there3661. Georgia condemned the polls stating 
that is was: “a clear demonstration of the ongoing occupation” of its territories, and “a yet another step 
towards their factual annexation by the Russian Federation.”3662.  
 
March 22, 2018: Georgia states that the negotiations on a joint non-use of force statement is not over 
stating:  “We will continue working with our partners so that we adopt a statement that will serve our 
objectives and interests, and that will be aimed at ensuring that Russia fulfils the obligations undertaken by 
the [August 12, 2008] ceasefire agreement,”3663 
 
March 29, 2018: The 43rd round of Geneva talks are held where focus amongst other was on the death of 
a Georgian citizen in South Ossetia3664. Georgia amongst other stated that the “torture and murder” of Archil 
Tatunashvili was a result of the “inaction of the Russian Federation and its occupation regimes” and the 
cases of Giga Otkhozoria and Davit Basharuli “encouraged violence against ethnic Georgians.”: “The 
Georgian side laid full responsibility on the Russian Federation on the matter, as the country exercising 
effective control in the occupied regions,”3665. Russia on the other hand stated that Georgia: “turned the 
meeting into a publicity event, contrary to Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili’s reassuring 
statement of March 9 on his country’s resolve to make progress at the talks in Geneva.”3666. It also stated 
that Georgia’s pedaling of “the alleged Russian occupation” and its attempts to “shift the blame for their 
own inability to normalize relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia onto Russia,” were “futile.”: “Instead, 
Georgia should start thinking about ways to restore trust in relations with its neighbors, launch a direct 
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dialogue with Abkhazia and South Ossetia based on mutual respect, stop encouraging other countries to 
deny visas to these republics’ residents, abolish the Law on Occupied Territories, and stop hindering the 
republics’ cultural and humanitarian events abroad,”3667. At the UN, Georgia’s permanent representative to 
the United Nations (UN) Kakha Imnadze states at the UNSC: “The Russian occupation has turned Georgia’s 
Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions into territories, where murder and torture are unaccounted for, as just 
recently witnessed by the brutal death of Georgian IDP/civilian Archil Tatunashvili”3668.  
 
April 3, 2018: South Ossetia’s representative to the Geneva International Discussions accuse the US of 
disrupting the joint non-use of force declaration3669. The dispute related to the wording in the declaration3670.  
 
April 4, 2018: Georgia announces new peace initiative3671. Called Step to a Better Future it has three points: 
facilitating trade across the dividing lines; enhancing educational opportunities in Georgia and abroad; and 
simplifying access to Georgia’s EU integration benefits3672. Georgia stated: “This is yet another statement 
of ours reaffirming that the government’s peace policy will definitely continue, and which, despite many 
challenges, has remained our firm, consistent, and continuous choice,” 3673. 
 
April 5, 2018: The State Security Service of Georgia (SSG) issued its annual report for the year of 2017, 
which focuses on the threats facing the country’s national security3674. The Russian occupation and the 
presence of its military forces in the occupied regions is the “primary threat” to Georgia with the report 
stating: “The presence of large Russian military forces in the occupied regions, increasing militarization of 
the occupied regions, and intensive military exercises amounts to a threat that harms the security 
environment not only of Georgia, but also of the entire South Caucasus region,” 3675.  
 
April 23, 2018: Russia’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova criticized Tbilisi’s policies 
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia stating: “We suggested the Georgian partners to discuss the issue with 
the South Ossetian side,”3676. She also stated that Georgia had been reluctant to accept “this logic[…]They 
continue laying responsibility on Russia for their own inability, and unwillingness, to establish a respectful 
dialogue with the Abkhaz and the South Ossetians[…]the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia do not 
consider themselves and do not want to become citizens of Georgia, even in exchange for generous 
promises[…]Recognition of this crucially important aspect gives us hope that over time, Tbilisi will fully 
recognize and accept the [new] political reality, that Georgia’s neighbors are two independent nations - the 
Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia; the sooner this is recognized in Tbilisi, the better 




3668 “The Russian occupation has turned Georgia’s Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions into territories, where murder 
and torture are unaccounted for” – Kakha Imnadze” Georgia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 29, 2018, 
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/News/rusetis-okupaciam-saqartvelos-afkhazetisa-da-ckhin.aspx  
3669 “Tskhinvali Blames U.S. Diplomats for Disrupting Non-Use of Force Declaration” Old Civil, April 3, 2018, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=30999  
3670 Ibid 




3674 “Security Service Reports on External, Internal Threats” Old Civil, April 5, 2018, 
https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=31009  
3675 Ibid 





May 9, 2018: South Ossetia closes temporarily closes the crossing points in Georgia along the 
administrative boundary line3678. The closing coincides with Georgia’s celebration of victory day and the 
US states that the closing restricts the “freedom of movement for residents living on both sides of the 
administrative boundary line”3679.  
 
May 23, 2018: Georgia accuses Russia of war crimes, human rights violations and a “rampage” on its 
territory during the conflict in 20083680. At the European court of Human Rights Georgia stated that Russian 
planes carried out more than 100 attacks on Georgian targets and that there was overwhelming proof that 
Russian bombs were dropped on civilian areas3681. Georgia also stated that Russia’s control over the 
territories was part of a plan “years in the making”, and the goal was to “occupy as much territory as it 
could get away with” 3682. Georgia also stated that both before and after the ceasefire, Russian troops entered 
ethnic Georgian villages where they sealed off entrances and exits after which Ossetian forces and other 
irregular soldiers systematically burned down Georgian homes and entire villages as well as carried out 
summary executions and threatened individuals with death if they refused to leave3683. 
 
May 26, 2018: South Ossetia and Abkhazia elaborate a joint security approach which states that Russia is 
responsible for the security of South Ossetia and that this cannot be changed with the South Ossetian 
president stating: "Today, Russia is a guarantor of South Ossetian security. Any talks about pullout of forces 
following some incomprehensible wishes of the United States or Georgia are out of agenda,"3684. 
 
May 29, 2018: Syria recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and Georgia responded 
by announcing that it would break diplomatic ties with Syria3685. Apart from Russia and Syria, the two areas 
are only recognized by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Vanuatu and Nauru3686. Georgia responded by stating: "By 
doing so, the Assad regime supported Russia's military aggression against Georgia, unlawful occupation of 
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (South Ossetia), and the ethnic cleansing that has been taking place for 
years," 3687. Syria will as a result of the recognition set up embassies in the two areas3688.  
 
June 13, 2018:  The UNGA adopts a Georgian initiated resolution which “condemns the forced 
demographic changes in the occupied regions and underlines the importance of the inviolability of property 
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June 14, 2018: The European Parliament passes a resolution demanding that Russia reverse its "decision 
to recognize the so-called independence of the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia."3690. It 
also calls on Russia to "cease its occupation" of the two breakaway regions and "fully respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, as well as the inviolability of its internationally recognized 
borders, and that it stop the de facto integration of both regions into the Russian administration." 3691. 
 
June 15, 2018:  Russia holds military exercises in South Ossetia, which according to Georgian media 
includes more than 25,000 military personnel and around 500 units of military equipment3692. 
 
June 19, 2018: Geneva talks are held where Russia stated that the “only way to increase the productivity 
of the consultations is for the Georgian side to engage in a direct and respectful dialogue with the 
representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to abandon any confrontational rhetoric and behaviour 
at other international platforms[…]Unfortunately, this appeal was ignored by the Georgian side, which 
continued to bring up the absurd claims about "Russian occupation" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and 
tried to politicise the tragic incidents that had resulted in the death of Georgian nationals Archil 
Tatunashvili, Giga Otkhozoria, and Davit Basharuli. The discussion of this matter took on an especially 
emotional character”3693. Georgia on the other hand stated: “Grave security, human rights and humanitarian 
situation in Georgia’s occupied territories was extensively discussed. Special attention was paid to the 
ongoing military build-up and illegal military exercises in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, as well as to 
the steps taken by the Russian Federation towards factual annexation of Georgia’s occupied 
regions[…]Continuation of ethnic discrimination of Georgians in the occupied regions was a particular 
topic of discussions in both working groups. Representatives of Georgia assessed as a continuation of ethnic 
cleansing the forced registration of local Georgians residing in Abkhazia region as foreigners and 
restrictions of their fundamental rights, including property rights. The concern was expressed on grave 
consequences resulting from the prohibition of education in Georgian language in Gali and Akhalgori 
districts.”3694.  
 
June 21, 2018: Georgian Foreign Minister, David Zalkaliani, states: “We continue to work every day to 
ensure that our partners keep reaffirming the importance of the issues relating to Georgia on their bilateral 
agenda with Russia.  Through the assistance of our partners we try to dispel the narrative being imposed on 
us that there is allegedly some new reality in Georgia. But there is no new reality whatsoever in Georgia. 
The reality is that Georgian territories are occupied and need to be de-occupied[…]We are against any kind 
of barriers and barbed wire fences hindering free movement of people. We support removal of these 
barriers, peace policy and the sharing of benefits with our fellow citizens living on the other side of the 
occupation line. I mean benefits, which Georgia’s European integration, visa-free travel, and free trade 
relations with Europe bring about. It is the benefits, not Barriers and wire fences, we offer”3695. 
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June 28, 2018: Georgian Parliament Speaker Irakli Kobakhidze states that Russia continues to remain the 
biggest challenge for Georgia’s national independence and further stated: “The human rights and security 
situation is worsening by the day in breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Every day people are 
kidnapped. We also see innocent people dying in these two occupied regions[…]The death of Tatunashvli 
clarified that the conflict in Georgia’s breakaway regions is not frozen and that it brings death to 
Georgians,”3696 
 
June 29, 2018:  South Ossetia and Georgia launch a tit-for-tat blackmailing list of individuals they blame 
for crimes against them3697. South Ossetia launched the “Sanakoyev list” which includes “citizens of 
Georgia, the United States, Ukraine and other countries that are involved in the Ossetian genocide in South 
Ossetia”3698. Georgia launched the Otkhozoria-Tatunashvili list which includes individuals who have 
violated the rights of Georgian citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia3699. 
 
July 7, 2018: The head of the Russian delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA Pyotr Tolstoy, 
calls on the PA not to consider three draft resolutions at the annual session in Berlin, which are about human 
rights in Crimea, criticism of the Russian judicial system and the 10th anniversary of the events in South 
Ossetia in August 2008: "The Russian Federation suggests that this session should not consider these three 
resolutions so that their authors could come to the Russian Federation themselves and see with their own 
eyes the real state of affairs, in order not to put the Assembly in a situation when we pass the decisions 
which are evidently far from reality[…]Therefore, Russia’s proposal is that these three resolutions should 
not be considered at this session but be postponed for a later date"3700. 
 
August 7, 2018: Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev states that a NATO decision to admit Georgia 
could trigger "a terrible conflict" with him stating: "This [Georgia's entry to NATO] could provoke a terrible 
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https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-ukrayinci-i-derzhava-ukrayina-ne-boyimosya-rosiyi-
prezide-47110 
57. “President: Strong border is a key element of independence and an important element of the 
national security system of the state” UP, April 27, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/micnij-kordon-ye-klyuchovim-elementom-nezalezhnosti-i-
vazhli-47194 
58. “President: ATO format ruined Russia's plans in Ukraine” UP, April 30, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/format-ato-zrujnuvav-plani-rosiyi-v-ukrayini-prezident-
47210 
59. “President signed a Decree: The Joint Forces Operation on deflection and deterrence of Russia's 
armed aggression in the Donbas began on April 30, 2018” UP, April 30, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/30-kvitnya-rozpochalas-operaciya-obyednanih-sil-iz-
vidsichi-47206 
60. “Head of State: Counteraction to Russian aggression will be completed when the last piece of 
Ukrainian land is released in the Donbas and occupied Crimea” UP, April 30, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-protistoyannya-agresiyi-rf-zavershitsya-
koli-47214 
61. “President: Having received the Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, we will get back 
to the origins of our history” UP, May 5, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/otrimavshi-avtokefaliyu-ukrayinskoyi-pravoslavnoyi-
cerkvi-mi-47274 
62. “President: Given that Ukrainians are killed everyday, we urgently need UN peacekeepers” UP, 
May 8, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-v-umovah-koli-shodnya-ginut-
ukrayinci-mi-potrebuye-47282 
63. “President: In January 2015, Russian regular troops carried out shelling of Mariupol” UP, May 8, 
2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-mariupol-u-sichni-2015-roku-
obstrilyuvali-kad-47294 
64. “President: Our military calendar should have nothing in common with the country-aggressor” 
UP, May 8, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-u-nashomu-vijskovomu-
kalendari-ne-maye-buti-n-47290 
65. “President: Russia wants to destabilize Ukraine and bring it back to the Soviet Union” UP, May 
8, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/rosiya-pragne-destabilizuvati-ukrayinu-i-
povernuti-yiyi-u-ra-47278 
66. “President: We want to build a new international security system that was ruined by the Russian 
aggressor” UP, May 8, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-pragnemo-zbuduvati-
novu-sistemu-mizhnarodnoyi-bezpeki-sho-47298 
67. “President: Four years ago, Ukraine almost lost all the Donbas, but due to a successful military 





68. “President: Just as in World War II, when Ukraine was attacked from the west, 4 years ago the 
war came to us from the east” UP, May 9, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-
derzhavi-podibno-tomu-yak-u-drugij-svitovij-ukrayinu-a-47310 
69. “President: Russia celebrates the Victory Day in a militaristic passion, having bristled up against 
the whole world, and we, together with the whole Europe, commemorate the deceased” UP, May 
9, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-rosiya-svyatkuye-den-peremogi-u-
militarnomu-ugari-47326 
70. “President: There are still maniacs ready to put the world on the verge of the third world war, that 
is why we must be vigilant and responsible” UP, May 9, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/she-ne-perevelisya-maniyaki-gotovi-postaviti-svit-na-
mezhu-v-47350 
71. “President: We do everything to convey an objective picture and prevent Russia from using the 
Nord Stream 2 as an element of hybrid aggression” UP, May 10, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/robimo-vse-shob-donesti-obyektivnu-kartinu-i-ne-dati-
rosiyi-47362 
72. “President: Invaders will necessarily need the bridge when they will urgently leave Ukrainian 
Crimea” UP, May 15, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/kerchenskij-mist-
znadobitsya-okupantam-koli-voni-budut-termi-47458 
73. “Our vyshyvanka unites the country - President during the flashmob on Vyshyvanka Day in 
Dnipro” UP, May 17, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/nasha-vishivanka-obyednuye-
krayinu-prezident-pid-chas-fleshm-47498 
74. “President: After restoration of its sovereignty in Crimea, Ukraine will use the Kerch Strait 
Bridge for ties with the Kuban” UP, May 18, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-pislya-vidnovlennya-svogo-suverenitetu-v-
krimu-viko-47522 
75. “President: Amendments to the Constitution concerning the Crimean Tatar people are necessary 
for Ukraine” UP, May 18, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zmini-do-konstituciyi-
stosovno-krimskotatarskogo-narodu-potr-47518 
76. “The bill on citizenship will be revised on the issue of Ukrainian collaborators in the occupied 
territories - President on the revocation of his bill” UP, May 18, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zakonoproekt-pro-gromadyanstvo-bude-doopracovanij-u-
pitanni-47526 
77. “President: The pain of Crimean Tatars is the pain of all Ukrainians” UP, May 18, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-bil-krimskih-tatar-ce-bil-usih-ukrayinciv-47530 
78. “President signed a Decree on the final termination of Ukraine's participation in the statutory 
bodies of the CIS” UP, May 19, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-pidpisav-
ukaz-pro-ostatochne-pripinennya-uchasti-u-47554 
79. “We all must move towards Europe every day - President congratulated Ukrainians on Europe 
Day” UP, May 19, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vsi-razom-mayemo-
ruhatisya-v-yevropu-kozhnogo-dnya-prezid-47558 
80. “Ukraine has its own way to God and it is not through Moscow - President on giving the Tomos 
to the Ukrainian church” UP, May 20, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-
maye-svij-shlyah-do-boga-i-vin-ne-cherez-moskvu-pre-47566 
81. “President: Ukraine appreciates Estonia's support in our struggle for sovereignty, territorial 




82. “President: Joint group presented additional evidence that Russia had supplied the anti-aircraft 
complex, which shot down the MH17 aircraft” UP, May 24, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/spilna-grupa-predstavila-dodatkovi-dokazi-postachannya-
z-rf-47686 
83. “President: Ukraine is in much better conditions than 4 years ago. And we keep moving forward” 
UP, May 25, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayina-sogodni-u-
nezrivnyanno-krashomu-stani-niz-47762 
84. “President: We expect that the decision on the peacekeepers in the occupied part of the Donbas 
will be made in the nearest time” UP, May 29, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-rozrahovuyemo-sho-rishennya-shodo-
mirotvo-47814 
85. “Every day, step by step, we are binging the victory closer - President prays for peace in Ukraine 
together with the Ukrainian community of Spain” UP, June 3, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/kozhen-den-krok-za-krokom-mi-nablizhayemo-peremogu-
prezident-47954 
86. “We are steadily moving to Europe - the President” UP, June 3, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-vpevneno-ruhayemosya-u-yevropu-prezident-47962 
87. “The whole world is a playground for Russian policy of fake news - President in an interview 
with Spanish newspaper «El País»” UP, June 5, 2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ves-
svit-ye-majdanchikom-dlya-rosijskoyi-politiki-falshivih-48002 
88. “Ukraine pays a very high price, protecting freedom and democracy in the world - the meeting of 
the President of Ukraine with the Crown Prince of the Principality of Liechtenstein” UP, June 6, 
2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-platit-duzhe-visoku-cinu-zahishayuchi-
svobodu-demok-48018 
89. “Release of Ukrainian political prisoners to be priority issue of the Normandy format foreign 
ministers’ meeting - President at the meeting with the Ukrainian hostages’ families” UP, June 8, 
2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvilnennya-ukrayinskih-politvyazniv-bude-odnim-z-
prioritetiv-48062 
90. “President: Decentralization is one of the most efficient reforms in the state” UP, June 18, 2018, 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-decentralizaciya-odna-z-najefektivnishih-
reform-v-48226 
91. “The success of our diplomats is no less important than the success of our soldiers on the 
frontline - President to the graduates of the Institute of International Relations” UP, June 26, 
2018, https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/uspihi-nashih-diplomativ-ne-mensh-vazhlivi-nizh-
uspihi-nashi-48346 
92. “President: It is such festivals as "Paths of Friendship" that are a cultural connection and evidence 









Appendix 7: Codebook - Thematic Analysis - Georgia 
 
Name: Name of the theme  
Description: Description of the theme  
Sources: Number of texts - out of the 365 primary sources analysed3702 - in which a theme has “occurred”  
References: Total number of times a theme has been analysed within the primary source dataset  
 
The themes are spoken by all conflict parties, unless otherwise is indicated.  
 
Theme name Description Sources References 
Aggressive posturing Referral to how the other is displaying aggressive 
behaviour in the conflict through either its behaviour 
(militarization) or rhetoric (anti-rhetoric) or both. 
94 160 
Belonging Referral to how a physical place belongs to a group or 
how a group belongs to somewhere 
48 79 
Blame: Referral to who is to blame for the onset of the 
conflict and its continuation 
  
They are to blame  22 37 
We are wrongly blamed  18 20 
Conflict behaviour: Referral to how the conflict started and who initiated it   
They attacked South 
Ossetia (Russia and 
South Ossetia theme) 
 50 59 
They attacked us  70 78 
We acted in self-defence  11 12 
Dialogue Referral to how a group is for or against dialogue 43 81 
Domestic crisis Referral to how the situation is largely driven by 
internal chaos and how the other is trying to make 
noise to conceal internal problems. 
18 21 
Escalation Referral to how the others are continuously escalating 
the situation 
18 37 
Ethnic Cleansing Referral to how the situation is characterised by ethnic 
cleansing or genocide 
71 119 
 
3702 Please refer to page 78 and onwards for a description of the primary sources  
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Theme name Description Sources References 
Ethnic co-existence: Referral to whether it is possible or impossible for 
certain groups to co-exist 
  
Negative  11 11 
Positive  16 17 
Exclusion Referral to how a group or leaders of a group are 
trying to exclude a group or members of a group 
26 26 
External interference and 
involvement: 
Referral to how external involvement/assistant is 
positive or negative for resolving the conflict 
  
Negative  62 68 
Positive  62 67 
Facts and Lies: Referral to how a group is either telling the truth or 
lying 
  
The other is lying Referral to how the other is telling lies and how they 
rely on propaganda. Also, referral to how the other 
needs to wake up and act in accordance with reality 
116 176 
We are telling the truth Referral to how one is telling the truth and how one 
acts in accordance with facts and the reality 
36 38 
Historical reference Referral to how the behaviour of the other is 
comparable to past events and how the others are 
trying to repeat past events. But also, how current 
events are rooted in history 
79 115 
Intentions: Referral to how the others have hostile intentions and 
how they themselves have peaceful intentions 
  
Hostile  90 115 
Peaceful  79 95 
Inter-group conflict Referral to how the conflict is an inter-group conflict 61 81 
Lawlessness Referral to how the behaviour of the others is defined 
by thug-like behaviour. Also refers to how the 
territory controlled by the other is lawless and how 




Theme name Description Sources References 
Leaders and civilians Referral to how there is a need to separate leaders 
from civilians when making sense of the conflict 
64 93 
Liberation and Occupation Referral to how the behaviour of the other is 
characterised by occupation/annexation whilst one's 
own behaviour is characterised as 
assistance/liberation. 
  
Assistance – Liberation   8 8 
Occupation - Annexation  62 68 
Legitimacy and Illegality Referral to how one's own behaviour and claims are 
legitimate and how the behaviour and claims of the 
others are illegitimate. 
  
Justified actions All actors refer to how their actions were and are 
justified. This justification is not necessarily rooted in 
law but rather in expressions of self-defence 
16 24 
The other is defying 
international law 
 70 78 
We act in accordance 
with the law 
 56 60 
Modernization: Referral to how one's own behaviour and ambitions is 
driven by modernization and how relations with others 
will lead to development and modernization. Also 
refers to how the other bases its behaviour and 
understandings on the past. 
  
Our behaviour is guided 
by the future 
 37 40 
Relations with actors will 
lead to modernization 
and development 
 32 34 
Their behaviour is guided 
by the past 
 11 11 
Personality Referral to how one's own and the others personality is 
and how this came to be 
70 113 
Political will: Referral to how a group has political will and how the 




Theme name Description Sources References 
Negative  52 52 
Positive  21 21 
Provocations Referral to how the behaviour and rhetoric of the other 
are unconstructive provocations 
81 106 
Proxy Referral to how the other uses proxies to reach its goal 29 53 
Regional threat Referral to how the behaviour of the other is a regional 
threat 
55 77 
Resolution: Referral to how the conflict should be resolved   
Accept the reality (Russia 
and South Ossetia theme) 
 16 16 
Acknowledge 
Wrongdoing 
 19 23 
Collaboration  11 11 
Delimitation and 
demarcation of borderline  
 11 11 
Dialogue between parties  18 21 
Implementation of 
ceasefire, Medvedev 
Sarkozy plan (themes 
used by all conflict 
parties) and the creation 
of non-use of force 
agreement (Russia and 
South Ossetia theme) 
 49 52 
Through the 
implementation or 
respect for international 
law 
 6 17 
Reconciliation  4 4 
Territorial retreat  8 8 
Trust-building  16 18 
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Theme name Description Sources References 
Sabotage Referral to how the other is trying to sabotage the 
peace process and the unity of the other 
52 68 
Security: Referral to how the actions undertaken are either 
meant to ensure security or the protection of civilians 
or both 
  
Civilian protection Referral to how the actions undertaken during 1992 
and 2008 were meant to protect civilians. Also refers 
to how the general objective is to ensure civilian 
protection and security 
40 73 
State and de-facto state 
security 
Referral to how one's behaviour is guided by the need 
to ensure state or de-facto state security 
37 83 
Survival How one’s actions and the assistance from others is 
meant to ensure survival of the state/entity and its 
people 
11 16 
Self-defence Referral to how a group is merely reacting to the 
other's behaviour and that a group is reacting in self-
defence 
16 25 
The nature of the situation: Referral to how the situation is stable or unstable   
Stable  9 9 
Unstable  19 23 
Unity Referral to how a group is unified and strong 28 54 
Untrustworthy Referral to how the other cannot be trusted 24 30 
Will of the people Referral to how the situation and the conflict is 











Appendix 8: Codebook - Thematic Analysis - Ukraine 
 
Name: Name of the theme  
Description: Description of the theme   
Sources: Number of texts – out of the 611 primary sources analysed3703 - in which a theme has “occurred”  
References: Total number of times a theme has been analysed within the primary source dataset  
 
The themes are spoken by all conflict parties, unless otherwise is indicated.  
 
Name Description Sources References 
Annexation or occupation or 
aggression 
Referral to how the situation and the behaviour of the 
other can be characterized as either an annexation, 
occupation, or aggression 
111 199 
Anti-Russian (DPR and 
Russia theme) 
Referral to how the other and its behaviour is anti-
Russian  
61 77 
Attack on civilians Referral to how the other is deliberately attacking 
civilians and how one's own behaviour is guided by 
the need to protect these civilians 
62 87 
Belonging Referral to how a physical place belongs to a group or 
how a group belongs somewhere 
55 141 
Blame Referral to how the other is to blame for the conflict 
and its continuation 
63 90 
Coup (DPR and Russia 
theme) 
Referral to how the situation was caused by a coup 21 41 
Destruction Referral to how the other is driven by destruction 35 42 
Elitism Referral to how the situation is the outcome of a small 
group of elites 
11 12 
Enemy Referral to an out-group as an enemy 12 21 
Enforced changes Referral to how the other is trying to impose its 
changes upon the other 
25 29 
Ethnic cleansing Referral to how the situation and the behaviour of the 




3703 Please refer to page 78 and onwards for a description of the primary sources  
672 
 
Name Description Sources References 
Exclusion Referral to how the other is trying to exclude members 
of an out-group or an entire out-group 
101 130 
External influence: Referral to how external influence/assistance from 
others not involved in the conflict, is either negative or 
positive for the resolution of the conflict 
  
Negative  43 113 
Positive  29 48 
Future Victory Referral to how the in-group will be victorious 24 29 
History Referral to how the situation is a replication of history 
or how the identity/interests of self and other can be 
explained by looking at history 
86 140 
Humanitarian Catastrophe Referral to how the situation is defined by a 
humanitarian catastrophe 
17 20 
Illegality Referral to how the others' behaviour is illegal 81 138 
Inclusion Referral to how an in-group is inclusive towards its 
members and/or members of out-groups 
42 63 
Intentions: Referral to how behaviour is either driven by hostile 
intentions or peaceful intentions 
  
Hostile  81 162 
Peaceful  33 65 
Inter-group conflict (Ukraine 
and DPR theme) 
Reference to how the conflict is an inter-group 
conflict/war between two distinct groups 
62 107 
Intra-group conflict (DPR 
and Russia theme) 
References to how the conflict is an intra group 
conflict/civil war 
50 77 
Legality Referral to how an in-group's behaviour is legal 10 30 
Liberation Referral how there is a need to liberate a group or 
certain group members 
12 15 
Nationalism Referral to how the situation is defined by, as well as 




Name Description Sources References 
No political will Referral to how the other has no political will to 
resolve the conflict 
80 132 
Peace and Democracy Referral to how the in-group is driven by democracy, 
peace, and freedom 
19 25 
Personality Referral to how the other's personality is and how this 
came to be 
49 55 
Positive political will Referral to how a group has the political will to solve 
the conflict 
28 39 
Propaganda Referral to how a group's behaviour and narrative is 
driven by lies and propaganda 
86 135 
Provocations Referral to how a group is provoking another 32 53 
Proxy Referral to how a group uses proxies in order to ensure 
its goals 
65 92 
Regional or global threat Referral to how the behaviour of the other is either a 
regional threat or a global threat 
25 35 
Resolution: Referral to how the conflict should be resolved   
End Military Operations  16 21 
External Pressure  29 29 
Implement Ceasefire and 
Other Agreements 
 13 21 
Negotiation  32 61 
Peacekeeping  11 11 
Sanctions  11 14 
Rights Referral how civilians’ rights are violated and how 




Referral to how is group is trying to Russify another 
group 
12 12 
Self-defence Referral to how a group is merely defending itself 




Name Description Sources References 
Split the country in two Referral to how the behaviour of the other is causing a 
conflict to split into two 
20 21 
State-building Referral to how the state should be (re)built to end the 
conflict and ensure peaceful co-existence 
21 61 
Terrorists (Ukraine theme) Referral to how a group is a terrorist group and how 
the situation is defined by terrorist attacks and other 
such methods 
61 112 
Truth Referral to how a group knows the truth about the 
situation and the other 
57 70 
Unified and Strong Referral to how a group is united and strong 52 83 
Vulnerable Situation Referral to how the situation is vulnerable and may 
escalate at any moment 
14 15 
Will of the People Referral to how the leaders of a group, and a group per 




















Appendix 9: Codebook - Frame analysis - Georgia  
 
GFM/GP: Georgia’s Foreign Ministry/Georgia’s President  
SO: South Ossetia  
RFM/RP: Russia’s Foreign Ministry/Russia’s President  
 
 
Frame  Description Example  
Situation-frames:    
The out-group instigated the 
conflict  
Referral to how the conflict has not been instigated by 
the in-group. It is a conflict the out-group has initiated 
unilaterally and unprovoked  
“We are meeting to discuss 
the new situation 
in the world, created 
as a result of the Georgian 
aggression against South 
Ossetia.[…]Let us call 
a spade a spade: a real war 
occurred in the region where 
the aggression was 
launched, a war which 
claimed the lives 
of Russians, Ossetians 
and Georgians” RP-6(5) 
The conflict is a matter of 
ethnic cleansing/genocide   
Referral to how the conflict is an example of ethnic 
cleansing/genocide.     
“Mr. Gamsakhurdia pursued 
a policy of ethnic cleansing, 
and in the person of Mr. 
Saakashvili, found a worthy 
successor” RFM-78 (5)  
The conflict is a matter of 
occupation/annexation 
Referral to how the conflict should be understood as a 
situation where the out-group is trying to annex/ 
occupy parts of the in-group’s territory  
“Russia’s policy vis-à-vis 
Georgia[…]illustrates that 
Moscow does not accept the 
independent choice of 
sovereign states and strives 
for the restoration of zones 
of influence in the region, 
including through the use of 
force, occupation, 
annexation and other 
aggressive acts” GFM-3 (5) 
The conflict is loaded with 
ideational threats/cover ups 
Referral to how the conflict is not only fought through 
military use, but to a great extent using propaganda, 
which distorts the truth about the conflict and leads to 
distorted self/other understandings  
It is not clear, for how much 
longer will the occurrences 
of August 2008 and other 
fascist crimes of the 
Georgian leadership, that 
took place during the last 
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Frame  Description Example  
twenty years, will be cover 
with mist. It is time to open 
eyes of Georgian 
people[..]on the ruinous 
inadequate policy of 
Georgian leadership 
towards people of South 
Ossetia. SO-25 (5) 
The out-group must leave the 
in-group territory  
Referral to how the conflict will only be solved if the 
out-group, and the agents who fight on its behalf, leave 
the in-group territory.  
“This reality will be 
changed only when the 
occupation lines no longer 
exist on the territory of 
Georgia and when the 
occupant troops leave the 
country”GP-56 (5) 
The out-group and in-group 
must be divided  
Referral to how the conflict will only be solved if the 
out- and in-group is separated  
“The leadership of Georgia 
for the last 20 years by its 
criminal actions the apogee 
of which became an 
aggression in august 2008 
against South 
Ossetia[…]spelt the death of 
the issue of territorial 
integrity of Georgia within 
the framework of former 
Georgian SSR. As a 
consequence of such 
aggressive policy became 
creation of two new 
recognized democratic 
states” SO-11 (5) 
Dialogue is need  Referral to how the conflict should be solved through 
dialogue and inclusion   
“We have always said that 
the questions of status can 
be tackled only by the 
parties in conflict without 
the use of force or outside 
pressure. But you have to 
move from the simple to the 
complex[…]You have to 
start with confidence-
building 
measures[…]People in such 
territories should not feel 
isolated” RFM-42 (5) 
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Frame  Description Example  
Self-frames:   
The in-group has existed for a 
long time 
Referral to how the in-group has existed for a long time 
and how it has continuously fought for its existence 
and interests in a consistent and united way  
“Georgia is the country of 
ancient civilization. This 
area was inhabited 1.7-1.8 
million years ago[…] 
Georgian people always 
found the forces to release 
from the rule of foreign 
tribes. Many great Empires 
were ruined, but Georgia 
still stands on his feet and 
continued struggle for 
protection of its own 
interests” GP-68 (5) 
The in-group has been 
collectively mobilised  
Referral to how the in-group acts in a unitary way and 
how they have been collectively mobilised in the 
conflict to fight a collective enemy  
“The repetitive massacres 
and ethnic cleanings of the 
Ossetian, organized by 
Georgian officials as well as 
attacks on South Ossetia and 
the August war of 2008, 
launched by Georgia can’t 
be forgotten, no matter how 
Georgian authorities seek 
for razing that from social 
memory.” SO-38 (5) 
The in-group is united    Referral to how the in-group is united, strong, and 
resilient.   
“The will of the Georgian 
people to determine own fate 
and future has not been 
changed either. Georgian 
people maintained this fate 
for centuries and it will 
continue in the future.” GP-
66 (5) 
The in-group is committed to 
conflict agreements  
Referral to how the in-group behaves in accordance 
with the conflict agreements made and how it 
continues to be committed to the agreements’ 
implementation  
“We do not attack anyone. 
On the contrary, 
in a number of cases we are 
protecting the lives 
and dignity of people, our 
citizens and foreign citizens, 
through our presence 
as peacekeepers in different 
countries” RP-4 (5) 
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Frame  Description Example  
The in-group is motivated by 
truth   
Referral to how the in-group is motivated by the 
pursuing of truth and how its actions is in accordance 
with what is happening on the ground 
“We try to dispel the 
narrative being imposed on 
us that there is allegedly 
some new reality in Georgia. 
But there is no new reality 
whatsoever in Georgia. The 
reality is that Georgian 
territories are occupied and 
need to be de-occupied” 
GFM-53 (5) 
Other-frames:   
The out-group leaders are 
distorting their out-group 
Referral to how the out-group leaders are distorting the 
identity and interests of the out-group  
“We were not going to break 
off diplomatic relations, 
knowing full well that the 
regime of Mikhail 
Saakashvili does not 
personify the Georgian 
people, but is an anomaly 
which in general does not 
grow from within Georgian 
society but was brought 
there from outside” RFM-71 
(5) 
The out-group behaves in the 
same way 
Referral to how the out-group continues to behave in 
the same way  
“It should be noted that 
South Ossetia had been 
attacked by Georgia several 
times before August 2008. 
Genocide and total ethnic 
cleansing of the Ossetian 
organized by Georgian 
troops in 1920 resulted in 
thousands of causality” SO-
50 (5) 
The out-group excludes others  Referral to how the out-group seeks to excludes others, 
particularly those who have another view of the out-
group and the conflict  
“The purpose of this 
practice is obvious – 
Georgian authorities are 
trying by all means available 
to block[…]South Ossetia 
communication with the 
outside world” RFM-72 (5) 
The out-group lies  Referral to how the out-group continues to lie about the 
conflict and their role in it. Also, referral to how the 
“Saakashvili is still trying to 
convince the international 
community that there is a 
conflict between Russia and 
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out-group is seeking to distort self/other 
understandings.  
Georgia, while at issue is 
actually the long-running 
conflict between Tbilisi and 
the peoples of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, which as a 
result of yet another military 
gamble by Georgia in 
August 2008”. RFM-74 (5) 
The out-group wants control  Referral to how the out-group is driven by control and 
how it wants to (re)instate control over groups to 
pursue its interests  
They keep on fantasizing 
about their territorial claims 
in Tbilisi. It appears that one 
should use applied 
psychology to comment such 
statements as it is evident 
that being frustrated because 
of the impossibility of getting 
the desired, Georgian 




The out-group is disruptive  Referral to how the out-group is violating international 
law and/or how it is violating the conflict 
agreements/hindering any further agreements  
“The Russian Federation is 
seriously harming the 
Geneva International 
Discussions and is 
intentionally obstructing any 
potential progress in the 














Appendix 10: Codebook - Frame Analysis - Ukraine  
 
UFM/UP: Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry/Ukraine’s President  
DPR: Donetsk People’s Republic  
RFM/RP: Russia’s Foreign Ministry/Russia’s President  
 
 
Frame  Description Example  
Situation-frames:    
The out-group instigated the 
conflict  
Referral to how the conflict has not been instigated by 
the in-group. It is a conflict the out-group has initiated 
unilaterally and unprovoked  
“Russia planned military 
aggression against Ukraine 
in advance. Victory of 
revolution of dignity was 
only a convenient pretext”. 
UFM-95 (6) 
The out-group leadership is 
mobilising agents  
Referral to how the out-group leadership is mobilising 
agents (who are not only out-group members) to fight 
in the conflict.    
“They [Russia] stick to the 
same routine as in Crimea. 
First, they recruit and arm 
professional military. 
Second, they deploy them on 
Ukrainian territory. Third, 
they hire local radicals to 
pose as the “pro-Russian 
forces”” UFM-11 (6)  
The conflict is a matter of 
occupation/annexation/eradication 
Referral to how the conflict should be understood as a 
situation where the out-group is trying to annex/ 
occupy parts of the in-group’s territory and/or 
eradicate the out-group 
“The Kiev’s implementation 
of consistent policy of 
Russian culture’s 
eradication is bearing its 
poisonous fruits. Ideas for 
the creation of ghettos for 
Russian-speaking people 
are being developed and 
bills are being drafted for 
the forced ukrainization of 
the population” DPR-61 (6) 
The conflict is loaded with 
ideational threats/cover ups 
Referral to how the conflict is not only fought through 
military use, but to a great extent using propaganda, 
which distorts the truth about the conflict and leads to 
distorted self/other understandings  
“We must do more to help 
our citizens resist Russian 
propaganda and 
disinformation – our 
citizens must now realise 
that Russia is a State that 




Frame  Description Example  
The out-group must leave the in-
group territory  
Referral to how the conflict will only be solved if the 
out-group, and the agents who fight on its behalf, 
leave the in-group territory.  
“When can peace come? 
Only when Russian invaders 
leave the Ukrainian land 
and when the Ukrainian 
flag and the Ukrainian 
national emblem return to 
the Ukrainian Donbass” 
UP-85 (6) 
The out-group and in-group must 
be divided  
Referral to how the conflict will only be solved if the 
out- and in-group is separated  
“As time has shown, as a 
rule, citizens of Ukraine fall 
under the repression of the 
neo-Nazi Kiev 
regime[…]Many former 
Ukrainian citizens were 
forced to leave Ukraine, 
and the Donbass and the 
Crimea did this together 
with their lands”. DPR-124 
(6) 
Dialogue is need  Referral to how the conflict should be solved through 
dialogue and inclusion   
“The Geneva meeting was 
to send a clear signal to 
Kiev that the situation can 
be stabilised only through 
the launch of a 
comprehensive dialogue 
with regions, especially 
with those, where Russian-
speaking population is 
prevailing and whose 
opinions should be heard by 
the central authorities” 
RFM-40(6) 
Self-frames:   
The in-group has been 
collectively mobilised  
Referral to how the in-group acts in a unitary way and 
how they have been collectively mobilised in the 
conflict to fight a collective enemy  
“The Russian-speaking 
south of Ukraine quite 
naturally rejects the 
artificially imposed alien 
life rules” DPR-86 (6) 
The in-group is seeking freedom   Referral to how the in-group is pursuing freedom and 
a future in which they can decide for themselves  
“Ukraine is a territory of 
dignity and freedom[…]We 
became so owning to not 
one but two 
revolutions[…]It was an 
extremely tough challenge 
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for Ukraine when the 
Ukrainians demonstrated 
their Europeanness, dignity, 
their desire for freedom”. 
UFM-47(6)  
The in-group is committed to 
conflict agreements  
Referral to how the in-group behaves in accordance 
with the conflict agreements made and how it 
continues to be committed to the agreements’ 
implementation  
“Our invitation to 
international observers is 
another confirmation of 
Russia' good will, because 
Russia uses all its efforts to 
assist the de-escalation of 
the internal Ukrainian 
crisis” RFM-83 (6) 
In-group violence is self-defence   Referral to how any violence committed by the in-
group is either a response to the violence they face 
from the out-group, or is an act of self-defence which 
is necessitated by the conflict the out-group has out 
the in-group in.  
And now we, local residents 
who have defended our 
land, culture and history, 
have also occupied 
ourselves[…]We, the 
representatives of the 
Donbass, perceive all these 
actions as preparation for 
military operations and the 
desire to seize the Donbass 
by force” DPR-97 (6)  
The in-group is motivated by 
truth   
Referral to how the in-group is motivated by the 
pursuing of truth and how its actions is in accordance 
with what is happening on the ground 
“The war will end with our 
victory[…]Not only because 
we have the best Armed 
Forces[…]But also because 
the truth is with us and the 
Lord is with us, so we will 
surely win” UP-40(6) 
The in-group is seeking to 
(re)establish their identity  
Referral to how the in-group is seeking to (re)stablish 
the true contours of their in-group identity. In the case 
of Russia this refers to how Russia is seeking to ensure 
the re-establishment of the true Ukraine group identity  
“The unity of the country is 
an absolute priority for 
everyone[…]Fighting for 
our Ukrainian language 
means not only shouting the 
slogans and putting forward 
demands to the 
authorities[…]the main 
thing is to speak it. Even if 
you have been speaking 
Russian for a lifetime, 
switch to the Ukrainian 
language” UP-23 (6)  
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The in-group is seeking in-group 
unity 
Referral to how the in-group is motivated to ensure a 
united in-group and a group with perfect manager-
member relations. In the case of Russia this refers to 
how Russia tries to ensure unity in the Ukraine group.  
“Dialogue is a pivotal 
concept in modern Ukraine. 
Maidan started from a 
protest of citizens who 
wanted to be heard by the 
Government” UFM-16(6)  
Other-frames:   
The out-group leaders are 
distorting their out-group 
Referral to how the out-group leaders are distorting 
the identity and interests of the out-group  
“It was thanks to work on 
changing the population’s 
consciousness the Kiev 
authorities managed to 
suppress protests in the 
southeast regions of 
Ukraine” DPR-182 (6) 
Agents are being manipulated  Referral to how out-group leaders are manipulating 
agents into fighting a conflict.   
This war has already 
recruited many different 
actors, who might not be 
even aware of their 
destructive roles. However, 
the evil behind this war is 
the same, and he resides in 
Kremlin” UP-8(6) 
The out-group behaves in the 
same way 
Referral to how the out-group continues to behave in 
the same way.   
“Russian aggression 
against Georgia 
in 2008 became a litmus test 
for European security. 
It was a warning sign that 
was not heeded” UFM-
58(6) 
The out-group lies  Referral to how the out-group continues to lie about 
the conflict and their role in it. Also, referral to how 
the out-group is seeking to distort self/other 
understandings.  
“It is not that easy to plant 
russophobia in the 
descendants of the Victory, 
the Russian-speaking 
population, and simply 
among the people with 
friendly and kindred ties. 
Fake news is short-lived, 
and the degree of hatred 
towards everything Russian 





Frame  Description Example  
The out-group wants control  Referral to how the out-group is driven by control and 
how it wants to (re)instate control over groups to 
pursue its interests  
“Refusing to see that 
something was badly wrong 
in the Ukrainian state and 
to start a dialogue, the 
government threatened to 
use military force and even 
sent tanks and aircraft 

























Appendix 11: Nvivo files for Georgia and Ukraine 
 
As mentioned in the method chapter, there is a tendency amongst the Ukraine and Georgia governments to 
delete the homepages of previous governments. The Georgia government has offered an archive of the 
Saakashvili administration (http://www.saakashviliarchive.info/en/) and I expect similar will occur for the 
Poroshenko administration. Nevertheless, should you be denied access to the online files listed in the 
primary data bibliographies, please consult the following Nvivo files where I have saved all data used for 
the analyses.  
 
 
Access to the Nvivo files via Google Drive: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1SgyIG5NoqPFlFgObMsSPxKRwzBpgfeQG 
 
 
 
 
